gecko-dev/dom/webauthn/WebAuthnManager.cpp

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Этот файл содержит неоднозначные символы Юникода!

Этот файл содержит неоднозначные символы Юникода, которые могут быть перепутаны с другими в текущей локали. Если это намеренно, можете спокойно проигнорировать это предупреждение. Используйте кнопку Экранировать, чтобы подсветить эти символы.

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim:set ts=2 sw=2 sts=2 et cindent: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
* You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "hasht.h"
#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
#include "nsNetCID.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h" // Used by WD-05 compat support (Remove in Bug 1381126)
#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/AuthenticatorAttestationResponse.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Promise.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnCBORUtil.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnManager.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnUtil.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/PWebAuthnTransaction.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnTransactionChild.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebCryptoCommon.h"
#include "mozilla/ipc/PBackgroundChild.h"
#include "mozilla/ipc/BackgroundChild.h"
using namespace mozilla::ipc;
namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {
/***********************************************************************
* Protocol Constants
**********************************************************************/
const uint8_t FLAG_TUP = 0x01; // Test of User Presence required
const uint8_t FLAG_AT = 0x40; // Authenticator Data is provided
/***********************************************************************
* Statics
**********************************************************************/
namespace {
StaticRefPtr<WebAuthnManager> gWebAuthnManager;
static mozilla::LazyLogModule gWebAuthnManagerLog("webauthnmanager");
}
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(WebAuthnManager, nsIIPCBackgroundChildCreateCallback);
/***********************************************************************
* Utility Functions
**********************************************************************/
template<class OOS>
static nsresult
GetAlgorithmName(const OOS& aAlgorithm,
/* out */ nsString& aName)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aAlgorithm.IsString()); // TODO: remove assertion when we coerce.
if (aAlgorithm.IsString()) {
// If string, then treat as algorithm name
aName.Assign(aAlgorithm.GetAsString());
} else {
// TODO: Coerce to string and extract name. See WebCryptoTask.cpp
}
// Only ES256 is currently supported
if (NORMALIZED_EQUALS(aName, JWK_ALG_ECDSA_P_256)) {
aName.AssignLiteral(JWK_ALG_ECDSA_P_256);
} else {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
static nsresult
HashCString(nsICryptoHash* aHashService, const nsACString& aIn,
/* out */ CryptoBuffer& aOut)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aHashService);
nsresult rv = aHashService->Init(nsICryptoHash::SHA256);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
rv = aHashService->Update(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(aIn.BeginReading()),aIn.Length());
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
nsAutoCString fullHash;
// Passing false below means we will get a binary result rather than a
// base64-encoded string.
rv = aHashService->Finish(false, fullHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
aOut.Assign(fullHash);
return rv;
}
static nsresult
AssembleClientData(const nsAString& aOrigin, const CryptoBuffer& aChallenge,
/* out */ nsACString& aJsonOut)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
nsString challengeBase64;
nsresult rv = aChallenge.ToJwkBase64(challengeBase64);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
CollectedClientData clientDataObject;
clientDataObject.mChallenge.Assign(challengeBase64);
clientDataObject.mOrigin.Assign(aOrigin);
clientDataObject.mHashAlg.Assign(NS_LITERAL_STRING("S256"));
nsAutoString temp;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!clientDataObject.ToJSON(temp))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
aJsonOut.Assign(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(temp));
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
GetOrigin(nsPIDOMWindowInner* aParent,
/*out*/ nsAString& aOrigin, /*out*/ nsACString& aHost)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc = aParent->GetDoc();
MOZ_ASSERT(doc);
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = doc->NodePrincipal();
nsresult rv = nsContentUtils::GetUTFOrigin(principal, aOrigin);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv)) ||
NS_WARN_IF(aOrigin.IsEmpty())) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (aOrigin.EqualsLiteral("null")) {
// 4.1.1.3 If callerOrigin is an opaque origin, reject promise with a
// DOMException whose name is "NotAllowedError", and terminate this
// algorithm
MOZ_LOG(gWebAuthnManagerLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Rejecting due to opaque origin"));
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_ALLOWED_ERR;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originUri;
if (NS_FAILED(principal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(originUri)))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (NS_FAILED(originUri->GetAsciiHost(aHost))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
RelaxSameOrigin(nsPIDOMWindowInner* aParent,
const nsAString& aInputRpId,
/* out */ nsACString& aRelaxedRpId)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aParent);
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc = aParent->GetDoc();
MOZ_ASSERT(doc);
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = doc->NodePrincipal();
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
if (NS_FAILED(principal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsAutoCString originHost;
if (NS_FAILED(uri->GetAsciiHost(originHost))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> document = aParent->GetDoc();
if (!document || !document->IsHTMLDocument()) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsHTMLDocument* html = document->AsHTMLDocument();
if (NS_WARN_IF(!html)) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// WD-05 origin compatibility support - aInputRpId might be a URI/origin,
// so catch that (Bug 1380421). Remove in Bug 1381126.
nsAutoString inputRpId(aInputRpId);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> inputUri;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(inputUri), aInputRpId))) {
// If we parsed the input as a URI, then pull out the host and use it as the
// input
nsAutoCString uriHost;
if (NS_FAILED(inputUri->GetHost(uriHost))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
CopyUTF8toUTF16(uriHost, inputRpId);
MOZ_LOG(gWebAuthnManagerLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("WD-05 Fallback: Parsed input %s URI into host %s",
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aInputRpId).get(), uriHost.get()));
}
// End WD-05 origin compatibility support (Bug 1380421)
if (!html->IsRegistrableDomainSuffixOfOrEqualTo(inputRpId, originHost)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR;
}
aRelaxedRpId.Assign(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aInputRpId));
return NS_OK;
}
/***********************************************************************
* WebAuthnManager Implementation
**********************************************************************/
WebAuthnManager::WebAuthnManager()
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
}
void
WebAuthnManager::MaybeClearTransaction()
{
mClientData.reset();
mInfo.reset();
mTransactionPromise = nullptr;
if (mChild) {
RefPtr<WebAuthnTransactionChild> c;
mChild.swap(c);
c->Send__delete__(c);
}
}
WebAuthnManager::~WebAuthnManager()
{
MaybeClearTransaction();
}
already_AddRefed<MozPromise<nsresult, nsresult, false>>
WebAuthnManager::GetOrCreateBackgroundActor()
{
bool ok = BackgroundChild::GetOrCreateForCurrentThread(this);
if (NS_WARN_IF(!ok)) {
ActorFailed();
}
return mPBackgroundCreationPromise.Ensure(__func__);
}
//static
WebAuthnManager*
WebAuthnManager::GetOrCreate()
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
if (gWebAuthnManager) {
return gWebAuthnManager;
}
gWebAuthnManager = new WebAuthnManager();
ClearOnShutdown(&gWebAuthnManager);
return gWebAuthnManager;
}
//static
WebAuthnManager*
WebAuthnManager::Get()
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
return gWebAuthnManager;
}
already_AddRefed<Promise>
WebAuthnManager::MakeCredential(nsPIDOMWindowInner* aParent,
const MakeCredentialOptions& aOptions)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aParent);
MaybeClearTransaction();
nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = do_QueryInterface(aParent);
ErrorResult rv;
RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(global, rv);
if(rv.Failed()) {
return nullptr;
}
nsString origin;
nsCString rpId;
rv = GetOrigin(aParent, origin, rpId);
if (NS_WARN_IF(rv.Failed())) {
promise->MaybeReject(rv);
return promise.forget();
}
// If timeoutSeconds was specified, check if its value lies within a
// reasonable range as defined by the platform and if not, correct it to the
// closest value lying within that range.
double adjustedTimeout = 30.0;
if (aOptions.mTimeout.WasPassed()) {
adjustedTimeout = aOptions.mTimeout.Value();
adjustedTimeout = std::max(15.0, adjustedTimeout);
adjustedTimeout = std::min(120.0, adjustedTimeout);
}
if (aOptions.mRp.mId.WasPassed()) {
// If rpId is specified, then invoke the procedure used for relaxing the
// same-origin restriction by setting the document.domain attribute, using
// rpId as the given value but without changing the current documents
// domain. If no errors are thrown, set rpId to the value of host as
// computed by this procedure, and rpIdHash to the SHA-256 hash of rpId.
// Otherwise, reject promise with a DOMException whose name is
// "SecurityError", and terminate this algorithm.
if (NS_FAILED(RelaxSameOrigin(aParent, aOptions.mRp.mId.Value(), rpId))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
}
CryptoBuffer rpIdHash;
if (!rpIdHash.SetLength(SHA256_LENGTH, fallible)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return promise.forget();
}
nsresult srv;
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hashService =
do_CreateInstance(NS_CRYPTO_HASH_CONTRACTID, &srv);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
srv = HashCString(hashService, rpId, rpIdHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// Process each element of cryptoParameters using the following steps, to
// produce a new sequence normalizedParameters.
nsTArray<PublicKeyCredentialParameters> normalizedParams;
for (size_t a = 0; a < aOptions.mParameters.Length(); ++a) {
// Let current be the currently selected element of
// cryptoParameters.
// If current.type does not contain a PublicKeyCredentialType
// supported by this implementation, then stop processing current and move
// on to the next element in cryptoParameters.
if (aOptions.mParameters[a].mType != PublicKeyCredentialType::Public_key) {
continue;
}
// Let normalizedAlgorithm be the result of normalizing an algorithm using
// the procedure defined in [WebCryptoAPI], with alg set to
// current.algorithm and op set to 'generateKey'. If an error occurs during
// this procedure, then stop processing current and move on to the next
// element in cryptoParameters.
nsString algName;
if (NS_FAILED(GetAlgorithmName(aOptions.mParameters[a].mAlgorithm,
algName))) {
continue;
}
// Add a new object of type PublicKeyCredentialParameters to
// normalizedParameters, with type set to current.type and algorithm set to
// normalizedAlgorithm.
PublicKeyCredentialParameters normalizedObj;
normalizedObj.mType = aOptions.mParameters[a].mType;
normalizedObj.mAlgorithm.SetAsString().Assign(algName);
if (!normalizedParams.AppendElement(normalizedObj, mozilla::fallible)){
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return promise.forget();
}
}
// If normalizedAlgorithm is empty and cryptoParameters was not empty, cancel
// the timer started in step 2, reject promise with a DOMException whose name
// is "NotSupportedError", and terminate this algorithm.
if (normalizedParams.IsEmpty() && !aOptions.mParameters.IsEmpty()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// TODO: The following check should not be here. This is checking for
// parameters specific to the soft key, and should be put in the soft key
// manager in the parent process. Still need to serialize
// PublicKeyCredentialParameters first.
// Check if at least one of the specified combinations of
// PublicKeyCredentialParameters and cryptographic parameters is supported. If
// not, return an error code equivalent to NotSupportedError and terminate the
// operation.
bool isValidCombination = false;
for (size_t a = 0; a < normalizedParams.Length(); ++a) {
if (normalizedParams[a].mType == PublicKeyCredentialType::Public_key &&
normalizedParams[a].mAlgorithm.IsString() &&
normalizedParams[a].mAlgorithm.GetAsString().EqualsLiteral(
JWK_ALG_ECDSA_P_256)) {
isValidCombination = true;
break;
}
}
if (!isValidCombination) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// If excludeList is undefined, set it to the empty list.
//
// If extensions was specified, process any extensions supported by this
// client platform, to produce the extension data that needs to be sent to the
// authenticator. If an error is encountered while processing an extension,
// skip that extension and do not produce any extension data for it. Call the
// result of this processing clientExtensions.
//
// Currently no extensions are supported
//
// Use attestationChallenge, callerOrigin and rpId, along with the token
// binding key associated with callerOrigin (if any), to create a ClientData
// structure representing this request. Choose a hash algorithm for hashAlg
// and compute the clientDataJSON and clientDataHash.
CryptoBuffer challenge;
if (!challenge.Assign(aOptions.mChallenge)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsAutoCString clientDataJSON;
srv = AssembleClientData(origin, challenge, clientDataJSON);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
CryptoBuffer clientDataHash;
if (!clientDataHash.SetLength(SHA256_LENGTH, fallible)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
srv = HashCString(hashService, clientDataJSON, clientDataHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsTArray<WebAuthnScopedCredentialDescriptor> excludeList;
if (aOptions.mExcludeList.WasPassed()) {
for (const auto& s: aOptions.mExcludeList.Value()) {
WebAuthnScopedCredentialDescriptor c;
CryptoBuffer cb;
cb.Assign(s.mId);
c.id() = cb;
excludeList.AppendElement(c);
}
}
// TODO: Add extension list building
nsTArray<WebAuthnExtension> extensions;
WebAuthnTransactionInfo info(rpIdHash,
clientDataHash,
adjustedTimeout,
excludeList,
extensions);
RefPtr<MozPromise<nsresult, nsresult, false>> p = GetOrCreateBackgroundActor();
p->Then(GetMainThreadSerialEventTarget(), __func__,
[]() {
WebAuthnManager* mgr = WebAuthnManager::Get();
if (!mgr) {
return;
}
mgr->StartRegister();
},
[]() {
// This case can't actually happen, we'll have crashed if the child
// failed to create.
});
mTransactionPromise = promise;
mClientData = Some(clientDataJSON);
mCurrentParent = aParent;
mInfo = Some(info);
return promise.forget();
}
void
WebAuthnManager::StartRegister() {
if (mChild) {
mChild->SendRequestRegister(mInfo.ref());
}
}
void
WebAuthnManager::StartSign() {
if (mChild) {
mChild->SendRequestSign(mInfo.ref());
}
}
already_AddRefed<Promise>
WebAuthnManager::GetAssertion(nsPIDOMWindowInner* aParent,
const PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions& aOptions)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aParent);
MaybeClearTransaction();
nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = do_QueryInterface(aParent);
ErrorResult rv;
RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(global, rv);
if(rv.Failed()) {
return nullptr;
}
nsString origin;
nsCString rpId;
rv = GetOrigin(aParent, origin, rpId);
if (NS_WARN_IF(rv.Failed())) {
promise->MaybeReject(rv);
return promise.forget();
}
// If timeoutSeconds was specified, check if its value lies within a
// reasonable range as defined by the platform and if not, correct it to the
// closest value lying within that range.
uint32_t adjustedTimeout = 30000;
if (aOptions.mTimeout.WasPassed()) {
adjustedTimeout = aOptions.mTimeout.Value();
adjustedTimeout = std::max(15000u, adjustedTimeout);
adjustedTimeout = std::min(120000u, adjustedTimeout);
}
if (aOptions.mRpId.WasPassed()) {
// If rpId is specified, then invoke the procedure used for relaxing the
// same-origin restriction by setting the document.domain attribute, using
// rpId as the given value but without changing the current documents
// domain. If no errors are thrown, set rpId to the value of host as
// computed by this procedure, and rpIdHash to the SHA-256 hash of rpId.
// Otherwise, reject promise with a DOMException whose name is
// "SecurityError", and terminate this algorithm.
if (NS_FAILED(RelaxSameOrigin(aParent, aOptions.mRpId.Value(), rpId))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
}
CryptoBuffer rpIdHash;
if (!rpIdHash.SetLength(SHA256_LENGTH, fallible)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return promise.forget();
}
nsresult srv;
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hashService =
do_CreateInstance(NS_CRYPTO_HASH_CONTRACTID, &srv);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
srv = HashCString(hashService, rpId, rpIdHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// Use assertionChallenge, callerOrigin and rpId, along with the token binding
// key associated with callerOrigin (if any), to create a ClientData structure
// representing this request. Choose a hash algorithm for hashAlg and compute
// the clientDataJSON and clientDataHash.
CryptoBuffer challenge;
if (!challenge.Assign(aOptions.mChallenge)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsAutoCString clientDataJSON;
srv = AssembleClientData(origin, challenge, clientDataJSON);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
CryptoBuffer clientDataHash;
if (!clientDataHash.SetLength(SHA256_LENGTH, fallible)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
srv = HashCString(hashService, clientDataJSON, clientDataHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// Note: we only support U2F-style authentication for now, so we effectively
// require an AllowList.
if (aOptions.mAllowList.Length() < 1) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_ALLOWED_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsTArray<WebAuthnScopedCredentialDescriptor> allowList;
for (const auto& s: aOptions.mAllowList) {
WebAuthnScopedCredentialDescriptor c;
CryptoBuffer cb;
cb.Assign(s.mId);
c.id() = cb;
allowList.AppendElement(c);
}
// TODO: Add extension list building
// If extensions was specified, process any extensions supported by this
// client platform, to produce the extension data that needs to be sent to the
// authenticator. If an error is encountered while processing an extension,
// skip that extension and do not produce any extension data for it. Call the
// result of this processing clientExtensions.
nsTArray<WebAuthnExtension> extensions;
WebAuthnTransactionInfo info(rpIdHash,
clientDataHash,
adjustedTimeout,
allowList,
extensions);
RefPtr<MozPromise<nsresult, nsresult, false>> p = GetOrCreateBackgroundActor();
p->Then(GetMainThreadSerialEventTarget(), __func__,
[]() {
WebAuthnManager* mgr = WebAuthnManager::Get();
if (!mgr) {
return;
}
mgr->StartSign();
},
[]() {
// This case can't actually happen, we'll have crashed if the child
// failed to create.
});
// Only store off the promise if we've succeeded in sending the IPC event.
mTransactionPromise = promise;
mClientData = Some(clientDataJSON);
mCurrentParent = aParent;
mInfo = Some(info);
return promise.forget();
}
void
WebAuthnManager::FinishMakeCredential(nsTArray<uint8_t>& aRegBuffer)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(mTransactionPromise);
MOZ_ASSERT(mInfo.isSome());
CryptoBuffer regData;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!regData.Assign(aRegBuffer.Elements(), aRegBuffer.Length()))) {
Cancel(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
mozilla::dom::CryptoBuffer aaguidBuf;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!aaguidBuf.SetCapacity(16, mozilla::fallible))) {
Cancel(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
// TODO: Adjust the AAGUID from all zeroes in Bug 1381575 (if needed)
// See https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/506
for (int i=0; i<16; i++) {
aaguidBuf.AppendElement(0x00, mozilla::fallible);
}
// Decompose the U2F registration packet
CryptoBuffer pubKeyBuf;
CryptoBuffer keyHandleBuf;
CryptoBuffer attestationCertBuf;
CryptoBuffer signatureBuf;
// Only handles attestation cert chains of length=1.
nsresult rv = U2FDecomposeRegistrationResponse(regData, pubKeyBuf, keyHandleBuf,
attestationCertBuf, signatureBuf);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
Cancel(rv);
return;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(keyHandleBuf.Length() <= 0xFFFF);
CryptoBuffer clientDataBuf;
if (!clientDataBuf.Assign(mClientData.ref())) {
Cancel(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer rpIdHashBuf;
if (!rpIdHashBuf.Assign(mInfo.ref().RpIdHash())) {
Cancel(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer authenticatorDataBuf;
rv = U2FAssembleAuthenticatorData(authenticatorDataBuf, rpIdHashBuf,
signatureBuf);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
Cancel(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
// Construct the public key object
CryptoBuffer pubKeyObj;
rv = CBOREncodePublicKeyObj(pubKeyBuf, pubKeyObj);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
Cancel(rv);
return;
}
// Format:
// 32 bytes: SHA256 of the RP ID
// 1 byte: flags (TUP & AT)
// 4 bytes: sign counter
// variable: attestation data struct
// - 16 bytes: AAGUID
// - 2 bytes: Length of Credential ID
// - L bytes: Credential ID
// - variable: CBOR-format public key
// variable: CBOR-format extension auth data (optional, not flagged)
mozilla::dom::CryptoBuffer authDataBuf;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!authDataBuf.SetCapacity(32 + 1 + 4 + aaguidBuf.Length() + 2 +
keyHandleBuf.Length() +
pubKeyObj.Length(),
mozilla::fallible))) {
Cancel(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
authDataBuf.AppendElements(rpIdHashBuf, mozilla::fallible);
authDataBuf.AppendElement(FLAG_TUP | FLAG_AT, mozilla::fallible);
// During create credential, counter is always 0 for U2F
// See https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/507
authDataBuf.AppendElement(0x00, mozilla::fallible);
authDataBuf.AppendElement(0x00, mozilla::fallible);
authDataBuf.AppendElement(0x00, mozilla::fallible);
authDataBuf.AppendElement(0x00, mozilla::fallible);
authDataBuf.AppendElements(aaguidBuf, mozilla::fallible);
authDataBuf.AppendElement((keyHandleBuf.Length() >> 8) & 0xFF, mozilla::fallible);
authDataBuf.AppendElement((keyHandleBuf.Length() >> 0) & 0xFF, mozilla::fallible);
authDataBuf.AppendElements(keyHandleBuf, mozilla::fallible);
authDataBuf.AppendElements(pubKeyObj, mozilla::fallible);
CryptoBuffer attObj;
rv = CBOREncodeAttestationObj(authDataBuf, attestationCertBuf, signatureBuf,
attObj);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
Cancel(rv);
return;
}
// Create a new PublicKeyCredential object and populate its fields with the
// values returned from the authenticator as well as the clientDataJSON
// computed earlier.
RefPtr<AuthenticatorAttestationResponse> attestation =
new AuthenticatorAttestationResponse(mCurrentParent);
attestation->SetClientDataJSON(clientDataBuf);
attestation->SetAttestationObject(attObj);
RefPtr<PublicKeyCredential> credential = new PublicKeyCredential(mCurrentParent);
credential->SetRawId(keyHandleBuf);
credential->SetResponse(attestation);
mTransactionPromise->MaybeResolve(credential);
MaybeClearTransaction();
}
void
WebAuthnManager::FinishGetAssertion(nsTArray<uint8_t>& aCredentialId,
nsTArray<uint8_t>& aSigBuffer)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(mTransactionPromise);
MOZ_ASSERT(mInfo.isSome());
CryptoBuffer signatureData;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!signatureData.Assign(aSigBuffer.Elements(), aSigBuffer.Length()))) {
Cancel(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer clientDataBuf;
if (!clientDataBuf.Assign(mClientData.ref())) {
Cancel(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer rpIdHashBuf;
if (!rpIdHashBuf.Assign(mInfo.ref().RpIdHash())) {
Cancel(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer authenticatorDataBuf;
nsresult rv = U2FAssembleAuthenticatorData(authenticatorDataBuf, rpIdHashBuf,
signatureData);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
Cancel(rv);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer credentialBuf;
if (!credentialBuf.Assign(aCredentialId)) {
Cancel(rv);
return;
}
// If any authenticator returns success:
// Create a new PublicKeyCredential object named value and populate its fields
// with the values returned from the authenticator as well as the
// clientDataJSON computed earlier.
RefPtr<AuthenticatorAssertionResponse> assertion =
new AuthenticatorAssertionResponse(mCurrentParent);
assertion->SetClientDataJSON(clientDataBuf);
assertion->SetAuthenticatorData(authenticatorDataBuf);
assertion->SetSignature(signatureData);
RefPtr<PublicKeyCredential> credential =
new PublicKeyCredential(mCurrentParent);
credential->SetRawId(credentialBuf);
credential->SetResponse(assertion);
mTransactionPromise->MaybeResolve(credential);
MaybeClearTransaction();
}
void
WebAuthnManager::Cancel(const nsresult& aError)
{
if (mTransactionPromise) {
mTransactionPromise->MaybeReject(aError);
}
MaybeClearTransaction();
}
void
WebAuthnManager::ActorCreated(PBackgroundChild* aActor)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aActor);
RefPtr<WebAuthnTransactionChild> mgr(new WebAuthnTransactionChild());
PWebAuthnTransactionChild* constructedMgr =
aActor->SendPWebAuthnTransactionConstructor(mgr);
if (NS_WARN_IF(!constructedMgr)) {
ActorFailed();
return;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(constructedMgr == mgr);
mChild = mgr.forget();
mPBackgroundCreationPromise.Resolve(NS_OK, __func__);
}
void
WebAuthnManager::ActorDestroyed()
{
mChild = nullptr;
}
void
WebAuthnManager::ActorFailed()
{
MOZ_CRASH("We shouldn't be here!");
}
}
}