Bug 766282 - Implement allow-popups directive for iframe sandbox. r=smaug

This commit is contained in:
Bob Owen 2013-03-21 18:44:58 +00:00
Родитель e0d8f92388
Коммит 858efdc803
7 изменённых файлов: 163 добавлений и 82 удалений

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@ -924,6 +924,7 @@ nsContentUtils::ParseSandboxAttributeToFlags(const nsAString& aSandboxAttrValue)
// If there's a sandbox attribute at all (and there is if this is being
// called), start off by setting all the restriction flags.
uint32_t out = SANDBOXED_NAVIGATION |
SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION |
SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION |
SANDBOXED_PLUGINS |
SANDBOXED_ORIGIN |
@ -954,6 +955,8 @@ nsContentUtils::ParseSandboxAttributeToFlags(const nsAString& aSandboxAttrValue)
out &= ~SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION;
} else if (token.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("allow-pointer-lock")) {
out &= ~SANDBOXED_POINTER_LOCK;
} else if (token.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("allow-popups")) {
out &= ~SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION;
}
}
}

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@ -72,12 +72,8 @@ GK_ATOM(align, "align")
GK_ATOM(alink, "alink")
GK_ATOM(all, "all")
GK_ATOM(allowevents, "allowevents")
GK_ATOM(allowforms, "allow-forms")
GK_ATOM(allownegativeassertions, "allownegativeassertions")
GK_ATOM(allowfullscreen, "allowfullscreen")
GK_ATOM(allowsameorigin, "allow-same-origin")
GK_ATOM(allowscripts, "allow-scripts")
GK_ATOM(allowtopnavigation, "allow-top-navigation")
GK_ATOM(allowuntrusted, "allowuntrusted")
GK_ATOM(alt, "alt")
GK_ATOM(alternate, "alternate")

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@ -13,8 +13,11 @@
/**
* This flag prevents content from navigating browsing contexts other than
* the sandboxed browsing context itself (or browsing contexts further
* nested inside it), and the top-level browsing context.
* itself, browsing contexts nested inside it, the top-level browsing context
* and browsing contexts that it has opened.
* As it is always on for sandboxed browsing contexts, it is used implicitly
* within the code by checking that the overall flags are non-zero.
* It is only uesd directly when the sandbox flags are initially set up.
*/
const unsigned long SANDBOXED_NAVIGATION = 0x1;
@ -65,4 +68,11 @@ const unsigned long SANDBOXED_POINTER_LOCK = 0x80;
* This flag blocks the document from changing document.domain.
*/
const unsigned long SANDBOXED_DOMAIN = 0x100;
/**
* This flag prevents content from creating new auxiliary browsing contexts,
* e.g. using the target attribute, the window.open() method, or the
* showModalDialog() method.
*/
const unsigned long SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION = 0x200;
#endif

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@ -3190,62 +3190,11 @@ nsDocShell::FindItemWithName(const PRUnichar * aName,
// DoFindItemWithName only returns active items and we don't check if
// the item is active for the special cases.
if (foundItem) {
// If our document is sandboxed, we need to do some extra checks.
uint32_t sandboxFlags = 0;
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc = do_GetInterface(aOriginalRequestor);
if (doc) {
sandboxFlags = doc->GetSandboxFlags();
if (IsSandboxedFrom(foundItem, aOriginalRequestor)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
} else {
foundItem.swap(*_retval);
}
if (sandboxFlags) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> root;
GetSameTypeRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(root));
// Is the found item not a top level browsing context and not ourself ?
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> selfAsItem = static_cast<nsIDocShellTreeItem *>(this);
if (foundItem != root && foundItem != selfAsItem) {
// Are we an ancestor of the foundItem ?
bool isAncestor = false;
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> parentAsItem;
foundItem->GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(parentAsItem));
while (parentAsItem) {
if (parentAsItem == selfAsItem) {
isAncestor = true;
break;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> tmp = parentAsItem;
tmp->GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(parentAsItem));
}
if (!isAncestor) {
// No, we are not an ancestor and our document is
// sandboxed, we can't allow this.
foundItem = nullptr;
}
} else {
// Top level browsing context - is it an ancestor of ours ?
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> tmp;
GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(tmp));
while (tmp) {
if (tmp && tmp == foundItem) {
// This is an ancestor, and we are sandboxed.
// Unless allow-top-navigation is set, we can't allow this.
if (sandboxFlags & SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION) {
foundItem = nullptr;
}
break;
}
tmp->GetParent(getter_AddRefs(tmp));
}
}
}
foundItem.swap(*_retval);
}
return NS_OK;
}
@ -3318,6 +3267,70 @@ nsDocShell::DoFindItemWithName(const PRUnichar* aName,
return NS_OK;
}
/* static */
bool
nsDocShell::IsSandboxedFrom(nsIDocShellTreeItem* aTargetItem,
nsIDocShellTreeItem* aAccessingItem)
{
// aAccessingItem cannot be sandboxed from itself.
if (SameCOMIdentity(aTargetItem, aAccessingItem)) {
return false;
}
uint32_t sandboxFlags = 0;
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc = do_GetInterface(aAccessingItem);
if (doc) {
sandboxFlags = doc->GetSandboxFlags();
}
// If no flags, aAccessingItem is not sandboxed at all.
if (!sandboxFlags) {
return false;
}
// If aTargetItem has an ancestor, it is not top level.
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> ancestorOfTarget;
aTargetItem->GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(ancestorOfTarget));
if (ancestorOfTarget) {
do {
// aAccessingItem is not sandboxed if it is an ancestor of target.
if (SameCOMIdentity(aAccessingItem, ancestorOfTarget)) {
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> tempTreeItem;
ancestorOfTarget->GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(tempTreeItem));
tempTreeItem.swap(ancestorOfTarget);
} while (ancestorOfTarget);
// Otherwise, aAccessingItem is sandboxed from aTargetItem.
return true;
}
// aTargetItem is top level, is aAccessingItem the "one permitted sandboxed
// navigator", i.e. did aAccessingItem open aTargetItem?
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> targetDocShell = do_QueryInterface(aTargetItem);
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> permittedNavigator;
targetDocShell->
GetOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator(getter_AddRefs(permittedNavigator));
if (SameCOMIdentity(aAccessingItem, permittedNavigator)) {
return false;
}
// If SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION flag is not on, aAccessingItem is
// not sandboxed from its top.
if (!(sandboxFlags & SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION)) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> rootTreeItem;
aAccessingItem->GetSameTypeRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(rootTreeItem));
if (SameCOMIdentity(aTargetItem, rootTreeItem)) {
return false;
}
}
// Otherwise, aAccessingItem is sandboxed from aTargetItem.
return true;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsDocShell::GetTreeOwner(nsIDocShellTreeOwner ** aTreeOwner)
{
@ -5055,6 +5068,8 @@ nsDocShell::Destroy()
SetTreeOwner(nullptr);
mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator = nullptr;
// required to break ref cycle
mSecurityUI = nullptr;
@ -5403,6 +5418,31 @@ nsDocShell::GetSandboxFlags(uint32_t *aSandboxFlags)
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsDocShell::SetOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator(nsIDocShell* aSandboxedNavigator)
{
if (mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator) {
NS_ERROR("One Permitted Sandboxed Navigator should only be set once.");
return NS_OK;
}
mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator = do_GetWeakReference(aSandboxedNavigator);
NS_ASSERTION(mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator,
"One Permitted Sandboxed Navigator must support weak references.");
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsDocShell::GetOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator(nsIDocShell** aSandboxedNavigator)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aSandboxedNavigator);
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> permittedNavigator =
do_QueryReferent(mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator);
NS_IF_ADDREF(*aSandboxedNavigator = permittedNavigator);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsDocShell::SetDefaultLoadFlags(uint32_t aDefaultLoadFlags)
{
@ -8719,8 +8759,10 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI * aURI,
if (aWindowTarget && *aWindowTarget) {
// Locate the target DocShell.
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> targetItem;
FindItemWithName(aWindowTarget, nullptr, this,
getter_AddRefs(targetItem));
if (FindItemWithName(aWindowTarget, nullptr, this,
getter_AddRefs(targetItem)) == NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
targetDocShell = do_QueryInterface(targetItem);
// If the targetDocShell doesn't exist, then this is a new docShell
@ -8847,19 +8889,17 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI * aURI,
bool isNewWindow = false;
if (!targetDocShell) {
// If the docshell's document is sandboxed and was trying to
// navigate/load a frame it wasn't allowed to access, the
// FindItemWithName above will have returned null for the target
// item - we don't want to actually open a new window in this case
// though. Check if we are sandboxed and bail out here if so.
// If the docshell's document is sandboxed, only open a new window
// if the document's SANDBOXED_AUXILLARY_NAVIGATION flag is not set.
// (i.e. if allow-popups is specified)
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mContentViewer, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
nsIDocument* doc = mContentViewer->GetDocument();
uint32_t sandboxFlags = 0;
if (doc) {
sandboxFlags = doc->GetSandboxFlags();
if (sandboxFlags & SANDBOXED_NAVIGATION) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
if (sandboxFlags & SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
}

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@ -771,6 +771,7 @@ protected:
int32_t mLoadedTransIndex;
uint32_t mSandboxFlags;
nsWeakPtr mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator;
// mFullscreenAllowed stores how we determine whether fullscreen is allowed
// when GetFullscreenAllowed() is called. Fullscreen is allowed in a
@ -880,6 +881,10 @@ private:
nsIDocShellTreeItem* aOriginalRequestor,
nsIDocShellTreeItem** _retval);
// Check whether accessing item is sandboxed from the target item.
static bool IsSandboxedFrom(nsIDocShellTreeItem* aTargetItem,
nsIDocShellTreeItem* aAccessingItem);
#ifdef DEBUG
// We're counting the number of |nsDocShells| to help find leaks
static unsigned long gNumberOfDocShells;

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@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ interface nsIReflowObserver;
typedef unsigned long nsLoadFlags;
[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(5f4d82fc-3220-4f7e-9b00-626f1033318a)]
[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(4ca172c3-67bf-4e6d-89a3-cbfb929c370d)]
interface nsIDocShell : nsIDocShellTreeItem
{
/**
@ -798,6 +798,13 @@ interface nsIDocShell : nsIDocShellTreeItem
*/
attribute unsigned long sandboxFlags;
/**
* When a new browsing context is opened by a sandboxed document, it needs to
* keep track of the browsing context that opened it, so that it can be
* navigated by it. This is the "one permitted sandboxed navigator".
*/
attribute nsIDocShell onePermittedSandboxedNavigator;
/**
* This member variable determines whether a document has Mixed Active Content that
* was initially blocked from loading, but the user has choosen to override the

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@ -475,7 +475,10 @@ nsWindowWatcher::OpenWindowInternal(nsIDOMWindow *aParent,
// try to find an extant window with the given name
nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> foundWindow;
SafeGetWindowByName(name, aParent, getter_AddRefs(foundWindow));
if (SafeGetWindowByName(name, aParent, getter_AddRefs(foundWindow)) ==
NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
GetWindowTreeItem(foundWindow, getter_AddRefs(newDocShellItem));
// no extant window? make a new one.
@ -543,21 +546,26 @@ nsWindowWatcher::OpenWindowInternal(nsIDOMWindow *aParent,
callerContextGuard.Push(cx);
}
uint32_t activeDocsSandboxFlags = 0;
if (!newDocShellItem) {
// We're going to either open up a new window ourselves or ask a
// nsIWindowProvider for one. In either case, we'll want to set the right
// name on it.
windowNeedsName = true;
// If the parent trying to open a new window is sandboxed,
// this is not allowed and we fail here.
// If the parent trying to open a new window is sandboxed
// without 'allow-popups', this is not allowed and we fail here.
if (aParent) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMDocument> domdoc;
aParent->GetDocument(getter_AddRefs(domdoc));
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc = do_QueryInterface(domdoc);
if (doc && (doc->GetSandboxFlags() & SANDBOXED_NAVIGATION)) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
if (doc) {
// Save sandbox flags for copying to new browsing context (docShell).
activeDocsSandboxFlags = doc->GetSandboxFlags();
if (activeDocsSandboxFlags & SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
}
}
@ -709,6 +717,16 @@ nsWindowWatcher::OpenWindowInternal(nsIDOMWindow *aParent,
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> newDocShell(do_QueryInterface(newDocShellItem));
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(newDocShell, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
// Set up sandboxing attributes if the window is new.
// The flags can only be non-zero for new windows.
if (activeDocsSandboxFlags != 0) {
newDocShell->SetSandboxFlags(activeDocsSandboxFlags);
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindow> window = do_QueryInterface(aParent);
if (window) {
newDocShell->SetOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator(window->GetDocShell());
}
}
rv = ReadyOpenedDocShellItem(newDocShellItem, aParent, windowIsNew, _retval);
if (NS_FAILED(rv))
@ -1299,6 +1317,7 @@ nsWindowWatcher::GetWindowByName(const PRUnichar *aTargetName,
if (!aResult) {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
nsresult rv;
*aResult = nullptr;
@ -1308,18 +1327,18 @@ nsWindowWatcher::GetWindowByName(const PRUnichar *aTargetName,
GetWindowTreeItem(aCurrentWindow, getter_AddRefs(startItem));
if (startItem) {
// Note: original requestor is null here, per idl comments
startItem->FindItemWithName(aTargetName, nullptr, nullptr,
rv = startItem->FindItemWithName(aTargetName, nullptr, nullptr,
getter_AddRefs(treeItem));
}
else {
// Note: original requestor is null here, per idl comments
FindItemWithName(aTargetName, nullptr, nullptr, getter_AddRefs(treeItem));
rv = FindItemWithName(aTargetName, nullptr, nullptr, getter_AddRefs(treeItem));
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> domWindow = do_GetInterface(treeItem);
domWindow.swap(*aResult);
return NS_OK;
return rv;
}
bool
@ -1731,6 +1750,7 @@ nsWindowWatcher::SafeGetWindowByName(const nsAString& aName,
nsIDOMWindow** aResult)
{
*aResult = nullptr;
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> startItem;
GetWindowTreeItem(aCurrentWindow, getter_AddRefs(startItem));
@ -1741,17 +1761,17 @@ nsWindowWatcher::SafeGetWindowByName(const nsAString& aName,
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> foundItem;
if (startItem) {
startItem->FindItemWithName(flatName.get(), nullptr, callerItem,
rv = startItem->FindItemWithName(flatName.get(), nullptr, callerItem,
getter_AddRefs(foundItem));
}
else {
FindItemWithName(flatName.get(), nullptr, callerItem,
rv = FindItemWithName(flatName.get(), nullptr, callerItem,
getter_AddRefs(foundItem));
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> foundWin = do_GetInterface(foundItem);
foundWin.swap(*aResult);
return NS_OK;
return rv;
}
/* Fetch the nsIDOMWindow corresponding to the given nsIDocShellTreeItem.