зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
Bug 942729, Part 1: Re-enable TLS False Start, r=mcmanus
--HG-- extra : rebase_source : 9908b1cbc3a30e9868739a10a705de8dbf30c5e1
This commit is contained in:
Brian Smith
Родитель
3c67acb47f
Коммит
da55c6102d
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@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ pref("security.ssl.treat_unsafe_negotiation_as_broken", false);
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pref("security.ssl.require_safe_negotiation", false);
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pref("security.ssl.warn_missing_rfc5746", 1);
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pref("security.ssl.enable_ocsp_stapling", true);
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pref("security.ssl.enable_false_start", false);
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pref("security.ssl.enable_false_start", true);
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pref("security.ssl.false_start.require-npn", true);
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pref("security.ssl.false_start.require-forward-secrecy", false);
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pref("security.ssl.false_start.require-forward-secrecy", true);
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pref("security.default_personal_cert", "Ask Every Time");
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pref("security.remember_cert_checkbox_default_setting", true);
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@ -36,6 +36,21 @@ extern PRLogModuleInfo* gPIPNSSLog;
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static void AccumulateCipherSuite(Telemetry::ID probe,
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const SSLChannelInfo& channelInfo);
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namespace {
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// Bits in bit mask for SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING telemetry probe
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// These bits are numbered so that the least subtle issues have higher values.
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// This should make it easier for us to interpret the results.
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const uint32_t NPN_NOT_NEGOTIATED = 64;
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const uint32_t KEA_NOT_FORWARD_SECRET = 32;
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const uint32_t KEA_NOT_SAME_AS_EXPECTED = 16;
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const uint32_t KEA_NOT_ALLOWED = 8;
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const uint32_t POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE = 4;
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const uint32_t POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE = 2;
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const uint32_t KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED = 1;
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}
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class nsHTTPDownloadEvent : public nsRunnable {
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public:
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nsHTTPDownloadEvent();
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@ -898,6 +913,8 @@ CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, PRBool *canFalseStart)
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return SECFailure;
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}
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infoObject->SetFalseStartCallbackCalled();
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if (infoObject->isAlreadyShutDown()) {
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MOZ_CRASH("SSL socket used after NSS shut down");
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PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
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@ -906,6 +923,8 @@ CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, PRBool *canFalseStart)
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PreliminaryHandshakeDone(fd);
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uint32_t reasonsForNotFalseStarting = 0;
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SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
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if (SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
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return SECSuccess;
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@ -920,11 +939,17 @@ CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, PRBool *canFalseStart)
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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nsSSLIOLayerHelpers& helpers = infoObject->SharedState().IOLayerHelpers();
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// Prevent version downgrade attacks from TLS 1.x to SSL 3.0.
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// TODO(bug 861310): If we negotiate less than our highest-supported version,
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// then check that a previously-completed handshake negotiated that version;
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// eventually, require that the highest-supported version of TLS is used.
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if (channelInfo.protocolVersion < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0) {
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
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"SSL Version must be >= TLS1 %x\n", fd,
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static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.protocolVersion)));
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return SECSuccess;
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reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE;
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}
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// never do false start without one of these key exchange algorithms
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@ -934,19 +959,51 @@ CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, PRBool *canFalseStart)
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
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"unsupported KEA %d\n", fd,
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static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.keaType)));
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return SECSuccess;
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reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED;
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}
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// never do false start without at least 80 bits of key material. This should
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// be redundant to an NSS precondition
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if (cipherInfo.effectiveKeyBits < 80) {
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MOZ_CRASH("NSS is not enforcing the precondition that the effective "
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"key size must be >= 80 bits for false start");
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
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"key too small %d\n", fd,
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static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.effectiveKeyBits)));
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PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
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return SECFailure;
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// XXX: This assumes that all TLS_DH_* and TLS_ECDH_* cipher suites
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// are disabled.
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if (cipherInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh &&
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cipherInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_dh) {
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if (helpers.mFalseStartRequireForwardSecrecy) {
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - KEA used is %d, but "
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"require-forward-secrecy configured.\n", fd,
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static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.keaType)));
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reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= KEA_NOT_FORWARD_SECRET;
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} else if (cipherInfo.keaType == ssl_kea_rsa) {
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// Make sure we've seen the same kea from this host in the past, to limit
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// the potential for downgrade attacks.
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int16_t expected = infoObject->GetKEAExpected();
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if (cipherInfo.keaType != expected) {
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
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"KEA used is %d, expected %d\n", fd,
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static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.keaType),
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static_cast<int32_t>(expected)));
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reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= KEA_NOT_SAME_AS_EXPECTED;
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}
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} else {
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reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= KEA_NOT_ALLOWED;
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}
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}
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// Prevent downgrade attacks on the symmetric cipher. We accept downgrades
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// from 256-bit keys to 128-bit keys and we treat AES and Camellia as being
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// equally secure. We consider every message authentication mechanism that we
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// support *for these ciphers* to be equally-secure. We assume that for CBC
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// mode, that the server has implemented all the same mitigations for
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// published attacks that we have, or that those attacks are not relevant in
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// the decision to false start.
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if (cipherInfo.symCipher != ssl_calg_aes_gcm &&
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cipherInfo.symCipher != ssl_calg_aes &&
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cipherInfo.symCipher != ssl_calg_camellia) {
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
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("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - Symmetric cipher used, %d, "
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"is not supported with False Start.\n", fd,
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static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.symCipher)));
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reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE;
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}
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// XXX: An attacker can choose which protocols are advertised in the
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@ -957,78 +1014,26 @@ CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data, PRBool *canFalseStart)
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// Enforce NPN to do false start if policy requires it. Do this as an
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// indicator if server compatibility.
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nsSSLIOLayerHelpers& helpers = infoObject->SharedState().IOLayerHelpers();
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if (helpers.mFalseStartRequireNPN) {
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nsAutoCString negotiatedNPN;
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if (NS_FAILED(infoObject->GetNegotiatedNPN(negotiatedNPN)) ||
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!negotiatedNPN.Length()) {
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
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"NPN cannot be verified\n", fd));
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return SECSuccess;
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reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= NPN_NOT_NEGOTIATED;
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}
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}
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// If we're not using eliptical curve kea then make sure we've seen the
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// same kea from this host in the past, to limit the potential for downgrade
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// attacks.
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if (cipherInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh) {
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if (helpers.mFalseStartRequireForwardSecrecy) {
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
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"KEA used is %d, but "
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"require-forward-secrecy configured.\n",
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fd, static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.keaType)));
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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int16_t expected = infoObject->GetKEAExpected();
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if (cipherInfo.keaType != expected) {
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
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"KEA used is %d, expected %d\n", fd,
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static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.keaType),
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static_cast<int32_t>(expected)));
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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// whitelist the expected key exchange algorithms that are
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// acceptable for false start when seen before.
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if (expected != ssl_kea_rsa && expected != ssl_kea_dh &&
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expected != ssl_kea_ecdh) {
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
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"KEA used, %d, "
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"is not supported with False Start.\n",
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fd, static_cast<int32_t>(expected)));
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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}
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// If we're not using AES then verify that this is the historically expected
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// symmetrical cipher for this host, to limit potential for downgrade attacks.
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if (cipherInfo.symCipher != ssl_calg_aes) {
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int16_t expected = infoObject->GetSymmetricCipherExpected();
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if (cipherInfo.symCipher != expected) {
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
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"Symmetric cipher used is %d, expected %d\n",
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fd, static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.symCipher),
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static_cast<int32_t>(expected)));
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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// whitelist the expected ciphers that are
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// acceptable for false start when seen before.
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if ((expected != ssl_calg_rc4) && (expected != ssl_calg_3des) &&
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(expected != ssl_calg_aes)) {
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
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"Symmetric cipher used, %d, "
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"is not supported with False Start.\n",
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fd, static_cast<int32_t>(expected)));
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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}
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING,
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reasonsForNotFalseStarting);
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if (reasonsForNotFalseStarting == 0) {
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*canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
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infoObject->SetFalseStarted();
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infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady();
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*canFalseStart = true;
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG, ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] ok\n", fd));
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}
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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@ -1308,5 +1313,5 @@ void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) {
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}
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infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady();
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infoObject->SetHandshakeCompleted(isResumedSession);
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infoObject->SetHandshakeCompleted();
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}
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@ -1313,10 +1313,9 @@ nsNSSComponent::InitializeNSS(bool showWarningBox)
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SSL_RENEGOTIATE_UNRESTRICTED :
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SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN);
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// Bug 920248: temporarily disable false start
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// bool falseStartEnabled = Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_false_start",
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// FALSE_START_ENABLED_DEFAULT);
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SSL_OptionSetDefault(SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START, false);
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SSL_OptionSetDefault(SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START,
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Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_false_start",
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FALSE_START_ENABLED_DEFAULT));
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if (NS_FAILED(InitializeCipherSuite())) {
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PR_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, PR_LOG_ERROR, ("Unable to initialize cipher suite settings\n"));
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@ -1728,10 +1727,9 @@ nsNSSComponent::Observe(nsISupports *aSubject, const char *aTopic,
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SSL_RENEGOTIATE_UNRESTRICTED :
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SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN);
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} else if (prefName.Equals("security.ssl.enable_false_start")) {
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// Bug 920248: temporarily disable false start
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// bool falseStartEnabled = Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_false_start",
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// FALSE_START_ENABLED_DEFAULT);
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SSL_OptionSetDefault(SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START, false);
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SSL_OptionSetDefault(SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START,
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Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.enable_false_start",
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FALSE_START_ENABLED_DEFAULT));
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} else if (prefName.Equals("security.OCSP.enabled")
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|| prefName.Equals("security.CRL_download.enabled")
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|| prefName.Equals("security.fresh_revocation_info.require")
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@ -77,6 +77,37 @@ getSiteKey(const nsACString & hostName, uint16_t port,
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/* SSM_UserCertChoice: enum for cert choice info */
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typedef enum {ASK, AUTO} SSM_UserCertChoice;
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// Forward secrecy provides us with a proof of posession of the private key
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// from the server. Without of proof of posession of the private key of the
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// server, any MitM can force us to false start in a connection that the real
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// server never participates in, since with RSA key exchange a MitM can
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// complete the server's first round of the handshake without knowing the
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// server's public key This would be used, for example, to greatly accelerate
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// the attacks on RC4 or other attacks that allow a MitM to decrypt encrypted
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// data without having the server's private key. Without false start, such
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// attacks are naturally rate limited by network latency and may also be rate
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// limited explicitly by the server's DoS or other security mechanisms.
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// Further, because the server that has the private key must participate in the
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// handshake, the server could detect these kinds of attacks if they they are
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// repeated rapidly and/or frequently, by noticing lots of invalid or
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// incomplete handshakes.
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//
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// With this in mind, when we choose not to require forward secrecy (when the
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// pref's value is false), then we will still only false start for RSA key
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// exchange only if the most recent handshake we've previously done used RSA
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// key exchange. This way, we prevent any (EC)DHE-to-RSA downgrade attacks for
|
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// servers that consistently choose (EC)DHE key exchange. In order to prevent
|
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// downgrade from ECDHE_*_GCM cipher suites, we need to also consider downgrade
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// from TLS 1.2 to earlier versions (bug 861310).
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static const bool FALSE_START_REQUIRE_FORWARD_SECRECY_DEFAULT = true;
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// XXX(perf bug 940787): We currently require NPN because there is a very
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// high (perfect so far) correlation between servers that are false-start-
|
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// tolerant and servers that support NPN, according to Google. Without this, we
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// will run into interop issues with a small percentage of servers that stop
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// responding when we attempt to false start.
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static const bool FALSE_START_REQUIRE_NPN_DEFAULT = true;
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} // unnamed namespace
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#ifdef PR_LOGGING
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@ -93,6 +124,8 @@ nsNSSSocketInfo::nsNSSSocketInfo(SharedSSLState& aState, uint32_t providerFlags)
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mRememberClientAuthCertificate(false),
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mPreliminaryHandshakeDone(false),
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mNPNCompleted(false),
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mFalseStartCallbackCalled(false),
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mFalseStarted(false),
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mIsFullHandshake(false),
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mHandshakeCompleted(false),
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mJoined(false),
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@ -256,16 +289,32 @@ nsNSSSocketInfo::NoteTimeUntilReady()
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}
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void
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nsNSSSocketInfo::SetHandshakeCompleted(bool aResumedSession)
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nsNSSSocketInfo::SetHandshakeCompleted()
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{
|
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if (!mHandshakeCompleted) {
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enum HandshakeType {
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Resumption = 1,
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FalseStarted = 2,
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ChoseNotToFalseStart = 3,
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NotAllowedToFalseStart = 4,
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};
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HandshakeType handshakeType = !IsFullHandshake() ? Resumption
|
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: mFalseStarted ? FalseStarted
|
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: mFalseStartCallbackCalled ? ChoseNotToFalseStart
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: NotAllowedToFalseStart;
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// This will include TCP and proxy tunnel wait time
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Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(Telemetry::SSL_TIME_UNTIL_HANDSHAKE_FINISHED,
|
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mSocketCreationTimestamp, TimeStamp::Now());
|
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|
||||
// If the handshake is completed for the first time from just 1 callback
|
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// that means that TLS session resumption must have been used.
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_RESUMED_SESSION, aResumedSession);
|
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_RESUMED_SESSION,
|
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handshakeType == Resumption);
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Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_TYPE, handshakeType);
|
||||
}
|
||||
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||||
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||||
// Remove the plain text layer as it is not needed anymore.
|
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// The plain text layer is not always present - so its not a fatal error
|
||||
|
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@ -283,7 +332,6 @@ nsNSSSocketInfo::SetHandshakeCompleted(bool aResumedSession)
|
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("[%p] nsNSSSocketInfo::SetHandshakeCompleted\n", (void*)mFd));
|
||||
|
||||
mIsFullHandshake = false; // reset for next handshake on this connection
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
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||||
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||||
void
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@ -1344,11 +1392,13 @@ PrefObserver::Observe(nsISupports *aSubject, const char *aTopic,
|
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Preferences::GetInt("security.ssl.warn_missing_rfc5746", &warnLevel);
|
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mOwner->setWarnLevelMissingRFC5746(warnLevel);
|
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} else if (prefName.Equals("security.ssl.false_start.require-npn")) {
|
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mOwner->mFalseStartRequireNPN =
|
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Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.false_start.require-npn",
|
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&mOwner->mFalseStartRequireNPN);
|
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FALSE_START_REQUIRE_NPN_DEFAULT);
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} else if (prefName.Equals("security.ssl.false_start.require-forward-secrecy")) {
|
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mOwner->mFalseStartRequireForwardSecrecy =
|
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Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.false_start.require-forward-secrecy",
|
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&mOwner->mFalseStartRequireForwardSecrecy);
|
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FALSE_START_REQUIRE_FORWARD_SECRECY_DEFAULT);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return NS_OK;
|
||||
|
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@ -1449,10 +1499,12 @@ nsresult nsSSLIOLayerHelpers::Init()
|
|||
Preferences::GetInt("security.ssl.warn_missing_rfc5746", &warnLevel);
|
||||
setWarnLevelMissingRFC5746(warnLevel);
|
||||
|
||||
mFalseStartRequireNPN =
|
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Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.false_start.require-npn",
|
||||
&mFalseStartRequireNPN);
|
||||
FALSE_START_REQUIRE_NPN_DEFAULT);
|
||||
mFalseStartRequireForwardSecrecy =
|
||||
Preferences::GetBool("security.ssl.false_start.require-forward-secrecy",
|
||||
&mFalseStartRequireForwardSecrecy);
|
||||
FALSE_START_REQUIRE_FORWARD_SECRECY_DEFAULT);
|
||||
|
||||
mPrefObserver = new PrefObserver(this);
|
||||
Preferences::AddStrongObserver(mPrefObserver,
|
||||
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|
|||
|
|
@ -56,9 +56,14 @@ public:
|
|||
const nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock & proofOfLock);
|
||||
|
||||
void SetNegotiatedNPN(const char *value, uint32_t length);
|
||||
void SetHandshakeCompleted(bool aResumedSession);
|
||||
|
||||
void SetHandshakeCompleted();
|
||||
void NoteTimeUntilReady();
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
void SetFalseStartCallbackCalled() { mFalseStartCallbackCalled = true; }
|
||||
void SetFalseStarted() { mFalseStarted = true; }
|
||||
|
||||
// Note that this is only valid *during* a handshake; at the end of the handshake,
|
||||
// it gets reset back to false.
|
||||
void SetFullHandshake() { mIsFullHandshake = true; }
|
||||
|
|
@ -130,6 +135,8 @@ private:
|
|||
|
||||
nsCString mNegotiatedNPN;
|
||||
bool mNPNCompleted;
|
||||
bool mFalseStartCallbackCalled;
|
||||
bool mFalseStarted;
|
||||
bool mIsFullHandshake;
|
||||
bool mHandshakeCompleted;
|
||||
bool mJoined;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4612,5 +4612,15 @@
|
|||
"kind": "enumerated",
|
||||
"n_values": 32,
|
||||
"description": "Symmetric cipher used in resumed handshake (null=0, rc4=1, 3des=4, aes-cbc=7, camellia=8, seed=9, aes-gcm=10)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING": {
|
||||
"kind": "enumerated",
|
||||
"n_values": 512,
|
||||
"description": "Bitmask of reasons we did not false start when libssl would have let us (see key in nsNSSCallbacks.cpp)"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"SSL_HANDSHAKE_TYPE": {
|
||||
"kind": "enumerated",
|
||||
"n_values": 8,
|
||||
"description": "Type of handshake (1=resumption, 2=false started, 3=chose not to false start, 4=not allowed to false start)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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