зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
299 строки
12 KiB
Plaintext
299 строки
12 KiB
Plaintext
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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/* Defines the abstract interface for a principal. */
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#include "nsISerializable.idl"
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%{C++
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struct JSContext;
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struct JSPrincipals;
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#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
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#include "nsTArray.h"
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%}
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interface nsIURI;
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interface nsIContentSecurityPolicy;
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[ptr] native JSContext(JSContext);
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[ptr] native JSPrincipals(JSPrincipals);
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[ptr] native PrincipalArray(nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> >);
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[scriptable, uuid(825ffce8-962d-11e1-aef3-8f2b6188709b)]
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interface nsIPrincipal : nsISerializable
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{
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/**
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* Values of capabilities for each principal. Order is
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* significant: if an operation is performed on a set
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* of capabilities, the minimum is computed.
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*/
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const short ENABLE_DENIED = 1;
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const short ENABLE_UNKNOWN = 2;
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const short ENABLE_WITH_USER_PERMISSION = 3;
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const short ENABLE_GRANTED = 4;
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/**
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* Returns the security preferences associated with this principal.
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* prefBranch will be set to the pref branch to which these preferences
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* pertain. id is a pseudo-unique identifier, pertaining to either the
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* fingerprint or the origin. subjectName is a name that identifies the
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* entity this principal represents (may be empty). grantedList and
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* deniedList are space-separated lists of capabilities which were
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* explicitly granted or denied by a pref. isTrusted is a boolean that
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* indicates whether this is a codebaseTrusted certificate.
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*/
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void getPreferences(out string prefBranch, out string id,
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out string subjectName, out string grantedList,
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out string deniedList, out boolean isTrusted);
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/**
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* Returns whether the other principal is equivalent to this principal.
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* Principals are considered equal if they are the same principal,
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* they have the same origin, or have the same certificate fingerprint ID
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*/
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boolean equals(in nsIPrincipal other);
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/**
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* Like equals, but doesn't take document.domain changes into account.
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*/
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boolean equalsIgnoringDomain(in nsIPrincipal other);
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/**
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* Returns a hash value for the principal.
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*/
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[noscript] readonly attribute unsigned long hashValue;
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/**
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* The domain security policy of the principal.
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*/
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// XXXcaa should this be here? The script security manager is the only
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// thing that should care about this. Wouldn't storing this data in one
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// of the hashtables in nsScriptSecurityManager be better?
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// XXXbz why is this writable? Who should have write access to this? What
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// happens if this principal is in our hashtable and we pass it out of the
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// security manager and someone writes to this field? Especially if they
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// write garbage? If we need to give someone other than the security
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// manager a way to set this (which I question, since it can increase the
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// permissions of a page) it should be a |void clearSecurityPolicy()|
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// method.
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[noscript] attribute voidPtr securityPolicy;
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// XXXcaa probably should be turned into {get|set}CapabilityFlags
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// XXXbz again, what if this lives in our hashtable and someone
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// messes with it? Is that OK?
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[noscript] short canEnableCapability(in string capability);
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[noscript] boolean isCapabilityEnabled(in string capability,
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in voidPtr annotation);
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[noscript] void enableCapability(in string capability,
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inout voidPtr annotation);
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/**
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* The codebase URI to which this principal pertains. This is
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* generally the document URI.
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*/
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readonly attribute nsIURI URI;
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/**
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* The domain URI to which this principal pertains.
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* This is congruent with HTMLDocument.domain, and may be null.
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* Setting this has no effect on the URI.
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*/
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[noscript] attribute nsIURI domain;
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/**
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* The origin of this principal's codebase URI.
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* An origin is defined as: scheme + host + port.
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*/
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// XXXcaa this should probably be turned into an nsIURI.
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// The system principal's origin should be some caps namespace
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// with a chrome URI. All of chrome should probably be the same.
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readonly attribute string origin;
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/**
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* Whether this principal is associated with a certificate.
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*/
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readonly attribute boolean hasCertificate;
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/**
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* The fingerprint ID of this principal's certificate.
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* Throws if there is no certificate associated with this principal.
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*/
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// XXXcaa kaie says this may not be unique. We should probably
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// consider using something else for this....
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readonly attribute AUTF8String fingerprint;
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/**
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* The pretty name for the certificate. This sort of (but not really)
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* identifies the subject of the certificate (the entity that stands behind
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* the certificate). Note that this may be empty; prefer to get the
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* certificate itself and get this information from it, since that may
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* provide more information.
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*
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* Throws if there is no certificate associated with this principal.
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*/
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readonly attribute AUTF8String prettyName;
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/**
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* Returns whether the other principal is equal to or weaker than this
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* principal. Principals are equal if they are the same object, they
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* have the same origin, or they have the same certificate ID.
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*
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* Thus a principal always subsumes itself.
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*
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* The system principal subsumes itself and all other principals.
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*
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* A null principal (corresponding to an unknown, hence assumed minimally
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* privileged, security context) is not equal to any other principal
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* (including other null principals), and therefore does not subsume
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* anything but itself.
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*
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* Both codebase and certificate principals are subsumed by the system
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* principal, but no codebase or certificate principal yet subsumes any
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* other codebase or certificate principal. This may change in a future
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* release; note that nsIPrincipal is unfrozen, not slated to be frozen.
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*
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* XXXbz except see bug 147145!
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*
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* Note for the future: Perhaps we should consider a certificate principal
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* for a given URI subsuming a codebase principal for the same URI? Not
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* sure what the immediate benefit would be, but I think the setup could
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* make some code (e.g. MaybeDowngradeToCodebase) clearer.
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*/
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boolean subsumes(in nsIPrincipal other);
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/**
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* Same as the previous method, subsumes(), but for codebase principals
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* ignores changes to document.domain.
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*/
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boolean subsumesIgnoringDomain(in nsIPrincipal other);
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/**
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* Checks whether this principal is allowed to load the network resource
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* located at the given URI under the same-origin policy. This means that
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* codebase principals are only allowed to load resources from the same
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* domain, the system principal is allowed to load anything, and null
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* principals are not allowed to load anything. This is changed slightly
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* by the optional flag allowIfInheritsPrincipal (which defaults to false)
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* which allows the load of a data: URI (which inherits the principal of
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* its loader) or a URI with the same principal as its loader (eg. a
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* Blob URI).
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* In these cases, with allowIfInheritsPrincipal set to true, the URI can
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* be loaded by a null principal.
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*
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* If the load is allowed this function does nothing. If the load is not
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* allowed the function throws NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI.
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*
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* NOTE: Other policies might override this, such as the Access-Control
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* specification.
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* NOTE: The 'domain' attribute has no effect on the behaviour of this
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* function.
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*
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*
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* @param uri The URI about to be loaded.
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* @param report If true, will report a warning to the console service
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* if the load is not allowed.
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* @param allowIfInheritsPrincipal If true, the load is allowed if the
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* loadee inherits the principal of the
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* loader.
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* @throws NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load is not allowed.
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*/
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void checkMayLoad(in nsIURI uri, in boolean report,
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in boolean allowIfInheritsPrincipal);
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/**
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* The subject name for the certificate. This actually identifies the
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* subject of the certificate. This may well not be a string that would
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* mean much to a typical user on its own (e.g. it may have a number of
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* different names all concatenated together with some information on what
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* they mean in between).
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*
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* Throws if there is no certificate associated with this principal.
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*/
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readonly attribute AUTF8String subjectName;
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/**
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* The certificate associated with this principal, if any. If there isn't
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* one, this will return null. Getting this attribute never throws.
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*/
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readonly attribute nsISupports certificate;
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/**
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* A Content Security Policy associated with this principal.
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*/
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[noscript] attribute nsIContentSecurityPolicy csp;
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/**
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* Returns the extended origin of the principal.
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* The extended origin is a string that has more information than the origin
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* and can be used to isolate data or permissions between different
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* principals while taking into account parameters like the app id or the
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* fact that the principal is embedded in a mozbrowser.
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* Some principals will return the origin for extendedOrigin.
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* Some principals will assert if you try to access the extendedOrigin.
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*
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* The extendedOrigin is intended to be an opaque identifier. It is
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* currently "human-readable" but no callers should assume it will stay
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* as is and it might be crypto-hashed at some point.
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*/
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readonly attribute AUTF8String extendedOrigin;
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const short APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED = 0;
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const short APP_STATUS_INSTALLED = 1;
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const short APP_STATUS_PRIVILEGED = 2;
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const short APP_STATUS_CERTIFIED = 3;
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/**
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* Shows the status of the app.
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* Can be: APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED, APP_STATUS_INSTALLED,
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* APP_STATUS_PRIVILEGED or APP_STATUS_CERTIFIED.
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*/
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readonly attribute unsigned short appStatus;
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%{C++
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uint16_t GetAppStatus()
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{
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uint16_t appStatus;
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nsresult rv = GetAppStatus(&appStatus);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return APP_STATUS_NOT_INSTALLED;
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}
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return appStatus;
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}
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%}
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/**
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* Returns the app id the principal is in, or returns
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* nsIScriptSecurityManager::NO_APP_ID if this principal isn't part of an
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* app.
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*/
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readonly attribute unsigned long appId;
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/**
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* Returns true iif the principal is inside a browser element.
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*/
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readonly attribute boolean isInBrowserElement;
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};
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/**
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* If nsSystemPrincipal is too risky to use, but we want a principal to access
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* more than one origin, nsExpandedPrincipals letting us define an array of
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* principals it subsumes. So script with an nsExpandedPrincipals will gain
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* same origin access when at least one of its principals it contains gained
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* sameorigin acccess. An nsExpandedPrincipal will be subsumed by the system
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* principal, and by another nsExpandedPrincipal that has all its principals.
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* It is added for jetpack content-scripts to let them interact with the
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* content and a well defined set of other domains, without the risk of
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* leaking out a system principal to the content. See: Bug 734891
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*/
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[uuid(f3e177Df-6a5e-489f-80a7-2dd1481471d8)]
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interface nsIExpandedPrincipal : nsISupports
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{
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/**
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* An array of principals that the expanded principal subsumes.
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* Note: this list is not reference counted, it is shared, so
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* should not be changed and should only be used ephemerally.
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*/
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[notxpcom] readonly attribute PrincipalArray whiteList;
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};
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