diff --git a/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_dispatcher.cc b/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_dispatcher.cc
index ff0f8885cd64..3452c42907fe 100644
--- a/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_dispatcher.cc
+++ b/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_dispatcher.cc
@@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ bool FilesystemDispatcher::NtCreateFile(IPCInfo* ipc,
                                         uint32_t create_disposition,
                                         uint32_t create_options) {
   if (!PreProcessName(name)) {
-    // The path requested might contain a reparse point.
     ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
     return true;
   }
@@ -146,7 +145,6 @@ bool FilesystemDispatcher::NtOpenFile(IPCInfo* ipc,
                                       uint32_t share_access,
                                       uint32_t open_options) {
   if (!PreProcessName(name)) {
-    // The path requested might contain a reparse point.
     ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
     return true;
   }
@@ -201,7 +199,6 @@ bool FilesystemDispatcher::NtQueryAttributesFile(IPCInfo* ipc,
     return false;
 
   if (!PreProcessName(name)) {
-    // The path requested might contain a reparse point.
     ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
     return true;
   }
@@ -250,7 +247,6 @@ bool FilesystemDispatcher::NtQueryFullAttributesFile(IPCInfo* ipc,
     return false;
 
   if (!PreProcessName(name)) {
-    // The path requested might contain a reparse point.
     ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
     return true;
   }
@@ -312,7 +308,6 @@ bool FilesystemDispatcher::NtSetInformationFile(IPCInfo* ipc,
   name.assign(rename_info->FileName,
               rename_info->FileNameLength / sizeof(rename_info->FileName[0]));
   if (!PreProcessName(&name)) {
-    // The path requested might contain a reparse point.
     ipc->return_info.nt_status = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
     return true;
   }
diff --git a/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_policy.cc b/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_policy.cc
index da9ef58a4f5b..9d1149eda549 100644
--- a/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_policy.cc
+++ b/security/sandbox/chromium/sandbox/win/src/filesystem_policy.cc
@@ -44,12 +44,6 @@ NTSTATUS NtCreateFileInTarget(HANDLE* target_file_handle,
     return status;
   }
 
-  if (!sandbox::SameObject(local_handle, obj_attributes->ObjectName->Buffer)) {
-    // The handle points somewhere else. Fail the operation.
-    ::CloseHandle(local_handle);
-    return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
-  }
-
   if (!::DuplicateHandle(::GetCurrentProcess(), local_handle, target_process,
                          target_file_handle, 0, false,
                          DUPLICATE_CLOSE_SOURCE | DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS)) {
@@ -405,13 +399,25 @@ bool FileSystemPolicy::SetInformationFileAction(EvalResult eval_result,
 }
 
 bool PreProcessName(std::wstring* path) {
+  // We now allow symbolic links to be opened via the broker, so we can no
+  // longer rely on the same object check where we checked the path of the
+  // opened file against the original. We don't specify a root when creating
+  // OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES from file names for brokering so they must be fully
+  // qualified and we can just check for the parent directory double dot between
+  // two backslashes. NtCreateFile doesn't seem to allow it anyway, but this is
+  // just an extra precaution. It also doesn't seem to allow the forward slash
+  // at least in fully qualified names so we rule out that as well, to simplify
+  // the combinations we might have to check.
+  if (path->find(L'/') != std::wstring::npos) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (path->find(L"\\..\\") != std::wstring::npos) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
   ConvertToLongPath(path);
-
-  if (ERROR_NOT_A_REPARSE_POINT == IsReparsePoint(*path))
-    return true;
-
-  // We can't process a reparsed file.
-  return false;
+  return true;
 }
 
 std::wstring FixNTPrefixForMatch(const std::wstring& name) {