Bug 1484980 - Add selective canvas tainting for content scripts r=bzbarsky

Reviewers: bzbarsky

Bug #: 1484980

Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D6999

dom/canvas/CanvasRenderingContext2D.cpp

@@ -5439,13 +5439,7 @@ CanvasRenderingContext2D::GetImageData(JSContext* aCx, double aSx,
 
   // Check only if we have a canvas element; if we were created with a docshell,
   // then it's special internal use.
-  if (mCanvasElement && mCanvasElement->IsWriteOnly() &&
-      // We could ask bindings for the caller type, but they already hand us a
-      // JSContext, and we're at least _somewhat_ perf-sensitive (so may not
-      // want to compute the caller type in the common non-write-only case), so
-      // let's just use what we have.
-      !nsContentUtils::CallerHasPermission(aCx, nsGkAtoms::all_urlsPermission))
-  {
+  if (mCanvasElement && !mCanvasElement->CallerCanRead(aCx)) {
     // XXX ERRMSG we need to report an error to developers here! (bug 329026)
     aError.Throw(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
     return nullptr;

dom/canvas/CanvasUtils.cpp

@@ -233,8 +233,9 @@ DoDrawImageSecurityCheck(dom::HTMLCanvasElement *aCanvasElement,
         return;
     }
 
-    if (aCanvasElement->IsWriteOnly())
+    if (aCanvasElement->IsWriteOnly() && !aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader) {
         return;
+    }
 
     // If we explicitly set WriteOnly just do it and get out
     if (forceWriteOnly) {
@@ -253,6 +254,25 @@ DoDrawImageSecurityCheck(dom::HTMLCanvasElement *aCanvasElement,
         return;
     }
 
+    if (BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->AddonPolicy()) {
+        // This is a resource from an extension content script principal.
+
+        if (aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader &&
+            aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader->Subsumes(aPrincipal)) {
+            // This canvas already allows reading from this principal.
+            return;
+        }
+
+        if (!aCanvasElement->mExpandedReader) {
+            // Allow future reads from this same princial only.
+            aCanvasElement->SetWriteOnly(aPrincipal);
+            return;
+        }
+
+        // If we got here, this must be the *second* extension tainting
+        // the canvas.  Fall through to mark it WriteOnly for everyone.
+    }
+
     aCanvasElement->SetWriteOnly();
 }
 

dom/html/HTMLCanvasElement.cpp

@@ -670,9 +670,8 @@ HTMLCanvasElement::ToDataURL(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aType,
                              nsIPrincipal& aSubjectPrincipal,
                              ErrorResult& aRv)
 {
-  // do a trust check if this is a write-only canvas
-  if (mWriteOnly &&
-      !nsContentUtils::CallerHasPermission(aCx, nsGkAtoms::all_urlsPermission)) {
+  // mWriteOnly check is redundant, but optimizes for the common case.
+  if (mWriteOnly && !CallerCanRead(aCx)) {
     aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
     return;
   }
@@ -881,9 +880,8 @@ HTMLCanvasElement::ToBlob(JSContext* aCx,
                           nsIPrincipal& aSubjectPrincipal,
                           ErrorResult& aRv)
 {
-  // do a trust check if this is a write-only canvas
-  if (mWriteOnly &&
-      !nsContentUtils::CallerHasPermission(aCx, nsGkAtoms::all_urlsPermission)) {
+  // mWriteOnly check is redundant, but optimizes for the common case.
+  if (mWriteOnly && !CallerCanRead(aCx)) {
     aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
     return;
   }
@@ -1093,9 +1091,36 @@ HTMLCanvasElement::IsWriteOnly()
 void
 HTMLCanvasElement::SetWriteOnly()
 {
+  mExpandedReader = nullptr;
   mWriteOnly = true;
 }
 
+void
+HTMLCanvasElement::SetWriteOnly(nsIPrincipal* aExpandedReader)
+{
+  mExpandedReader = aExpandedReader;
+  mWriteOnly = true;
+}
+
+bool
+HTMLCanvasElement::CallerCanRead(JSContext* aCx)
+{
+  if (!mWriteOnly) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  nsIPrincipal* prin = nsContentUtils::SubjectPrincipal(aCx);
+
+  // If mExpandedReader is set, this canvas was tainted only by
+  // mExpandedReader's resources. So allow reading if the subject
+  // principal subsumes mExpandedReader.
+  if (mExpandedReader && prin->Subsumes(mExpandedReader)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return nsContentUtils::PrincipalHasPermission(prin, nsGkAtoms::all_urlsPermission);
+}
+
 void
 HTMLCanvasElement::InvalidateCanvasContent(const gfx::Rect* damageRect)
 {

dom/html/HTMLCanvasElement.h

@@ -230,6 +230,12 @@ public:
    */
   void SetWriteOnly();
 
+  /**
+   * Force the canvas to be write-only, except for readers from
+   * a specific extension's content script expanded principal.
+   */
+  void SetWriteOnly(nsIPrincipal* aExpandedReader);
+
   /**
    * Notify that some canvas content has changed and the window may
    * need to be updated. aDamageRect is in canvas coordinates.
@@ -395,8 +401,15 @@ public:
   // We set this when script paints an image from a different origin.
   // We also transitively set it when script paints a canvas which
   // is itself write-only.
-  bool                     mWriteOnly;
+  bool mWriteOnly;
 
+  // When this canvas is (only) tainted by an image from an extension
+  // content script, allow reads from the same extension afterwards.
+  RefPtr<nsIPrincipal> mExpandedReader;
+
+  // Determines if the caller should be able to read the content.
+  bool CallerCanRead(JSContext* aCx);
+  
   bool IsPrintCallbackDone();
 
   void HandlePrintCallback(nsPresContext::nsPresContextType aType);

toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/test_ext_contentscript_canvas_tainting.js

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const server = createHttpServer({hosts: ["green.example.com", "red.example.com"]});
+
+server.registerDirectory("/data/", do_get_file("data"));
+
+server.registerPathHandler("/pixel.html", (request, response) => {
+  response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 200, "OK");
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  response.write(`<!DOCTYPE html>
+    <script>
+      function readByWeb() {
+        let ctx = document.querySelector("canvas").getContext("2d");
+        let {data} = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, 1, 1);
+        return data.slice(0, 3).join();
+      }
+    </script>
+  `);
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_contentscript_canvas_tainting() {
+  async function contentScript() {
+    let canvas = document.createElement("canvas");
+    let ctx = canvas.getContext("2d");
+    document.body.appendChild(canvas);
+
+    function draw(url) {
+      return new Promise(resolve => {
+        let img = document.createElement("img");
+        img.onload = () => {
+          ctx.drawImage(img, 0, 0, 1, 1);
+          resolve();
+        };
+        img.src = url;
+      });
+    }
+
+    function readByExt() {
+      let {data} = ctx.getImageData(0, 0, 1, 1);
+      return data.slice(0, 3).join();
+    }
+
+    let readByWeb = window.wrappedJSObject.readByWeb;
+
+    // Test reading after drawing an image from the same origin as the web page.
+    await draw("http://green.example.com/data/pixel_green.gif");
+    browser.test.assertEq(readByWeb(), "0,255,0", "Content can read same-origin image");
+    browser.test.assertEq(readByExt(), "0,255,0", "Extension can read same-origin image");
+
+    // Test reading after drawing a blue pixel data URI from extension content script.
+    await draw("");
+    browser.test.assertThrows(readByWeb, /operation is insecure/, "Content can't read extension's image");
+    browser.test.assertEq(readByExt(), "0,0,255", "Extension can read its own image");
+
+    // Test after tainting the canvas with an image from a third party domain.
+    await draw("http://red.example.com/data/pixel_red.gif");
+    browser.test.assertThrows(readByWeb, /operation is insecure/, "Content can't read third party image");
+    browser.test.assertThrows(readByExt, /operation is insecure/, "Extension can't read fully tainted");
+
+    // Test canvas is still fully tainted after drawing extension's data: image again.
+    await draw("");
+    browser.test.assertThrows(readByWeb, /operation is insecure/, "Canvas still fully tainted for content");
+    browser.test.assertThrows(readByExt, /operation is insecure/, "Canvas still fully tainted for extension");
+
+    browser.test.sendMessage("done");
+  }
+
+  let extension = ExtensionTestUtils.loadExtension({
+    manifest: {
+      content_scripts: [{
+        "matches": ["http://green.example.com/pixel.html"],
+        "js": ["cs.js"],
+      }],
+    },
+    files: {
+      "cs.js": contentScript,
+    },
+  });
+
+  await extension.startup();
+  let contentPage = await ExtensionTestUtils.loadContentPage("http://green.example.com/pixel.html");
+  await extension.awaitMessage("done");
+
+  await contentPage.close();
+  await extension.unload();
+});

toolkit/components/extensions/test/xpcshell/xpcshell-content.ini

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ skip-if = os == "android" || (os == "win" && debug) || (os == "linux")
 [test_ext_i18n_css.js]
 [test_ext_contentscript.js]
 [test_ext_contentscript_about_blank_start.js]
+[test_ext_contentscript_canvas_tainting.js]
 [test_ext_contentscript_scriptCreated.js]
 [test_ext_contentscript_triggeringPrincipal.js]
 skip-if = (os == "android" && debug) || (os == "win" && debug) # Windows: Bug 1438796