Calling VFY_VerifyDigestDirect causes the provided SECKEYPublicKey to be
reimported to the softoken regardless of if it already exists on it. EC keys
must be verified upon import (to see if the point is on the curve to avoid some
small subgroup attacks), and so repeatedly doing this with a static key (say,
for example, a key corresponding to a built-in certificate transparency log) is
inefficient. This patch alters the certificate transparency implementation to
import these keys each once and then use PK11_Verify for ECDSA signature
verification, which doesn't have the same drawback.
Since this change causes CertVerifier to hold an NSS resource (via its
MultiLogCTVerifier having a list of CTLogVerifier, each of which now has a
SECKEYPublicKey), nsNSSComponent has to make sure it goes away before shutting
down NSS. This patch ensures this happens in nsNSSComponent::ShutdownNSS().
MozReview-Commit-ID: 6VSmz7S53y2
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 4994db9de80a6c1aec3d7e322ff30d040140ce92
The NSS Base64 functions are less safe and convenient to use than the XPCOM ones.
They're also an unnecessary dependency on NSS.
The NSS Base64 functions behave slightly differently than the XPCOM ones:
1. ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem() / NSSBase64_DecodeBuffer() silently ignore invalid
characters like CRLF, space and so on. Base64Decode() will return an error
if these characters are encountered.
2. BTOA_DataToAscii() will produce output that has CRLF inserted every 64
characters. Base64Encode() doesn't do this.
For the reasons listed below, no unexpected compatibility issues should arise:
1. AppSignatureVerification.cpp already filters out CRLF and spaces for Manifest
and Signature values before decoding.
2. ExtendedValidation.cpp is only given what should be valid hard-coded input to
decode.
3. ContentSignatureVerifier.cpp already splits on CRLF for when it needs to
decode PEM certs. Spaces shouldn't be likely.
For Content-Signature header verification, examination of real input to a
running instance of Firefox suggests CRLF and spaces will not be present in
the header to decode.
4. nsCryptoHash.cpp encode is affected, but we actually don't want the CRLF
behaviour.
5. nsDataSignatureVerifier.cpp decode is affected, but we add whitespace
stripping to maintain backwards compatibility.
6. nsKeygenHandler.cpp encode is affected, but the previous CRLF behaviour was
arguably a bug, since neither WHATWG or W3C specs specified this.
MozReview-Commit-ID: IWMFxqVZMeX
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 4863b2e5eabef0555e8e1ebe39216d0d9393f3e9
verifySignedManifestAsync() was added in Bug 1059216 to support Trusted Hosted
Apps.
However, Bug 1196988 removed THA and no add-ons use this method, so there's no
point in keeping it around.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 6xBRxvRZfjh
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 5b8cf9c5863187b55325a8f9929bbe52c6478ec5
CERT_AddTempCertToPerm and CERT_ImportCerts (when called with keepCerts=true)
internally use PK11_GetInternalKeySlot. The current plan for making NSS always
available involves initializing it in memory-only mode and later opening the
user's certificate and key databases. Doing so means that
PK11_GetInternalKeySlot will not return the right token, so we can't rely on
functions that make use of it internally. For now we'll simply use equivalent
functions that take an explicit PK11SlotInfo argument and pass in the current
internal token. A later patch will change all places where PSM and Gecko use the
internal token to use the correct token.
MozReview-Commit-ID: CpSo5dIkyVW
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 4f6e1707b34cb8dcf5e89cf3620c2d76fea39c82
Franziskus Kiefer
David Keeler
Cykesiopka
Kai Engert
Dragana Damjanovic
Jonathan Hao
Ted Mielczarek