зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
1379 строки
38 KiB
C++
1379 строки
38 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "nsCSPUtils.h"
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#include "nsDebug.h"
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#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
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#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
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#include "nsIScriptError.h"
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#include "nsIServiceManager.h"
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#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
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#include "nsIURL.h"
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#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
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static mozilla::LogModule*
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GetCspUtilsLog()
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{
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static mozilla::LazyLogModule gCspUtilsPRLog("CSPUtils");
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return gCspUtilsPRLog;
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}
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#define CSPUTILSLOG(args) MOZ_LOG(GetCspUtilsLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
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#define CSPUTILSLOGENABLED() MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspUtilsLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
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void
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CSP_GetLocalizedStr(const char16_t* aName,
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const char16_t** aParams,
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uint32_t aLength,
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char16_t** outResult)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> keyStringBundle;
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nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> stringBundleService =
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mozilla::services::GetStringBundleService();
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NS_ASSERTION(stringBundleService, "String bundle service must be present!");
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stringBundleService->CreateBundle("chrome://global/locale/security/csp.properties",
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getter_AddRefs(keyStringBundle));
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NS_ASSERTION(keyStringBundle, "Key string bundle must be available!");
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if (!keyStringBundle) {
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return;
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}
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keyStringBundle->FormatStringFromName(aName, aParams, aLength, outResult);
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}
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void
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CSP_LogStrMessage(const nsAString& aMsg)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
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if (!console) {
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return;
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}
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nsString msg = PromiseFlatString(aMsg);
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console->LogStringMessage(msg.get());
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}
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void
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CSP_LogMessage(const nsAString& aMessage,
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const nsAString& aSourceName,
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const nsAString& aSourceLine,
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uint32_t aLineNumber,
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uint32_t aColumnNumber,
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uint32_t aFlags,
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const char *aCategory,
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uint32_t aInnerWindowID)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID));
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nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptError> error(do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID));
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if (!console || !error) {
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return;
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}
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// Prepending CSP to the outgoing console message
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nsString cspMsg;
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cspMsg.Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING("Content Security Policy: "));
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cspMsg.Append(aMessage);
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nsresult rv;
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if (aInnerWindowID > 0) {
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nsCString catStr;
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catStr.AssignASCII(aCategory);
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rv = error->InitWithWindowID(cspMsg, aSourceName,
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aSourceLine, aLineNumber,
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aColumnNumber, aFlags,
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catStr, aInnerWindowID);
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}
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else {
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rv = error->Init(cspMsg, aSourceName,
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aSourceLine, aLineNumber,
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aColumnNumber, aFlags,
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aCategory);
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}
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return;
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}
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console->LogMessage(error);
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}
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/**
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* Combines CSP_LogMessage and CSP_GetLocalizedStr into one call.
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*/
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void
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CSP_LogLocalizedStr(const char16_t* aName,
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const char16_t** aParams,
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uint32_t aLength,
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const nsAString& aSourceName,
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const nsAString& aSourceLine,
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uint32_t aLineNumber,
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uint32_t aColumnNumber,
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uint32_t aFlags,
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const char* aCategory,
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uint32_t aInnerWindowID)
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{
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nsXPIDLString logMsg;
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CSP_GetLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, aLength, getter_Copies(logMsg));
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CSP_LogMessage(logMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine,
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aLineNumber, aColumnNumber, aFlags,
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aCategory, aInnerWindowID);
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}
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/* ===== Helpers ============================ */
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CSPDirective
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CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(nsContentPolicyType aType)
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{
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switch (aType) {
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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// BLock XSLT as script, see bug 910139
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT_PRELOAD:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WEB_MANIFEST_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CHILD_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XBL:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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// csp shold not block top level loads, e.g. in case
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// of a redirect.
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT:
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// CSP can not block csp reports
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT:
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE;
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// Fall through to error for all other directives
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default:
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MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Can not map nsContentPolicyType to CSPDirective");
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}
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return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
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}
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nsCSPHostSrc*
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CSP_CreateHostSrcFromURI(nsIURI* aURI)
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{
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// Create the host first
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nsCString host;
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aURI->GetHost(host);
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nsCSPHostSrc *hostsrc = new nsCSPHostSrc(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(host));
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// Add the scheme.
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nsCString scheme;
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aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
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hostsrc->setScheme(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(scheme));
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int32_t port;
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aURI->GetPort(&port);
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// Only add port if it's not default port.
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if (port > 0) {
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nsAutoString portStr;
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portStr.AppendInt(port);
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hostsrc->setPort(portStr);
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}
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return hostsrc;
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}
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bool
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CSP_IsValidDirective(const nsAString& aDir)
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{
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uint32_t numDirs = (sizeof(CSPStrDirectives) / sizeof(CSPStrDirectives[0]));
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numDirs; i++) {
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if (aDir.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSPStrDirectives[i])) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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bool
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CSP_IsDirective(const nsAString& aValue, CSPDirective aDir)
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{
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return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDir));
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}
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bool
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CSP_IsKeyword(const nsAString& aValue, enum CSPKeyword aKey)
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{
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return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKey));
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}
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bool
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CSP_IsQuotelessKeyword(const nsAString& aKey)
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{
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nsString lowerKey = PromiseFlatString(aKey);
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ToLowerCase(lowerKey);
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static_assert(CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE ==
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(sizeof(CSPStrKeywords) / sizeof(CSPStrKeywords[0])),
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"CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE does not match length of CSPStrKeywords");
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nsAutoString keyword;
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE; i++) {
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// skipping the leading ' and trimming the trailing '
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keyword.AssignASCII(CSPStrKeywords[i] + 1);
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keyword.Trim("'", false, true);
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if (lowerKey.Equals(keyword)) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* Checks whether the current directive permits a specific
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* scheme. This function is called from nsCSPSchemeSrc() and
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* also nsCSPHostSrc.
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* @param aEnforcementScheme
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* The scheme that this directive allows
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* @param aUri
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* The uri of the subresource load.
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* @param aReportOnly
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* Whether the enforced policy is report only or not.
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* @param aUpgradeInsecure
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* Whether the policy makes use of the directive
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* 'upgrade-insecure-requests'.
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*/
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bool
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permitsScheme(const nsAString& aEnforcementScheme,
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nsIURI* aUri,
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bool aReportOnly,
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bool aUpgradeInsecure)
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{
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nsAutoCString scheme;
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nsresult rv = aUri->GetScheme(scheme);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
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// no scheme to enforce, let's allow the load (e.g. script-src *)
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if (aEnforcementScheme.IsEmpty()) {
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return true;
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}
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// if the scheme matches, all good - allow the load
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if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII(scheme.get())) {
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return true;
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}
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// allow scheme-less sources where the protected resource is http
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// and the load is https, see:
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// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#match-source-expression
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if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("http") &&
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scheme.EqualsASCII("https")) {
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return true;
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}
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// Allow the load when enforcing upgrade-insecure-requests with the
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// promise the request gets upgraded from http to https and ws to wss.
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// See nsHttpChannel::Connect() and also WebSocket.cpp. Please note,
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// the report only policies should not allow the load and report
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// the error back to the page.
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return ((aUpgradeInsecure && !aReportOnly) &&
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((scheme.EqualsASCII("http") && aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("https")) ||
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(scheme.EqualsASCII("ws") && aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("wss"))));
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}
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/* ===== nsCSPSrc ============================ */
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nsCSPBaseSrc::nsCSPBaseSrc()
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{
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}
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nsCSPBaseSrc::~nsCSPBaseSrc()
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{
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}
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// ::permits is only called for external load requests, therefore:
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// nsCSPKeywordSrc and nsCSPHashSource fall back to this base class
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// implementation which will never allow the load.
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bool
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nsCSPBaseSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
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bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure) const
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{
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if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
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nsAutoCString spec;
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aUri->GetSpec(spec);
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CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPBaseSrc::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get()));
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}
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return false;
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}
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// ::allows is only called for inlined loads, therefore:
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// nsCSPSchemeSrc, nsCSPHostSrc fall back
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// to this base class implementation which will never allow the load.
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bool
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nsCSPBaseSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
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{
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CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPBaseSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
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aKeyword == CSP_HASH ? "hash" : CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword),
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NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
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return false;
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}
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/* ====== nsCSPSchemeSrc ===================== */
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nsCSPSchemeSrc::nsCSPSchemeSrc(const nsAString& aScheme)
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: mScheme(aScheme)
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{
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ToLowerCase(mScheme);
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}
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nsCSPSchemeSrc::~nsCSPSchemeSrc()
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{
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}
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bool
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nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
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bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure) const
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{
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if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
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nsAutoCString spec;
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aUri->GetSpec(spec);
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CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get()));
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}
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MOZ_ASSERT((!mScheme.EqualsASCII("")), "scheme can not be the empty string");
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return permitsScheme(mScheme, aUri, aReportOnly, aUpgradeInsecure);
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}
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bool
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nsCSPSchemeSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const
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{
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return aVisitor->visitSchemeSrc(*this);
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}
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void
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nsCSPSchemeSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
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{
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outStr.Append(mScheme);
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outStr.AppendASCII(":");
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}
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/* ===== nsCSPHostSrc ======================== */
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nsCSPHostSrc::nsCSPHostSrc(const nsAString& aHost)
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: mHost(aHost)
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{
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ToLowerCase(mHost);
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}
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nsCSPHostSrc::~nsCSPHostSrc()
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{
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}
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bool
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nsCSPHostSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
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bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure) const
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{
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if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
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nsAutoCString spec;
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aUri->GetSpec(spec);
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CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPHostSrc::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get()));
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}
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// we are following the enforcement rules from the spec, see:
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// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#match-source-expression
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// 4.3) scheme matching: Check if the scheme matches.
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if (!permitsScheme(mScheme, aUri, aReportOnly, aUpgradeInsecure)) {
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return false;
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}
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// The host in nsCSpHostSrc should never be empty. In case we are enforcing
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// just a specific scheme, the parser should generate a nsCSPSchemeSource.
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NS_ASSERTION((!mHost.IsEmpty()), "host can not be the empty string");
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// 2) host matching: Enforce a single *
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if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*")) {
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// The single ASTERISK character (*) does not match a URI's scheme of a type
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// designating a globally unique identifier (such as blob:, data:, or filesystem:)
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// At the moment firefox does not support filesystem; but for future compatibility
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// we support it in CSP according to the spec, see: 4.2.2 Matching Source Expressions
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// Note, that whitelisting any of these schemes would call nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits().
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bool isBlobScheme =
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(NS_SUCCEEDED(aUri->SchemeIs("blob", &isBlobScheme)) && isBlobScheme);
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bool isDataScheme =
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(NS_SUCCEEDED(aUri->SchemeIs("data", &isDataScheme)) && isDataScheme);
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bool isFileScheme =
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(NS_SUCCEEDED(aUri->SchemeIs("filesystem", &isFileScheme)) && isFileScheme);
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if (isBlobScheme || isDataScheme || isFileScheme) {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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// Before we can check if the host matches, we have to
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// extract the host part from aUri.
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nsAutoCString uriHost;
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nsresult rv = aUri->GetHost(uriHost);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
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// 4.5) host matching: Check if the allowed host starts with a wilcard.
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if (mHost.First() == '*') {
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NS_ASSERTION(mHost[1] == '.', "Second character needs to be '.' whenever host starts with '*'");
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// Eliminate leading "*", but keeping the FULL STOP (.) thereafter before checking
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// if the remaining characters match
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nsString wildCardHost = mHost;
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wildCardHost = Substring(wildCardHost, 1, wildCardHost.Length() - 1);
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if (!StringEndsWith(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriHost), wildCardHost)) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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// 4.6) host matching: Check if hosts match.
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else if (!mHost.Equals(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriHost))) {
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return false;
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}
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// 4.9) Path matching: If there is a path, we have to enforce
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// path-level matching, unless the channel got redirected, see:
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// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list-paths-and-redirects
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if (!aWasRedirected && !mPath.IsEmpty()) {
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// converting aUri into nsIURL so we can strip query and ref
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// example.com/test#foo -> example.com/test
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// example.com/test?val=foo -> example.com/test
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURL> url = do_QueryInterface(aUri);
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if (!url) {
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NS_ASSERTION(false, "can't QI into nsIURI");
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return false;
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}
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nsAutoCString uriPath;
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rv = url->GetFilePath(uriPath);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
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// check if the last character of mPath is '/'; if so
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// we just have to check loading resource is within
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// the allowed path.
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if (mPath.Last() == '/') {
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if (!StringBeginsWith(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriPath), mPath)) {
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return false;
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}
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}
|
|
// otherwise mPath whitelists a specific file, and we have to
|
|
// check if the loading resource matches that whitelisted file.
|
|
else {
|
|
if (!mPath.Equals(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriPath))) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// 4.8) Port matching: If port uses wildcard, allow the load.
|
|
if (mPort.EqualsASCII("*")) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Before we can check if the port matches, we have to
|
|
// query the port from aUri.
|
|
int32_t uriPort;
|
|
rv = aUri->GetPort(&uriPort);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
|
|
|
|
nsAutoCString scheme;
|
|
rv = aUri->GetScheme(scheme);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
|
|
|
|
uriPort = (uriPort > 0) ? uriPort : NS_GetDefaultPort(scheme.get());
|
|
|
|
// 4.7) Default port matching: If mPort is empty, we have to compare default ports.
|
|
if (mPort.IsEmpty()) {
|
|
int32_t port = NS_GetDefaultPort(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mScheme).get());
|
|
if (port != uriPort) {
|
|
// We should not return false for scheme-less sources where the protected resource
|
|
// is http and the load is https, see: http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#match-source-expression
|
|
// BUT, we only allow scheme-less sources to be upgraded from http to https if CSP
|
|
// does not explicitly define a port.
|
|
if (!(uriPort == NS_GetDefaultPort("https"))) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// 4.7) Port matching: Compare the ports.
|
|
else {
|
|
nsString portStr;
|
|
portStr.AppendInt(uriPort);
|
|
if (!mPort.Equals(portStr)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// At the end: scheme, host, path, and port match -> allow the load.
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPHostSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const
|
|
{
|
|
return aVisitor->visitHostSrc(*this);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPHostSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
|
|
{
|
|
// If mHost is a single "*", we append the wildcard and return.
|
|
if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*") &&
|
|
mScheme.IsEmpty() &&
|
|
mPort.IsEmpty()) {
|
|
outStr.Append(mHost);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// append scheme
|
|
outStr.Append(mScheme);
|
|
|
|
// append host
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII("://");
|
|
outStr.Append(mHost);
|
|
|
|
// append port
|
|
if (!mPort.IsEmpty()) {
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(":");
|
|
outStr.Append(mPort);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// append path
|
|
outStr.Append(mPath);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPHostSrc::setScheme(const nsAString& aScheme)
|
|
{
|
|
mScheme = aScheme;
|
|
ToLowerCase(mScheme);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPHostSrc::setPort(const nsAString& aPort)
|
|
{
|
|
mPort = aPort;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPHostSrc::appendPath(const nsAString& aPath)
|
|
{
|
|
mPath.Append(aPath);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ===== nsCSPKeywordSrc ===================== */
|
|
|
|
nsCSPKeywordSrc::nsCSPKeywordSrc(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword)
|
|
: mKeyword(aKeyword)
|
|
, mInvalidated(false)
|
|
{
|
|
NS_ASSERTION((aKeyword != CSP_SELF),
|
|
"'self' should have been replaced in the parser");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCSPKeywordSrc::~nsCSPKeywordSrc()
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
|
|
{
|
|
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, aHashOrNonce: %s, mInvalidated: %s",
|
|
CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword),
|
|
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get(),
|
|
mInvalidated ? "yes" : "false"));
|
|
// if unsafe-inline should be ignored, then bail early
|
|
if (mInvalidated) {
|
|
NS_ASSERTION(mKeyword == CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
|
|
"should only invalidate unsafe-inline within script-src");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return mKeyword == aKeyword;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPKeywordSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const
|
|
{
|
|
return aVisitor->visitKeywordSrc(*this);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPKeywordSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
|
|
{
|
|
if (mInvalidated) {
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(mKeyword == CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
|
|
"can only ignore 'unsafe-inline' within toString()");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(mKeyword));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPKeywordSrc::invalidate()
|
|
{
|
|
mInvalidated = true;
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(mKeyword == CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
|
|
"invalidate 'unsafe-inline' only within script-src");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ===== nsCSPNonceSrc ==================== */
|
|
|
|
nsCSPNonceSrc::nsCSPNonceSrc(const nsAString& aNonce)
|
|
: mNonce(aNonce)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCSPNonceSrc::~nsCSPNonceSrc()
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPNonceSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
|
|
bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure) const
|
|
{
|
|
if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
|
|
nsAutoCString spec;
|
|
aUri->GetSpec(spec);
|
|
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::permits, aUri: %s, aNonce: %s",
|
|
spec.get(), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aNonce).get()));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return mNonce.Equals(aNonce);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPNonceSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
|
|
{
|
|
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
|
|
CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
|
|
|
|
if (aKeyword != CSP_NONCE) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return mNonce.Equals(aHashOrNonce);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPNonceSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const
|
|
{
|
|
return aVisitor->visitNonceSrc(*this);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPNonceSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
|
|
{
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(CSP_NONCE));
|
|
outStr.Append(mNonce);
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII("'");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ===== nsCSPHashSrc ===================== */
|
|
|
|
nsCSPHashSrc::nsCSPHashSrc(const nsAString& aAlgo, const nsAString& aHash)
|
|
: mAlgorithm(aAlgo)
|
|
, mHash(aHash)
|
|
{
|
|
// Only the algo should be rewritten to lowercase, the hash must remain the same.
|
|
ToLowerCase(mAlgorithm);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCSPHashSrc::~nsCSPHashSrc()
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPHashSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
|
|
{
|
|
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPHashSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
|
|
CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
|
|
|
|
if (aKeyword != CSP_HASH) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Convert aHashOrNonce to UTF-8
|
|
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 utf8_hash(aHashOrNonce);
|
|
|
|
nsresult rv;
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hasher;
|
|
hasher = do_CreateInstance("@mozilla.org/security/hash;1", &rv);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
|
|
|
|
rv = hasher->InitWithString(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mAlgorithm));
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
|
|
|
|
rv = hasher->Update((uint8_t *)utf8_hash.get(), utf8_hash.Length());
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
|
|
|
|
nsAutoCString hash;
|
|
rv = hasher->Finish(true, hash);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
|
|
|
|
// The NSS Base64 encoder automatically adds linebreaks "\r\n" every 64
|
|
// characters. We need to remove these so we can properly validate longer
|
|
// (SHA-512) base64-encoded hashes
|
|
hash.StripChars("\r\n");
|
|
return NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mHash).Equals(hash);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPHashSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const
|
|
{
|
|
return aVisitor->visitHashSrc(*this);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPHashSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
|
|
{
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII("'");
|
|
outStr.Append(mAlgorithm);
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII("-");
|
|
outStr.Append(mHash);
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII("'");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ===== nsCSPReportURI ===================== */
|
|
|
|
nsCSPReportURI::nsCSPReportURI(nsIURI *aURI)
|
|
:mReportURI(aURI)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCSPReportURI::~nsCSPReportURI()
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPReportURI::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const
|
|
{
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPReportURI::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
|
|
{
|
|
nsAutoCString spec;
|
|
nsresult rv = mReportURI->GetSpec(spec);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(spec.get());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ===== nsCSPDirective ====================== */
|
|
|
|
nsCSPDirective::nsCSPDirective(CSPDirective aDirective)
|
|
{
|
|
mDirective = aDirective;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCSPDirective::~nsCSPDirective()
|
|
{
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
|
|
delete mSrcs[i];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPDirective::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
|
|
bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure) const
|
|
{
|
|
if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
|
|
nsAutoCString spec;
|
|
aUri->GetSpec(spec);
|
|
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPDirective::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get()));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mSrcs[i]->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected, aReportOnly, aUpgradeInsecure)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPDirective::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
|
|
{
|
|
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPDirective::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
|
|
CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
|
|
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mSrcs[i]->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPDirective::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
|
|
{
|
|
// Append directive name
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(mDirective));
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(" ");
|
|
|
|
// Append srcs
|
|
uint32_t length = mSrcs.Length();
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < length; i++) {
|
|
mSrcs[i]->toString(outStr);
|
|
if (i != (length - 1)) {
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(" ");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPDirective::toDomCSPStruct(mozilla::dom::CSP& outCSP) const
|
|
{
|
|
mozilla::dom::Sequence<nsString> srcs;
|
|
nsString src;
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
|
|
src.Truncate();
|
|
mSrcs[i]->toString(src);
|
|
srcs.AppendElement(src, mozilla::fallible);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch(mDirective) {
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mDefault_src.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mDefault_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mScript_src.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mScript_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mObject_src.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mObject_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mStyle_src.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mStyle_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mImg_src.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mImg_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mMedia_src.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mMedia_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mFrame_src.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mFrame_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mFont_src.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mFont_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mConnect_src.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mConnect_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mReport_uri.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mReport_uri.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mFrame_ancestors.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mFrame_ancestors.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WEB_MANIFEST_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mManifest_src.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mManifest_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
// not supporting REFLECTED_XSS_DIRECTIVE
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BASE_URI_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mBase_uri.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mBase_uri.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FORM_ACTION_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mForm_action.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mForm_action.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT:
|
|
outCSP.mBlock_all_mixed_content.Construct();
|
|
// does not have any srcs
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mUpgrade_insecure_requests.Construct();
|
|
// does not have any srcs
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CHILD_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
|
|
outCSP.mChild_src.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mChild_src.Value() = mozilla::Move(srcs);
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
// REFERRER_DIRECTIVE and REQUIRE_SRI_FOR are handled in nsCSPPolicy::toDomCSPStruct()
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
NS_ASSERTION(false, "cannot find directive to convert CSP to JSON");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPDirective::restrictsContentType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType) const
|
|
{
|
|
// make sure we do not check for the default src before any other sources
|
|
if (isDefaultDirective()) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return mDirective == CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(aContentType);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPDirective::getReportURIs(nsTArray<nsString> &outReportURIs) const
|
|
{
|
|
NS_ASSERTION((mDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE), "not a report-uri directive");
|
|
|
|
// append uris
|
|
nsString tmpReportURI;
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
|
|
tmpReportURI.Truncate();
|
|
mSrcs[i]->toString(tmpReportURI);
|
|
outReportURIs.AppendElement(tmpReportURI);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPDirective::visitSrcs(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const
|
|
{
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (!mSrcs[i]->visit(aVisitor)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool nsCSPDirective::equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const
|
|
{
|
|
return (mDirective == aDirective);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* =============== nsCSPChildSrcDirective ============= */
|
|
|
|
nsCSPChildSrcDirective::nsCSPChildSrcDirective(CSPDirective aDirective)
|
|
: nsCSPDirective(aDirective)
|
|
, mHandleFrameSrc(false)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCSPChildSrcDirective::~nsCSPChildSrcDirective()
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void nsCSPChildSrcDirective::setHandleFrameSrc()
|
|
{
|
|
mHandleFrameSrc = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool nsCSPChildSrcDirective::restrictsContentType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType) const
|
|
{
|
|
if (aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
|
|
return mHandleFrameSrc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER
|
|
|| aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER
|
|
|| aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool nsCSPChildSrcDirective::equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const
|
|
{
|
|
if (aDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE) {
|
|
return mHandleFrameSrc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (aDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CHILD_SRC_DIRECTIVE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* =============== nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective ============= */
|
|
|
|
nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective::nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective(CSPDirective aDirective)
|
|
: nsCSPDirective(aDirective)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective::~nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective()
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
|
|
{
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(
|
|
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* =============== nsUpgradeInsecureDirective ============= */
|
|
|
|
nsUpgradeInsecureDirective::nsUpgradeInsecureDirective(CSPDirective aDirective)
|
|
: nsCSPDirective(aDirective)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsUpgradeInsecureDirective::~nsUpgradeInsecureDirective()
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsUpgradeInsecureDirective::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
|
|
{
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(
|
|
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ===== nsRequireSRIForDirective ========================= */
|
|
|
|
nsRequireSRIForDirective::nsRequireSRIForDirective(CSPDirective aDirective)
|
|
: nsCSPDirective(aDirective)
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsRequireSRIForDirective::~nsRequireSRIForDirective()
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsRequireSRIForDirective::toString(nsAString &outStr) const
|
|
{
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(
|
|
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REQUIRE_SRI_FOR));
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTypes.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mTypes[i] == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT) {
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(" script");
|
|
}
|
|
else if (mTypes[i] == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET) {
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(" style");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsRequireSRIForDirective::hasType(nsContentPolicyType aType) const
|
|
{
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTypes.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mTypes[i] == aType) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsRequireSRIForDirective::restrictsContentType(const nsContentPolicyType aType) const
|
|
{
|
|
return this->hasType(aType);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsRequireSRIForDirective::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
|
|
{
|
|
// can only disallow CSP_REQUIRE_SRI_FOR.
|
|
return (aKeyword != CSP_REQUIRE_SRI_FOR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ===== nsCSPPolicy ========================= */
|
|
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::nsCSPPolicy()
|
|
: mUpgradeInsecDir(nullptr)
|
|
, mReportOnly(false)
|
|
{
|
|
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::nsCSPPolicy"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::~nsCSPPolicy()
|
|
{
|
|
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::~nsCSPPolicy"));
|
|
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
|
|
delete mDirectives[i];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::permits(CSPDirective aDir,
|
|
nsIURI* aUri,
|
|
bool aSpecific) const
|
|
{
|
|
nsString outp;
|
|
return this->permits(aDir, aUri, EmptyString(), false, aSpecific, outp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::permits(CSPDirective aDir,
|
|
nsIURI* aUri,
|
|
const nsAString& aNonce,
|
|
bool aWasRedirected,
|
|
bool aSpecific,
|
|
nsAString& outViolatedDirective) const
|
|
{
|
|
if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
|
|
nsAutoCString spec;
|
|
aUri->GetSpec(spec);
|
|
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %d, aSpecific: %s",
|
|
spec.get(), aDir, aSpecific ? "true" : "false"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_ASSERTION(aUri, "permits needs an uri to perform the check!");
|
|
outViolatedDirective.Truncate();
|
|
|
|
nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr;
|
|
|
|
// Try to find a relevant directive
|
|
// These directive arrays are short (1-5 elements), not worth using a hashtable.
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) {
|
|
if (!mDirectives[i]->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected, mReportOnly, mUpgradeInsecDir)) {
|
|
mDirectives[i]->toString(outViolatedDirective);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) {
|
|
defaultDir = mDirectives[i];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the above loop runs through, we haven't found a matching directive.
|
|
// Avoid relooping, just store the result of default-src while looping.
|
|
if (!aSpecific && defaultDir) {
|
|
if (!defaultDir->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected, mReportOnly, mUpgradeInsecDir)) {
|
|
defaultDir->toString(outViolatedDirective);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Nothing restricts this, so we're allowing the load
|
|
// See bug 764937
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::allows(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
|
|
enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
|
|
const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
|
|
{
|
|
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
|
|
CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
|
|
|
|
nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr;
|
|
|
|
// Try to find a matching directive
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->restrictsContentType(aContentType)) {
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) {
|
|
defaultDir = mDirectives[i];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// {nonce,hash}-source should not consult default-src:
|
|
// * return false if default-src is specified
|
|
// * but allow the load if default-src is *not* specified (Bug 1198422)
|
|
if (aKeyword == CSP_NONCE || aKeyword == CSP_HASH) {
|
|
if (!defaultDir) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the above loop runs through, we haven't found a matching directive.
|
|
// Avoid relooping, just store the result of default-src while looping.
|
|
if (defaultDir) {
|
|
return defaultDir->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Allowing the load; see Bug 885433
|
|
// a) inline scripts (also unsafe eval) should only be blocked
|
|
// if there is a [script-src] or [default-src]
|
|
// b) inline styles should only be blocked
|
|
// if there is a [style-src] or [default-src]
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::allows(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
|
|
enum CSPKeyword aKeyword) const
|
|
{
|
|
return allows(aContentType, aKeyword, NS_LITERAL_STRING(""));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t length = mDirectives.Length();
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
|
|
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REFERRER_DIRECTIVE)) {
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REFERRER_DIRECTIVE));
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII(" ");
|
|
outStr.Append(mReferrerPolicy);
|
|
} else {
|
|
mDirectives[i]->toString(outStr);
|
|
}
|
|
if (i != (length - 1)) {
|
|
outStr.AppendASCII("; ");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::toDomCSPStruct(mozilla::dom::CSP& outCSP) const
|
|
{
|
|
outCSP.mReport_only = mReportOnly;
|
|
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); ++i) {
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REFERRER_DIRECTIVE)) {
|
|
mozilla::dom::Sequence<nsString> srcs;
|
|
srcs.AppendElement(mReferrerPolicy, mozilla::fallible);
|
|
outCSP.mReferrer.Construct();
|
|
outCSP.mReferrer.Value() = srcs;
|
|
} else {
|
|
mDirectives[i]->toDomCSPStruct(outCSP);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::hasDirective(CSPDirective aDir) const
|
|
{
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use this function only after ::allows() returned 'false'. Most and
|
|
* foremost it's used to get the violated directive before sending reports.
|
|
* The parameter outDirective is the equivalent of 'outViolatedDirective'
|
|
* for the ::permits() function family.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::getDirectiveStringForContentType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
|
|
nsAString& outDirective) const
|
|
{
|
|
nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr;
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->restrictsContentType(aContentType)) {
|
|
mDirectives[i]->toString(outDirective);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) {
|
|
defaultDir = mDirectives[i];
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// if we haven't found a matching directive yet,
|
|
// the contentType must be restricted by the default directive
|
|
if (defaultDir) {
|
|
defaultDir->toString(outDirective);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
NS_ASSERTION(false, "Can not query directive string for contentType!");
|
|
outDirective.AppendASCII("couldNotQueryViolatedDirective");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::getDirectiveAsString(CSPDirective aDir, nsAString& outDirective) const
|
|
{
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) {
|
|
mDirectives[i]->toString(outDirective);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::getReportURIs(nsTArray<nsString>& outReportURIs) const
|
|
{
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE)) {
|
|
mDirectives[i]->getReportURIs(outReportURIs);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::visitDirectiveSrcs(CSPDirective aDir, nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const
|
|
{
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) {
|
|
return mDirectives[i]->visitSrcs(aVisitor);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
nsCSPPolicy::requireSRIForType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType)
|
|
{
|
|
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
|
|
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REQUIRE_SRI_FOR)) {
|
|
return static_cast<nsRequireSRIForDirective*>(mDirectives[i])->hasType(aContentType);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|