Bug 1644917 - Part 2: Cache as much of the content sandbox file policy as possible. r=gcp

Now that filesystem broker policy entries that depend on prefs can be
cached in the "common" policy object, let's do this wherever possible.
Should also fix bug 1621231.

Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D81424
This commit is contained in:
Jed Davis 2020-06-29 22:32:07 +00:00
Родитель 771b8498b1
Коммит 172a1b1ced
1 изменённых файлов: 56 добавлений и 57 удалений

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@ -507,65 +507,19 @@ void SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory::InitContentPolicy() {
}
#endif
mCommonContentPolicy.reset(policy);
}
UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory::GetContentPolicy(
int aPid, bool aFileProcess) {
// Policy entries that vary per-process (currently the only reason
// that can happen is because they contain the pid) are added here,
// as well as entries that depend on preferences or paths not available
// in early startup.
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
// The file broker is used at level 2 and up.
if (GetEffectiveContentSandboxLevel() <= 1) {
return nullptr;
}
std::call_once(mContentInited, [this] { InitContentPolicy(); });
MOZ_ASSERT(mCommonContentPolicy);
UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> policy(
new SandboxBroker::Policy(*mCommonContentPolicy));
const int level = GetEffectiveContentSandboxLevel();
// Read any extra paths that will get write permissions,
// configured by the user or distro
AddDynamicPathList(policy.get(),
"security.sandbox.content.write_path_whitelist", rdwr);
AddDynamicPathList(policy, "security.sandbox.content.write_path_whitelist",
rdwr);
// Whitelisted for reading by the user/distro
AddDynamicPathList(policy.get(),
"security.sandbox.content.read_path_whitelist", rdonly);
// No read blocking at level 2 and below.
// file:// processes also get global read permissions
// This requires accessing user preferences so we can only do it now.
// Our constructor is initialized before user preferences are read in.
if (level <= 2 || aFileProcess) {
policy->AddDir(rdonly, "/");
// Any other read-only rules will be removed as redundant by
// Policy::FixRecursivePermissions, so there's no need to
// early-return here.
}
// Bug 1198550: the profiler's replacement for dl_iterate_phdr
policy->AddPath(rdonly, nsPrintfCString("/proc/%d/maps", aPid).get());
// Bug 1198552: memory reporting.
policy->AddPath(rdonly, nsPrintfCString("/proc/%d/statm", aPid).get());
policy->AddPath(rdonly, nsPrintfCString("/proc/%d/smaps", aPid).get());
// Bug 1384804, notably comment 15
// Used by libnuma, included by x265/ffmpeg, who falls back
// to get_mempolicy if this fails
policy->AddPath(rdonly, nsPrintfCString("/proc/%d/status", aPid).get());
AddDynamicPathList(policy, "security.sandbox.content.read_path_whitelist",
rdonly);
// Add write permissions on the content process specific temporary dir.
nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> tmpDir;
nsresult rv = NS_GetSpecialDirectory(NS_APP_CONTENT_PROCESS_TEMP_DIR,
getter_AddRefs(tmpDir));
rv = NS_GetSpecialDirectory(NS_APP_CONTENT_PROCESS_TEMP_DIR,
getter_AddRefs(tmpDir));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
nsAutoCString tmpPath;
rv = tmpDir->GetNativePath(tmpPath);
@ -575,8 +529,7 @@ UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory::GetContentPolicy(
}
// userContent.css and the extensions dir sit in the profile, which is
// normally blocked and we can't get the profile dir earlier in startup,
// so this must happen here.
// normally blocked.
nsCOMPtr<nsIFile> profileDir;
rv = NS_GetSpecialDirectory(NS_APP_USER_PROFILE_50_DIR,
getter_AddRefs(profileDir));
@ -606,6 +559,7 @@ UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory::GetContentPolicy(
}
}
const int level = GetEffectiveContentSandboxLevel();
bool allowPulse = false;
bool allowAlsa = false;
if (level < 4) {
@ -624,8 +578,6 @@ UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory::GetContentPolicy(
if (allowPulse) {
policy->AddDir(rdwrcr, "/dev/shm");
} else {
AddSharedMemoryPaths(policy.get(), aPid);
}
#ifdef MOZ_WIDGET_GTK
@ -661,7 +613,54 @@ UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory::GetContentPolicy(
policy->AddDir(access, "/sys");
}
// Return the common policy.
mCommonContentPolicy.reset(policy);
}
UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> SandboxBrokerPolicyFactory::GetContentPolicy(
int aPid, bool aFileProcess) {
// Policy entries that vary per-process (because they depend on the
// pid or content subtype) are added here.
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
const int level = GetEffectiveContentSandboxLevel();
// The file broker is used at level 2 and up.
if (level <= 1) {
return nullptr;
}
std::call_once(mContentInited, [this] { InitContentPolicy(); });
MOZ_ASSERT(mCommonContentPolicy);
UniquePtr<SandboxBroker::Policy> policy(
new SandboxBroker::Policy(*mCommonContentPolicy));
// No read blocking at level 2 and below.
// file:// processes also get global read permissions
if (level <= 2 || aFileProcess) {
policy->AddDir(rdonly, "/");
// Any other read-only rules will be removed as redundant by
// Policy::FixRecursivePermissions, so there's no need to
// early-return here.
}
// Access to /dev/shm is restricted to a per-process prefix to
// prevent interfering with other processes or with services outside
// the browser (e.g., PulseAudio).
AddSharedMemoryPaths(policy.get(), aPid);
// Bug 1198550: the profiler's replacement for dl_iterate_phdr
policy->AddPath(rdonly, nsPrintfCString("/proc/%d/maps", aPid).get());
// Bug 1198552: memory reporting.
policy->AddPath(rdonly, nsPrintfCString("/proc/%d/statm", aPid).get());
policy->AddPath(rdonly, nsPrintfCString("/proc/%d/smaps", aPid).get());
// Bug 1384804, notably comment 15
// Used by libnuma, included by x265/ffmpeg, who falls back
// to get_mempolicy if this fails
policy->AddPath(rdonly, nsPrintfCString("/proc/%d/status", aPid).get());
// Finalize the policy.
policy->FixRecursivePermissions();
return policy;
}