gecko-dev/dom/webauthn/WebAuthnManager.cpp

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C++
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Этот файл содержит неоднозначные символы Юникода!

Этот файл содержит неоднозначные символы Юникода, которые могут быть перепутаны с другими в текущей локали. Если это намеренно, можете спокойно проигнорировать это предупреждение. Используйте кнопку Экранировать, чтобы подсветить эти символы.

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
* You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "hasht.h"
#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
#include "nsNetCID.h"
#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
#include "WebAuthnCoseIdentifiers.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/AuthenticatorAttestationResponse.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Promise.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/PWebAuthnTransaction.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/U2FUtil.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnCBORUtil.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnManager.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnTransactionChild.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnUtil.h"
#include "mozilla/ipc/BackgroundChild.h"
#include "mozilla/ipc/PBackgroundChild.h"
using namespace mozilla::ipc;
namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {
/***********************************************************************
* Protocol Constants
**********************************************************************/
const uint8_t FLAG_TUP = 0x01; // Test of User Presence required
const uint8_t FLAG_AT = 0x40; // Authenticator Data is provided
const uint8_t FLAG_UV = 0x04; // User was Verified (biometrics, etc.); this
// flag is not possible with U2F devices
/***********************************************************************
* Statics
**********************************************************************/
namespace {
static mozilla::LazyLogModule gWebAuthnManagerLog("webauthnmanager");
}
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(WebAuthnManager, nsIDOMEventListener);
/***********************************************************************
* Utility Functions
**********************************************************************/
static nsresult
AssembleClientData(const nsAString& aOrigin,
const CryptoBuffer& aChallenge,
const nsAString& aType,
const AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs& aExtensions,
/* out */ nsACString& aJsonOut)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
nsString challengeBase64;
nsresult rv = aChallenge.ToJwkBase64(challengeBase64);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
CollectedClientData clientDataObject;
clientDataObject.mType.Assign(aType);
clientDataObject.mChallenge.Assign(challengeBase64);
clientDataObject.mOrigin.Assign(aOrigin);
clientDataObject.mHashAlgorithm.AssignLiteral(u"SHA-256");
clientDataObject.mClientExtensions = aExtensions;
nsAutoString temp;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!clientDataObject.ToJSON(temp))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
aJsonOut.Assign(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(temp));
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
GetOrigin(nsPIDOMWindowInner* aParent,
/*out*/ nsAString& aOrigin, /*out*/ nsACString& aHost)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aParent);
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc = aParent->GetDoc();
MOZ_ASSERT(doc);
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = doc->NodePrincipal();
nsresult rv = nsContentUtils::GetUTFOrigin(principal, aOrigin);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv)) ||
NS_WARN_IF(aOrigin.IsEmpty())) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (aOrigin.EqualsLiteral("null")) {
// 4.1.1.3 If callerOrigin is an opaque origin, reject promise with a
// DOMException whose name is "NotAllowedError", and terminate this
// algorithm
MOZ_LOG(gWebAuthnManagerLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Rejecting due to opaque origin"));
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_ALLOWED_ERR;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originUri;
if (NS_FAILED(principal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(originUri)))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (NS_FAILED(originUri->GetAsciiHost(aHost))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
RelaxSameOrigin(nsPIDOMWindowInner* aParent,
const nsAString& aInputRpId,
/* out */ nsACString& aRelaxedRpId)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aParent);
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc = aParent->GetDoc();
MOZ_ASSERT(doc);
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = doc->NodePrincipal();
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
if (NS_FAILED(principal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsAutoCString originHost;
if (NS_FAILED(uri->GetAsciiHost(originHost))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> document = aParent->GetDoc();
if (!document || !document->IsHTMLDocument()) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsHTMLDocument* html = document->AsHTMLDocument();
if (NS_WARN_IF(!html)) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (!html->IsRegistrableDomainSuffixOfOrEqualTo(aInputRpId, originHost)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR;
}
aRelaxedRpId.Assign(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aInputRpId));
return NS_OK;
}
/***********************************************************************
* WebAuthnManager Implementation
**********************************************************************/
void
WebAuthnManager::ClearTransaction()
{
if (!NS_WARN_IF(mTransaction.isNothing())) {
StopListeningForVisibilityEvents();
}
mTransaction.reset();
Unfollow();
}
void
WebAuthnManager::RejectTransaction(const nsresult& aError)
{
if (!NS_WARN_IF(mTransaction.isNothing())) {
mTransaction.ref().mPromise->MaybeReject(aError);
}
ClearTransaction();
}
void
WebAuthnManager::CancelTransaction(const nsresult& aError)
{
if (!NS_WARN_IF(!mChild || mTransaction.isNothing())) {
mChild->SendRequestCancel(mTransaction.ref().mId);
}
RejectTransaction(aError);
}
WebAuthnManager::~WebAuthnManager()
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
if (mTransaction.isSome()) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
}
if (mChild) {
RefPtr<WebAuthnTransactionChild> c;
mChild.swap(c);
c->Disconnect();
}
}
already_AddRefed<Promise>
WebAuthnManager::MakeCredential(const PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions& aOptions,
const Optional<OwningNonNull<AbortSignal>>& aSignal)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
if (mTransaction.isSome()) {
CancelTransaction(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = do_QueryInterface(mParent);
ErrorResult rv;
RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(global, rv);
if (rv.Failed()) {
return nullptr;
}
// Abort the request if aborted flag is already set.
if (aSignal.WasPassed() && aSignal.Value().Aborted()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_ABORT_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsString origin;
nsCString rpId;
rv = GetOrigin(mParent, origin, rpId);
if (NS_WARN_IF(rv.Failed())) {
promise->MaybeReject(rv);
return promise.forget();
}
// Enforce 5.4.3 User Account Parameters for Credential Generation
// When we add UX, we'll want to do more with this value, but for now
// we just have to verify its correctness.
{
CryptoBuffer userId;
userId.Assign(aOptions.mUser.mId);
if (userId.Length() > 64) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_TYPE_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
}
// If timeoutSeconds was specified, check if its value lies within a
// reasonable range as defined by the platform and if not, correct it to the
// closest value lying within that range.
uint32_t adjustedTimeout = 30000;
if (aOptions.mTimeout.WasPassed()) {
adjustedTimeout = aOptions.mTimeout.Value();
adjustedTimeout = std::max(15000u, adjustedTimeout);
adjustedTimeout = std::min(120000u, adjustedTimeout);
}
if (aOptions.mRp.mId.WasPassed()) {
// If rpId is specified, then invoke the procedure used for relaxing the
// same-origin restriction by setting the document.domain attribute, using
// rpId as the given value but without changing the current documents
// domain. If no errors are thrown, set rpId to the value of host as
// computed by this procedure, and rpIdHash to the SHA-256 hash of rpId.
// Otherwise, reject promise with a DOMException whose name is
// "SecurityError", and terminate this algorithm.
if (NS_FAILED(RelaxSameOrigin(mParent, aOptions.mRp.mId.Value(), rpId))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
}
// <https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#sctn-appid-extension>
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mAppid.WasPassed()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
CryptoBuffer rpIdHash;
if (!rpIdHash.SetLength(SHA256_LENGTH, fallible)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return promise.forget();
}
nsresult srv;
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hashService =
do_CreateInstance(NS_CRYPTO_HASH_CONTRACTID, &srv);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
srv = HashCString(hashService, rpId, rpIdHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// TODO: Move this logic into U2FTokenManager in Bug 1409220.
// Process each element of mPubKeyCredParams using the following steps, to
// produce a new sequence acceptableParams.
nsTArray<PublicKeyCredentialParameters> acceptableParams;
for (size_t a = 0; a < aOptions.mPubKeyCredParams.Length(); ++a) {
// Let current be the currently selected element of
// mPubKeyCredParams.
// If current.type does not contain a PublicKeyCredentialType
// supported by this implementation, then stop processing current and move
// on to the next element in mPubKeyCredParams.
if (aOptions.mPubKeyCredParams[a].mType != PublicKeyCredentialType::Public_key) {
continue;
}
nsString algName;
if (NS_FAILED(CoseAlgorithmToWebCryptoId(aOptions.mPubKeyCredParams[a].mAlg,
algName))) {
continue;
}
if (!acceptableParams.AppendElement(aOptions.mPubKeyCredParams[a],
mozilla::fallible)){
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return promise.forget();
}
}
// If acceptableParams is empty and mPubKeyCredParams was not empty, cancel
// the timer started in step 2, reject promise with a DOMException whose name
// is "NotSupportedError", and terminate this algorithm.
if (acceptableParams.IsEmpty() && !aOptions.mPubKeyCredParams.IsEmpty()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// If excludeList is undefined, set it to the empty list.
//
// If extensions was specified, process any extensions supported by this
// client platform, to produce the extension data that needs to be sent to the
// authenticator. If an error is encountered while processing an extension,
// skip that extension and do not produce any extension data for it. Call the
// result of this processing clientExtensions.
//
// Currently no extensions are supported
//
// Use attestationChallenge, callerOrigin and rpId, along with the token
// binding key associated with callerOrigin (if any), to create a ClientData
// structure representing this request. Choose a hash algorithm for hashAlg
// and compute the clientDataJSON and clientDataHash.
CryptoBuffer challenge;
if (!challenge.Assign(aOptions.mChallenge)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsAutoCString clientDataJSON;
srv = AssembleClientData(origin, challenge,
NS_LITERAL_STRING("webauthn.create"),
aOptions.mExtensions, clientDataJSON);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
CryptoBuffer clientDataHash;
if (!clientDataHash.SetLength(SHA256_LENGTH, fallible)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
srv = HashCString(hashService, clientDataJSON, clientDataHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsTArray<WebAuthnScopedCredential> excludeList;
for (const auto& s: aOptions.mExcludeCredentials) {
WebAuthnScopedCredential c;
CryptoBuffer cb;
cb.Assign(s.mId);
c.id() = cb;
excludeList.AppendElement(c);
}
if (!MaybeCreateBackgroundActor()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// TODO: Add extension list building
nsTArray<WebAuthnExtension> extensions;
const auto& selection = aOptions.mAuthenticatorSelection;
const auto& attachment = selection.mAuthenticatorAttachment;
const AttestationConveyancePreference& attestation = aOptions.mAttestation;
// Does the RP require attachment == "platform"?
bool requirePlatformAttachment =
attachment.WasPassed() && attachment.Value() == AuthenticatorAttachment::Platform;
// Does the RP require user verification?
bool requireUserVerification =
selection.mUserVerification == UserVerificationRequirement::Required;
// Does the RP desire direct attestation? Indirect attestation is not
// implemented, and thus is equivilent to None.
bool requestDirectAttestation =
attestation == AttestationConveyancePreference::Direct;
// Create and forward authenticator selection criteria.
WebAuthnAuthenticatorSelection authSelection(selection.mRequireResidentKey,
requireUserVerification,
requirePlatformAttachment);
WebAuthnMakeCredentialInfo info(origin,
rpIdHash,
clientDataHash,
adjustedTimeout,
excludeList,
extensions,
authSelection,
requestDirectAttestation);
ListenForVisibilityEvents();
AbortSignal* signal = nullptr;
if (aSignal.WasPassed()) {
signal = &aSignal.Value();
Follow(signal);
}
MOZ_ASSERT(mTransaction.isNothing());
mTransaction = Some(WebAuthnTransaction(promise,
rpIdHash,
clientDataJSON,
requestDirectAttestation,
signal));
mChild->SendRequestRegister(mTransaction.ref().mId, info);
return promise.forget();
}
already_AddRefed<Promise>
WebAuthnManager::GetAssertion(const PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions& aOptions,
const Optional<OwningNonNull<AbortSignal>>& aSignal)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
if (mTransaction.isSome()) {
CancelTransaction(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = do_QueryInterface(mParent);
ErrorResult rv;
RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(global, rv);
if (rv.Failed()) {
return nullptr;
}
// Abort the request if aborted flag is already set.
if (aSignal.WasPassed() && aSignal.Value().Aborted()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_ABORT_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsString origin;
nsCString rpId;
rv = GetOrigin(mParent, origin, rpId);
if (NS_WARN_IF(rv.Failed())) {
promise->MaybeReject(rv);
return promise.forget();
}
// If timeoutSeconds was specified, check if its value lies within a
// reasonable range as defined by the platform and if not, correct it to the
// closest value lying within that range.
uint32_t adjustedTimeout = 30000;
if (aOptions.mTimeout.WasPassed()) {
adjustedTimeout = aOptions.mTimeout.Value();
adjustedTimeout = std::max(15000u, adjustedTimeout);
adjustedTimeout = std::min(120000u, adjustedTimeout);
}
if (aOptions.mRpId.WasPassed()) {
// If rpId is specified, then invoke the procedure used for relaxing the
// same-origin restriction by setting the document.domain attribute, using
// rpId as the given value but without changing the current documents
// domain. If no errors are thrown, set rpId to the value of host as
// computed by this procedure, and rpIdHash to the SHA-256 hash of rpId.
// Otherwise, reject promise with a DOMException whose name is
// "SecurityError", and terminate this algorithm.
if (NS_FAILED(RelaxSameOrigin(mParent, aOptions.mRpId.Value(), rpId))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
}
CryptoBuffer rpIdHash;
if (!rpIdHash.SetLength(SHA256_LENGTH, fallible)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return promise.forget();
}
nsresult srv;
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hashService =
do_CreateInstance(NS_CRYPTO_HASH_CONTRACTID, &srv);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
srv = HashCString(hashService, rpId, rpIdHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// Use assertionChallenge, callerOrigin and rpId, along with the token binding
// key associated with callerOrigin (if any), to create a ClientData structure
// representing this request. Choose a hash algorithm for hashAlg and compute
// the clientDataJSON and clientDataHash.
CryptoBuffer challenge;
if (!challenge.Assign(aOptions.mChallenge)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsAutoCString clientDataJSON;
srv = AssembleClientData(origin, challenge, NS_LITERAL_STRING("webauthn.get"),
aOptions.mExtensions, clientDataJSON);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
CryptoBuffer clientDataHash;
if (!clientDataHash.SetLength(SHA256_LENGTH, fallible)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
srv = HashCString(hashService, clientDataJSON, clientDataHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsTArray<WebAuthnScopedCredential> allowList;
for (const auto& s: aOptions.mAllowCredentials) {
if (s.mType == PublicKeyCredentialType::Public_key) {
WebAuthnScopedCredential c;
CryptoBuffer cb;
cb.Assign(s.mId);
c.id() = cb;
// Serialize transports.
if (s.mTransports.WasPassed()) {
uint8_t transports = 0;
for (const auto& t: s.mTransports.Value()) {
if (t == AuthenticatorTransport::Usb) {
transports |= U2F_AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_USB;
}
if (t == AuthenticatorTransport::Nfc) {
transports |= U2F_AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_NFC;
}
if (t == AuthenticatorTransport::Ble) {
transports |= U2F_AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_BLE;
}
}
c.transports() = transports;
}
allowList.AppendElement(c);
}
}
if (!MaybeCreateBackgroundActor()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// Does the RP require user verification?
bool requireUserVerification =
aOptions.mUserVerification == UserVerificationRequirement::Required;
// If extensions were specified, process any extensions supported by this
// client platform, to produce the extension data that needs to be sent to the
// authenticator. If an error is encountered while processing an extension,
// skip that extension and do not produce any extension data for it. Call the
// result of this processing clientExtensions.
nsTArray<WebAuthnExtension> extensions;
// <https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#sctn-appid-extension>
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mAppid.WasPassed()) {
nsString appId(aOptions.mExtensions.mAppid.Value());
// Check that the appId value is allowed.
if (!EvaluateAppID(mParent, origin, U2FOperation::Sign, appId)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
CryptoBuffer appIdHash;
if (!appIdHash.SetLength(SHA256_LENGTH, fallible)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return promise.forget();
}
// We need the SHA-256 hash of the appId.
nsresult srv = HashCString(hashService, NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(appId), appIdHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// Append the hash and send it to the backend.
extensions.AppendElement(WebAuthnExtensionAppId(appIdHash));
}
WebAuthnGetAssertionInfo info(origin,
rpIdHash,
clientDataHash,
adjustedTimeout,
allowList,
requireUserVerification,
extensions);
ListenForVisibilityEvents();
AbortSignal* signal = nullptr;
if (aSignal.WasPassed()) {
signal = &aSignal.Value();
Follow(signal);
}
MOZ_ASSERT(mTransaction.isNothing());
mTransaction = Some(WebAuthnTransaction(promise,
rpIdHash,
clientDataJSON,
false /* aDirectAttestation */,
signal));
mChild->SendRequestSign(mTransaction.ref().mId, info);
return promise.forget();
}
already_AddRefed<Promise>
WebAuthnManager::Store(const Credential& aCredential)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
if (mTransaction.isSome()) {
CancelTransaction(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = do_QueryInterface(mParent);
ErrorResult rv;
RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(global, rv);
if (rv.Failed()) {
return nullptr;
}
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
void
WebAuthnManager::FinishMakeCredential(const uint64_t& aTransactionId,
const WebAuthnMakeCredentialResult& aResult)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
// Check for a valid transaction.
if (mTransaction.isNothing() || mTransaction.ref().mId != aTransactionId) {
return;
}
CryptoBuffer regData;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!regData.Assign(aResult.RegBuffer().Elements(),
aResult.RegBuffer().Length()))) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
mozilla::dom::CryptoBuffer aaguidBuf;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!aaguidBuf.SetCapacity(16, mozilla::fallible))) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
// FIDO U2F devices have no AAGUIDs, so they'll be all zeros until we add
// support for CTAP2 devices.
for (int i=0; i<16; i++) {
aaguidBuf.AppendElement(0x00, mozilla::fallible);
}
// Decompose the U2F registration packet
CryptoBuffer pubKeyBuf;
CryptoBuffer keyHandleBuf;
CryptoBuffer attestationCertBuf;
CryptoBuffer signatureBuf;
// Only handles attestation cert chains of length=1.
nsresult rv = U2FDecomposeRegistrationResponse(regData, pubKeyBuf, keyHandleBuf,
attestationCertBuf, signatureBuf);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
RejectTransaction(rv);
return;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(keyHandleBuf.Length() <= 0xFFFF);
nsAutoString keyHandleBase64Url;
rv = keyHandleBuf.ToJwkBase64(keyHandleBase64Url);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
RejectTransaction(rv);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer clientDataBuf;
if (!clientDataBuf.Assign(mTransaction.ref().mClientData)) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer rpIdHashBuf;
if (!rpIdHashBuf.Assign(mTransaction.ref().mRpIdHash)) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
// Construct the public key object
CryptoBuffer pubKeyObj;
rv = CBOREncodePublicKeyObj(pubKeyBuf, pubKeyObj);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
RejectTransaction(rv);
return;
}
// During create credential, counter is always 0 for U2F
// See https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/507
mozilla::dom::CryptoBuffer counterBuf;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!counterBuf.SetCapacity(4, mozilla::fallible))) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
counterBuf.AppendElement(0x00, mozilla::fallible);
counterBuf.AppendElement(0x00, mozilla::fallible);
counterBuf.AppendElement(0x00, mozilla::fallible);
counterBuf.AppendElement(0x00, mozilla::fallible);
// Construct the Attestation Data, which slots into the end of the
// Authentication Data buffer.
CryptoBuffer attDataBuf;
rv = AssembleAttestationData(aaguidBuf, keyHandleBuf, pubKeyObj, attDataBuf);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
RejectTransaction(rv);
return;
}
mozilla::dom::CryptoBuffer authDataBuf;
rv = AssembleAuthenticatorData(rpIdHashBuf, FLAG_TUP, counterBuf, attDataBuf,
authDataBuf);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
RejectTransaction(rv);
return;
}
// Direct attestation might have been requested by the RP. This will
// be true only if the user consented via the permission UI.
CryptoBuffer attObj;
if (aResult.DirectAttestationPermitted()) {
rv = CBOREncodeFidoU2FAttestationObj(authDataBuf, attestationCertBuf,
signatureBuf, attObj);
} else {
rv = CBOREncodeNoneAttestationObj(authDataBuf, attObj);
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
RejectTransaction(rv);
return;
}
// Create a new PublicKeyCredential object and populate its fields with the
// values returned from the authenticator as well as the clientDataJSON
// computed earlier.
RefPtr<AuthenticatorAttestationResponse> attestation =
new AuthenticatorAttestationResponse(mParent);
attestation->SetClientDataJSON(clientDataBuf);
attestation->SetAttestationObject(attObj);
RefPtr<PublicKeyCredential> credential =
new PublicKeyCredential(mParent);
credential->SetId(keyHandleBase64Url);
credential->SetType(NS_LITERAL_STRING("public-key"));
credential->SetRawId(keyHandleBuf);
credential->SetResponse(attestation);
mTransaction.ref().mPromise->MaybeResolve(credential);
ClearTransaction();
}
void
WebAuthnManager::FinishGetAssertion(const uint64_t& aTransactionId,
const WebAuthnGetAssertionResult& aResult)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
// Check for a valid transaction.
if (mTransaction.isNothing() || mTransaction.ref().mId != aTransactionId) {
return;
}
CryptoBuffer tokenSignatureData;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!tokenSignatureData.Assign(aResult.SigBuffer().Elements(),
aResult.SigBuffer().Length()))) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer clientDataBuf;
if (!clientDataBuf.Assign(mTransaction.ref().mClientData)) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer rpIdHashBuf;
if (!rpIdHashBuf.Assign(aResult.RpIdHash())) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer signatureBuf;
CryptoBuffer counterBuf;
uint8_t flags = 0;
nsresult rv = U2FDecomposeSignResponse(tokenSignatureData, flags, counterBuf,
signatureBuf);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
RejectTransaction(rv);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer attestationDataBuf;
CryptoBuffer authenticatorDataBuf;
rv = AssembleAuthenticatorData(rpIdHashBuf, FLAG_TUP, counterBuf,
/* deliberately empty */ attestationDataBuf,
authenticatorDataBuf);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
RejectTransaction(rv);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer credentialBuf;
if (!credentialBuf.Assign(aResult.CredentialID())) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
nsAutoString credentialBase64Url;
rv = credentialBuf.ToJwkBase64(credentialBase64Url);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
RejectTransaction(rv);
return;
}
// If any authenticator returns success:
// Create a new PublicKeyCredential object named value and populate its fields
// with the values returned from the authenticator as well as the
// clientDataJSON computed earlier.
RefPtr<AuthenticatorAssertionResponse> assertion =
new AuthenticatorAssertionResponse(mParent);
assertion->SetClientDataJSON(clientDataBuf);
assertion->SetAuthenticatorData(authenticatorDataBuf);
assertion->SetSignature(signatureBuf);
RefPtr<PublicKeyCredential> credential = new PublicKeyCredential(mParent);
credential->SetId(credentialBase64Url);
credential->SetType(NS_LITERAL_STRING("public-key"));
credential->SetRawId(credentialBuf);
credential->SetResponse(assertion);
// Forward client extension results.
for (auto& ext: aResult.Extensions()) {
if (ext.type() == WebAuthnExtensionResult::TWebAuthnExtensionResultAppId) {
bool appid = ext.get_WebAuthnExtensionResultAppId().AppId();
credential->SetClientExtensionResultAppId(appid);
}
}
mTransaction.ref().mPromise->MaybeResolve(credential);
ClearTransaction();
}
void
WebAuthnManager::RequestAborted(const uint64_t& aTransactionId,
const nsresult& aError)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
if (mTransaction.isSome() && mTransaction.ref().mId == aTransactionId) {
RejectTransaction(aError);
}
}
void
WebAuthnManager::Abort()
{
CancelTransaction(NS_ERROR_DOM_ABORT_ERR);
}
}
}