All the instances are converted as follows.
- nsAFlatString --> nsString
- nsAFlatCString --> nsCString
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : b37350642c58a85a08363df2e7c610873faa6e41
Changes to Promise tests designed to test .then(null) have been reverted, and the browser/extensions directory was excluded because the projects it contains have a separate process for accepting changes.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 1buqgX1EP4P
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 3a9ea310d3e4a8642aabbc10636c04bfe2e77070
Add a field to the HSTS cache which indicates the source of the HSTS
entry if known, from the preload list, organically seen header, or HSTS
priming, or unknown otherwise. Also adds telemetry to collect the source
when upgrading in NS_ShouldSecureUpgrade.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 3IwyYe3Cn73
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 9b8daac3aa02bd7a1b4285fb1e5731a817a76b7f
Collect telemetry for all requests to get an exact percentage of
requests that are subject to HSTS priming, and how many result in an
HSTS Priming request being sent. Clean up telemetry to remove instances
of double counting requests if a priming request was sent.
HSTSPrimingListener::ReportTiming was using mCallback to calculate
timing telemetry, but we were calling swap() on the nsCOMPtr. Give it an
explicit argument for the callback.
Add tests for telemetry values to all of the HSTS priming tests. This
tests for the minimum as telemetry may be gathered on background or
other requests.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 5V2Nf0Ugc3r
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : daa357219a77d912a78b95a703430f39d884c6ab
data:text/css should be considered as a CORS request, and should be
blocked if crossorigin is not specified.
Also move the original test to test_style-crossdomain_legacy.html
--HG--
rename : dom/security/test/sri/iframe_style_crossdomain.html => dom/security/test/sri/iframe_style_crossdomain_legacy.html
According to the spec, content from loopback addresses should no longer
be treated as mixed content even in secure origins. See:
- 349501cdaa
- https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy
Note that we only whitelist '127.0.0.1' and '::1' to match Chrome 53 and
later. See:
- 130ee686fa
It is unclear if HTTPS origins should be able to use workers and WebSocket
connections through a loopback HTTP address. They are not supported in Chrome
(whether this is intentional or not is uncertain) so lets just ignore them for
now.
See also: https://github.com/w3c/web-platform-tests/pull/5304
This patch is generated by the following sed script:
find . ! -wholename '*/.hg*' -type f \( -iname '*.html' -o -iname '*.xhtml' -o -iname '*.xul' -o -iname '*.js' \) -exec sed -i -e 's/\(\(text\|application\)\/javascript\);version=1.[0-9]/\1/g' {} \;
MozReview-Commit-ID: AzhtdwJwVNg
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : e8f90249454c0779d926f87777f457352961748d