Right now, a lot of test code relies on side-effects of SpecialPowers being
loaded into frame script globals. In particular:
- It forces permissive COWs from those scopes, which allows frame scripts to
pass objects from those scopes to unprivileged content that they otherwise
wouldn't.
- It imports a bunch of helper modules and WebIDL globals which would
otherwise not be available.
Fortunately, this seems to only impact test code at this point. But there's a
real down-the-road risk of it impacting shipping code, which ends up working
in automation due to the side-effects of SpecialPowers, but failing in real
world use.
MozReview-Commit-ID: G27eSSOHymX
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 1702e63fed719fc92def2bdbbb8a7c53572432db
extra : source : 41bedc526dd6ec6b7e8c7be1c832ac60c81d6263
Adds a test to validate that content sandboxing is allowing content
processes to access fonts from non-standard locations on the
filesystem. The test copies the Fira Sans font to the root of the
home directory and renders a page that should use Fira Sans when it
is installed and registered with the OS. The test checks for the use
of the ".LastResort" font which is an indication of the the content
process failing to load the font.
MozReview-Commit-ID: GPWqHdF3vhG
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : c0ea283d496517812202d068c610bdcc0ece640d
With this change, the macOS content sandbox has no ability to create files
anywhere on disk (in release builds). If the content process needs a file to
write to, it needs to obtain a file descriptor from the parent process.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 7LoG1PW0UDR
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 4ac0a7f187d45c9b6c0f8a658edfdae0509054ac
This was done using the following script:
37e3803c7a/processors/chromeutils-import.jsm
MozReview-Commit-ID: 1Nc3XDu0wGl
--HG--
extra : source : 12fc4dee861c812fd2bd032c63ef17af61800c70
extra : intermediate-source : 34c999fa006bffe8705cf50c54708aa21a962e62
extra : histedit_source : b2be2c5e5d226e6c347312456a6ae339c1e634b0
This was done using the following script:
37e3803c7a/processors/chromeutils-import.jsm
MozReview-Commit-ID: 1Nc3XDu0wGl
--HG--
extra : source : 12fc4dee861c812fd2bd032c63ef17af61800c70
This was done using the following script:
37e3803c7a/processors/chromeutils-import.jsm
MozReview-Commit-ID: 1Nc3XDu0wGl
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : c004a023389f1f6bf3d2f3efe93c13d423b23ccd
Enable sandbox read access extensions to allow content processes
to access fonts stored in non-standard locations without whitelisting
hardcoded directories. This is needed for configurations with third
party font managers that store fonts in their own directories or
user-specified directories.
Now that font access is not dependent on the filename extension
such as .otf and .ttf, remove the relevent tests.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 8hSMrocGwIm
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : b757480398e3f0d9720ab845e9f10fb70a794d77
Fix the file access check by adding missing parentheses to isDirectory method call.
Don't run the cookies file check on Linux because the test profile is read accessible due to being in /tmp.
MozReview-Commit-ID: lps2hk8f5U
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 5fba75d65081e56df5a0d171c41689c489a3aace
This mechanically replaces nsILocalFile with nsIFile in
*.js, *.jsm, *.sjs, *.html, *.xul, *.xml, and *.py.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 4ecl3RZhOwC
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 412880ea27766118c38498d021331a3df6bccc70
This specifically disallows the creation of ttys and symlinks. Writable
directories are needed for plugins, which lazily create the plugintmp directory.
If/when the plugin API surface is reduced we can restrict down to just regular
files.
MozReview-Commit-ID: Ec6qeaiHSsB
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 252a3cbf7954b9c09092b896ef8af45310438a86
On macOS, the file-write* permission type contains numerous sub-permissions (see
bug for full listing). Restrict the ones we allow to only the two we need:
file-write-create and file-write-data. This primarily reduces kernel attack
surface, I'm not aware of any bad things that could be done directly with the
removed permissions.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 3VvjFesy2qx
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 934ec17c44c9ef3d7fab29919d66cf1a55d57697
If the "security.sandbox.content.level" preference is set to a value less than
1, all consumers will automatically treat it as if it were level 1. On Linux and
Nightly builds, setting the sandbox level to 0 is still allowed, for now.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 9QNTCkdbTfm
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : cd5a853c46a5cd334504b339bef8df30a3cabe51
If the "security.sandbox.content.level" preference is set to a value less than
1, all consumers will automatically treat it as if it were level 1. On Linux and
Nightly builds, setting the sandbox level to 0 is still allowed, for now.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 9QNTCkdbTfm
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 1a26ffc5b9f80e6df4c37c23f506e907ba44053a
Removes read access to /private/var and its subdirectories from
the content process under the level 3 Mac sandbox. Still permits
reading of file metadata within the majority of /private/var.
Adds tests to validate the level 3 Mac content sandbox prevents
reading from /private.
MozReview-Commit-ID: FO5dz0F7dl4
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : 226f8de6d4d88f188c272a3e119ed7b8bac292df
Remove reading of "~/Library/Caches/TemporaryItems" from level 3 and update
sandboxing filesystem test to check ~/Library/Caches/TemporaryItems readability.
MozReview-Commit-ID: 6EMzH7brSnp
--HG--
extra : rebase_source : f97b5625da2abda73decc969fc581c2bf858183f
Mark Banner
Kris Maglione
Sylvestre Ledru
Haik Aftandilian
Jared Wein
Alex Gaynor
Gian-Carlo Pascutto
Cosmin Sabou
Brindusan Cristian
Csoregi Natalia
Sebastian Hengst
Masatoshi Kimura
Bob Owen
Florian Quèze
Christoph Kerschbaumer
Hemant Singh Patwal
Wes Kocher