XMLHttpRequest.open(). For xmlextras, r=heikki, sr=jband. For caps,
r=bzbarsky, sr=jst
147754 - Add same-origin check to XMLSerializer. Patch by jst. r=mstoltz,
sr=jband
113351 - Add same-origin check to XSL Include. Patch by peterv and jst,
r=mstoltz, sr=rpotts
135267 - Add same-origin check to stylesheets included via LINK tags.
r=dveditz, sr=scc
128697 - Added a pref listener for changes to capability.policy prefs,
removed profile-change listener
131025 - Removed insecure "trusted codebase principals" feature
131340 - Make nsCodebasePrincipal::Equals handle jar URLs correctly
131342 - Clean up privilege-grant dialog code
128861 - class policy hashtables allocated only when needed; avoids
PLDHash memory-use warning
Fixed comparison of -1 and 80 ports (Can't find the bug # right now)
All r=harishd, sr=jst, a=asa.
105050, pass null window.opener when opener is a mail window.
both r=heikki, sr=jst, a=asa.
Backed out previously because of tinderbox problem, which should be fixed now.
Added nsIScriptSecurityManager::CheckConnect for this purpose.
Also cleaned up the security check API by removing some unnecessary
parameters. r=vidur@netscape.com, sr=jst@netscape.com
Bug 79775 - Forward button broken in main mail window. Making
WindowWatcher not call GetSubjectPrincipal if the URL to be loaded is
chrome, since the calling principal is superfluous in this case.
No one has been able to find the root cause of this problem, but
this checkin works around it, which is the best we can do for now.
r=ducarroz@netscape.com, sr=jst@netscape.com
caps/idl/nsICertificatePrincipal.idl
caps/idl/nsIPrincipal.idl
caps/src/nsBasePrincipal.cpp
Implement the ability to manipulate multiple capabilties simultaneously.
r=mstoltz@netscape.com
Files:
caps/src/nsCodebasePrincipal.cpp
Codebase equality should be based upon origin, not full path.
r=mstoltz@netscape.com
Files:
caps/src/nsScriptSecurityManager.cpp
Change URI checking to deny based upon scheme rather than allow based upon
scheme for greater flexibility.
r=mstoltz@netscape.com
Files:
dom/public/nsDOMPropEnums.h
dom/public/nsDOMPropNames.h
dom/src/base/nsGlobalWindow.cpp
modules/libpref/src/init/all.js
Fix bug 20469 Seeing JS functions and global variables from arbitrary host
r=vidur@netscape.com
Files:
dom/src/base/nsJSUtils.cpp
dom/src/base/nsJSUtils.h
dom/src/base/nsJSEnvironment.cpp
dom/tools/JSStubGen.cpp
layout/base/src/nsDocument.cpp
layout/html/content/src/nsGenericHTMLElement.cpp
Improve performance by removing NS_WITH_SERVICE call for every DOM access.
Propagate XPCOM failure codes out properly.
r=vidur@netscape.com
Files:
layout/html/document/src/nsFrameFrame.cpp
Fix 27387 Circumventing Same Origin security policy using setAttribute
r=vidur@netscape.com
DOM: getting rid of JS_GetContextPrivate wherever possible. Use static parent
links where we can. When we do need to find this info about the caller
we call a function that knows how to get that info rather than inline calls
to JS_GetContextPrivate. This is all required for calling DOM objects on
non-DOM JSContexts as we do via xpconnect.
XPConnect: basic refactoring work to disassociate wrappers from the JSContext
that was active when the wrapper was constructed. This allows for calling into
wrapped JS objects on the right JSContext and for proper grouping of wrapped
native objects so that they can share proto objects. This also allows for
better sharing of objects and lays the foundations for threadsafety and
interface flattening.
Also, xpconnect tests are reorganized and improved.
fixes bugs: 13419, 17736, 17746, 17952, 22086
r=vidur r=mccabe r=norris r=cbegle
a=chofmann
20257 unable to edit existing images in editor due to JS error
19933 JavaScript "window.location" core dumps in CAPS
Back out previous changes for enforcing security on listeners and go with a
simple restriction of access to the method for adding listeners.
r=mstoltz
Add checks to nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckCanListenTo that take
a principal and ensure that the currently executing script code
either is from the same origin as that principal or has the
UniversalBrowserRead privilege enabled. (chrome code has all
privileges enabled by default.) It's okay for the principal passed in
to be null. That just signifies a privileged window/document that only
can be listened to with privileges.
I added GetPrincipal/SetPrincipal methods to nsIEventListenerManager.
nsDocument::GetNewListenerManager sets a principal on the listener
manager when it creates one. Obviously there are other places that
create listener managers, but scripts seem to go through this one.
Another change is to save some memory usage. Currently I allocate an
array of PolicyType that is NS_DOM_PROP_MAX elements long.
Unfortunately, compilers appear to allocate four bytes for each
PolicyType, so the array takes around 2400 bytes. I've added changes
to use two bit vectors that should consume about 1/16 that space.
r=joki
There are also changes that push nsnull onto the JSContext stack when
entering a nested event loop.
r=jband
and efficiency.
Tighten checks on document properties and node properties. Should resolve
several bugs:
18965 document.firstChild vulnerability
19043 document.childNodes vulnerability
19044 document.lastChild vulnerability
r=mstoltz
17977 [DOGFOOD] Reading documents using document.body
17538 document.lastModified is exposed
17537 document.images vulnerabilities
16036 [DOGFOOD] document.Element exposes the DOM of documents from
15757 [DOGFOOD] Injecting JS code using setAttribute and getElemen
15550 Injecting text in documents from any domain using createText
15067 [DOGFOOD] getElementsByTagName() allows reading of arbitrary
* Create an array of dom property policy types and initialize it when the script security manager is created.
* Move some implementation code to a new shared implementation base class.
* Implement privilege enabling, disabling and reverting
* Implement stack walking for checking privileges.
r=mstoltz@netscape.com
* Modify nsIPref to support security policy work.
r=neeti@netscape.com
mstoltz%netscape.com
mcafee%netscape.com
gerv%gerv.net
scc%mozilla.org
brendan%mozilla.org
ddrinan%netscape.com
blizzard%redhat.com
jst%netscape.com
rayw%netscape.com
jband%netscape.com
vidur%netscape.com
joki%netscape.com
warren%netscape.com
norris%netscape.com
dmose%mozilla.org
briano%netscape.com
arielb%netscape.com
sspitzer%netscape.com