It appears the wallet code was not included during the initial 2007 import of
code from CVS to Mercurial, so anything referencing wallet has been dead code
ever since.
MozReview-Commit-ID: BRTd1M0DsT0
--HG--
extra : transplant_source : %BC%FC%05%AE%B5%8C%DC%21J%DC%B4%B17M%19%AA%F3%B9%05L
ScopedAutoSECItem is useful for:
1. Removing manual memory management.
2. Getting rid of this pattern:
> UniqueSECItem item(SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0));
While this pattern works, ScopedAutoSECItem is slightly superior in that it
doesn't unnecessarily cause a SECItem to be allocated from the heap.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 8DPD9gtzeru
--HG--
extra : transplant_source : %10l%27C%12%3E%08%85q%06%1A%FC%FB%DE%F9%A3%99%0AN%A1
Adds content sandbox metadata to parent and child crash reports:
Includes the value of pref security.sandbox.content.level,
whether or not the system is capable of sandboxing, if the
sandbox was successfully turned on, and (on Linux systems)
the sandbox capabilities flags.
New crash report keys:
"ContentSandboxLevel" in parent and content
"ContentSandboxCapable" in parent
"ContentSandboxEnabled" in content
"ContentSandboxCapabilities" in content on Linux
HSTS priming changes the order of mixed-content blocking and HSTS
upgrades, and adds a priming request to check if a mixed-content load is
accesible over HTTPS and the server supports upgrading via the
Strict-Transport-Security header.
Every call site that uses AsyncOpen2 passes through the mixed-content
blocker, and has a LoadInfo. If the mixed-content blocker marks the load as
needing HSTS priming, nsHttpChannel will build and send an HSTS priming
request on the same URI with the scheme upgraded to HTTPS. If the server
allows the upgrade, then channel performs an internal redirect to the HTTPS URI,
otherwise use the result of mixed-content blocker to allow or block the
load.
nsISiteSecurityService adds an optional boolean out parameter to
determine if the HSTS state is already cached for negative assertions.
If the host has been probed within the previous 24 hours, no HSTS
priming check will be sent.
(r=ckerschb,r=mayhemer,r=jld,r=smaug,r=dkeeler,r=jmaher,p=ally)
chooseCertificate() currently uses a concatenation of the Common Name of the
server cert and the port of the server to allow the user to identify the server
requesting client authentication. Unfortunately, this approach is flawed, since
it doesn't take into account things like SAN entries, which might be very
different from the CN.
Using the hostname instead avoids this problem.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 6XjGCknWNi9
--HG--
extra : transplant_source : k%10N%7B%E8%A4%9B%C9%9A%23Q%D1%99%D2%A3%C0.%2B%7F%A5
HSTS priming changes the order of mixed-content blocking and HSTS
upgrades, and adds a priming request to check if a mixed-content load is
accesible over HTTPS and the server supports upgrading via the
Strict-Transport-Security header.
Every call site that uses AsyncOpen2 passes through the mixed-content
blocker, and has a LoadInfo. If the mixed-content blocker marks the load as
needing HSTS priming, nsHttpChannel will build and send an HSTS priming
request on the same URI with the scheme upgraded to HTTPS. If the server
allows the upgrade, then channel performs an internal redirect to the HTTPS URI,
otherwise use the result of mixed-content blocker to allow or block the
load.
nsISiteSecurityService adds an optional boolean out parameter to
determine if the HSTS state is already cached for negative assertions.
If the host has been probed within the previous 24 hours, no HSTS
priming check will be sent.
(r=ckerschb,r=mayhemer,r=jld,r=smaug,r=dkeeler,r=jmaher,p=ally)
HSTS priming changes the order of mixed-content blocking and HSTS
upgrades, and adds a priming request to check if a mixed-content load is
accesible over HTTPS and the server supports upgrading via the
Strict-Transport-Security header.
Every call site that uses AsyncOpen2 passes through the mixed-content
blocker, and has a LoadInfo. If the mixed-content blocker marks the load as
needing HSTS priming, nsHttpChannel will build and send an HSTS priming
request on the same URI with the scheme upgraded to HTTPS. If the server
allows the upgrade, then channel performs an internal redirect to the HTTPS URI,
otherwise use the result of mixed-content blocker to allow or block the
load.
nsISiteSecurityService adds an optional boolean out parameter to
determine if the HSTS state is already cached for negative assertions.
If the host has been probed within the previous 24 hours, no HSTS
priming check will be sent.
(r=ckerschb,r=mayhemer,r=jld,r=smaug,r=dkeeler,r=jmaher,p=ally)
Callers should use a UniquePtr to hold the platform handle.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 6BWnyAf4b3a
--HG--
extra : transplant_source : %26%CA%0D%28%08%9BT%97Z%A1%3Dq%CD%21%A1_%EFE%83%0E
extra : histedit_source : 77f8ed3d0fdec6cce0c95469130ade0fb547bb91
The WebRTC implementation inherits cipher suite preferences from PSM and then
enables a few mandatory ones and disables a number of undesirable ones. If PSM
makes a change to a cipher suite preference that isn't in WebRTC's whitelist or
blacklist, compatibility issues can arise. See bug 1288246 for an example.
--HG--
rename : security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_fallback_cipher.js => security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/test_weak_crypto.js
Bug 1084025 added this telemetry to measure the impact of bumping the fallback limit.
But we already bumped the fallback limit to TLS 1.2 long before. We will not need this kind of telemetry until we bump the fallback limit to TLS 1.3 that will not happen in the near future. So let's just remove wasting resource for now.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 22o8FirlYql
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : c04b6a7aa7bf8970b22c24dcb1d8f0184330cb43
nsIX509Cert provided the APIs getUsagesArray, requestUsagesArrayAsync, and
getUsagesString. These APIs were problematic in that the synchronous ones would
cause certificate verification to block the main thread and the asynchronous one
was needlessly indirect in its definition (it made use of two additional
special-case xpidl types) and needlessly complex in its implementation (it
required nsNSSComponent to manually manage a background thread without the aid
of recent improvements in that area (e.g. CryptoTask)). Furthermore, these APIs
would return string descriptions of the usages the certificate in question had
been verified for rather than using more concrete identifiers or values. This
paradigm is usable but imprecise. The new nsIX509CertDB API
asyncVerifyCertAtTime is much more expressive, enforces off-main-thread
computation, and makes use of CryptoTask for a simple implementation. Using this
API, previous uses of the old nsIX509Cert APIs can be replaced. As an additional
benefit, this removes a ton of obsolete C++ code.
MozReview-Commit-ID: KXVTcjAKehu
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 50c51f73b2b61ed0ad4dc9702cc5df470ce998bc
The changes in bug 1217602 missed that browser_certViewer.js should have been
updated to use a nsIDialogParamBlock instead of a (mock) nsIPKIParamBlock.
"Luckily" the test harness completely ignored the errors resulting from this
oversight.
MozReview-Commit-ID: JlA62L5PPW8
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : ec06cd026f3aec8cc7a7c032cd1c9a9c5a8e9536
This removes the unnecessary setting of c-basic-offset from all
python-mode files.
This was automatically generated using
perl -pi -e 's/; *c-basic-offset: *[0-9]+//'
... on the affected files.
The bulk of these files are moz.build files but there a few others as
well.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 2pPf3DEiZqx
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 0a7dcac80b924174a2c429b093791148ea6ac204
fork() will now fail with EPERM instead of crashing; see code comment
and bug for more info. Tested with GTK3 Oxygen theme and SCIM, which
both seem to work. Also verified that GMP child processes still crash
on fork().
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 267c4cb892b691502a9d7760bca4d23fee3fe449
PSM JS code already pass these rules, so enabling these rules will just help
catch future bugs.
MozReview-Commit-ID: AXM2VoG8jBP
--HG--
extra : transplant_source : 4h%89%5BV7%C6%FB%B2%80%CE%B16%DC%22%BA%20%09%FB%92