gecko-dev/netwerk/base/LoadInfo.cpp

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "mozilla/LoadInfo.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/ToJSValue.h"
#include "mozIThirdPartyUtil.h"
#include "nsFrameLoader.h"
#include "nsIDocShell.h"
#include "nsIDocument.h"
#include "nsIDOMDocument.h"
#include "nsIFrameLoader.h"
#include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h"
#include "nsISupportsImpl.h"
#include "nsISupportsUtils.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsDocShell.h"
#include "nsGlobalWindow.h"
using namespace mozilla::dom;
namespace mozilla {
namespace net {
static void
InheritOriginAttributes(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal, NeckoOriginAttributes& aAttrs)
{
const PrincipalOriginAttributes attrs =
BasePrincipal::Cast(aLoadingPrincipal)->OriginAttributesRef();
aAttrs.InheritFromDocToNecko(attrs);
}
LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
nsINode* aLoadingContext,
nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags,
nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType)
: mLoadingPrincipal(aLoadingContext ?
aLoadingContext->NodePrincipal() : aLoadingPrincipal)
, mTriggeringPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal ?
aTriggeringPrincipal : mLoadingPrincipal.get())
, mLoadingContext(do_GetWeakReference(aLoadingContext))
, mSecurityFlags(aSecurityFlags)
, mInternalContentPolicyType(aContentPolicyType)
, mTainting(LoadTainting::Basic)
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(false)
, mVerifySignedContent(false)
, mEnforceSRI(false)
, mInnerWindowID(0)
, mOuterWindowID(0)
, mParentOuterWindowID(0)
, mEnforceSecurity(false)
, mInitialSecurityCheckDone(false)
, mIsThirdPartyContext(false)
, mForcePreflight(false)
, mIsPreflight(false)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal);
MOZ_ASSERT(mTriggeringPrincipal);
#ifdef DEBUG
// TYPE_DOCUMENT loads initiated by javascript tests will go through
// nsIOService and use the wrong constructor. Don't enforce the
// !TYPE_DOCUMENT check in those cases
bool skipContentTypeCheck = false;
skipContentTypeCheck = Preferences::GetBool("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion");
#endif
// This constructor shouldn't be used for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads that don't
// have a loadingPrincipal
MOZ_ASSERT(skipContentTypeCheck ||
mInternalContentPolicyType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT);
// TODO(bug 1259873): Above, we initialize mIsThirdPartyContext to false meaning
// that consumers of LoadInfo that don't pass a context or pass a context from
// which we can't find a window will default to assuming that they're 1st
// party. It would be nice if we could default "safe" and assume that we are
// 3rd party until proven otherwise.
// if consumers pass both, aLoadingContext and aLoadingPrincipal
// then the loadingPrincipal must be the same as the node's principal
MOZ_ASSERT(!aLoadingContext || !aLoadingPrincipal ||
aLoadingContext->NodePrincipal() == aLoadingPrincipal);
// if the load is sandboxed, we can not also inherit the principal
if (mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_SANDBOXED) {
mSecurityFlags ^= nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL;
mSecurityFlags |= nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL_WAS_DROPPED;
}
if (aLoadingContext) {
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowOuter> contextOuter = aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->GetWindow();
if (contextOuter) {
ComputeIsThirdPartyContext(contextOuter);
}
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowOuter> outerWindow;
// When the element being loaded is a frame, we choose the frame's window
// for the window ID and the frame element's window as the parent
// window. This is the behavior that Chrome exposes to add-ons.
// NB: If the frameLoaderOwner doesn't have a frame loader, then the load
// must be coming from an object (such as a plugin) that's loaded into it
// instead of a document being loaded. In that case, treat this object like
// any other non-document-loading element.
nsCOMPtr<nsIFrameLoaderOwner> frameLoaderOwner =
do_QueryInterface(aLoadingContext);
nsCOMPtr<nsIFrameLoader> fl = frameLoaderOwner ?
frameLoaderOwner->GetFrameLoader() : nullptr;
if (fl) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(fl->GetDocShell(getter_AddRefs(docShell))) && docShell) {
outerWindow = do_GetInterface(docShell);
}
} else {
outerWindow = contextOuter.forget();
}
if (outerWindow) {
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> inner = outerWindow->GetCurrentInnerWindow();
mInnerWindowID = inner ? inner->WindowID() : 0;
mOuterWindowID = outerWindow->WindowID();
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowOuter> parent = outerWindow->GetScriptableParent();
mParentOuterWindowID = parent->WindowID();
}
// if the document forces all requests to be upgraded from http to https, then
// we should do that for all requests. If it only forces preloads to be upgraded
// then we should enforce upgrade insecure requests only for preloads.
mUpgradeInsecureRequests =
aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(false) ||
(nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(mInternalContentPolicyType) &&
aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(true));
// if owner doc has content signature, we enforce SRI
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->GetChannel();
if (channel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->GetLoadInfo();
if (loadInfo) {
loadInfo->GetVerifySignedContent(&mEnforceSRI);
}
}
}
if (!(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_PRIVATE_BROWSING)) {
if (aLoadingContext) {
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadContext> loadContext =
aLoadingContext->OwnerDoc()->GetLoadContext();
if (loadContext) {
bool usePrivateBrowsing;
nsresult rv = loadContext->GetUsePrivateBrowsing(&usePrivateBrowsing);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && usePrivateBrowsing) {
mSecurityFlags |= nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_PRIVATE_BROWSING;
}
}
}
}
InheritOriginAttributes(mLoadingPrincipal, mOriginAttributes);
}
/* Constructor takes an outer window, but no loadingNode or loadingPrincipal.
* This constructor should only be used for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads, since they
* have a null loadingNode and loadingPrincipal.
*/
LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsPIDOMWindowOuter* aOuterWindow,
nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags)
: mLoadingPrincipal(nullptr)
, mTriggeringPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)
, mSecurityFlags(aSecurityFlags)
, mInternalContentPolicyType(nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT)
, mTainting(LoadTainting::Basic)
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(false)
, mVerifySignedContent(false)
, mEnforceSRI(false)
, mInnerWindowID(0)
, mOuterWindowID(0)
, mParentOuterWindowID(0)
, mEnforceSecurity(false)
, mInitialSecurityCheckDone(false)
, mIsThirdPartyContext(false) // NB: TYPE_DOCUMENT implies not third-party.
, mForcePreflight(false)
, mIsPreflight(false)
{
// Top-level loads are never third-party
// Grab the information we can out of the window.
MOZ_ASSERT(aOuterWindow);
MOZ_ASSERT(mTriggeringPrincipal);
// if the load is sandboxed, we can not also inherit the principal
if (mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_SANDBOXED) {
mSecurityFlags ^= nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL;
mSecurityFlags |= nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL_WAS_DROPPED;
}
// NB: Ignore the current inner window since we're navigating away from it.
mOuterWindowID = aOuterWindow->WindowID();
// TODO We can have a parent without a frame element in some cases dealing
// with the hidden window.
nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowOuter> parent = aOuterWindow->GetScriptableParent();
mParentOuterWindowID = parent ? parent->WindowID() : 0;
// get the docshell from the outerwindow, and then get the originattributes
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell = aOuterWindow->GetDocShell();
MOZ_ASSERT(docShell);
const DocShellOriginAttributes attrs =
nsDocShell::Cast(docShell)->GetOriginAttributes();
mOriginAttributes.InheritFromDocShellToNecko(attrs);
}
LoadInfo::LoadInfo(const LoadInfo& rhs)
: mLoadingPrincipal(rhs.mLoadingPrincipal)
, mTriggeringPrincipal(rhs.mTriggeringPrincipal)
, mLoadingContext(rhs.mLoadingContext)
, mSecurityFlags(rhs.mSecurityFlags)
, mInternalContentPolicyType(rhs.mInternalContentPolicyType)
, mTainting(rhs.mTainting)
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(rhs.mUpgradeInsecureRequests)
, mVerifySignedContent(rhs.mVerifySignedContent)
, mEnforceSRI(rhs.mEnforceSRI)
, mInnerWindowID(rhs.mInnerWindowID)
, mOuterWindowID(rhs.mOuterWindowID)
, mParentOuterWindowID(rhs.mParentOuterWindowID)
, mEnforceSecurity(rhs.mEnforceSecurity)
, mInitialSecurityCheckDone(rhs.mInitialSecurityCheckDone)
, mIsThirdPartyContext(rhs.mIsThirdPartyContext)
, mOriginAttributes(rhs.mOriginAttributes)
, mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects(
rhs.mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects)
, mRedirectChain(rhs.mRedirectChain)
, mCorsUnsafeHeaders(rhs.mCorsUnsafeHeaders)
, mForcePreflight(rhs.mForcePreflight)
, mIsPreflight(rhs.mIsPreflight)
{
}
LoadInfo::LoadInfo(nsIPrincipal* aLoadingPrincipal,
nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
nsSecurityFlags aSecurityFlags,
nsContentPolicyType aContentPolicyType,
LoadTainting aTainting,
bool aUpgradeInsecureRequests,
bool aVerifySignedContent,
bool aEnforceSRI,
uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
uint64_t aOuterWindowID,
uint64_t aParentOuterWindowID,
bool aEnforceSecurity,
bool aInitialSecurityCheckDone,
bool aIsThirdPartyContext,
const NeckoOriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes,
nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>& aRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects,
nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>& aRedirectChain,
const nsTArray<nsCString>& aCorsUnsafeHeaders,
bool aForcePreflight,
bool aIsPreflight)
: mLoadingPrincipal(aLoadingPrincipal)
, mTriggeringPrincipal(aTriggeringPrincipal)
, mSecurityFlags(aSecurityFlags)
, mInternalContentPolicyType(aContentPolicyType)
, mTainting(aTainting)
, mUpgradeInsecureRequests(aUpgradeInsecureRequests)
, mVerifySignedContent(aVerifySignedContent)
, mEnforceSRI(aEnforceSRI)
, mInnerWindowID(aInnerWindowID)
, mOuterWindowID(aOuterWindowID)
, mParentOuterWindowID(aParentOuterWindowID)
, mEnforceSecurity(aEnforceSecurity)
, mInitialSecurityCheckDone(aInitialSecurityCheckDone)
, mIsThirdPartyContext(aIsThirdPartyContext)
, mOriginAttributes(aOriginAttributes)
, mCorsUnsafeHeaders(aCorsUnsafeHeaders)
, mForcePreflight(aForcePreflight)
, mIsPreflight(aIsPreflight)
{
// Only top level TYPE_DOCUMENT loads can have a null loadingPrincipal
MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal || aContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT);
MOZ_ASSERT(mTriggeringPrincipal);
mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects.SwapElements(
aRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects);
mRedirectChain.SwapElements(aRedirectChain);
}
LoadInfo::~LoadInfo()
{
}
void
LoadInfo::ComputeIsThirdPartyContext(nsPIDOMWindowOuter* aOuterWindow)
{
nsContentPolicyType type =
nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(mInternalContentPolicyType);
if (type == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
// Top-level loads are never third-party.
mIsThirdPartyContext = false;
return;
}
nsCOMPtr<mozIThirdPartyUtil> util(do_GetService(THIRDPARTYUTIL_CONTRACTID));
if (NS_WARN_IF(!util)) {
return;
}
util->IsThirdPartyWindow(aOuterWindow, nullptr, &mIsThirdPartyContext);
}
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(LoadInfo, nsILoadInfo)
already_AddRefed<nsILoadInfo>
LoadInfo::Clone() const
{
RefPtr<LoadInfo> copy(new LoadInfo(*this));
return copy.forget();
}
already_AddRefed<nsILoadInfo>
LoadInfo::CloneForNewRequest() const
{
RefPtr<LoadInfo> copy(new LoadInfo(*this));
copy->mEnforceSecurity = false;
copy->mInitialSecurityCheckDone = false;
copy->mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects.Clear();
copy->mRedirectChain.Clear();
return copy.forget();
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetLoadingPrincipal(nsIPrincipal** aLoadingPrincipal)
{
NS_IF_ADDREF(*aLoadingPrincipal = mLoadingPrincipal);
return NS_OK;
}
nsIPrincipal*
LoadInfo::LoadingPrincipal()
{
return mLoadingPrincipal;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetTriggeringPrincipal(nsIPrincipal** aTriggeringPrincipal)
{
NS_ADDREF(*aTriggeringPrincipal = mTriggeringPrincipal);
return NS_OK;
}
nsIPrincipal*
LoadInfo::TriggeringPrincipal()
{
return mTriggeringPrincipal;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetLoadingDocument(nsIDOMDocument** aResult)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
if (node) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMDocument> context = do_QueryInterface(node->OwnerDoc());
context.forget(aResult);
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsINode*
LoadInfo::LoadingNode()
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
return node;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetSecurityFlags(nsSecurityFlags* aResult)
{
*aResult = mSecurityFlags;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetSecurityMode(uint32_t* aFlags)
{
*aFlags = (mSecurityFlags &
(nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS));
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetIsInThirdPartyContext(bool* aIsInThirdPartyContext)
{
*aIsInThirdPartyContext = mIsThirdPartyContext;
return NS_OK;
}
static const uint32_t sCookiePolicyMask =
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_OMIT;
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetCookiePolicy(uint32_t *aResult)
{
uint32_t policy = mSecurityFlags & sCookiePolicyMask;
if (policy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT) {
policy = (mSecurityFlags & SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) ?
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN : nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE;
}
*aResult = policy;
return NS_OK;
}
void
LoadInfo::SetIncludeCookiesSecFlag()
{
MOZ_ASSERT(!mEnforceSecurity,
"Request should not have been opened yet");
MOZ_ASSERT((mSecurityFlags & sCookiePolicyMask) ==
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT);
mSecurityFlags = (mSecurityFlags & ~sCookiePolicyMask) |
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetForceInheritPrincipal(bool* aInheritPrincipal)
{
*aInheritPrincipal =
(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetLoadingSandboxed(bool* aLoadingSandboxed)
{
*aLoadingSandboxed = (mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_SANDBOXED);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetAboutBlankInherits(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult =
(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_ABOUT_BLANK_INHERITS);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetAllowChrome(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult =
(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CHROME);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetDisallowScript(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult =
(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_DISALLOW_SCRIPT);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetDontFollowRedirects(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult =
(mSecurityFlags & nsILoadInfo::SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetUsePrivateBrowsing(bool* aUsePrivateBrowsing)
{
*aUsePrivateBrowsing = (mSecurityFlags &
nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_PRIVATE_BROWSING);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetExternalContentPolicyType(nsContentPolicyType* aResult)
{
*aResult = nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(mInternalContentPolicyType);
return NS_OK;
}
nsContentPolicyType
LoadInfo::InternalContentPolicyType()
{
return mInternalContentPolicyType;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult = mUpgradeInsecureRequests;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::SetVerifySignedContent(bool aVerifySignedContent)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(mInternalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT,
"can only verify content for TYPE_DOCUMENT");
mVerifySignedContent = aVerifySignedContent;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetVerifySignedContent(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult = mVerifySignedContent;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::SetEnforceSRI(bool aEnforceSRI)
{
mEnforceSRI = aEnforceSRI;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetEnforceSRI(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult = mEnforceSRI;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetInnerWindowID(uint64_t* aResult)
{
*aResult = mInnerWindowID;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetOuterWindowID(uint64_t* aResult)
{
*aResult = mOuterWindowID;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetParentOuterWindowID(uint64_t* aResult)
{
*aResult = mParentOuterWindowID;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetScriptableOriginAttributes(JSContext* aCx,
JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes)
{
if (NS_WARN_IF(!ToJSValue(aCx, mOriginAttributes, aOriginAttributes))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::SetScriptableOriginAttributes(JSContext* aCx,
JS::Handle<JS::Value> aOriginAttributes)
{
NeckoOriginAttributes attrs;
if (!aOriginAttributes.isObject() || !attrs.Init(aCx, aOriginAttributes)) {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
mOriginAttributes = attrs;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
LoadInfo::GetOriginAttributes(mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes* aOriginAttributes)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aOriginAttributes);
*aOriginAttributes = mOriginAttributes;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
LoadInfo::SetOriginAttributes(const mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes)
{
mOriginAttributes = aOriginAttributes;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::SetEnforceSecurity(bool aEnforceSecurity)
{
// Indicates whether the channel was openend using AsyncOpen2. Once set
// to true, it must remain true throughout the lifetime of the channel.
// Setting it to anything else than true will be discarded.
MOZ_ASSERT(aEnforceSecurity, "aEnforceSecurity must be true");
mEnforceSecurity = mEnforceSecurity || aEnforceSecurity;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetEnforceSecurity(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult = mEnforceSecurity;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::SetInitialSecurityCheckDone(bool aInitialSecurityCheckDone)
{
// Indicates whether the channel was ever evaluated by the
// ContentSecurityManager. Once set to true, this flag must
// remain true throughout the lifetime of the channel.
// Setting it to anything else than true will be discarded.
MOZ_ASSERT(aInitialSecurityCheckDone, "aInitialSecurityCheckDone must be true");
mInitialSecurityCheckDone = mInitialSecurityCheckDone || aInitialSecurityCheckDone;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetInitialSecurityCheckDone(bool* aResult)
{
*aResult = mInitialSecurityCheckDone;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::AppendRedirectedPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, bool aIsInternalRedirect)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aPrincipal);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects.AppendElement(aPrincipal);
if (!aIsInternalRedirect) {
mRedirectChain.AppendElement(aPrincipal);
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects(JSContext* aCx, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value> aChain)
{
if (!ToJSValue(aCx, mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects, aChain)) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return NS_OK;
}
const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>&
LoadInfo::RedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects()
{
return mRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetRedirectChain(JSContext* aCx, JS::MutableHandle<JS::Value> aChain)
{
if (!ToJSValue(aCx, mRedirectChain, aChain)) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return NS_OK;
}
const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>&
LoadInfo::RedirectChain()
{
return mRedirectChain;
}
void
LoadInfo::SetCorsPreflightInfo(const nsTArray<nsCString>& aHeaders,
bool aForcePreflight)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(GetSecurityMode() == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS);
MOZ_ASSERT(!mInitialSecurityCheckDone);
mCorsUnsafeHeaders = aHeaders;
mForcePreflight = aForcePreflight;
}
const nsTArray<nsCString>&
LoadInfo::CorsUnsafeHeaders()
{
return mCorsUnsafeHeaders;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetForcePreflight(bool* aForcePreflight)
{
*aForcePreflight = mForcePreflight;
return NS_OK;
}
void
LoadInfo::SetIsPreflight()
{
MOZ_ASSERT(GetSecurityMode() == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS);
MOZ_ASSERT(!mInitialSecurityCheckDone);
mIsPreflight = true;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetIsPreflight(bool* aIsPreflight)
{
*aIsPreflight = mIsPreflight;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::GetTainting(uint32_t* aTaintingOut)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aTaintingOut);
*aTaintingOut = static_cast<uint32_t>(mTainting);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
LoadInfo::MaybeIncreaseTainting(uint32_t aTainting)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aTainting <= TAINTING_OPAQUE);
LoadTainting tainting = static_cast<LoadTainting>(aTainting);
if (tainting > mTainting) {
mTainting = tainting;
}
return NS_OK;
}
} // namespace net
} // namespace mozilla