зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
1917 строки
69 KiB
C++
1917 строки
69 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include <string>
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#include <unordered_set>
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#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
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#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h"
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#include "nsContentUtils.h"
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#include "nsCSPContext.h"
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#include "nsCSPParser.h"
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#include "nsCSPService.h"
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#include "nsError.h"
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#include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h"
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#include "nsIClassInfoImpl.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
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#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
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#include "nsIInterfaceRequestor.h"
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#include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h"
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#include "nsIObjectInputStream.h"
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#include "nsIObjectOutputStream.h"
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#include "nsIObserver.h"
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#include "nsIObserverService.h"
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#include "nsIStringStream.h"
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#include "nsISupportsPrimitives.h"
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#include "nsIUploadChannel.h"
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#include "nsIURIMutator.h"
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#include "nsIScriptError.h"
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#include "nsMimeTypes.h"
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#include "nsNetUtil.h"
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#include "nsIContentPolicy.h"
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#include "nsSupportsPrimitives.h"
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#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
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#include "nsString.h"
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#include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h"
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#include "nsStringStream.h"
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#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
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#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/CSPReportBinding.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/CSPDictionariesBinding.h"
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#include "mozilla/ipc/PBackgroundSharedTypes.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h"
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#include "nsINetworkInterceptController.h"
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#include "nsSandboxFlags.h"
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#include "nsIScriptElement.h"
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#include "nsIEventTarget.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/DocGroup.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
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#include "nsXULAppAPI.h"
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#include "nsJSUtils.h"
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using namespace mozilla;
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using namespace mozilla::dom;
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using namespace mozilla::ipc;
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static LogModule* GetCspContextLog() {
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static LazyLogModule gCspContextPRLog("CSPContext");
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return gCspContextPRLog;
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}
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#define CSPCONTEXTLOG(args) \
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MOZ_LOG(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
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#define CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED() \
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MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
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static const uint32_t CSP_CACHE_URI_CUTOFF_SIZE = 512;
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#ifdef DEBUG
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/**
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* This function is only used for verification purposes within
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* GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData.
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*/
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static bool ValidateDirectiveName(const nsAString& aDirective) {
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static const auto directives = []() {
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std::unordered_set<std::string> directives;
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constexpr size_t dirLen =
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sizeof(CSPStrDirectives) / sizeof(CSPStrDirectives[0]);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < dirLen; ++i) {
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directives.insert(CSPStrDirectives[i]);
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}
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return directives;
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}();
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nsAutoString directive(aDirective);
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auto itr = directives.find(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(directive).get());
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return itr != directives.end();
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}
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#endif // DEBUG
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static void BlockedContentSourceToString(
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nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource aSource, nsACString& aString) {
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switch (aSource) {
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case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eUnknown:
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aString.Truncate();
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break;
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case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eInline:
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aString.AssignLiteral("inline");
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break;
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case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eEval:
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aString.AssignLiteral("eval");
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break;
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case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eSelf:
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aString.AssignLiteral("self");
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break;
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}
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}
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/* ===== nsIContentSecurityPolicy impl ====== */
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
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nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
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nsIURI* aContentLocation,
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const nsACString& aMimeTypeGuess,
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nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect,
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bool aSendViolationReports, const nsAString& aNonce,
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bool aParserCreated, int16_t* outDecision) {
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if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
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CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, aContentLocation: %s",
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aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
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CSPCONTEXTLOG((">>>> aContentType: %d", aContentType));
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}
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bool isPreload = nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(aContentType);
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// Since we know whether we are dealing with a preload, we have to convert
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// the internal policytype ot the external policy type before moving on.
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// We still need to know if this is a worker so child-src can handle that
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// case correctly.
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aContentType =
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nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternalOrWorker(aContentType);
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// This ShouldLoad function is called from nsCSPService::ShouldLoad,
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// which already checked a number of things, including:
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// * aContentLocation is not null; we can consume this without further checks
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// * scheme is not a allowlisted scheme (about: chrome:, etc).
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// * CSP is enabled
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// * Content Type is not allowlisted (CSP Reports, TYPE_DOCUMENT, etc).
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// * Fast Path for Apps
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// Default decision, CSP can revise it if there's a policy to enforce
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*outDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
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// If the content type doesn't map to a CSP directive, there's nothing for
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// CSP to do.
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CSPDirective dir = CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(aContentType);
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if (dir == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE) {
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return NS_OK;
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}
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bool permitted =
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permitsInternal(dir,
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nullptr, // aTriggeringElement
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aCSPEventListener, aContentLocation,
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aOriginalURIIfRedirect, aNonce, isPreload,
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false, // allow fallback to default-src
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aSendViolationReports,
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true, // send blocked URI in violation reports
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aParserCreated);
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*outDecision =
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permitted ? nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT : nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_SERVER;
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if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
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CSPCONTEXTLOG(
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("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, decision: %s, "
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"aContentLocation: %s",
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*outDecision > 0 ? "load" : "deny",
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aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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bool nsCSPContext::permitsInternal(
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CSPDirective aDir, Element* aTriggeringElement,
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nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aContentLocation,
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nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aIsPreload,
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bool aSpecific, bool aSendViolationReports,
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bool aSendContentLocationInViolationReports, bool aParserCreated) {
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EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
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bool permits = true;
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nsAutoString violatedDirective;
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for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
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if (!mPolicies[p]->permits(aDir, aContentLocation, aNonce,
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!!aOriginalURIIfRedirect, aSpecific,
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aParserCreated, violatedDirective)) {
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// If the policy is violated and not report-only, reject the load and
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// report to the console
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if (!mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
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CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::permitsInternal, false"));
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permits = false;
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}
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// Do not send a report or notify observers if this is a preload - the
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// decision may be wrong due to the inability to get the nonce, and will
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// incorrectly fail the unit tests.
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if (!aIsPreload && aSendViolationReports) {
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uint32_t lineNumber = 0;
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uint32_t columnNumber = 0;
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nsAutoString spec;
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JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
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if (cx) {
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nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, spec, &lineNumber, &columnNumber);
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// If GetCallingLocation fails linenumber & columnNumber are set to 0
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// anyway so we can skip checking if that is the case.
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}
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AsyncReportViolation(
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aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
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(aSendContentLocationInViolationReports ? aContentLocation
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: nullptr),
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BlockedContentSource::eUnknown, /* a BlockedContentSource */
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aOriginalURIIfRedirect, /* in case of redirect originalURI is not
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null */
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violatedDirective, p, /* policy index */
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EmptyString(), /* no observer subject */
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spec, /* source file */
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EmptyString(), /* no script sample */
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lineNumber, /* line number */
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columnNumber); /* column number */
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}
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}
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}
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return permits;
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}
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/* ===== nsISupports implementation ========== */
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NS_IMPL_CLASSINFO(nsCSPContext, nullptr, nsIClassInfo::MAIN_THREAD_ONLY,
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NS_CSPCONTEXT_CID)
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NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS_CI(nsCSPContext, nsIContentSecurityPolicy, nsISerializable)
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nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext()
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: mInnerWindowID(0),
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mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck(false),
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mLoadingContext(nullptr),
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mLoadingPrincipal(nullptr),
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mQueueUpMessages(true) {
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CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext"));
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}
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nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext() {
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CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext"));
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
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delete mPolicies[i];
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}
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}
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/* static */
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bool nsCSPContext::Equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCSP,
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nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aOtherCSP) {
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if (aCSP == aOtherCSP) {
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// fast path for pointer equality
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return true;
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}
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uint32_t policyCount = 0;
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if (aCSP) {
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aCSP->GetPolicyCount(&policyCount);
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}
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uint32_t otherPolicyCount = 0;
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if (aOtherCSP) {
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aOtherCSP->GetPolicyCount(&otherPolicyCount);
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}
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if (policyCount != otherPolicyCount) {
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return false;
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}
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nsAutoString policyStr, otherPolicyStr;
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < policyCount; ++i) {
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aCSP->GetPolicyString(i, policyStr);
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aOtherCSP->GetPolicyString(i, otherPolicyStr);
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if (!policyStr.Equals(otherPolicyStr)) {
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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nsresult nsCSPContext::InitFromOther(nsCSPContext* aOtherContext) {
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NS_ENSURE_ARG(aOtherContext);
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nsresult rv = NS_OK;
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nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(aOtherContext->mLoadingContext);
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if (doc) {
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rv = SetRequestContextWithDocument(doc);
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} else {
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rv = SetRequestContextWithPrincipal(
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aOtherContext->mLoadingPrincipal, aOtherContext->mSelfURI,
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aOtherContext->mReferrer, aOtherContext->mInnerWindowID);
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}
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck = aOtherContext->mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck;
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for (auto policy : aOtherContext->mPolicies) {
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nsAutoString policyStr;
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policy->toString(policyStr);
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AppendPolicy(policyStr, policy->getReportOnlyFlag(),
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policy->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
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}
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mIPCPolicies = aOtherContext->mIPCPolicies.Clone();
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return NS_OK;
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}
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void nsCSPContext::EnsureIPCPoliciesRead() {
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if (mIPCPolicies.Length() > 0) {
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nsresult rv;
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for (auto& policy : mIPCPolicies) {
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rv = AppendPolicy(policy.policy(), policy.reportOnlyFlag(),
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policy.deliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
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Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
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}
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mIPCPolicies.Clear();
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}
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsCSPContext::GetPolicyString(uint32_t aIndex, nsAString& outStr) {
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outStr.Truncate();
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EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
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if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) {
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return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
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}
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mPolicies[aIndex]->toString(outStr);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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const nsCSPPolicy* nsCSPContext::GetPolicy(uint32_t aIndex) {
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EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
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if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) {
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return nullptr;
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}
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return mPolicies[aIndex];
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsCSPContext::GetPolicyCount(uint32_t* outPolicyCount) {
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EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
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*outPolicyCount = mPolicies.Length();
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsCSPContext::GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(bool* outUpgradeRequest) {
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EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
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*outUpgradeRequest = false;
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
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if (mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
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nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) {
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*outUpgradeRequest = true;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsCSPContext::GetBlockAllMixedContent(bool* outBlockAllMixedContent) {
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EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
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*outBlockAllMixedContent = false;
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
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if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag() &&
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mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
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nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT)) {
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*outBlockAllMixedContent = true;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsCSPContext::GetEnforcesFrameAncestors(bool* outEnforcesFrameAncestors) {
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EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
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*outEnforcesFrameAncestors = false;
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
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if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag() &&
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mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
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nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE)) {
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*outEnforcesFrameAncestors = true;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy(const nsAString& aPolicyString, bool aReportOnly,
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bool aDeliveredViaMetaTag) {
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CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy: %s",
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NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPolicyString).get()));
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// Use mSelfURI from setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal} (bug 991474)
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MOZ_ASSERT(
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mLoadingPrincipal,
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"did you forget to call setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal}?");
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MOZ_ASSERT(
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mSelfURI,
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"did you forget to call setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal}?");
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mLoadingPrincipal, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mSelfURI, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
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nsCSPPolicy* policy = nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy(
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aPolicyString, mSelfURI, aReportOnly, this, aDeliveredViaMetaTag);
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if (policy) {
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if (policy->hasDirective(
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nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) {
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nsAutoCString selfURIspec, referrer;
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if (mSelfURI) {
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mSelfURI->GetAsciiSpec(selfURIspec);
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}
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referrer = NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mReferrer);
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CSPCONTEXTLOG(
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("nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy added UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE "
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"self-uri=%s referrer=%s",
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selfURIspec.get(), referrer.get()));
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}
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mPolicies.AppendElement(policy);
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// set the flag on the document for CSP telemetry
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nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
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if (doc) {
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doc->SetHasCSP(true);
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}
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsCSPContext::GetAllowsEval(bool* outShouldReportViolation,
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bool* outAllowsEval) {
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EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
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*outShouldReportViolation = false;
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*outAllowsEval = true;
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
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if (!mPolicies[i]->allows(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT, CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL,
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EmptyString(), false)) {
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// policy is violated: must report the violation and allow the inline
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// script if the policy is report-only.
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*outShouldReportViolation = true;
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if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
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*outAllowsEval = false;
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}
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}
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// Helper function to report inline violations
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void nsCSPContext::reportInlineViolation(
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nsContentPolicyType aContentType, Element* aTriggeringElement,
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nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const nsAString& aNonce,
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const nsAString& aContent, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective,
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uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, // TODO, use report only flag for that
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uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber) {
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nsString observerSubject;
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// if the nonce is non empty, then we report the nonce error, otherwise
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// let's report the hash error; no need to report the unsafe-inline error
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// anymore.
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if (!aNonce.IsEmpty()) {
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observerSubject = (aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT)
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? NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
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SCRIPT_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC)
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: NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
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STYLE_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
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} else {
|
||
observerSubject = (aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT)
|
||
? NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
|
||
SCRIPT_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC)
|
||
: NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
|
||
STYLE_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsAutoString sourceFile;
|
||
uint32_t lineNumber;
|
||
uint32_t columnNumber;
|
||
|
||
JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
|
||
if (!cx || !nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, sourceFile, &lineNumber,
|
||
&columnNumber)) {
|
||
// use selfURI as the sourceFile
|
||
if (mSelfURI) {
|
||
nsAutoCString cSourceFile;
|
||
mSelfURI->GetSpec(cSourceFile);
|
||
sourceFile.Assign(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(cSourceFile));
|
||
}
|
||
lineNumber = aLineNumber;
|
||
columnNumber = aColumnNumber;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
AsyncReportViolation(aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
|
||
nullptr, // aBlockedURI
|
||
BlockedContentSource::eInline, // aBlockedSource
|
||
mSelfURI, // aOriginalURI
|
||
aViolatedDirective, // aViolatedDirective
|
||
aViolatedPolicyIndex, // aViolatedPolicyIndex
|
||
observerSubject, // aObserverSubject
|
||
sourceFile, // aSourceFile
|
||
aContent, // aScriptSample
|
||
lineNumber, // aLineNum
|
||
columnNumber); // aColumnNum
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::GetAllowsInline(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
|
||
const nsAString& aNonce, bool aParserCreated,
|
||
Element* aTriggeringElement,
|
||
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
|
||
const nsAString& aContentOfPseudoScript,
|
||
uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber,
|
||
bool* outAllowsInline) {
|
||
*outAllowsInline = true;
|
||
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(
|
||
aContentType ==
|
||
nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(aContentType),
|
||
"We should only see external content policy types here.");
|
||
|
||
if (aContentType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT &&
|
||
aContentType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET) {
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "can only allow inline for script or style");
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
|
||
nsAutoString content(EmptyString());
|
||
|
||
// always iterate all policies, otherwise we might not send out all reports
|
||
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
|
||
bool allowed =
|
||
mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, EmptyString(),
|
||
aParserCreated) ||
|
||
mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, CSP_NONCE, aNonce, aParserCreated);
|
||
|
||
// If the inlined script or style is allowed by either unsafe-inline or the
|
||
// nonce, go ahead and shortcut this loop so we can avoid allocating
|
||
// unecessary strings
|
||
if (allowed) {
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Check the content length to ensure the content is not allocated more than
|
||
// once. Even though we are in a for loop, it is probable that there is only
|
||
// one policy, so this check may be unnecessary.
|
||
if (content.IsEmpty() && aTriggeringElement) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptElement> element =
|
||
do_QueryInterface(aTriggeringElement);
|
||
if (element) {
|
||
element->GetScriptText(content);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (content.IsEmpty()) {
|
||
content = aContentOfPseudoScript;
|
||
}
|
||
allowed =
|
||
mPolicies[i]->allows(aContentType, CSP_HASH, content, aParserCreated);
|
||
|
||
if (!allowed) {
|
||
// policy is violoated: deny the load unless policy is report only and
|
||
// report the violation.
|
||
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
|
||
*outAllowsInline = false;
|
||
}
|
||
nsAutoString violatedDirective;
|
||
bool reportSample = false;
|
||
mPolicies[i]->getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType(
|
||
aContentType, violatedDirective, &reportSample);
|
||
reportInlineViolation(aContentType, aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
|
||
aNonce, reportSample ? content : EmptyString(),
|
||
violatedDirective, i, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::GetAllowsNavigateTo(nsIURI* aURI, bool aIsFormSubmission,
|
||
bool aWasRedirected, bool aEnforceAllowlist,
|
||
bool* outAllowsNavigateTo) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* The matrix below shows the different values of (aWasRedirect,
|
||
* aEnforceAllowlist) for the three different checks we do.
|
||
*
|
||
* Navigation | Start Loading | Initiate Redirect | Document
|
||
* | (nsDocShell) | (nsCSPService) |
|
||
* -----------------------------------------------------------------
|
||
* A -> B (false,false) - (false,true)
|
||
* A -> ... -> B (false,false) (true,false) (true,true)
|
||
*/
|
||
*outAllowsNavigateTo = false;
|
||
|
||
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
|
||
// The 'form-action' directive overrules 'navigate-to' for form submissions.
|
||
// So in case this is a form submission and the directive 'form-action' is
|
||
// present then there is nothing for us to do here, see: 6.3.3.1.2
|
||
// https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/#navigate-to-pre-navigate
|
||
if (aIsFormSubmission) {
|
||
for (unsigned long i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
|
||
if (mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
|
||
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FORM_ACTION_DIRECTIVE)) {
|
||
*outAllowsNavigateTo = true;
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
bool atLeastOneBlock = false;
|
||
for (unsigned long i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
|
||
if (!mPolicies[i]->allowsNavigateTo(aURI, aWasRedirected,
|
||
aEnforceAllowlist)) {
|
||
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
|
||
atLeastOneBlock = true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// If the load encountered a server side redirect, the spec suggests to
|
||
// remove the path component from the URI, see:
|
||
// https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/#source-list-paths-and-redirects
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> blockedURIForReporting = aURI;
|
||
if (aWasRedirected) {
|
||
nsAutoCString prePathStr;
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> prePathURI;
|
||
nsresult rv = aURI->GetPrePath(prePathStr);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(blockedURIForReporting), prePathStr);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Lines numbers and source file for the violation report
|
||
uint32_t lineNumber = 0;
|
||
uint32_t columnNumber = 0;
|
||
nsAutoCString spec;
|
||
JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
|
||
if (cx) {
|
||
nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, spec, &lineNumber, &columnNumber);
|
||
// If GetCallingLocation fails linenumber & columnNumber are set to 0
|
||
// anyway so we can skip checking if that is the case.
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Report the violation
|
||
nsresult rv = AsyncReportViolation(
|
||
nullptr, // aTriggeringElement
|
||
nullptr, // aCSPEventListener
|
||
blockedURIForReporting, // aBlockedURI
|
||
nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eSelf, // aBlockedSource
|
||
nullptr, // aOriginalURI
|
||
u"navigate-to"_ns, // aViolatedDirective
|
||
i, // aViolatedPolicyIndex
|
||
EmptyString(), // aObserverSubject
|
||
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec), // aSourceFile
|
||
EmptyString(), // aScriptSample
|
||
lineNumber, // aLineNum
|
||
columnNumber); // aColumnNum
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*outAllowsNavigateTo = !atLeastOneBlock;
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Reduces some code repetition for the various logging situations in
|
||
* LogViolationDetails.
|
||
*
|
||
* Call-sites for the eval/inline checks recieve two return values: allows
|
||
* and violates. Based on those, they must choose whether to call
|
||
* LogViolationDetails or not. Policies that are report-only allow the
|
||
* loads/compilations but violations should still be reported. Not all
|
||
* policies in this nsIContentSecurityPolicy instance will be violated,
|
||
* which is why we must check allows() again here.
|
||
*
|
||
* Note: This macro uses some parameters from its caller's context:
|
||
* p, mPolicies, this, aSourceFile, aScriptSample, aLineNum, aColumnNum,
|
||
* blockedContentSource
|
||
*
|
||
* @param violationType: the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constant (partial symbol)
|
||
* such as INLINE_SCRIPT
|
||
* @param contentPolicyType: a constant from nsIContentPolicy such as
|
||
* TYPE_STYLESHEET
|
||
* @param nonceOrHash: for NONCE and HASH violations, it's the nonce or content
|
||
* string. For other violations, it is an empty string.
|
||
* @param keyword: the keyword corresponding to violation (UNSAFE_INLINE for
|
||
* most)
|
||
* @param observerTopic: the observer topic string to send with the CSP
|
||
* observer notifications.
|
||
*
|
||
* Please note that inline violations for scripts are reported within
|
||
* GetAllowsInline() and do not call this macro, hence we can pass 'false'
|
||
* as the argument _aParserCreated_ to allows().
|
||
*/
|
||
#define CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(violationType, contentPolicyType, nonceOrHash, \
|
||
keyword, observerTopic) \
|
||
case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_##violationType: \
|
||
PR_BEGIN_MACRO \
|
||
if (!mPolicies[p]->allows(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_##contentPolicyType, \
|
||
keyword, nonceOrHash, false)) { \
|
||
nsAutoString violatedDirective; \
|
||
bool reportSample = false; \
|
||
mPolicies[p]->getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType( \
|
||
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_##contentPolicyType, violatedDirective, \
|
||
&reportSample); \
|
||
AsyncReportViolation( \
|
||
aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, nullptr, \
|
||
blockedContentSource, nullptr, violatedDirective, p, \
|
||
NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(observerTopic), aSourceFile, \
|
||
reportSample ? aScriptSample : EmptyString(), aLineNum, aColumnNum); \
|
||
} \
|
||
PR_END_MACRO; \
|
||
break
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* For each policy, log any violation on the Error Console and send a report
|
||
* if a report-uri is present in the policy
|
||
*
|
||
* @param aViolationType
|
||
* one of the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constants, e.g. inline-script or eval
|
||
* @param aSourceFile
|
||
* name of the source file containing the violation (if available)
|
||
* @param aContentSample
|
||
* sample of the violating content (to aid debugging)
|
||
* @param aLineNum
|
||
* source line number of the violation (if available)
|
||
* @param aColumnNum
|
||
* source column number of the violation (if available)
|
||
* @param aNonce
|
||
* (optional) If this is a nonce violation, include the nonce so we can
|
||
* recheck to determine which policies were violated and send the
|
||
* appropriate reports.
|
||
* @param aContent
|
||
* (optional) If this is a hash violation, include contents of the inline
|
||
* resource in the question so we can recheck the hash in order to
|
||
* determine which policies were violated and send the appropriate
|
||
* reports.
|
||
*/
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::LogViolationDetails(
|
||
uint16_t aViolationType, Element* aTriggeringElement,
|
||
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const nsAString& aSourceFile,
|
||
const nsAString& aScriptSample, int32_t aLineNum, int32_t aColumnNum,
|
||
const nsAString& aNonce, const nsAString& aContent) {
|
||
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
|
||
for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
|
||
NS_ASSERTION(mPolicies[p], "null pointer in nsTArray<nsCSPPolicy>");
|
||
|
||
BlockedContentSource blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eUnknown;
|
||
if (aViolationType == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL) {
|
||
blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eEval;
|
||
} else if (aViolationType ==
|
||
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_INLINE_SCRIPT ||
|
||
aViolationType ==
|
||
nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_INLINE_STYLE) {
|
||
blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eInline;
|
||
} else {
|
||
// All the other types should have a URL, but just in case, let's use
|
||
// 'self' here.
|
||
blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eSelf;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
switch (aViolationType) {
|
||
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(EVAL, SCRIPT, u""_ns, CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL,
|
||
EVAL_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
|
||
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(INLINE_STYLE, STYLESHEET, u""_ns, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
|
||
INLINE_STYLE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
|
||
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(INLINE_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, u""_ns, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
|
||
INLINE_SCRIPT_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
|
||
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(NONCE_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, aNonce, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
|
||
SCRIPT_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
|
||
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(NONCE_STYLE, STYLESHEET, aNonce, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
|
||
STYLE_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
|
||
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(HASH_SCRIPT, SCRIPT, aContent, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
|
||
SCRIPT_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
|
||
CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT(HASH_STYLE, STYLESHEET, aContent, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE,
|
||
STYLE_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
|
||
|
||
default:
|
||
NS_ASSERTION(false, "LogViolationDetails with invalid type");
|
||
break;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#undef CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::SetRequestContextWithDocument(Document* aDocument) {
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument, "Can't set context without doc");
|
||
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aDocument);
|
||
|
||
mLoadingContext = do_GetWeakReference(aDocument);
|
||
mSelfURI = aDocument->GetDocumentURI();
|
||
mLoadingPrincipal = aDocument->NodePrincipal();
|
||
aDocument->GetReferrer(mReferrer);
|
||
mInnerWindowID = aDocument->InnerWindowID();
|
||
// the innerWindowID is not available for CSPs delivered through the
|
||
// header at the time setReqeustContext is called - let's queue up
|
||
// console messages until it becomes available, see flushConsoleMessages
|
||
mQueueUpMessages = !mInnerWindowID;
|
||
mCallingChannelLoadGroup = aDocument->GetDocumentLoadGroup();
|
||
// set the flag on the document for CSP telemetry
|
||
mEventTarget = aDocument->EventTargetFor(TaskCategory::Other);
|
||
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal, "need a valid requestPrincipal");
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(mSelfURI, "need mSelfURI to translate 'self' into actual URI");
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::SetRequestContextWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aRequestPrincipal,
|
||
nsIURI* aSelfURI,
|
||
const nsAString& aReferrer,
|
||
uint64_t aInnerWindowId) {
|
||
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aRequestPrincipal);
|
||
|
||
mLoadingPrincipal = aRequestPrincipal;
|
||
mSelfURI = aSelfURI;
|
||
mReferrer = aReferrer;
|
||
mInnerWindowID = aInnerWindowId;
|
||
// if no document is available, then it also does not make sense to queue
|
||
// console messages sending messages to the browser console instead of the web
|
||
// console in that case.
|
||
mQueueUpMessages = false;
|
||
mCallingChannelLoadGroup = nullptr;
|
||
mEventTarget = nullptr;
|
||
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal, "need a valid requestPrincipal");
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(mSelfURI, "need mSelfURI to translate 'self' into actual URI");
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsIPrincipal* nsCSPContext::GetRequestPrincipal() { return mLoadingPrincipal; }
|
||
|
||
nsIURI* nsCSPContext::GetSelfURI() { return mSelfURI; }
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::GetReferrer(nsAString& outReferrer) {
|
||
outReferrer.Truncate();
|
||
outReferrer.Append(mReferrer);
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
uint64_t nsCSPContext::GetInnerWindowID() { return mInnerWindowID; }
|
||
|
||
bool nsCSPContext::GetSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck() {
|
||
return mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void nsCSPContext::SetSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck(
|
||
bool aSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck) {
|
||
mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck = aSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::EnsureEventTarget(nsIEventTarget* aEventTarget) {
|
||
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aEventTarget);
|
||
// Don't bother if we did have a valid event target (if the csp object is
|
||
// tied to a document in SetRequestContextWithDocument)
|
||
if (mEventTarget) {
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
mEventTarget = aEventTarget;
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
struct ConsoleMsgQueueElem {
|
||
nsString mMsg;
|
||
nsString mSourceName;
|
||
nsString mSourceLine;
|
||
uint32_t mLineNumber;
|
||
uint32_t mColumnNumber;
|
||
uint32_t mSeverityFlag;
|
||
nsCString mCategory;
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
void nsCSPContext::flushConsoleMessages() {
|
||
bool privateWindow = false;
|
||
|
||
// should flush messages even if doc is not available
|
||
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
|
||
if (doc) {
|
||
mInnerWindowID = doc->InnerWindowID();
|
||
privateWindow =
|
||
!!doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
mQueueUpMessages = false;
|
||
|
||
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mConsoleMsgQueue.Length(); i++) {
|
||
ConsoleMsgQueueElem& elem = mConsoleMsgQueue[i];
|
||
CSP_LogMessage(elem.mMsg, elem.mSourceName, elem.mSourceLine,
|
||
elem.mLineNumber, elem.mColumnNumber, elem.mSeverityFlag,
|
||
elem.mCategory, mInnerWindowID, privateWindow);
|
||
}
|
||
mConsoleMsgQueue.Clear();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void nsCSPContext::logToConsole(const char* aName,
|
||
const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
|
||
const nsAString& aSourceName,
|
||
const nsAString& aSourceLine,
|
||
uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber,
|
||
uint32_t aSeverityFlag) {
|
||
// we are passing aName as the category so we can link to the
|
||
// appropriate MDN docs depending on the specific error.
|
||
nsDependentCString category(aName);
|
||
|
||
// let's check if we have to queue up console messages
|
||
if (mQueueUpMessages) {
|
||
nsAutoString msg;
|
||
CSP_GetLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, msg);
|
||
ConsoleMsgQueueElem& elem = *mConsoleMsgQueue.AppendElement();
|
||
elem.mMsg = msg;
|
||
elem.mSourceName = PromiseFlatString(aSourceName);
|
||
elem.mSourceLine = PromiseFlatString(aSourceLine);
|
||
elem.mLineNumber = aLineNumber;
|
||
elem.mColumnNumber = aColumnNumber;
|
||
elem.mSeverityFlag = aSeverityFlag;
|
||
elem.mCategory = category;
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
bool privateWindow = false;
|
||
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
|
||
if (doc) {
|
||
privateWindow =
|
||
!!doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
CSP_LogLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, aSourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber,
|
||
aColumnNumber, aSeverityFlag, category, mInnerWindowID,
|
||
privateWindow);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Strip URI for reporting according to:
|
||
* http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/#violation-reports
|
||
*
|
||
* @param aURI
|
||
* The uri to be stripped for reporting
|
||
* @param aSelfURI
|
||
* The uri of the protected resource
|
||
* which is needed to enforce the SOP.
|
||
* @return ASCII serialization of the uri to be reported.
|
||
*/
|
||
void StripURIForReporting(nsIURI* aURI, nsIURI* aSelfURI,
|
||
nsACString& outStrippedURI) {
|
||
// 1) If the origin of uri is a globally unique identifier (for example,
|
||
// aURI has a scheme of data, blob, or filesystem), then return the
|
||
// ASCII serialization of uri’s scheme.
|
||
bool isHttpFtpOrWs =
|
||
(aURI->SchemeIs("http") || aURI->SchemeIs("https") ||
|
||
aURI->SchemeIs("ftp") || aURI->SchemeIs("ws") || aURI->SchemeIs("wss"));
|
||
|
||
if (!isHttpFtpOrWs) {
|
||
// not strictly spec compliant, but what we really care about is
|
||
// http/https and also ftp. If it's not http/https or ftp, then treat aURI
|
||
// as if it's a globally unique identifier and just return the scheme.
|
||
aURI->GetScheme(outStrippedURI);
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Return uri, with any fragment component removed.
|
||
aURI->GetSpecIgnoringRef(outStrippedURI);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsresult nsCSPContext::GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
|
||
nsIURI* aBlockedURI, const nsACString& aBlockedString, nsIURI* aOriginalURI,
|
||
nsAString& aViolatedDirective, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex,
|
||
nsAString& aSourceFile, nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum,
|
||
uint32_t aColumnNum,
|
||
mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit) {
|
||
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
|
||
NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1);
|
||
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(ValidateDirectiveName(aViolatedDirective),
|
||
"Invalid directive name");
|
||
|
||
nsresult rv;
|
||
|
||
// document-uri
|
||
nsAutoCString reportDocumentURI;
|
||
StripURIForReporting(mSelfURI, mSelfURI, reportDocumentURI);
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mDocumentURI = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(reportDocumentURI);
|
||
|
||
// referrer
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mReferrer = mReferrer;
|
||
|
||
// blocked-uri
|
||
if (aBlockedURI) {
|
||
// in case of blocking a browsing context (frame) we have to report
|
||
// the final URI in case of a redirect. For subresources we report
|
||
// the URI before redirects.
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uriToReport;
|
||
if (aViolatedDirective.EqualsLiteral("frame-src")) {
|
||
uriToReport = aBlockedURI;
|
||
} else {
|
||
uriToReport = aOriginalURI ? aOriginalURI : aBlockedURI;
|
||
}
|
||
nsAutoCString reportBlockedURI;
|
||
StripURIForReporting(uriToReport, mSelfURI, reportBlockedURI);
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(reportBlockedURI);
|
||
} else {
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(aBlockedString);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// effective-directive
|
||
// The name of the policy directive that was violated.
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mEffectiveDirective = aViolatedDirective;
|
||
|
||
// violated-directive
|
||
// In CSP2, the policy directive that was violated, as it appears in the
|
||
// policy. In CSP3, the same as effective-directive.
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mViolatedDirective = aViolatedDirective;
|
||
|
||
// original-policy
|
||
nsAutoString originalPolicy;
|
||
rv = this->GetPolicyString(aViolatedPolicyIndex, originalPolicy);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mOriginalPolicy = originalPolicy;
|
||
|
||
// source-file
|
||
if (!aSourceFile.IsEmpty()) {
|
||
// if aSourceFile is a URI, we have to make sure to strip fragments
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceURI;
|
||
NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI), aSourceFile);
|
||
if (sourceURI) {
|
||
nsAutoCString spec;
|
||
sourceURI->GetSpecIgnoringRef(spec);
|
||
aSourceFile = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec);
|
||
}
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile = aSourceFile;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// sample, max 40 chars.
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mSample = aScriptSample;
|
||
uint32_t length = aViolationEventInit.mSample.Length();
|
||
if (length > ScriptSampleMaxLength()) {
|
||
uint32_t desiredLength = ScriptSampleMaxLength();
|
||
// Don't cut off right before a low surrogate. Just include it.
|
||
if (NS_IS_LOW_SURROGATE(aViolationEventInit.mSample[desiredLength])) {
|
||
desiredLength++;
|
||
}
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mSample.Replace(ScriptSampleMaxLength(),
|
||
length - desiredLength,
|
||
nsContentUtils::GetLocalizedEllipsis());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// disposition
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mDisposition =
|
||
mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportOnlyFlag()
|
||
? mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventDisposition::Report
|
||
: mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventDisposition::Enforce;
|
||
|
||
// status-code
|
||
uint16_t statusCode = 0;
|
||
{
|
||
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
|
||
if (doc) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(doc->GetChannel());
|
||
if (channel) {
|
||
uint32_t responseStatus = 0;
|
||
nsresult rv = channel->GetResponseStatus(&responseStatus);
|
||
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && (responseStatus <= UINT16_MAX)) {
|
||
statusCode = static_cast<uint16_t>(responseStatus);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mStatusCode = statusCode;
|
||
|
||
// line-number
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber = aLineNum;
|
||
|
||
// column-number
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber = aColumnNum;
|
||
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mBubbles = true;
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mComposed = true;
|
||
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsresult nsCSPContext::SendReports(
|
||
const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit,
|
||
uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex) {
|
||
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
|
||
NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1);
|
||
|
||
dom::CSPReport report;
|
||
|
||
// blocked-uri
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mBlocked_uri = aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI;
|
||
|
||
// document-uri
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mDocument_uri = aViolationEventInit.mDocumentURI;
|
||
|
||
// original-policy
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mOriginal_policy = aViolationEventInit.mOriginalPolicy;
|
||
|
||
// referrer
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mReferrer = aViolationEventInit.mReferrer;
|
||
|
||
// violated-directive
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mViolated_directive =
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mViolatedDirective;
|
||
|
||
// source-file
|
||
if (!aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile.IsEmpty()) {
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mSource_file.Construct();
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mSource_file.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// script-sample
|
||
if (!aViolationEventInit.mSample.IsEmpty()) {
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mScript_sample.Construct();
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mScript_sample.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mSample;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// line-number
|
||
if (aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber != 0) {
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mLine_number.Construct();
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mLine_number.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber != 0) {
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mColumn_number.Construct();
|
||
report.mCsp_report.mColumn_number.Value() =
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsString csp_report;
|
||
if (!report.ToJSON(csp_report)) {
|
||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ---------- Assembled, now send it to all the report URIs ----------- //
|
||
|
||
nsTArray<nsString> reportURIs;
|
||
mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportURIs(reportURIs);
|
||
|
||
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> reportURI;
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> reportChannel;
|
||
|
||
nsresult rv;
|
||
for (uint32_t r = 0; r < reportURIs.Length(); r++) {
|
||
nsAutoCString reportURICstring = NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(reportURIs[r]);
|
||
// try to create a new uri from every report-uri string
|
||
rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(reportURI), reportURIs[r]);
|
||
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
||
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {reportURIs[r]};
|
||
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("Could not create nsIURI for report URI %s",
|
||
reportURICstring.get()));
|
||
logToConsole("triedToSendReport", params, aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile,
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mSample, aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber,
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber,
|
||
nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
|
||
continue; // don't return yet, there may be more URIs
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// try to create a new channel for every report-uri
|
||
if (doc) {
|
||
rv =
|
||
NS_NewChannel(getter_AddRefs(reportChannel), reportURI, doc,
|
||
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
|
||
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT);
|
||
} else {
|
||
rv = NS_NewChannel(
|
||
getter_AddRefs(reportChannel), reportURI, mLoadingPrincipal,
|
||
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
|
||
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
||
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("Could not create new channel for report URI %s",
|
||
reportURICstring.get()));
|
||
continue; // don't return yet, there may be more URIs
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// log a warning to console if scheme is not http or https
|
||
bool isHttpScheme =
|
||
reportURI->SchemeIs("http") || reportURI->SchemeIs("https");
|
||
|
||
if (!isHttpScheme) {
|
||
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {reportURIs[r]};
|
||
logToConsole(
|
||
"reportURInotHttpsOrHttp2", params, aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile,
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mSample, aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber,
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber, nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// make sure this is an anonymous request (no cookies) so in case the
|
||
// policy URI is injected, it can't be abused for CSRF.
|
||
nsLoadFlags flags;
|
||
rv = reportChannel->GetLoadFlags(&flags);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
flags |= nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS;
|
||
rv = reportChannel->SetLoadFlags(flags);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
// we need to set an nsIChannelEventSink on the channel object
|
||
// so we can tell it to not follow redirects when posting the reports
|
||
RefPtr<CSPReportRedirectSink> reportSink = new CSPReportRedirectSink();
|
||
if (doc && doc->GetDocShell()) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsINetworkInterceptController> interceptController =
|
||
do_QueryInterface(doc->GetDocShell());
|
||
reportSink->SetInterceptController(interceptController);
|
||
}
|
||
reportChannel->SetNotificationCallbacks(reportSink);
|
||
|
||
// apply the loadgroup taken by setRequestContextWithDocument. If there's
|
||
// no loadgroup, AsyncOpen will fail on process-split necko (since the
|
||
// channel cannot query the iBrowserChild).
|
||
rv = reportChannel->SetLoadGroup(mCallingChannelLoadGroup);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
// wire in the string input stream to send the report
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringInputStream> sis(
|
||
do_CreateInstance(NS_STRINGINPUTSTREAM_CONTRACTID));
|
||
NS_ASSERTION(sis,
|
||
"nsIStringInputStream is needed but not available to send CSP "
|
||
"violation reports");
|
||
nsAutoCString utf8CSPReport = NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(csp_report);
|
||
rv = sis->SetData(utf8CSPReport.get(), utf8CSPReport.Length());
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIUploadChannel> uploadChannel(do_QueryInterface(reportChannel));
|
||
if (!uploadChannel) {
|
||
// It's possible the URI provided can't be uploaded to, in which case
|
||
// we skip this one. We'll already have warned about a non-HTTP URI
|
||
// earlier.
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
rv = uploadChannel->SetUploadStream(sis, "application/csp-report"_ns, -1);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
// if this is an HTTP channel, set the request method to post
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel(do_QueryInterface(reportChannel));
|
||
if (httpChannel) {
|
||
rv = httpChannel->SetRequestMethod("POST"_ns);
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
RefPtr<CSPViolationReportListener> listener =
|
||
new CSPViolationReportListener();
|
||
rv = reportChannel->AsyncOpen(listener);
|
||
|
||
// AsyncOpen should not fail, but could if there's no load group (like if
|
||
// SetRequestContextWith{Document,Principal} is not given a channel). This
|
||
// should fail quietly and not return an error since it's really ok if
|
||
// reports don't go out, but it's good to log the error locally.
|
||
|
||
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
||
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {reportURIs[r]};
|
||
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("AsyncOpen failed for report URI %s",
|
||
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(params[0]).get()));
|
||
logToConsole("triedToSendReport", params, aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile,
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mSample, aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber,
|
||
aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber,
|
||
nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
|
||
} else {
|
||
CSPCONTEXTLOG(
|
||
("Sent violation report to URI %s", reportURICstring.get()));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsresult nsCSPContext::FireViolationEvent(
|
||
Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
|
||
const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit) {
|
||
if (aCSPEventListener) {
|
||
nsAutoString json;
|
||
if (aViolationEventInit.ToJSON(json)) {
|
||
aCSPEventListener->OnCSPViolationEvent(json);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// 1. If target is not null, and global is a Window, and target’s
|
||
// shadow-including root is not global’s associated Document, set target to
|
||
// null.
|
||
RefPtr<EventTarget> eventTarget = aTriggeringElement;
|
||
|
||
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
|
||
if (doc && aTriggeringElement &&
|
||
aTriggeringElement->GetComposedDoc() != doc) {
|
||
eventTarget = nullptr;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!eventTarget) {
|
||
// If target is a Window, set target to target’s associated Document.
|
||
eventTarget = doc;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!eventTarget && mInnerWindowID && XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
|
||
if (RefPtr<WindowGlobalParent> parent =
|
||
WindowGlobalParent::GetByInnerWindowId(mInnerWindowID)) {
|
||
nsAutoString json;
|
||
if (aViolationEventInit.ToJSON(json)) {
|
||
Unused << parent->SendDispatchSecurityPolicyViolation(json);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (!eventTarget) {
|
||
// If we are here, we are probably dealing with workers. Those are handled
|
||
// via nsICSPEventListener. Nothing to do here.
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
RefPtr<mozilla::dom::Event> event =
|
||
mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEvent::Constructor(
|
||
eventTarget, u"securitypolicyviolation"_ns, aViolationEventInit);
|
||
event->SetTrusted(true);
|
||
|
||
ErrorResult rv;
|
||
eventTarget->DispatchEvent(*event, rv);
|
||
return rv.StealNSResult();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Dispatched from the main thread to send reports for one CSP violation.
|
||
*/
|
||
class CSPReportSenderRunnable final : public Runnable {
|
||
public:
|
||
CSPReportSenderRunnable(
|
||
Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
|
||
nsIURI* aBlockedURI,
|
||
nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource aBlockedContentSource,
|
||
nsIURI* aOriginalURI, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, bool aReportOnlyFlag,
|
||
const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, const nsAString& aObserverSubject,
|
||
const nsAString& aSourceFile, const nsAString& aScriptSample,
|
||
uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum, nsCSPContext* aCSPContext)
|
||
: mozilla::Runnable("CSPReportSenderRunnable"),
|
||
mTriggeringElement(aTriggeringElement),
|
||
mCSPEventListener(aCSPEventListener),
|
||
mBlockedURI(aBlockedURI),
|
||
mBlockedContentSource(aBlockedContentSource),
|
||
mOriginalURI(aOriginalURI),
|
||
mViolatedPolicyIndex(aViolatedPolicyIndex),
|
||
mReportOnlyFlag(aReportOnlyFlag),
|
||
mViolatedDirective(aViolatedDirective),
|
||
mSourceFile(aSourceFile),
|
||
mScriptSample(aScriptSample),
|
||
mLineNum(aLineNum),
|
||
mColumnNum(aColumnNum),
|
||
mCSPContext(aCSPContext) {
|
||
NS_ASSERTION(!aViolatedDirective.IsEmpty(),
|
||
"Can not send reports without a violated directive");
|
||
// the observer subject is an nsISupports: either an nsISupportsCString
|
||
// from the arg passed in directly, or if that's empty, it's the blocked
|
||
// source.
|
||
if (aObserverSubject.IsEmpty() && mBlockedURI) {
|
||
mObserverSubject = aBlockedURI;
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsAutoCString subject;
|
||
if (aObserverSubject.IsEmpty()) {
|
||
BlockedContentSourceToString(aBlockedContentSource, subject);
|
||
} else {
|
||
CopyUTF16toUTF8(aObserverSubject, subject);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsCString> supportscstr =
|
||
do_CreateInstance(NS_SUPPORTS_CSTRING_CONTRACTID);
|
||
if (supportscstr) {
|
||
supportscstr->SetData(subject);
|
||
mObserverSubject = do_QueryInterface(supportscstr);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHOD Run() override {
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
|
||
|
||
nsresult rv;
|
||
|
||
// 0) prepare violation data
|
||
mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit init;
|
||
|
||
nsAutoCString blockedContentSource;
|
||
BlockedContentSourceToString(mBlockedContentSource, blockedContentSource);
|
||
|
||
rv = mCSPContext->GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
|
||
mBlockedURI, blockedContentSource, mOriginalURI, mViolatedDirective,
|
||
mViolatedPolicyIndex, mSourceFile, mScriptSample, mLineNum, mColumnNum,
|
||
init);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
// 1) notify observers
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService =
|
||
mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
|
||
if (mObserverSubject && observerService) {
|
||
rv = observerService->NotifyObservers(
|
||
mObserverSubject, CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC, mViolatedDirective.get());
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// 2) send reports for the policy that was violated
|
||
mCSPContext->SendReports(init, mViolatedPolicyIndex);
|
||
|
||
// 3) log to console (one per policy violation)
|
||
|
||
if (mBlockedURI) {
|
||
mBlockedURI->GetSpec(blockedContentSource);
|
||
if (blockedContentSource.Length() >
|
||
nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength()) {
|
||
bool isData = mBlockedURI->SchemeIs("data");
|
||
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && isData &&
|
||
blockedContentSource.Length() >
|
||
nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength()) {
|
||
blockedContentSource.Truncate(nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength());
|
||
blockedContentSource.Append(
|
||
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(nsContentUtils::GetLocalizedEllipsis()));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (blockedContentSource.Length() > 0) {
|
||
nsString blockedContentSource16 =
|
||
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(blockedContentSource);
|
||
AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {mViolatedDirective,
|
||
blockedContentSource16};
|
||
mCSPContext->logToConsole(
|
||
mReportOnlyFlag ? "CSPROViolationWithURI" : "CSPViolationWithURI",
|
||
params, mSourceFile, mScriptSample, mLineNum, mColumnNum,
|
||
nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// 4) fire violation event
|
||
mCSPContext->FireViolationEvent(mTriggeringElement, mCSPEventListener,
|
||
init);
|
||
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
private:
|
||
RefPtr<Element> mTriggeringElement;
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsICSPEventListener> mCSPEventListener;
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mBlockedURI;
|
||
nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource mBlockedContentSource;
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mOriginalURI;
|
||
uint32_t mViolatedPolicyIndex;
|
||
bool mReportOnlyFlag;
|
||
nsString mViolatedDirective;
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> mObserverSubject;
|
||
nsString mSourceFile;
|
||
nsString mScriptSample;
|
||
uint32_t mLineNum;
|
||
uint32_t mColumnNum;
|
||
RefPtr<nsCSPContext> mCSPContext;
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Asynchronously notifies any nsIObservers listening to the CSP violation
|
||
* topic that a violation occurred. Also triggers report sending and console
|
||
* logging. All asynchronous on the main thread.
|
||
*
|
||
* @param aTriggeringElement
|
||
* The element that triggered this report violation. It can be null.
|
||
* @param aBlockedContentSource
|
||
* Either a CSP Source (like 'self', as string) or nsIURI: the source
|
||
* of the violation.
|
||
* @param aOriginalUri
|
||
* The original URI if the blocked content is a redirect, else null
|
||
* @param aViolatedDirective
|
||
* the directive that was violated (string).
|
||
* @param aViolatedPolicyIndex
|
||
* the index of the policy that was violated (so we know where to send
|
||
* the reports).
|
||
* @param aObserverSubject
|
||
* optional, subject sent to the nsIObservers listening to the CSP
|
||
* violation topic.
|
||
* @param aSourceFile
|
||
* name of the file containing the inline script violation
|
||
* @param aScriptSample
|
||
* a sample of the violating inline script
|
||
* @param aLineNum
|
||
* source line number of the violation (if available)
|
||
* @param aColumnNum
|
||
* source column number of the violation (if available)
|
||
*/
|
||
nsresult nsCSPContext::AsyncReportViolation(
|
||
Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
|
||
nsIURI* aBlockedURI, BlockedContentSource aBlockedContentSource,
|
||
nsIURI* aOriginalURI, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective,
|
||
uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, const nsAString& aObserverSubject,
|
||
const nsAString& aSourceFile, const nsAString& aScriptSample,
|
||
uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum) {
|
||
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
|
||
NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1);
|
||
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> task = new CSPReportSenderRunnable(
|
||
aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, aBlockedURI, aBlockedContentSource,
|
||
aOriginalURI, aViolatedPolicyIndex,
|
||
mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportOnlyFlag(), aViolatedDirective,
|
||
aObserverSubject, aSourceFile, aScriptSample, aLineNum, aColumnNum, this);
|
||
|
||
if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) {
|
||
if (mEventTarget) {
|
||
mEventTarget->Dispatch(task.forget(), NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_DispatchToMainThread(task.forget());
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Based on the given loadinfo, determines if this CSP context allows the
|
||
* ancestry.
|
||
*
|
||
* In order to determine the URI of the parent document (one causing the load
|
||
* of this protected document), this function traverses all Browsing Contexts
|
||
* until it reaches the top level browsing context.
|
||
*/
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
|
||
bool* outPermitsAncestry) {
|
||
nsresult rv;
|
||
|
||
*outPermitsAncestry = true;
|
||
|
||
RefPtr<mozilla::dom::BrowsingContext> ctx;
|
||
aLoadInfo->GetBrowsingContext(getter_AddRefs(ctx));
|
||
|
||
// extract the ancestry as an array
|
||
nsCOMArray<nsIURI> ancestorsArray;
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uriClone;
|
||
|
||
while (ctx) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentURI;
|
||
// Generally permitsAncestry is consulted from within the
|
||
// DocumentLoadListener in the parent process. For loads of type object
|
||
// and embed it's called from the Document in the content process.
|
||
// After Bug 1646899 we should be able to remove that branching code for
|
||
// querying the currentURI.
|
||
if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
|
||
WindowGlobalParent* window = ctx->Canonical()->GetCurrentWindowGlobal();
|
||
if (window) {
|
||
currentURI = window->GetDocumentURI();
|
||
}
|
||
} else if (nsPIDOMWindowOuter* windowOuter = ctx->GetDOMWindow()) {
|
||
currentURI = windowOuter->GetDocumentURI();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (currentURI) {
|
||
nsAutoCString spec;
|
||
currentURI->GetSpec(spec);
|
||
// delete the userpass from the URI.
|
||
rv = NS_MutateURI(currentURI)
|
||
.SetRef(EmptyCString())
|
||
.SetUserPass(EmptyCString())
|
||
.Finalize(uriClone);
|
||
|
||
// If setUserPass fails for some reason, just return a clone of the
|
||
// current URI
|
||
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
||
rv = NS_GetURIWithoutRef(currentURI, getter_AddRefs(uriClone));
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
}
|
||
ancestorsArray.AppendElement(uriClone);
|
||
}
|
||
ctx = ctx->GetParent();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsAutoString violatedDirective;
|
||
|
||
// Now that we've got the ancestry chain in ancestorsArray, time to check
|
||
// them against any CSP.
|
||
// NOTE: the ancestors are not allowed to be sent cross origin; this is a
|
||
// restriction not placed on subresource loads.
|
||
|
||
for (uint32_t a = 0; a < ancestorsArray.Length(); a++) {
|
||
if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
|
||
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry, checking ancestor: %s",
|
||
ancestorsArray[a]->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
|
||
}
|
||
// omit the ancestor URI in violation reports if cross-origin as per spec
|
||
// (it is a violation of the same-origin policy).
|
||
bool okToSendAncestor =
|
||
NS_SecurityCompareURIs(ancestorsArray[a], mSelfURI, true);
|
||
|
||
bool permits =
|
||
permitsInternal(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE,
|
||
nullptr, // triggering element
|
||
nullptr, // nsICSPEventListener
|
||
ancestorsArray[a],
|
||
nullptr, // no redirect here.
|
||
EmptyString(), // no nonce
|
||
false, // not a preload.
|
||
true, // specific, do not use default-src
|
||
true, // send violation reports
|
||
okToSendAncestor,
|
||
false); // not parser created
|
||
if (!permits) {
|
||
*outPermitsAncestry = false;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::Permits(Element* aTriggeringElement,
|
||
nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aURI,
|
||
CSPDirective aDir, bool aSpecific, bool* outPermits) {
|
||
// Can't perform check without aURI
|
||
if (aURI == nullptr) {
|
||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (aURI->SchemeIs("resource")) {
|
||
// XXX Ideally we would call SubjectToCSP() here but that would also
|
||
// allowlist e.g. javascript: URIs which should not be allowlisted here.
|
||
// As a hotfix we just allowlist pdf.js internals here explicitly.
|
||
nsAutoCString uriSpec;
|
||
aURI->GetSpec(uriSpec);
|
||
if (StringBeginsWith(uriSpec, "resource://pdf.js/"_ns)) {
|
||
*outPermits = true;
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
*outPermits =
|
||
permitsInternal(aDir, aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, aURI,
|
||
nullptr, // no original (pre-redirect) URI
|
||
EmptyString(), // no nonce
|
||
false, // not a preload.
|
||
aSpecific,
|
||
true, // send violation reports
|
||
true, // send blocked URI in violation reports
|
||
false); // not parser created
|
||
|
||
if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
|
||
CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::Permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %d, isAllowed: %s",
|
||
aURI->GetSpecOrDefault().get(), aDir,
|
||
*outPermits ? "allow" : "deny"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::ToJSON(nsAString& outCSPinJSON) {
|
||
outCSPinJSON.Truncate();
|
||
dom::CSPPolicies jsonPolicies;
|
||
jsonPolicies.mCsp_policies.Construct();
|
||
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
|
||
|
||
for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
|
||
dom::CSP jsonCSP;
|
||
mPolicies[p]->toDomCSPStruct(jsonCSP);
|
||
if (!jsonPolicies.mCsp_policies.Value().AppendElement(jsonCSP, fallible)) {
|
||
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// convert the gathered information to JSON
|
||
if (!jsonPolicies.ToJSON(outCSPinJSON)) {
|
||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||
}
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::GetCSPSandboxFlags(uint32_t* aOutSandboxFlags) {
|
||
if (!aOutSandboxFlags) {
|
||
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
|
||
}
|
||
*aOutSandboxFlags = SANDBOXED_NONE;
|
||
|
||
EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
|
||
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
|
||
uint32_t flags = mPolicies[i]->getSandboxFlags();
|
||
|
||
// current policy doesn't have sandbox flag, check next policy
|
||
if (!flags) {
|
||
continue;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// current policy has sandbox flags, if the policy is in enforcement-mode
|
||
// (i.e. not report-only) set these flags and check for policies with more
|
||
// restrictions
|
||
if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
|
||
*aOutSandboxFlags |= flags;
|
||
} else {
|
||
// sandbox directive is ignored in report-only mode, warn about it and
|
||
// continue the loop checking for an enforcement policy.
|
||
nsAutoString policy;
|
||
mPolicies[i]->toString(policy);
|
||
|
||
CSPCONTEXTLOG(
|
||
("nsCSPContext::GetCSPSandboxFlags, report only policy, ignoring "
|
||
"sandbox in: %s",
|
||
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(policy).get()));
|
||
|
||
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {policy};
|
||
logToConsole("ignoringReportOnlyDirective", params, EmptyString(),
|
||
EmptyString(), 0, 0, nsIScriptError::warningFlag);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* ========== CSPViolationReportListener implementation ========== */
|
||
|
||
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPViolationReportListener, nsIStreamListener,
|
||
nsIRequestObserver, nsISupports);
|
||
|
||
CSPViolationReportListener::CSPViolationReportListener() = default;
|
||
|
||
CSPViolationReportListener::~CSPViolationReportListener() = default;
|
||
|
||
nsresult AppendSegmentToString(nsIInputStream* aInputStream, void* aClosure,
|
||
const char* aRawSegment, uint32_t aToOffset,
|
||
uint32_t aCount, uint32_t* outWrittenCount) {
|
||
nsCString* decodedData = static_cast<nsCString*>(aClosure);
|
||
decodedData->Append(aRawSegment, aCount);
|
||
*outWrittenCount = aCount;
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
CSPViolationReportListener::OnDataAvailable(nsIRequest* aRequest,
|
||
nsIInputStream* aInputStream,
|
||
uint64_t aOffset, uint32_t aCount) {
|
||
uint32_t read;
|
||
nsCString decodedData;
|
||
return aInputStream->ReadSegments(AppendSegmentToString, &decodedData, aCount,
|
||
&read);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
CSPViolationReportListener::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest,
|
||
nsresult aStatus) {
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
CSPViolationReportListener::OnStartRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest) {
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* ========== CSPReportRedirectSink implementation ========== */
|
||
|
||
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPReportRedirectSink, nsIChannelEventSink,
|
||
nsIInterfaceRequestor);
|
||
|
||
CSPReportRedirectSink::CSPReportRedirectSink() = default;
|
||
|
||
CSPReportRedirectSink::~CSPReportRedirectSink() = default;
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
CSPReportRedirectSink::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(
|
||
nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aRedirFlags,
|
||
nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCallback) {
|
||
if (aRedirFlags & nsIChannelEventSink::REDIRECT_INTERNAL) {
|
||
aCallback->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// cancel the old channel so XHR failure callback happens
|
||
nsresult rv = aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
// notify an observer that we have blocked the report POST due to a redirect,
|
||
// used in testing, do this async since we're in an async call now to begin
|
||
// with
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
|
||
rv = aOldChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService =
|
||
mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
|
||
NS_ASSERTION(observerService,
|
||
"Observer service required to log CSP violations");
|
||
observerService->NotifyObservers(
|
||
uri, CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC,
|
||
u"denied redirect while sending violation report");
|
||
|
||
return NS_BINDING_REDIRECTED;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
CSPReportRedirectSink::GetInterface(const nsIID& aIID, void** aResult) {
|
||
if (aIID.Equals(NS_GET_IID(nsINetworkInterceptController)) &&
|
||
mInterceptController) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsINetworkInterceptController> copy(mInterceptController);
|
||
*aResult = copy.forget().take();
|
||
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return QueryInterface(aIID, aResult);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void CSPReportRedirectSink::SetInterceptController(
|
||
nsINetworkInterceptController* aInterceptController) {
|
||
mInterceptController = aInterceptController;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* ===== nsISerializable implementation ====== */
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::Read(nsIObjectInputStream* aStream) {
|
||
nsresult rv;
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> supports;
|
||
|
||
rv = NS_ReadOptionalObject(aStream, true, getter_AddRefs(supports));
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
mSelfURI = do_QueryInterface(supports);
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(mSelfURI, "need a self URI to de-serialize");
|
||
|
||
nsAutoCString JSON;
|
||
rv = aStream->ReadCString(JSON);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = BasePrincipal::FromJSON(JSON);
|
||
mLoadingPrincipal = principal;
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal, "need a loadingPrincipal to de-serialize");
|
||
|
||
uint32_t numPolicies;
|
||
rv = aStream->Read32(&numPolicies);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
nsAutoString policyString;
|
||
|
||
while (numPolicies > 0) {
|
||
numPolicies--;
|
||
|
||
rv = aStream->ReadString(policyString);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
bool reportOnly = false;
|
||
rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&reportOnly);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
bool deliveredViaMetaTag = false;
|
||
rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&deliveredViaMetaTag);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
AddIPCPolicy(mozilla::ipc::ContentSecurityPolicy(policyString, reportOnly,
|
||
deliveredViaMetaTag));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
||
nsCSPContext::Write(nsIObjectOutputStream* aStream) {
|
||
nsresult rv = NS_WriteOptionalCompoundObject(aStream, mSelfURI,
|
||
NS_GET_IID(nsIURI), true);
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
nsAutoCString JSON;
|
||
BasePrincipal::Cast(mLoadingPrincipal)->ToJSON(JSON);
|
||
rv = aStream->WriteStringZ(JSON.get());
|
||
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
||
|
||
// Serialize all the policies.
|
||
aStream->Write32(mPolicies.Length() + mIPCPolicies.Length());
|
||
|
||
nsAutoString polStr;
|
||
for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
|
||
polStr.Truncate();
|
||
mPolicies[p]->toString(polStr);
|
||
aStream->WriteWStringZ(polStr.get());
|
||
aStream->WriteBoolean(mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag());
|
||
aStream->WriteBoolean(mPolicies[p]->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
|
||
}
|
||
for (auto& policy : mIPCPolicies) {
|
||
aStream->WriteWStringZ(policy.policy().get());
|
||
aStream->WriteBoolean(policy.reportOnlyFlag());
|
||
aStream->WriteBoolean(policy.deliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
|
||
}
|
||
return NS_OK;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void nsCSPContext::AddIPCPolicy(const ContentSecurityPolicy& aPolicy) {
|
||
mIPCPolicies.AppendElement(aPolicy);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void nsCSPContext::SerializePolicies(
|
||
nsTArray<ContentSecurityPolicy>& aPolicies) {
|
||
for (auto* policy : mPolicies) {
|
||
nsAutoString policyString;
|
||
policy->toString(policyString);
|
||
aPolicies.AppendElement(
|
||
ContentSecurityPolicy(policyString, policy->getReportOnlyFlag(),
|
||
policy->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
aPolicies.AppendElements(mIPCPolicies);
|
||
}
|