858 [Feature] JavaScript auto-disable per-domain RFE
13023 Users must be able to disable Java and JavaScript (for JS in mail)
21923 Executing functions in "chrome:" protocol - #2.
r=mstoltz
(Checked in with red on Mac; Wan-Teh says his changes are localized so
it shouldn't interfere with his fixing bustage.)
Add checks to nsScriptSecurityManager::CheckCanListenTo that take
a principal and ensure that the currently executing script code
either is from the same origin as that principal or has the
UniversalBrowserRead privilege enabled. (chrome code has all
privileges enabled by default.) It's okay for the principal passed in
to be null. That just signifies a privileged window/document that only
can be listened to with privileges.
I added GetPrincipal/SetPrincipal methods to nsIEventListenerManager.
nsDocument::GetNewListenerManager sets a principal on the listener
manager when it creates one. Obviously there are other places that
create listener managers, but scripts seem to go through this one.
Another change is to save some memory usage. Currently I allocate an
array of PolicyType that is NS_DOM_PROP_MAX elements long.
Unfortunately, compilers appear to allocate four bytes for each
PolicyType, so the array takes around 2400 bytes. I've added changes
to use two bit vectors that should consume about 1/16 that space.
r=joki
There are also changes that push nsnull onto the JSContext stack when
entering a nested event loop.
r=jband
and efficiency.
Tighten checks on document properties and node properties. Should resolve
several bugs:
18965 document.firstChild vulnerability
19043 document.childNodes vulnerability
19044 document.lastChild vulnerability
r=mstoltz
17977 [DOGFOOD] Reading documents using document.body
17538 document.lastModified is exposed
17537 document.images vulnerabilities
16036 [DOGFOOD] document.Element exposes the DOM of documents from
15757 [DOGFOOD] Injecting JS code using setAttribute and getElemen
15550 Injecting text in documents from any domain using createText
15067 [DOGFOOD] getElementsByTagName() allows reading of arbitrary
* Create an array of dom property policy types and initialize it when the script security manager is created.
* Move some implementation code to a new shared implementation base class.
* Implement privilege enabling, disabling and reverting
* Implement stack walking for checking privileges.
r=mstoltz@netscape.com
* Modify nsIPref to support security policy work.
r=neeti@netscape.com
mstoltz%netscape.com
norris%netscape.com
mkaply%us.ibm.com
dmose%mozilla.org
mccabe%netscape.com
arielb%netscape.com