зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
Bug 766282 - Implement allow-popups directive for iframe sandbox. r=smaug
This commit is contained in:
Родитель
e0d8f92388
Коммит
858efdc803
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@ -924,6 +924,7 @@ nsContentUtils::ParseSandboxAttributeToFlags(const nsAString& aSandboxAttrValue)
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// If there's a sandbox attribute at all (and there is if this is being
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// called), start off by setting all the restriction flags.
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uint32_t out = SANDBOXED_NAVIGATION |
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SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION |
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SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION |
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SANDBOXED_PLUGINS |
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SANDBOXED_ORIGIN |
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@ -954,6 +955,8 @@ nsContentUtils::ParseSandboxAttributeToFlags(const nsAString& aSandboxAttrValue)
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out &= ~SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION;
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} else if (token.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("allow-pointer-lock")) {
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out &= ~SANDBOXED_POINTER_LOCK;
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} else if (token.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("allow-popups")) {
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out &= ~SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION;
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}
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}
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}
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@ -72,12 +72,8 @@ GK_ATOM(align, "align")
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GK_ATOM(alink, "alink")
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GK_ATOM(all, "all")
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GK_ATOM(allowevents, "allowevents")
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GK_ATOM(allowforms, "allow-forms")
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GK_ATOM(allownegativeassertions, "allownegativeassertions")
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GK_ATOM(allowfullscreen, "allowfullscreen")
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GK_ATOM(allowsameorigin, "allow-same-origin")
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GK_ATOM(allowscripts, "allow-scripts")
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GK_ATOM(allowtopnavigation, "allow-top-navigation")
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GK_ATOM(allowuntrusted, "allowuntrusted")
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GK_ATOM(alt, "alt")
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GK_ATOM(alternate, "alternate")
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@ -13,8 +13,11 @@
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/**
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* This flag prevents content from navigating browsing contexts other than
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* the sandboxed browsing context itself (or browsing contexts further
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* nested inside it), and the top-level browsing context.
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* itself, browsing contexts nested inside it, the top-level browsing context
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* and browsing contexts that it has opened.
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* As it is always on for sandboxed browsing contexts, it is used implicitly
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* within the code by checking that the overall flags are non-zero.
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* It is only uesd directly when the sandbox flags are initially set up.
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*/
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const unsigned long SANDBOXED_NAVIGATION = 0x1;
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@ -65,4 +68,11 @@ const unsigned long SANDBOXED_POINTER_LOCK = 0x80;
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* This flag blocks the document from changing document.domain.
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*/
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const unsigned long SANDBOXED_DOMAIN = 0x100;
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/**
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* This flag prevents content from creating new auxiliary browsing contexts,
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* e.g. using the target attribute, the window.open() method, or the
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* showModalDialog() method.
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*/
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const unsigned long SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION = 0x200;
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#endif
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@ -3190,62 +3190,11 @@ nsDocShell::FindItemWithName(const PRUnichar * aName,
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// DoFindItemWithName only returns active items and we don't check if
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// the item is active for the special cases.
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if (foundItem) {
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// If our document is sandboxed, we need to do some extra checks.
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uint32_t sandboxFlags = 0;
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc = do_GetInterface(aOriginalRequestor);
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if (doc) {
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sandboxFlags = doc->GetSandboxFlags();
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if (IsSandboxedFrom(foundItem, aOriginalRequestor)) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
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} else {
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foundItem.swap(*_retval);
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}
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if (sandboxFlags) {
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> root;
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GetSameTypeRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(root));
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// Is the found item not a top level browsing context and not ourself ?
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> selfAsItem = static_cast<nsIDocShellTreeItem *>(this);
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if (foundItem != root && foundItem != selfAsItem) {
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// Are we an ancestor of the foundItem ?
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bool isAncestor = false;
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> parentAsItem;
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foundItem->GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(parentAsItem));
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while (parentAsItem) {
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if (parentAsItem == selfAsItem) {
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isAncestor = true;
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break;
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> tmp = parentAsItem;
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tmp->GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(parentAsItem));
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}
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if (!isAncestor) {
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// No, we are not an ancestor and our document is
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// sandboxed, we can't allow this.
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foundItem = nullptr;
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}
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} else {
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// Top level browsing context - is it an ancestor of ours ?
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> tmp;
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GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(tmp));
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while (tmp) {
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if (tmp && tmp == foundItem) {
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// This is an ancestor, and we are sandboxed.
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// Unless allow-top-navigation is set, we can't allow this.
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if (sandboxFlags & SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION) {
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foundItem = nullptr;
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}
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break;
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}
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tmp->GetParent(getter_AddRefs(tmp));
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}
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}
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}
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foundItem.swap(*_retval);
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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@ -3318,6 +3267,70 @@ nsDocShell::DoFindItemWithName(const PRUnichar* aName,
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return NS_OK;
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}
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/* static */
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bool
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nsDocShell::IsSandboxedFrom(nsIDocShellTreeItem* aTargetItem,
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nsIDocShellTreeItem* aAccessingItem)
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{
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// aAccessingItem cannot be sandboxed from itself.
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if (SameCOMIdentity(aTargetItem, aAccessingItem)) {
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return false;
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}
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uint32_t sandboxFlags = 0;
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc = do_GetInterface(aAccessingItem);
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if (doc) {
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sandboxFlags = doc->GetSandboxFlags();
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}
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// If no flags, aAccessingItem is not sandboxed at all.
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if (!sandboxFlags) {
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return false;
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}
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// If aTargetItem has an ancestor, it is not top level.
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> ancestorOfTarget;
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aTargetItem->GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(ancestorOfTarget));
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if (ancestorOfTarget) {
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do {
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// aAccessingItem is not sandboxed if it is an ancestor of target.
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if (SameCOMIdentity(aAccessingItem, ancestorOfTarget)) {
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return false;
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> tempTreeItem;
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ancestorOfTarget->GetSameTypeParent(getter_AddRefs(tempTreeItem));
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tempTreeItem.swap(ancestorOfTarget);
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} while (ancestorOfTarget);
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// Otherwise, aAccessingItem is sandboxed from aTargetItem.
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return true;
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}
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// aTargetItem is top level, is aAccessingItem the "one permitted sandboxed
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// navigator", i.e. did aAccessingItem open aTargetItem?
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> targetDocShell = do_QueryInterface(aTargetItem);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> permittedNavigator;
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targetDocShell->
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GetOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator(getter_AddRefs(permittedNavigator));
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if (SameCOMIdentity(aAccessingItem, permittedNavigator)) {
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return false;
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}
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// If SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION flag is not on, aAccessingItem is
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// not sandboxed from its top.
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if (!(sandboxFlags & SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION)) {
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> rootTreeItem;
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aAccessingItem->GetSameTypeRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(rootTreeItem));
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if (SameCOMIdentity(aTargetItem, rootTreeItem)) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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// Otherwise, aAccessingItem is sandboxed from aTargetItem.
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return true;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsDocShell::GetTreeOwner(nsIDocShellTreeOwner ** aTreeOwner)
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{
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@ -5055,6 +5068,8 @@ nsDocShell::Destroy()
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SetTreeOwner(nullptr);
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mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator = nullptr;
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// required to break ref cycle
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mSecurityUI = nullptr;
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@ -5403,6 +5418,31 @@ nsDocShell::GetSandboxFlags(uint32_t *aSandboxFlags)
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsDocShell::SetOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator(nsIDocShell* aSandboxedNavigator)
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{
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if (mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator) {
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NS_ERROR("One Permitted Sandboxed Navigator should only be set once.");
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return NS_OK;
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}
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mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator = do_GetWeakReference(aSandboxedNavigator);
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NS_ASSERTION(mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator,
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"One Permitted Sandboxed Navigator must support weak references.");
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsDocShell::GetOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator(nsIDocShell** aSandboxedNavigator)
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{
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NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aSandboxedNavigator);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> permittedNavigator =
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do_QueryReferent(mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator);
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NS_IF_ADDREF(*aSandboxedNavigator = permittedNavigator);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsDocShell::SetDefaultLoadFlags(uint32_t aDefaultLoadFlags)
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{
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@ -8719,8 +8759,10 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI * aURI,
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if (aWindowTarget && *aWindowTarget) {
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// Locate the target DocShell.
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> targetItem;
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FindItemWithName(aWindowTarget, nullptr, this,
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getter_AddRefs(targetItem));
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if (FindItemWithName(aWindowTarget, nullptr, this,
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getter_AddRefs(targetItem)) == NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
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}
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targetDocShell = do_QueryInterface(targetItem);
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// If the targetDocShell doesn't exist, then this is a new docShell
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@ -8847,19 +8889,17 @@ nsDocShell::InternalLoad(nsIURI * aURI,
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bool isNewWindow = false;
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if (!targetDocShell) {
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// If the docshell's document is sandboxed and was trying to
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// navigate/load a frame it wasn't allowed to access, the
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// FindItemWithName above will have returned null for the target
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// item - we don't want to actually open a new window in this case
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// though. Check if we are sandboxed and bail out here if so.
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// If the docshell's document is sandboxed, only open a new window
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// if the document's SANDBOXED_AUXILLARY_NAVIGATION flag is not set.
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// (i.e. if allow-popups is specified)
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mContentViewer, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
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nsIDocument* doc = mContentViewer->GetDocument();
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uint32_t sandboxFlags = 0;
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if (doc) {
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sandboxFlags = doc->GetSandboxFlags();
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if (sandboxFlags & SANDBOXED_NAVIGATION) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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if (sandboxFlags & SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
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}
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}
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@ -771,6 +771,7 @@ protected:
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int32_t mLoadedTransIndex;
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uint32_t mSandboxFlags;
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nsWeakPtr mOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator;
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// mFullscreenAllowed stores how we determine whether fullscreen is allowed
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// when GetFullscreenAllowed() is called. Fullscreen is allowed in a
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@ -880,6 +881,10 @@ private:
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nsIDocShellTreeItem* aOriginalRequestor,
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nsIDocShellTreeItem** _retval);
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// Check whether accessing item is sandboxed from the target item.
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static bool IsSandboxedFrom(nsIDocShellTreeItem* aTargetItem,
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nsIDocShellTreeItem* aAccessingItem);
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#ifdef DEBUG
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// We're counting the number of |nsDocShells| to help find leaks
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static unsigned long gNumberOfDocShells;
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@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ interface nsIReflowObserver;
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typedef unsigned long nsLoadFlags;
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[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(5f4d82fc-3220-4f7e-9b00-626f1033318a)]
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[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(4ca172c3-67bf-4e6d-89a3-cbfb929c370d)]
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interface nsIDocShell : nsIDocShellTreeItem
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{
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/**
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@ -798,6 +798,13 @@ interface nsIDocShell : nsIDocShellTreeItem
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*/
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attribute unsigned long sandboxFlags;
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/**
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* When a new browsing context is opened by a sandboxed document, it needs to
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* keep track of the browsing context that opened it, so that it can be
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* navigated by it. This is the "one permitted sandboxed navigator".
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*/
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attribute nsIDocShell onePermittedSandboxedNavigator;
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/**
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* This member variable determines whether a document has Mixed Active Content that
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* was initially blocked from loading, but the user has choosen to override the
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@ -475,7 +475,10 @@ nsWindowWatcher::OpenWindowInternal(nsIDOMWindow *aParent,
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// try to find an extant window with the given name
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> foundWindow;
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SafeGetWindowByName(name, aParent, getter_AddRefs(foundWindow));
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if (SafeGetWindowByName(name, aParent, getter_AddRefs(foundWindow)) ==
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NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
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}
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GetWindowTreeItem(foundWindow, getter_AddRefs(newDocShellItem));
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// no extant window? make a new one.
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@ -543,21 +546,26 @@ nsWindowWatcher::OpenWindowInternal(nsIDOMWindow *aParent,
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callerContextGuard.Push(cx);
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}
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uint32_t activeDocsSandboxFlags = 0;
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if (!newDocShellItem) {
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// We're going to either open up a new window ourselves or ask a
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// nsIWindowProvider for one. In either case, we'll want to set the right
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// name on it.
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windowNeedsName = true;
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// If the parent trying to open a new window is sandboxed,
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// this is not allowed and we fail here.
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// If the parent trying to open a new window is sandboxed
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// without 'allow-popups', this is not allowed and we fail here.
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if (aParent) {
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMDocument> domdoc;
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aParent->GetDocument(getter_AddRefs(domdoc));
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc = do_QueryInterface(domdoc);
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if (doc && (doc->GetSandboxFlags() & SANDBOXED_NAVIGATION)) {
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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if (doc) {
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// Save sandbox flags for copying to new browsing context (docShell).
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activeDocsSandboxFlags = doc->GetSandboxFlags();
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if (activeDocsSandboxFlags & SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION) {
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return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
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}
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}
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}
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@ -709,6 +717,16 @@ nsWindowWatcher::OpenWindowInternal(nsIDOMWindow *aParent,
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> newDocShell(do_QueryInterface(newDocShellItem));
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(newDocShell, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
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// Set up sandboxing attributes if the window is new.
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// The flags can only be non-zero for new windows.
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if (activeDocsSandboxFlags != 0) {
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newDocShell->SetSandboxFlags(activeDocsSandboxFlags);
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nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindow> window = do_QueryInterface(aParent);
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if (window) {
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newDocShell->SetOnePermittedSandboxedNavigator(window->GetDocShell());
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}
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}
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rv = ReadyOpenedDocShellItem(newDocShellItem, aParent, windowIsNew, _retval);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv))
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@ -1299,6 +1317,7 @@ nsWindowWatcher::GetWindowByName(const PRUnichar *aTargetName,
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if (!aResult) {
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return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
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}
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nsresult rv;
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*aResult = nullptr;
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@ -1308,18 +1327,18 @@ nsWindowWatcher::GetWindowByName(const PRUnichar *aTargetName,
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GetWindowTreeItem(aCurrentWindow, getter_AddRefs(startItem));
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if (startItem) {
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// Note: original requestor is null here, per idl comments
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startItem->FindItemWithName(aTargetName, nullptr, nullptr,
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rv = startItem->FindItemWithName(aTargetName, nullptr, nullptr,
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getter_AddRefs(treeItem));
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}
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else {
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// Note: original requestor is null here, per idl comments
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FindItemWithName(aTargetName, nullptr, nullptr, getter_AddRefs(treeItem));
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rv = FindItemWithName(aTargetName, nullptr, nullptr, getter_AddRefs(treeItem));
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> domWindow = do_GetInterface(treeItem);
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domWindow.swap(*aResult);
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return NS_OK;
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return rv;
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}
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bool
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@ -1731,6 +1750,7 @@ nsWindowWatcher::SafeGetWindowByName(const nsAString& aName,
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nsIDOMWindow** aResult)
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{
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*aResult = nullptr;
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nsresult rv;
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> startItem;
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GetWindowTreeItem(aCurrentWindow, getter_AddRefs(startItem));
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@ -1741,17 +1761,17 @@ nsWindowWatcher::SafeGetWindowByName(const nsAString& aName,
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> foundItem;
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if (startItem) {
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startItem->FindItemWithName(flatName.get(), nullptr, callerItem,
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rv = startItem->FindItemWithName(flatName.get(), nullptr, callerItem,
|
||||
getter_AddRefs(foundItem));
|
||||
}
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||||
else {
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||||
FindItemWithName(flatName.get(), nullptr, callerItem,
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rv = FindItemWithName(flatName.get(), nullptr, callerItem,
|
||||
getter_AddRefs(foundItem));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> foundWin = do_GetInterface(foundItem);
|
||||
foundWin.swap(*aResult);
|
||||
return NS_OK;
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Fetch the nsIDOMWindow corresponding to the given nsIDocShellTreeItem.
|
||||
|
|
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