We need to side-step existing cross-origin checks in Performance Timing code
when the caller is a web extension content script that otherwise has permission
to access the cross-origin resource.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 8IgtqZgPWgY
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : e8152c5d8ab32096d1ff7f97311c1b43b57c3694
The logic for choosing the principal here was originally written before
loadInfo had a separate principalToInherit field, and we needed to specify it
via the triggeringPrincipal instead. At that point, we had to choose a
component principal with permission to load the URI at the start of the
request.
However, now that we have a separate field for the principal to inherit, it's
only needed after access checks have passed and we know that we have a URI
which inherits a principal. In that case, the current logic causes us to
always inherit the first principal in the whitelist (which is the page
principal) for URIs (such as data: URIs) that always inherit, where we really
want to inherit the last (which is the extension principal).
MozReview-Commit-ID: EPoUNuOCwrH
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 535083e3dd4598ac4e8ea187d27d61ac2ac48476
There are several ways that expanded principals can be used as triggering
principals for requests. While that works fine for security checks, it also
sometimes causes them to be inherited, and used as result principals in
contexts where expanded principals aren't allowed.
This patch changes our inheritance behavior so that expanded principals are
downgraded to the most appropriate constituent principal when they would
otherwise be inherited.
The logic for choosing the most appropriate principal is a bit suspect, and
may eventually need to be changed to always select the last whitelist
principal, but I chose it to preserve the current principal downgrade behavior
used by XMLHttpRequest for the time being.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 9fvAKr2e2fa
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : c30df1b3851c11fed5a1d6a7fb158cec14933182
The current API makes the life time and ownership of the result array unclear
without careful reading. The result array is always owned by the principal,
and its lifetime tied to the lifetime of the principal itself. Returning a
const array reference makes this clear, and should prevent callers from
accidentally modifying the returned array.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 3f8mhynkKAj
--HG--
extra : source : 237acf2879f6222bc4b076c377bf026d18a6ebef
extra : amend_source : dfaf6e88e3c4758f7fdcf7fb422d457edafab1b7
The current API makes the life time and ownership of the result array unclear
without careful reading. The result array is always owned by the principal,
and its lifetime tied to the lifetime of the principal itself. Returning a
const array reference makes this clear, and should prevent callers from
accidentally modifying the returned array.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 3f8mhynkKAj
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : d2a5e0862f8c964fb5a3e46b50c2e9629b218699
extra : amend_source : 27d7a7ef5da6fe2aa1104009b6ee067465db73e1
(Path is actually r=froydnj.)
Bug 1400459 devirtualized nsIAtom so that it is no longer a subclass of
nsISupports. This means that nsAtom is now a better name for it than nsIAtom.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 91U22X2NydP
--HG--
rename : xpcom/ds/nsIAtom.h => xpcom/ds/nsAtom.h
extra : rebase_source : ac3e904a21b8b48e74534fff964f1623ee937c67
The extension policy services uses atoms internally for permission names, so
using them directly rather than strings is considerably cheaper.
MozReview-Commit-ID: Io8EuOXHKVy
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 577b4bdf7f899729e4cf92961a8e9e25bf886a72