gecko-dev/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp

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C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
#include "insanity/pkix.h"
#include "certdb.h"
#include "nss.h"
#include "ocsp.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "prerror.h"
#include "prmem.h"
#include "prprf.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "secmod.h"
using namespace insanity::pkix;
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
extern PRLogModuleInfo* gCertVerifierLog;
#endif
namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
const char BUILTIN_ROOTS_MODULE_DEFAULT_NAME[] = "Builtin Roots Module";
namespace {
inline void PORT_Free_string(char* str) { PORT_Free(str); }
typedef ScopedPtr<SECMODModule, SECMOD_DestroyModule> ScopedSECMODModule;
} // unnamed namespace
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NSSCertDBTrustDomain(SECTrustType certDBTrustType,
OCSPFetching ocspFetching,
void* pinArg)
: mCertDBTrustType(certDBTrustType)
, mOCSPFetching(ocspFetching)
, mPinArg(pinArg)
{
}
SECStatus
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FindPotentialIssuers(
const SECItem* encodedIssuerName, PRTime time,
/*out*/ insanity::pkix::ScopedCERTCertList& results)
{
// TODO: normalize encodedIssuerName
// TODO: NSS seems to be ambiguous between "no potential issuers found" and
// "there was an error trying to retrieve the potential issuers."
results = CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
encodedIssuerName, time, true);
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
SECOidTag policy,
const CERTCertificate* candidateCert,
/*out*/ TrustLevel* trustLevel)
{
PR_ASSERT(candidateCert);
PR_ASSERT(trustLevel);
if (!candidateCert || !trustLevel) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
#ifdef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
if (policy != SEC_OID_X509_ANY_POLICY) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
#endif
// XXX: CERT_GetCertTrust seems to be abusing SECStatus as a boolean, where
// SECSuccess means that there is a trust record and SECFailure means there
// is not a trust record. I looked at NSS's internal uses of
// CERT_GetCertTrust, and all that code uses the result as a boolean meaning
// "We have a trust record."
CERTCertTrust trust;
if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert, &trust) == SECSuccess) {
PRUint32 flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, mCertDBTrustType);
// For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
// because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
// CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
// relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
// distrusted.
PRUint32 relevantTrustBit = endEntityOrCA == MustBeCA ? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
: CERTDB_TRUSTED;
if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit|CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
== CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
*trustLevel = ActivelyDistrusted;
return SECSuccess;
}
// For TRUST, we only use the CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit, because Gecko hasn't
// needed to consider end-entity certs to be their own trust anchors since
// Gecko implemented nsICertOverrideService.
if (flags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA) {
if (policy == SEC_OID_X509_ANY_POLICY) {
*trustLevel = TrustAnchor;
return SECSuccess;
}
#ifndef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
if (CertIsAuthoritativeForEVPolicy(candidateCert, policy)) {
*trustLevel = TrustAnchor;
return SECSuccess;
}
#endif
}
}
*trustLevel = InheritsTrust;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifySignedData(const CERTSignedData* signedData,
const CERTCertificate* cert)
{
return ::insanity::pkix::VerifySignedData(signedData, cert, mPinArg);
}
SECStatus
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(
insanity::pkix::EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
const CERTCertificate* cert,
/*const*/ CERTCertificate* issuerCert,
PRTime time,
/*optional*/ const SECItem* stapledOCSPResponse)
{
// Actively distrusted certificates will have already been blocked by
// GetCertTrust.
// TODO: need to verify that IsRevoked isn't called for trust anchors AND
// that that fact is documented in insanity.
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: Top of CheckRevocation\n"));
PORT_Assert(cert);
PORT_Assert(issuerCert);
if (!cert || !issuerCert) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
// If we have a stapled OCSP response then the verification of that response
// determines the result unless the OCSP response is expired. We make an
// exception for expired responses because some servers, nginx in particular,
// are known to serve expired responses due to bugs.
if (stapledOCSPResponse) {
PR_ASSERT(endEntityOrCA == MustBeEndEntity);
SECStatus rv = VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse(*this, cert, issuerCert, time,
stapledOCSPResponse);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
if (PR_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
return rv;
}
}
// TODO(bug 915932): Need to change this when we add the OCSP cache.
// TODO: We still need to handle the fallback for expired responses. But,
// if/when we disable OCSP fetching by default, it would be ambiguous whether
// security.OCSP.enable==0 means "I want the default" or "I really never want
// you to ever fetch OCSP."
if ((mOCSPFetching == NeverFetchOCSP) ||
(endEntityOrCA == MustBeCA && (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVHardFail ||
mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail))) {
return SECSuccess;
}
if (mOCSPFetching == LocalOnlyOCSPForEV) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
ScopedPtr<char, PORT_Free_string>
url(CERT_GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation(cert));
if (!url) {
if (stapledOCSPResponse) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
if (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForEV) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
// Nothing to do if we don't have an OCSP responder URI for the cert; just
// assume it is good. Note that this is the confusing, but intended,
// interpretation of "strict" revocation checking in the face of a
// certificate that lacks an OCSP responder URI.
return SECSuccess;
}
ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return SECFailure;
}
const SECItem* request(CreateEncodedOCSPRequest(arena.get(), cert,
issuerCert));
if (!request) {
return SECFailure;
}
const SECItem* response(CERT_PostOCSPRequest(arena.get(), url.get(),
request));
if (!response) {
if (mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure after "
"CERT_PostOCSPRequest failure"));
return SECFailure;
}
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECSuccess after "
"CERT_PostOCSPRequest failure"));
return SECSuccess; // Soft fail -> success :(
}
SECStatus rv = VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse(*this, cert, issuerCert, time,
response);
if (rv == SECSuccess || mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning after VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse"));
return rv;
}
PRErrorCode error = PR_GetError();
if (error == SEC_ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT ||
error == SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
return rv;
}
PR_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: end of CheckRevocation"));
return SECSuccess;
}
namespace {
static char*
nss_addEscape(const char* string, char quote)
{
char* newString = 0;
int escapes = 0, size = 0;
const char* src;
char* dest;
for (src = string; *src; src++) {
if ((*src == quote) || (*src == '\\')) {
escapes++;
}
size++;
}
newString = (char*) PORT_ZAlloc(escapes + size + 1);
if (!newString) {
return nullptr;
}
for (src = string, dest = newString; *src; src++, dest++) {
if ((*src == quote) || (*src == '\\')) {
*dest++ = '\\';
}
*dest = *src;
}
return newString;
}
} // unnamed namespace
SECStatus
InitializeNSS(const char* dir, bool readOnly)
{
// The NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT flag turns off the loading of the root certs
// module by NSS_Initialize because we will load it in InstallLoadableRoots
// later. It also allows us to work around a bug in the system NSS in
// Ubuntu 8.04, which loads any nonexistent "<configdir>/libnssckbi.so" as
// "/usr/lib/nss/libnssckbi.so".
uint32_t flags = NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE;
if (readOnly) {
flags |= NSS_INIT_READONLY;
}
return ::NSS_Initialize(dir, "", "", SECMOD_DB, flags);
}
void
DisableMD5()
{
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_MD5,
0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC,
0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
}
SECStatus
LoadLoadableRoots(/*optional*/ const char* dir, const char* modNameUTF8)
{
PR_ASSERT(modNameUTF8);
if (!modNameUTF8) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
ScopedPtr<char, PR_FreeLibraryName> fullLibraryPath(
PR_GetLibraryName(dir, "nssckbi"));
if (!fullLibraryPath) {
return SECFailure;
}
ScopedPtr<char, PORT_Free_string> escaped_fullLibraryPath(
nss_addEscape(fullLibraryPath.get(), '\"'));
if (!escaped_fullLibraryPath) {
return SECFailure;
}
// If a module exists with the same name, delete it.
int modType;
SECMOD_DeleteModule(modNameUTF8, &modType);
ScopedPtr<char, PR_smprintf_free> pkcs11ModuleSpec(
PR_smprintf("name=\"%s\" library=\"%s\"", modNameUTF8,
escaped_fullLibraryPath.get()));
if (!pkcs11ModuleSpec) {
return SECFailure;
}
ScopedSECMODModule rootsModule(SECMOD_LoadUserModule(pkcs11ModuleSpec.get(),
nullptr, false));
if (!rootsModule) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (!rootsModule->loaded) {
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
void
UnloadLoadableRoots(const char* modNameUTF8)
{
PR_ASSERT(modNameUTF8);
ScopedSECMODModule rootsModule(SECMOD_FindModule(modNameUTF8));
if (rootsModule) {
SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(rootsModule.get());
}
}
void
SetClassicOCSPBehavior(CertVerifier::ocsp_download_config enabled,
CertVerifier::ocsp_strict_config strict,
CertVerifier::ocsp_get_config get)
{
CERT_DisableOCSPDefaultResponder(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB());
if (enabled == CertVerifier::ocsp_off) {
CERT_DisableOCSPChecking(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB());
} else {
CERT_EnableOCSPChecking(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB());
}
SEC_OcspFailureMode failureMode = strict == CertVerifier::ocsp_strict
? ocspMode_FailureIsVerificationFailure
: ocspMode_FailureIsNotAVerificationFailure;
(void) CERT_SetOCSPFailureMode(failureMode);
CERT_ForcePostMethodForOCSP(get != CertVerifier::ocsp_get_enabled);
int OCSPTimeoutSeconds = 3;
if (strict == CertVerifier::ocsp_strict) {
OCSPTimeoutSeconds = 10;
}
CERT_SetOCSPTimeout(OCSPTimeoutSeconds);
}
char*
DefaultServerNicknameForCert(CERTCertificate* cert)
{
char* nickname = nullptr;
int count;
bool conflict;
char* servername = nullptr;
servername = CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
// Certs without common names are strange, but they do exist...
// Let's try to use another string for the nickname
servername = CERT_GetOrgUnitName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
servername = CERT_GetOrgName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
servername = CERT_GetLocalityName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
servername = CERT_GetStateName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
servername = CERT_GetCountryName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
// We tried hard, there is nothing more we can do.
// A cert without any names doesn't really make sense.
return nullptr;
}
}
}
}
}
}
count = 1;
while (1) {
if (count == 1) {
nickname = PR_smprintf("%s", servername);
}
else {
nickname = PR_smprintf("%s #%d", servername, count);
}
if (!nickname) {
break;
}
conflict = SEC_CertNicknameConflict(nickname, &cert->derSubject,
cert->dbhandle);
if (!conflict) {
break;
}
PR_Free(nickname);
count++;
}
PR_FREEIF(servername);
return nickname;
}
void
SaveIntermediateCerts(const ScopedCERTCertList& certList)
{
if (!certList) {
return;
}
bool isEndEntity = true;
for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
!CERT_LIST_END(node, certList);
node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
if (isEndEntity) {
// Skip the end-entity; we only want to store intermediates
isEndEntity = false;
continue;
}
if (node->cert->slot) {
// This cert was found on a token, no need to remember it in the temp db.
continue;
}
if (node->cert->isperm) {
// We don't need to remember certs already stored in perm db.
continue;
}
// We have found a signer cert that we want to remember.
char* nickname = DefaultServerNicknameForCert(node->cert);
if (nickname && *nickname) {
ScopedPtr<PK11SlotInfo, PK11_FreeSlot> slot(PK11_GetInternalKeySlot());
if (slot) {
PK11_ImportCert(slot.get(), node->cert, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
nickname, false);
}
}
PR_FREEIF(nickname);
}
}
} } // namespace mozilla::psm