Support for accept4 and arc4random_buf depends on which set of NDK
headers we're using. accept4 is supported for API >= 21 for unified and
non-unified headers. arc4random_buf is supported for API >= 21 if using
non-unified headers, and it's always supported if using unified headers
(the unified headers provide shims for API < 21).
MozReview-Commit-ID: FY8n5jWXB1K
--HG--
rename : ipc/chromium/src/third_party/libevent/patches/android-arc4random-buf.patch => ipc/chromium/src/third_party/libevent/patches/android-api-level.patch
extra : rebase_source : 45ec28ca03ba877d9e0911bde081df7d9cb2d3d2
Support for accept4 and arc4random_buf depends on which set of NDK
headers we're using. accept4 is supported for API >= 21 for unified and
non-unified headers. arc4random_buf is supported for API >= 21 if using
non-unified headers, and it's always supported if using unified headers
(the unified headers provide shims for API < 21).
MozReview-Commit-ID: FY8n5jWXB1K
--HG--
rename : ipc/chromium/src/third_party/libevent/patches/android-arc4random-buf.patch => ipc/chromium/src/third_party/libevent/patches/android-api-level.patch
extra : rebase_source : a8974cb1e8e71a8c951754ca9902fff28c099031
This fix is completely speculative, but I have strong reason to believe that
we are having lifetime issues, and that refcount stabilization might be coming
into play.
The situation is this:
Suppose we're aggregating an object, so we pass |this| as the outer IUnknown.
The inner object might perform AddRef() and Release() on |this| during its
initialization.
But if we're in the process of creating the outer object, that refcount might
not yet have been incremented by 1, so the inner object's invocation of the
outer object's Release() could trigger a deletion.
The way around this is to temporarily bump the refcount when aggregating another
object. The key, though, is to not do this via AddRef() and Release(), but by
direct maniuplation of the refcount variable, so that we don't trigger any of
the self-deletion stuff.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 3WA2AJvb6jY
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : ab05a52760541a4ab11f1245a5ddeae938998047
The FunctionBroker is a special kind of FunctionHook that brokers the hooked function on another process. In the child process, it uses the FunctionBrokerChild to request that the FunctionBrokerParent run a function and return the response. It handles most cases of parameter, return value and error marshaling on its own. It also guarantees that requests are issued from the proper thread.
The FunctionBroker actors allow the NPAPI process (child) to run methods on the main process (parent). Both the parent and the child run dedicated threads for this task -- this is a top-level protocol.
Namespace isolation is now handled by using clone() at process creation
time, rather than calling unshare.
pthread_atfork will no longer apply to sandboxed child processes.
The two significant uses of it in Firefox currently are to (1) make
malloc work post-fork, which we already avoid depending on in IPC and
sandboxing, and (2) block SIGPROF while forking, which is taken care of;
see SandboxFork::Fork for details. Note that if we need pthread_atfork
in the future it could be emulated by symbol interposition.
clone() is called via glibc's wrapper, for increased compatibility vs.
invoking the syscall directly, using longjmp to recover the syscall's
fork-like semantics the same way Chromium does; see comments for details.
The chroot helper is reimplemented; the general approach is similar,
but instead of a thread it's a process cloned with CLONE_FS (so the
filesystem root is shared) from the child process before it calls
exec, so that it still holds CAP_SYS_CHROOT in the newly created user
namespace. This does mean that it will retain a CoW copy of the
parent's address space until the child starts sandboxing, but that is a
relatively short period of time, so the memory overhead should be small
and short-lived.
The chrooting now happens *after* the seccomp-bpf policy is applied;
previously this wasn't possible because the chroot thread would have
become seccomp-restricted and unable to chroot. This fixes a potential
race condition where a thread could try to access the filesystem after
chrooting but before having its syscalls intercepted for brokering,
causing spurious failure. (This failure mode hasn't been observed in
practice, but we may not be looking for it.)
This adds a hidden bool pref, security.sandbox.content.force-namespace,
which unshares the user namespace (if possible) even if no sandboxing
requires it. It defaults to true on Nightly and false otherwise, to
get test coverage; the default will change to false once we're using
namespaces by default with content.
MozReview-Commit-ID: JhCXF9EgOt6
--HG--
rename : security/sandbox/linux/LinuxCapabilities.cpp => security/sandbox/linux/launch/LinuxCapabilities.cpp
rename : security/sandbox/linux/LinuxCapabilities.h => security/sandbox/linux/launch/LinuxCapabilities.h
extra : rebase_source : f37acacd4f79b0d6df0bcb9d1d5ceb4b9c5e6371
inline is never set so cgen never emits inline.
MozReview-Commit-ID: BDL6BV8906t
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : aa51cda34db36ba08622d9940402cea14617c74a
never_inline is never set so cgen never emits MOZ_NEVER_INLINE.
MozReview-Commit-ID: HS7qw7D4lBC
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 2eae9e3a7a0c95d94986283fabe670d5decec3c3
pure or override implies virtual. static is mutually exclusive with virtual (and pure and override). Combining these types into a "method specifier" enum simplifies the code and prevents bogus states like virtual=0 and pure=1.
MozReview-Commit-ID: IFeuvbp1RIo
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : d423d168a8b3a3d60cabd0f5e58fd03c6f655baf
Nika Layzell
Gian-Carlo Pascutto
Noemi Erli
Bogdan Tara
Andrea Marchesini
arthur.iakab
Jim Chen
Petr Sumbera
Gurzau Raul
Cosmin Sabou
Aaron Klotz
Daniel Zielas
David Parks
Ben Kelly
Narcis Beleuzu
Alex Gaynor
Sebastian Hengst
Jed Davis
Heiher
Chris Peterson
Mike Hommey
Sylvestre Ledru
Kate McKinley
Margareta Eliza Balazs
Jan Beich
Dorel Luca