/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ /* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "nsNSSCertificateDB.h" #include "AppTrustDomain.h" #include "base64.h" #include "certdb.h" #include "CryptoTask.h" #include "mozilla/RefPtr.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h" #include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h" #include "nsCOMPtr.h" #include "nsDataSignatureVerifier.h" #include "nsHashKeys.h" #include "nsIFile.h" #include "nsIFileStreams.h" #include "nsIInputStream.h" #include "nsIStringEnumerator.h" #include "nsIDirectoryEnumerator.h" #include "nsIZipReader.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h" #include "nsNSSCertificate.h" #include "nsProxyRelease.h" #include "nssb64.h" #include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h" #include "nsString.h" #include "nsTHashtable.h" #include "plstr.h" #include "mozilla/Logging.h" #include "pkix/pkix.h" #include "pkix/pkixnss.h" #include "secmime.h" using namespace mozilla::pkix; using namespace mozilla; using namespace mozilla::psm; extern PRLogModuleInfo* gPIPNSSLog; namespace { // Reads a maximum of 1MB from a stream into the supplied buffer. // The reason for the 1MB limit is because this function is used to read // signature-related files and we want to avoid OOM. The uncompressed length of // an entry can be hundreds of times larger than the compressed version, // especially if someone has specifically crafted the entry to cause OOM or to // consume massive amounts of disk space. // // @param stream The input stream to read from. // @param buf The buffer that we read the stream into, which must have // already been allocated. nsresult ReadStream(const nsCOMPtr& stream, /*out*/ SECItem& buf) { // The size returned by Available() might be inaccurate so we need // to check that Available() matches up with the actual length of // the file. uint64_t length; nsresult rv = stream->Available(&length); if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { return rv; } // Cap the maximum accepted size of signature-related files at 1MB (which is // still crazily huge) to avoid OOM. The uncompressed length of an entry can be // hundreds of times larger than the compressed version, especially if // someone has speifically crafted the entry to cause OOM or to consume // massive amounts of disk space. static const uint32_t MAX_LENGTH = 1024 * 1024; if (length > MAX_LENGTH) { return NS_ERROR_FILE_TOO_BIG; } // With bug 164695 in mind we +1 to leave room for null-terminating // the buffer. SECITEM_AllocItem(buf, static_cast(length + 1)); // buf.len == length + 1. We attempt to read length + 1 bytes // instead of length, so that we can check whether the metadata for // the entry is incorrect. uint32_t bytesRead; rv = stream->Read(char_ptr_cast(buf.data), buf.len, &bytesRead); if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { return rv; } if (bytesRead != length) { return NS_ERROR_FILE_CORRUPTED; } buf.data[buf.len - 1] = 0; // null-terminate return NS_OK; } // Finds exactly one (signature metadata) JAR entry that matches the given // search pattern, and then load it. Fails if there are no matches or if // there is more than one match. If bugDigest is not null then on success // bufDigest will contain the SHA-1 digeset of the entry. nsresult FindAndLoadOneEntry(nsIZipReader * zip, const nsACString & searchPattern, /*out*/ nsACString & filename, /*out*/ SECItem & buf, /*optional, out*/ Digest * bufDigest) { nsCOMPtr files; nsresult rv = zip->FindEntries(searchPattern, getter_AddRefs(files)); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } bool more; rv = files->HasMore(&more); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (!more) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } rv = files->GetNext(filename); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Check if there is more than one match, if so then error! rv = files->HasMore(&more); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (more) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } nsCOMPtr stream; rv = zip->GetInputStream(filename, getter_AddRefs(stream)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = ReadStream(stream, buf); if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID; } if (bufDigest) { rv = bufDigest->DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, buf.data, buf.len - 1); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } return NS_OK; } // Verify the digest of an entry. We avoid loading the entire entry into memory // at once, which would require memory in proportion to the size of the largest // entry. Instead, we require only a small, fixed amount of memory. // // @param stream an input stream from a JAR entry or file depending on whether // it is from a signed archive or unpacked into a directory // @param digestFromManifest The digest that we're supposed to check the file's // contents against, from the manifest // @param buf A scratch buffer that we use for doing the I/O, which must have // already been allocated. The size of this buffer is the unit // size of our I/O. nsresult VerifyStreamContentDigest(nsIInputStream* stream, const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf) { MOZ_ASSERT(buf.len > 0); if (digestFromManifest.len != SHA1_LENGTH) return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; nsresult rv; uint64_t len64; rv = stream->Available(&len64); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (len64 > UINT32_MAX) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_TOO_LARGE; } ScopedPK11Context digestContext(PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA1)); if (!digestContext) { return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(PR_GetError()); } rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestBegin(digestContext)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); uint64_t totalBytesRead = 0; for (;;) { uint32_t bytesRead; rv = stream->Read(char_ptr_cast(buf.data), buf.len, &bytesRead); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (bytesRead == 0) { break; // EOF } totalBytesRead += bytesRead; if (totalBytesRead >= UINT32_MAX) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_TOO_LARGE; } rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestOp(digestContext, buf.data, bytesRead)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } if (totalBytesRead != len64) { // The metadata we used for Available() doesn't match the actual size of // the entry. return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID; } // Verify that the digests match. Digest digest; rv = digest.End(SEC_OID_SHA1, digestContext); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&digestFromManifest, &digest.get()) != SECEqual) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MODIFIED_ENTRY; } return NS_OK; } nsresult VerifyEntryContentDigest(nsIZipReader* zip, const nsACString& aFilename, const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf) { nsCOMPtr stream; nsresult rv = zip->GetInputStream(aFilename, getter_AddRefs(stream)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING; } return VerifyStreamContentDigest(stream, digestFromManifest, buf); } // @oaram aDir directory containing the unpacked signed archive // @param aFilename path of the target file relative to aDir // @param digestFromManifest The digest that we're supposed to check the file's // contents against, from the manifest // @param buf A scratch buffer that we use for doing the I/O nsresult VerifyFileContentDigest(nsIFile* aDir, const nsAString& aFilename, const SECItem& digestFromManifest, SECItem& buf) { // Find the file corresponding to the manifest path nsCOMPtr file; nsresult rv = aDir->Clone(getter_AddRefs(file)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // We don't know how to handle JARs with signed directory entries. // It's technically possible in the manifest but makes no sense on disk. // Inside an archive we just ignore them, but here we have to treat it // as an error because the signed bytes never got unpacked. int32_t pos = 0; int32_t slash; int32_t namelen = aFilename.Length(); if (namelen == 0 || aFilename[namelen - 1] == '/') { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID; } // Append path segments one by one do { slash = aFilename.FindChar('/', pos); int32_t segend = (slash == kNotFound) ? namelen : slash; rv = file->Append(Substring(aFilename, pos, (segend - pos))); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID; } pos = slash + 1; } while (pos < namelen && slash != kNotFound); bool exists; rv = file->Exists(&exists); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING; } bool isDir; rv = file->IsDirectory(&isDir); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || isDir) { // We only support signed files, not directory entries return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID; } // Open an input stream for that file and verify it. nsCOMPtr stream; rv = NS_NewLocalFileInputStream(getter_AddRefs(stream), file, -1, -1, nsIFileInputStream::CLOSE_ON_EOF); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !stream) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING; } return VerifyStreamContentDigest(stream, digestFromManifest, buf); } // On input, nextLineStart is the start of the current line. On output, // nextLineStart is the start of the next line. nsresult ReadLine(/*in/out*/ const char* & nextLineStart, /*out*/ nsCString & line, bool allowContinuations = true) { line.Truncate(); size_t previousLength = 0; size_t currentLength = 0; for (;;) { const char* eol = PL_strpbrk(nextLineStart, "\r\n"); if (!eol) { // Reached end of file before newline eol = nextLineStart + strlen(nextLineStart); } previousLength = currentLength; line.Append(nextLineStart, eol - nextLineStart); currentLength = line.Length(); // The spec says "No line may be longer than 72 bytes (not characters)" // in its UTF8-encoded form. static const size_t lineLimit = 72; if (currentLength - previousLength > lineLimit) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } // The spec says: "Implementations should support 65535-byte // (not character) header values..." if (currentLength > 65535) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } if (*eol == '\r') { ++eol; } if (*eol == '\n') { ++eol; } nextLineStart = eol; if (*eol != ' ') { // not a continuation return NS_OK; } // continuation if (!allowContinuations) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } ++nextLineStart; // skip space and keep appending } } // The header strings are defined in the JAR specification. #define JAR_MF_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/(M|m)(ANIFEST|anifest).(MF|mf)$" #define JAR_SF_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/*.(SF|sf)$" #define JAR_RSA_SEARCH_STRING "(M|/M)ETA-INF/*.(RSA|rsa)$" #define JAR_META_DIR "META-INF" #define JAR_MF_HEADER "Manifest-Version: 1.0" #define JAR_SF_HEADER "Signature-Version: 1.0" nsresult ParseAttribute(const nsAutoCString & curLine, /*out*/ nsAutoCString & attrName, /*out*/ nsAutoCString & attrValue) { // Find the colon that separates the name from the value. int32_t colonPos = curLine.FindChar(':'); if (colonPos == kNotFound) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } // set attrName to the name, skipping spaces between the name and colon int32_t nameEnd = colonPos; for (;;) { if (nameEnd == 0) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; // colon with no name } if (curLine[nameEnd - 1] != ' ') break; --nameEnd; } curLine.Left(attrName, nameEnd); // Set attrValue to the value, skipping spaces between the colon and the // value. The value may be empty. int32_t valueStart = colonPos + 1; int32_t curLineLength = curLine.Length(); while (valueStart != curLineLength && curLine[valueStart] == ' ') { ++valueStart; } curLine.Right(attrValue, curLineLength - valueStart); return NS_OK; } // Parses the version line of the MF or SF header. nsresult CheckManifestVersion(const char* & nextLineStart, const nsACString & expectedHeader) { // The JAR spec says: "Manifest-Version and Signature-Version must be first, // and in exactly that case (so that they can be recognized easily as magic // strings)." nsAutoCString curLine; nsresult rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine, false); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } if (!curLine.Equals(expectedHeader)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } return NS_OK; } // Parses a signature file (SF) as defined in the JDK 8 JAR Specification. // // The SF file *must* contain exactly one SHA1-Digest-Manifest attribute in // the main section. All other sections are ignored. This means that this will // NOT parse old-style signature files that have separate digests per entry. // The JDK8 x-Digest-Manifest variant is better because: // // (1) It allows us to follow the principle that we should minimize the // processing of data that we do before we verify its signature. In // particular, with the x-Digest-Manifest style, we can verify the digest // of MANIFEST.MF before we parse it, which prevents malicious JARs // exploiting our MANIFEST.MF parser. // (2) It is more time-efficient and space-efficient to have one // x-Digest-Manifest instead of multiple x-Digest values. // // In order to get benefit (1), we do NOT implement the fallback to the older // mechanism as the spec requires/suggests. Also, for simplity's sake, we only // support exactly one SHA1-Digest-Manifest attribute, and no other // algorithms. // // filebuf must be null-terminated. On output, mfDigest will contain the // decoded value of SHA1-Digest-Manifest. nsresult ParseSF(const char* filebuf, /*out*/ SECItem & mfDigest) { nsresult rv; const char* nextLineStart = filebuf; rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_SF_HEADER)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; // Find SHA1-Digest-Manifest for (;;) { nsAutoCString curLine; rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } if (curLine.Length() == 0) { // End of main section (blank line or end-of-file), and no // SHA1-Digest-Manifest found. return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } nsAutoCString attrName; nsAutoCString attrValue; rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest-manifest")) { rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&mfDigest, attrValue.get())); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // There could be multiple SHA1-Digest-Manifest attributes, which // would be an error, but it's better to just skip any erroneous // duplicate entries rather than trying to detect them, because: // // (1) It's simpler, and simpler generally means more secure // (2) An attacker can't make us accept a JAR we would otherwise // reject just by adding additional SHA1-Digest-Manifest // attributes. break; } // ignore unrecognized attributes } return NS_OK; } // Parses MANIFEST.MF. The filenames of all entries will be returned in // mfItems. buf must be a pre-allocated scratch buffer that is used for doing // I/O. nsresult ParseMF(const char* filebuf, nsIZipReader * zip, /*out*/ nsTHashtable & mfItems, ScopedAutoSECItem & buf) { nsresult rv; const char* nextLineStart = filebuf; rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_HEADER)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // Skip the rest of the header section, which ends with a blank line. { nsAutoCString line; do { rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, line); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } } while (line.Length() > 0); // Manifest containing no file entries is OK, though useless. if (*nextLineStart == '\0') { return NS_OK; } } nsAutoCString curItemName; ScopedAutoSECItem digest; for (;;) { nsAutoCString curLine; rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (curLine.Length() == 0) { // end of section (blank line or end-of-file) if (curItemName.Length() == 0) { // '...Each section must start with an attribute with the name as // "Name",...', so every section must have a Name attribute. return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } if (digest.len == 0) { // We require every entry to have a digest, since we require every // entry to be signed and we don't allow duplicate entries. return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } if (mfItems.Contains(curItemName)) { // Duplicate entry return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } // Verify that the entry's content digest matches the digest from this // MF section. rv = VerifyEntryContentDigest(zip, curItemName, digest, buf); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; mfItems.PutEntry(curItemName); if (*nextLineStart == '\0') // end-of-file break; // reset so we know we haven't encountered either of these for the next // item yet. curItemName.Truncate(); digest.reset(); continue; // skip the rest of the loop below } nsAutoCString attrName; nsAutoCString attrValue; rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // Lines to look for: // (1) Digest: if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest")) { if (digest.len > 0) // multiple SHA1 digests in section return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&digest, attrValue.get())); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; continue; } // (2) Name: associates this manifest section with a file in the jar. if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("name")) { if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(curItemName.Length() > 0)) // multiple names in section return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(attrValue.Length() == 0)) return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; curItemName = attrValue; continue; } // (3) Magic: the only other must-understand attribute if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("magic")) { // We don't understand any magic, so we can't verify an entry that // requires magic. Since we require every entry to have a valid // signature, we have no choice but to reject the entry. return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } // unrecognized attributes must be ignored } return NS_OK; } struct VerifyCertificateContext { AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot; ScopedCERTCertList& builtChain; }; nsresult VerifyCertificate(CERTCertificate* signerCert, void* voidContext, void* pinArg) { // TODO: null pinArg is tolerated. if (NS_WARN_IF(!signerCert) || NS_WARN_IF(!voidContext)) { return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; } const VerifyCertificateContext& context = *reinterpret_cast(voidContext); AppTrustDomain trustDomain(context.builtChain, pinArg); if (trustDomain.SetTrustedRoot(context.trustedRoot) != SECSuccess) { return MapSECStatus(SECFailure); } Input certDER; Result rv = certDER.Init(signerCert->derCert.data, signerCert->derCert.len); if (rv != Success) { return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv)); } rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, Now(), EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, KeyUsage::digitalSignature, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_codeSigning, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, nullptr/*stapledOCSPResponse*/); if (rv != Success) { return mozilla::psm::GetXPCOMFromNSSError(MapResultToPRErrorCode(rv)); } return NS_OK; } nsresult VerifySignature(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot, const SECItem& buffer, const SECItem& detachedDigest, /*out*/ ScopedCERTCertList& builtChain) { VerifyCertificateContext context = { trustedRoot, builtChain }; // XXX: missing pinArg return VerifyCMSDetachedSignatureIncludingCertificate(buffer, detachedDigest, VerifyCertificate, &context, nullptr); } NS_IMETHODIMP OpenSignedAppFile(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile, /*out, optional */ nsIZipReader** aZipReader, /*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert) { NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aJarFile); if (aZipReader) { *aZipReader = nullptr; } if (aSignerCert) { *aSignerCert = nullptr; } nsresult rv; static NS_DEFINE_CID(kZipReaderCID, NS_ZIPREADER_CID); nsCOMPtr zip = do_CreateInstance(kZipReaderCID, &rv); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = zip->Open(aJarFile); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Signature (RSA) file nsAutoCString sigFilename; ScopedAutoSECItem sigBuffer; rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, nsLiteralCString(JAR_RSA_SEARCH_STRING), sigFilename, sigBuffer, nullptr); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED; } // Signature (SF) file nsAutoCString sfFilename; ScopedAutoSECItem sfBuffer; Digest sfCalculatedDigest; rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_SF_SEARCH_STRING), sfFilename, sfBuffer, &sfCalculatedDigest); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } sigBuffer.type = siBuffer; ScopedCERTCertList builtChain; rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, sigBuffer, sfCalculatedDigest.get(), builtChain); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } ScopedAutoSECItem mfDigest; rv = ParseSF(char_ptr_cast(sfBuffer.data), mfDigest); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // Manifest (MF) file nsAutoCString mfFilename; ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer; Digest mfCalculatedDigest; rv = FindAndLoadOneEntry(zip, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_SEARCH_STRING), mfFilename, manifestBuffer, &mfCalculatedDigest); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&mfDigest, &mfCalculatedDigest.get()) != SECEqual) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } // Allocate the I/O buffer only once per JAR, instead of once per entry, in // order to minimize malloc/free calls and in order to avoid fragmenting // memory. ScopedAutoSECItem buf(128 * 1024); nsTHashtable items; rv = ParseMF(char_ptr_cast(manifestBuffer.data), zip, items, buf); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // Verify every entry in the file. nsCOMPtr entries; rv = zip->FindEntries(EmptyCString(), getter_AddRefs(entries)); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !entries) { rv = NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; } if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } for (;;) { bool hasMore; rv = entries->HasMore(&hasMore); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (!hasMore) { break; } nsAutoCString entryFilename; rv = entries->GetNext(entryFilename); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Verifying digests for %s", entryFilename.get())); // The files that comprise the signature mechanism are not covered by the // signature. // // XXX: This is OK for a single signature, but doesn't work for // multiple signatures, because the metadata for the other signatures // is not signed either. if (entryFilename == mfFilename || entryFilename == sfFilename || entryFilename == sigFilename) { continue; } if (entryFilename.Length() == 0) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_INVALID; } // Entries with names that end in "/" are directory entries, which are not // signed. // // XXX: As long as we don't unpack the JAR into the filesystem, the "/" // entries are harmless. But, it is not clear what the security // implications of directory entries are if/when we were to unpackage the // JAR into the filesystem. if (entryFilename[entryFilename.Length() - 1] == '/') { continue; } nsCStringHashKey * item = items.GetEntry(entryFilename); if (!item) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_UNSIGNED_ENTRY; } // Remove the item so we can check for leftover items later items.RemoveEntry(entryFilename); } // We verified that every entry that we require to be signed is signed. But, // were there any missing entries--that is, entries that are mentioned in the // manifest but missing from the archive? if (items.Count() != 0) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING; } // Return the reader to the caller if they want it if (aZipReader) { zip.forget(aZipReader); } // Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it. // XXX: We should return an nsIX509CertList with the whole validated chain. if (aSignerCert) { MOZ_ASSERT(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain)); nsCOMPtr signerCert = nsNSSCertificate::Create(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain)->cert); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(signerCert, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY); signerCert.forget(aSignerCert); } return NS_OK; } nsresult VerifySignedManifest(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIInputStream* aManifestStream, nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream, /*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert) { NS_ENSURE_ARG(aManifestStream); NS_ENSURE_ARG(aSignatureStream); if (aSignerCert) { *aSignerCert = nullptr; } // Load signature file in buffer ScopedAutoSECItem signatureBuffer; nsresult rv = ReadStream(aSignatureStream, signatureBuffer); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } signatureBuffer.type = siBuffer; // Load manifest file in buffer ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer; rv = ReadStream(aManifestStream, manifestBuffer); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // Calculate SHA1 digest of the manifest buffer Digest manifestCalculatedDigest; rv = manifestCalculatedDigest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, manifestBuffer.data, manifestBuffer.len - 1); // buffer is null terminated if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { return rv; } // Get base64 encoded string from manifest buffer digest UniquePtr base64EncDigest(NSSBase64_EncodeItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0, const_cast(&manifestCalculatedDigest.get())), PORT_Free); if (NS_WARN_IF(!base64EncDigest)) { return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } // Calculate SHA1 digest of the base64 encoded string Digest doubleDigest; rv = doubleDigest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, reinterpret_cast(base64EncDigest.get()), strlen(base64EncDigest.get())); if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) { return rv; } // Verify the manifest signature (signed digest of the base64 encoded string) ScopedCERTCertList builtChain; rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, signatureBuffer, doubleDigest.get(), builtChain); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it. if (aSignerCert) { MOZ_ASSERT(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain)); nsCOMPtr signerCert = nsNSSCertificate::Create(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain)->cert); if (NS_WARN_IF(!signerCert)) { return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } signerCert.forget(aSignerCert); } return NS_OK; } class OpenSignedAppFileTask final : public CryptoTask { public: OpenSignedAppFileTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile, nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback* aCallback) : mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot) , mJarFile(aJarFile) , mCallback(new nsMainThreadPtrHolder(aCallback)) { } private: virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override { return OpenSignedAppFile(mTrustedRoot, mJarFile, getter_AddRefs(mZipReader), getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert)); } // nsNSSCertificate implements nsNSSShutdownObject, so there's nothing that // needs to be released virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { } virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override { (void) mCallback->OpenSignedAppFileFinished(rv, mZipReader, mSignerCert); } const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot; const nsCOMPtr mJarFile; nsMainThreadPtrHandle mCallback; nsCOMPtr mZipReader; // out nsCOMPtr mSignerCert; // out }; class VerifySignedmanifestTask final : public CryptoTask { public: VerifySignedmanifestTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIInputStream* aManifestStream, nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream, nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback* aCallback) : mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot) , mManifestStream(aManifestStream) , mSignatureStream(aSignatureStream) , mCallback( new nsMainThreadPtrHolder(aCallback)) { } private: virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override { return VerifySignedManifest(mTrustedRoot, mManifestStream, mSignatureStream, getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert)); } // nsNSSCertificate implements nsNSSShutdownObject, so there's nothing that // needs to be released virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { } virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override { (void) mCallback->VerifySignedManifestFinished(rv, mSignerCert); } const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot; const nsCOMPtr mManifestStream; const nsCOMPtr mSignatureStream; nsMainThreadPtrHandle mCallback; nsCOMPtr mSignerCert; // out }; } // unnamed namespace NS_IMETHODIMP nsNSSCertificateDB::OpenSignedAppFileAsync( AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aJarFile, nsIOpenSignedAppFileCallback* aCallback) { NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aJarFile); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback); RefPtr task(new OpenSignedAppFileTask(aTrustedRoot, aJarFile, aCallback)); return task->Dispatch("SignedJAR"); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsNSSCertificateDB::VerifySignedManifestAsync( AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIInputStream* aManifestStream, nsIInputStream* aSignatureStream, nsIVerifySignedManifestCallback* aCallback) { NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aManifestStream); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aSignatureStream); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback); RefPtr task( new VerifySignedmanifestTask(aTrustedRoot, aManifestStream, aSignatureStream, aCallback)); return task->Dispatch("SignedManifest"); } // // Signature verification for archives unpacked into a file structure // // Finds the "*.rsa" signature file in the META-INF directory and returns // the name. It is an error if there are none or more than one .rsa file nsresult FindSignatureFilename(nsIFile* aMetaDir, /*out*/ nsAString& aFilename) { nsCOMPtr entries; nsresult rv = aMetaDir->GetDirectoryEntries(getter_AddRefs(entries)); nsCOMPtr files = do_QueryInterface(entries); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED; } bool found = false; nsCOMPtr file; rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file)); while (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && file) { nsAutoString leafname; rv = file->GetLeafName(leafname); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { if (StringEndsWith(leafname, NS_LITERAL_STRING(".rsa"))) { if (!found) { found = true; aFilename = leafname; } else { // second signature file is an error rv = NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; break; } } rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file)); } } if (!found) { rv = NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED; } files->Close(); return rv; } // Loads the signature metadata file that matches the given filename in // the passed-in Meta-inf directory. If bufDigest is not null then on // success bufDigest will contain the SHA-1 digest of the entry. nsresult LoadOneMetafile(nsIFile* aMetaDir, const nsAString& aFilename, /*out*/ SECItem& aBuf, /*optional, out*/ Digest* aBufDigest) { nsCOMPtr metafile; nsresult rv = aMetaDir->Clone(getter_AddRefs(metafile)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = metafile->Append(aFilename); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); bool exists; rv = metafile->Exists(&exists); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) { // we can call a missing .rsa file "unsigned" but FindSignatureFilename() // already found one: missing other metadata files means a broken signature. return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } nsCOMPtr stream; rv = NS_NewLocalFileInputStream(getter_AddRefs(stream), metafile); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = ReadStream(stream, aBuf); stream->Close(); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (aBufDigest) { rv = aBufDigest->DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA1, aBuf.data, aBuf.len - 1); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } return NS_OK; } // Parses MANIFEST.MF and verifies the contents of the unpacked files // listed in the manifest. // The filenames of all entries will be returned in aMfItems. aBuf must // be a pre-allocated scratch buffer that is used for doing I/O. nsresult ParseMFUnpacked(const char* aFilebuf, nsIFile* aDir, /*out*/ nsTHashtable& aMfItems, ScopedAutoSECItem& aBuf) { nsresult rv; const char* nextLineStart = aFilebuf; rv = CheckManifestVersion(nextLineStart, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(JAR_MF_HEADER)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // Skip the rest of the header section, which ends with a blank line. { nsAutoCString line; do { rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, line); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } } while (line.Length() > 0); // Manifest containing no file entries is OK, though useless. if (*nextLineStart == '\0') { return NS_OK; } } nsAutoString curItemName; ScopedAutoSECItem digest; for (;;) { nsAutoCString curLine; rv = ReadLine(nextLineStart, curLine); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } if (curLine.Length() == 0) { // end of section (blank line or end-of-file) if (curItemName.Length() == 0) { // '...Each section must start with an attribute with the name as // "Name",...', so every section must have a Name attribute. return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } if (digest.len == 0) { // We require every entry to have a digest, since we require every // entry to be signed and we don't allow duplicate entries. return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } if (aMfItems.Contains(curItemName)) { // Duplicate entry return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } // Verify that the file's content digest matches the digest from this // MF section. rv = VerifyFileContentDigest(aDir, curItemName, digest, aBuf); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } aMfItems.PutEntry(curItemName); if (*nextLineStart == '\0') { // end-of-file break; } // reset so we know we haven't encountered either of these for the next // item yet. curItemName.Truncate(); digest.reset(); continue; // skip the rest of the loop below } nsAutoCString attrName; nsAutoCString attrValue; rv = ParseAttribute(curLine, attrName, attrValue); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // Lines to look for: // (1) Digest: if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sha1-digest")) { if (digest.len > 0) { // multiple SHA1 digests in section return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } rv = MapSECStatus(ATOB_ConvertAsciiToItem(&digest, attrValue.get())); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } continue; } // (2) Name: associates this manifest section with a file in the jar. if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("name")) { if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(curItemName.Length() > 0)) { // multiple names in section return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(attrValue.Length() == 0)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } curItemName = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(attrValue); continue; } // (3) Magic: the only other must-understand attribute if (attrName.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("magic")) { // We don't understand any magic, so we can't verify an entry that // requires magic. Since we require every entry to have a valid // signature, we have no choice but to reject the entry. return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } // unrecognized attributes must be ignored } return NS_OK; } // recursively check a directory tree for files not in the list of // verified files we found in the manifest. For each file we find // Check it against the files found in the manifest. If the file wasn't // in the manifest then it's unsigned and we can stop looking. Otherwise // remove it from the collection so we can check leftovers later. // // @param aDir Directory to check // @param aPath Relative path to that directory (to check against aItems) // @param aItems All the files found // @param *Filename signature files that won't be in the manifest nsresult CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(nsIFile* aDir, const nsString& aPath, /* in/out */ nsTHashtable& aItems, const nsAString& sigFilename, const nsAString& sfFilename, const nsAString& mfFilename) { nsCOMPtr entries; nsresult rv = aDir->GetDirectoryEntries(getter_AddRefs(entries)); nsCOMPtr files = do_QueryInterface(entries); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !files) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING; } bool inMeta = StringBeginsWith(aPath, NS_LITERAL_STRING(JAR_META_DIR)); while (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { nsCOMPtr file; rv = files->GetNextFile(getter_AddRefs(file)); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !file) { break; } nsAutoString leafname; rv = file->GetLeafName(leafname); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } nsAutoString curName(aPath + leafname); bool isDir; rv = file->IsDirectory(&isDir); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // if it's a directory we need to recurse if (isDir) { curName.Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING("/")); rv = CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(file, curName, aItems, sigFilename, sfFilename, mfFilename); } else { // The files that comprise the signature mechanism are not covered by the // signature. // // XXX: This is OK for a single signature, but doesn't work for // multiple signatures because the metadata for the other signatures // is not signed either. if (inMeta && ( leafname == sigFilename || leafname == sfFilename || leafname == mfFilename )) { continue; } // make sure the current file was found in the manifest nsStringHashKey* item = aItems.GetEntry(curName); if (!item) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_UNSIGNED_ENTRY; } // Remove the item so we can check for leftover items later aItems.RemoveEntry(curName); } } files->Close(); return rv; } /* * Verify the signature of a directory structure as if it were a * signed JAR file (used for unpacked JARs) */ nsresult VerifySignedDirectory(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aDirectory, /*out, optional */ nsIX509Cert** aSignerCert) { NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aDirectory); if (aSignerCert) { *aSignerCert = nullptr; } // Make sure there's a META-INF directory nsCOMPtr metaDir; nsresult rv = aDirectory->Clone(getter_AddRefs(metaDir)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } rv = metaDir->Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING(JAR_META_DIR)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } bool exists; rv = metaDir->Exists(&exists); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !exists) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED; } bool isDirectory; rv = metaDir->IsDirectory(&isDirectory); if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !isDirectory) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED; } // Find and load the Signature (RSA) file nsAutoString sigFilename; rv = FindSignatureFilename(metaDir, sigFilename); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } ScopedAutoSECItem sigBuffer; rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, sigFilename, sigBuffer, nullptr); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_NOT_SIGNED; } // Load the signature (SF) file and verify the signature. // The .sf and .rsa files must have the same name apart from the extension. nsAutoString sfFilename(Substring(sigFilename, 0, sigFilename.Length() - 3) + NS_LITERAL_STRING("sf")); ScopedAutoSECItem sfBuffer; Digest sfCalculatedDigest; rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, sfFilename, sfBuffer, &sfCalculatedDigest); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } sigBuffer.type = siBuffer; ScopedCERTCertList builtChain; rv = VerifySignature(aTrustedRoot, sigBuffer, sfCalculatedDigest.get(), builtChain); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } // Get the expected manifest hash from the signed .sf file ScopedAutoSECItem mfDigest; rv = ParseSF(char_ptr_cast(sfBuffer.data), mfDigest); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } // Load manifest (MF) file and verify signature nsAutoString mfFilename(NS_LITERAL_STRING("manifest.mf")); ScopedAutoSECItem manifestBuffer; Digest mfCalculatedDigest; rv = LoadOneMetafile(metaDir, mfFilename, manifestBuffer, &mfCalculatedDigest); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&mfDigest, &mfCalculatedDigest.get()) != SECEqual) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_MANIFEST_INVALID; } // Parse manifest and verify signed hash of all listed files // Allocate the I/O buffer only once per JAR, instead of once per entry, in // order to minimize malloc/free calls and in order to avoid fragmenting // memory. ScopedAutoSECItem buf(128 * 1024); nsTHashtable items; rv = ParseMFUnpacked(char_ptr_cast(manifestBuffer.data), aDirectory, items, buf); if (NS_FAILED(rv)){ return rv; } // We've checked that everything listed in the manifest exists and is signed // correctly. Now check on disk for extra (unsigned) files. // Deletes found entries from items as it goes. rv = CheckDirForUnsignedFiles(aDirectory, EmptyString(), items, sigFilename, sfFilename, mfFilename); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { return rv; } // We verified that every entry that we require to be signed is signed. But, // were there any missing entries--that is, entries that are mentioned in the // manifest but missing from the directory tree? (There shouldn't be given // ParseMFUnpacked() checking them all, but it's a cheap sanity check.) if (items.Count() != 0) { return NS_ERROR_SIGNED_JAR_ENTRY_MISSING; } // Return the signer's certificate to the reader if they want it. // XXX: We should return an nsIX509CertList with the whole validated chain. if (aSignerCert) { MOZ_ASSERT(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain)); nsCOMPtr signerCert = nsNSSCertificate::Create(CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain)->cert); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(signerCert, NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY); signerCert.forget(aSignerCert); } return NS_OK; } class VerifySignedDirectoryTask final : public CryptoTask { public: VerifySignedDirectoryTask(AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aUnpackedJar, nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback* aCallback) : mTrustedRoot(aTrustedRoot) , mDirectory(aUnpackedJar) , mCallback(new nsMainThreadPtrHolder(aCallback)) { } private: virtual nsresult CalculateResult() override { return VerifySignedDirectory(mTrustedRoot, mDirectory, getter_AddRefs(mSignerCert)); } // This class doesn't directly hold NSS resources so there's nothing that // needs to be released virtual void ReleaseNSSResources() override { } virtual void CallCallback(nsresult rv) override { (void) mCallback->VerifySignedDirectoryFinished(rv, mSignerCert); } const AppTrustedRoot mTrustedRoot; const nsCOMPtr mDirectory; nsMainThreadPtrHandle mCallback; nsCOMPtr mSignerCert; // out }; NS_IMETHODIMP nsNSSCertificateDB::VerifySignedDirectoryAsync( AppTrustedRoot aTrustedRoot, nsIFile* aUnpackedJar, nsIVerifySignedDirectoryCallback* aCallback) { NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aUnpackedJar); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback); RefPtr task(new VerifySignedDirectoryTask(aTrustedRoot, aUnpackedJar, aCallback)); return task->Dispatch("UnpackedJar"); }