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gecko-dev/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h"
#include "nsCSPContext.h"
#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
#include "nsINode.h"
#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
#include "nsDocShell.h"
#include "nsIWebProgressListener.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsIParentChannel.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
#include "nsIProtocolHandler.h"
#include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h"
#include "nsISecureBrowserUI.h"
#include "nsIWebNavigation.h"
#include "nsLoadGroup.h"
#include "nsIScriptError.h"
#include "nsIURI.h"
#include "nsIChannelEventSink.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsAsyncRedirectVerifyHelper.h"
#include "mozilla/LoadInfo.h"
#include "nsISiteSecurityService.h"
#include "prnetdb.h"
#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/ContentChild.h"
#include "mozilla/ipc/URIUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/net/DNS.h"
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::dom;
enum nsMixedContentBlockerMessageType { eBlocked = 0x00, eUserOverride = 0x01 };
// Whitelist of hostnames that should be considered secure contexts even when
// served over http:// or ws://
nsCString* nsMixedContentBlocker::sSecurecontextWhitelist = nullptr;
bool nsMixedContentBlocker::sSecurecontextWhitelistCached = false;
enum MixedContentHSTSState {
MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_NO_HSTS = 0,
MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_WITH_HSTS = 1,
MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_NO_HSTS = 2,
MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_WITH_HSTS = 3
};
// Fired at the document that attempted to load mixed content. The UI could
// handle this event, for example, by displaying an info bar that offers the
// choice to reload the page with mixed content permitted.
class nsMixedContentEvent : public Runnable {
public:
nsMixedContentEvent(nsISupports* aContext, MixedContentTypes aType,
bool aRootHasSecureConnection)
: mozilla::Runnable("nsMixedContentEvent"),
mContext(aContext),
mType(aType),
mRootHasSecureConnection(aRootHasSecureConnection) {}
NS_IMETHOD Run() override {
NS_ASSERTION(mContext,
"You can't call this runnable without a requesting context");
// To update the security UI in the tab with the blocked mixed content, call
// nsDocLoader::OnSecurityChange.
// Mixed content was allowed and is about to load; get the document and
// set the approriate flag to true if we are about to load Mixed Active
// Content.
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell = NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(mContext);
if (!docShell) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> sameTypeRoot;
docShell->GetInProcessSameTypeRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(sameTypeRoot));
NS_ASSERTION(
sameTypeRoot,
"No document shell root tree item from document shell tree item!");
// now get the document from sameTypeRoot
nsCOMPtr<Document> rootDoc = sameTypeRoot->GetDocument();
NS_ASSERTION(rootDoc,
"No root document from document shell root tree item.");
nsDocShell* nativeDocShell = nsDocShell::Cast(docShell);
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> rootShell = do_GetInterface(sameTypeRoot);
NS_ASSERTION(rootShell,
"No root docshell from document shell root tree item.");
uint32_t state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
nsCOMPtr<nsISecureBrowserUI> securityUI;
rootShell->GetSecurityUI(getter_AddRefs(securityUI));
// If there is no securityUI, document doesn't have a security state to
// update. But we still want to set the document flags, so we don't return
// early.
nsresult stateRV = NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
if (securityUI) {
stateRV = securityUI->GetState(&state);
}
if (mType == eMixedScript) {
// See if the pref will change here. If it will, only then do we need to
// call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI.
if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded()) {
return NS_OK;
}
rootDoc->SetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded(true);
// Update the security UI in the tab with the allowed mixed active content
if (securityUI) {
// Bug 1182551 - before changing the security state to broken, check
// that the root is actually secure.
if (mRootHasSecureConnection) {
// reset state security flag
state = state >> 4 << 4;
// set state security flag to broken, since there is mixed content
state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
// If mixed display content is loaded, make sure to include that in
// the state.
if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded()) {
state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT;
}
nativeDocShell->nsDocLoader::OnSecurityChange(
mContext,
(state |
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT));
} else {
// root not secure, mixed active content loaded in an https subframe
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
nativeDocShell->nsDocLoader::OnSecurityChange(
mContext,
(state |
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT));
}
}
}
} else if (mType == eMixedDisplay) {
// See if the pref will change here. If it will, only then do we need to
// call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI.
if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded()) {
return NS_OK;
}
rootDoc->SetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded(true);
// Update the security UI in the tab with the allowed mixed display
// content.
if (securityUI) {
// Bug 1182551 - before changing the security state to broken, check
// that the root is actually secure.
if (mRootHasSecureConnection) {
// reset state security flag
state = state >> 4 << 4;
// set state security flag to broken, since there is mixed content
state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
// If mixed active content is loaded, make sure to include that in the
// state.
if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded()) {
state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT;
}
nativeDocShell->nsDocLoader::OnSecurityChange(
mContext,
(state |
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT));
} else {
// root not secure, mixed display content loaded in an https subframe
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
nativeDocShell->nsDocLoader::OnSecurityChange(
mContext,
(state |
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT));
}
}
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
private:
// The requesting context for the content load. Generally, a DOM node from
// the document that caused the load.
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> mContext;
// The type of mixed content detected, e.g. active or display
const MixedContentTypes mType;
// Indicates whether the top level load is https or not.
bool mRootHasSecureConnection;
};
nsMixedContentBlocker::~nsMixedContentBlocker() = default;
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsMixedContentBlocker, nsIContentPolicy, nsIChannelEventSink)
static void LogMixedContentMessage(
MixedContentTypes aClassification, nsIURI* aContentLocation,
Document* aRootDoc, nsMixedContentBlockerMessageType aMessageType) {
nsAutoCString messageCategory;
uint32_t severityFlag;
nsAutoCString messageLookupKey;
if (aMessageType == eBlocked) {
severityFlag = nsIScriptError::errorFlag;
messageCategory.AssignLiteral("Mixed Content Blocker");
if (aClassification == eMixedDisplay) {
messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("BlockMixedDisplayContent");
} else {
messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("BlockMixedActiveContent");
}
} else {
severityFlag = nsIScriptError::warningFlag;
messageCategory.AssignLiteral("Mixed Content Message");
if (aClassification == eMixedDisplay) {
messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("LoadingMixedDisplayContent2");
} else {
messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("LoadingMixedActiveContent2");
}
}
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> strings;
CopyUTF8toUTF16(aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault(),
*strings.AppendElement());
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(severityFlag, messageCategory, aRootDoc,
nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
messageLookupKey.get(), strings);
}
/* nsIChannelEventSink implementation
* This code is called when a request is redirected.
* We check the channel associated with the new uri is allowed to load
* in the current context
*/
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsMixedContentBlocker::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(
nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aFlags,
nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCallback) {
mozilla::net::nsAsyncRedirectAutoCallback autoCallback(aCallback);
if (!aOldChannel) {
NS_ERROR("No channel when evaluating mixed content!");
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// If we are in the parent process in e10s, we don't have access to the
// document node, and hence ShouldLoad will fail when we try to get
// the docShell. If that's the case, ignore mixed content checks
// on redirects in the parent. Let the child check for mixed content.
nsCOMPtr<nsIParentChannel> is_ipc_channel;
NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(aNewChannel, is_ipc_channel);
if (is_ipc_channel) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> oldUri;
rv = aOldChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(oldUri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newUri;
rv = aNewChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(newUri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Get the loading Info from the old channel
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aOldChannel->LoadInfo();
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> requestingPrincipal = loadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
// Since we are calling shouldLoad() directly on redirects, we don't go
// through the code in nsContentPolicyUtils::NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy().
// Hence, we have to duplicate parts of it here.
if (requestingPrincipal) {
// We check to see if the loadingPrincipal is systemPrincipal and return
// early if it is
if (requestingPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
return NS_OK;
}
}
int16_t decision = REJECT_REQUEST;
rv = ShouldLoad(newUri, loadInfo,
EmptyCString(), // aMimeGuess
&decision);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
autoCallback.DontCallback();
aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
return NS_BINDING_FAILED;
}
// If the channel is about to load mixed content, abort the channel
if (!NS_CP_ACCEPTED(decision)) {
autoCallback.DontCallback();
aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
return NS_BINDING_FAILED;
}
return NS_OK;
}
/* This version of ShouldLoad() is non-static and called by the Content Policy
* API and AsyncOnChannelRedirect(). See nsIContentPolicy::ShouldLoad()
* for detailed description of the parameters.
*/
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(nsIURI* aContentLocation,
nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
const nsACString& aMimeGuess,
int16_t* aDecision) {
uint32_t contentType = aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> requestingContext = aLoadInfo->GetLoadingContext();
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> requestPrincipal = aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> requestingLocation;
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal = aLoadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
// We need to get a Requesting Location if possible
// so we're casting to BasePrincipal to acess GetURI
auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(loadingPrincipal);
if (basePrin) {
basePrin->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(requestingLocation));
}
// We pass in false as the first parameter to ShouldLoad(), because the
// callers of this method don't know whether the load went through cached
// image redirects. This is handled by direct callers of the static
// ShouldLoad.
nsresult rv =
ShouldLoad(false, // aHadInsecureImageRedirect
contentType, aContentLocation, requestingLocation,
requestingContext, aMimeGuess, requestPrincipal, aDecision);
if (*aDecision == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST) {
NS_SetRequestBlockingReason(aLoadInfo,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_MIXED_BLOCKED);
}
return rv;
}
bool nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackHost(
const nsACString& aAsciiHost) {
if (aAsciiHost.EqualsLiteral("::1") ||
aAsciiHost.EqualsLiteral("localhost")) {
return true;
}
PRNetAddr tempAddr;
memset(&tempAddr, 0, sizeof(PRNetAddr));
if (PR_StringToNetAddr(PromiseFlatCString(aAsciiHost).get(), &tempAddr) !=
PR_SUCCESS) {
return false;
}
using namespace mozilla::net;
NetAddr addr;
PRNetAddrToNetAddr(&tempAddr, &addr);
// Step 4 of
// https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy says
// we should only consider [::1]/128 as a potentially trustworthy IPv6
// address, whereas for IPv4 127.0.0.1/8 are considered as potentially
// trustworthy. We already handled "[::1]" above, so all that's remained to
// handle here are IPv4 loopback addresses.
return IsIPAddrV4(&addr) && IsLoopBackAddress(&addr);
}
bool nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackURL(nsIURI* aURL) {
nsAutoCString asciiHost;
nsresult rv = aURL->GetAsciiHost(asciiHost);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
return IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackHost(asciiHost);
}
/* Maybe we have a .onion URL. Treat it as whitelisted as well if
* `dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions` is `true`.
*/
bool nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(nsIURI* aURL) {
if (!StaticPrefs::dom_securecontext_whitelist_onions()) {
return false;
}
nsAutoCString host;
nsresult rv = aURL->GetHost(host);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
return StringEndsWith(host, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(".onion"));
}
// static
void nsMixedContentBlocker::OnPrefChange(const char* aPref, void* aClosure) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
MOZ_ASSERT(!strcmp(aPref, "dom.securecontext.whitelist"));
Preferences::GetCString("dom.securecontext.whitelist",
*sSecurecontextWhitelist);
}
// static
void nsMixedContentBlocker::GetSecureContextWhiteList(nsACString& aList) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
if (!sSecurecontextWhitelistCached) {
MOZ_ASSERT(!sSecurecontextWhitelist);
sSecurecontextWhitelistCached = true;
sSecurecontextWhitelist = new nsCString();
Preferences::RegisterCallbackAndCall(OnPrefChange,
"dom.securecontext.whitelist");
}
aList = *sSecurecontextWhitelist;
}
// static
void nsMixedContentBlocker::Shutdown() {
if (sSecurecontextWhitelist) {
delete sSecurecontextWhitelist;
sSecurecontextWhitelist = nullptr;
}
}
bool nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOrigin(nsIURI* aURI) {
// The following implements:
// https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy
nsAutoCString scheme;
nsresult rv = aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
// Blobs are expected to inherit their principal so we don't expect to have
// a content principal with scheme 'blob' here. We can't assert that though
// since someone could mess with a non-blob URI to give it that scheme.
NS_WARNING_ASSERTION(!scheme.EqualsLiteral("blob"),
"IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy ignoring blob scheme");
// According to the specification, the user agent may choose to extend the
// trust to other, vendor-specific URL schemes. We use this for "resource:",
// which is technically a substituting protocol handler that is not limited to
// local resource mapping, but in practice is never mapped remotely as this
// would violate assumptions a lot of code makes.
// We use nsIProtocolHandler flags to determine which protocols we consider a
// priori authenticated.
bool aPrioriAuthenticated = false;
if (NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY,
&aPrioriAuthenticated))) {
return false;
}
if (aPrioriAuthenticated) {
return true;
}
nsAutoCString host;
rv = aURI->GetHost(host);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
if (IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackURL(aURI)) {
return true;
}
// If a host is not considered secure according to the default algorithm, then
// check to see if it has been whitelisted by the user. We only apply this
// whitelist for network resources, i.e., those with scheme "http" or "ws".
// The pref should contain a comma-separated list of hostnames.
if (!scheme.EqualsLiteral("http") && !scheme.EqualsLiteral("ws")) {
return false;
}
nsAutoCString whitelist;
GetSecureContextWhiteList(whitelist);
nsCCharSeparatedTokenizer tokenizer(whitelist, ',');
while (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) {
const nsACString& allowedHost = tokenizer.nextToken();
if (host.Equals(allowedHost)) {
return true;
}
}
// Maybe we have a .onion URL. Treat it as whitelisted as well if
// `dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions` is `true`.
if (nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(aURI)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
/* Static version of ShouldLoad() that contains all the Mixed Content Blocker
* logic. Called from non-static ShouldLoad().
*/
nsresult nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(
bool aHadInsecureImageRedirect, uint32_t aContentType,
nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsIURI* aRequestingLocation,
nsISupports* aRequestingContext, const nsACString& aMimeGuess,
nsIPrincipal* aRequestPrincipal, int16_t* aDecision) {
// Asserting that we are on the main thread here and hence do not have to lock
// and unlock security.mixed_content.block_active_content and
// security.mixed_content.block_display_content before reading/writing to
// them.
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
bool isPreload = nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(aContentType);
// The content policy type that we receive may be an internal type for
// scripts. Let's remember if we have seen a worker type, and reset it to the
// external type in all cases right now.
bool isWorkerType =
aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER ||
aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER ||
aContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER;
aContentType =
nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(aContentType);
// Assume active (high risk) content and blocked by default
MixedContentTypes classification = eMixedScript;
// Make decision to block/reject by default
*aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
// Notes on non-obvious decisions:
//
// TYPE_DTD: A DTD can contain entity definitions that expand to scripts.
//
// TYPE_FONT: The TrueType hinting mechanism is basically a scripting
// language that gets interpreted by the operating system's font rasterizer.
// Mixed content web fonts are relatively uncommon, and we can can fall back
// to built-in fonts with minimal disruption in almost all cases.
//
// TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST could actually be either active content (e.g. a
// script that a plugin will execute) or display content (e.g. Flash video
// content). Until we have a way to determine active vs passive content
// from plugin requests (bug 836352), we will treat this as passive content.
// This is to prevent false positives from causing users to become
// desensitized to the mixed content blocker.
//
// TYPE_CSP_REPORT: High-risk because they directly leak information about
// the content of the page, and because blocking them does not have any
// negative effect on the page loading.
//
// TYPE_PING: Ping requests are POSTS, not GETs like images and media.
// Also, PING requests have no bearing on the rendering or operation of
// the page when used as designed, so even though they are lower risk than
// scripts, blocking them is basically risk-free as far as compatibility is
// concerned.
//
// TYPE_STYLESHEET: XSLT stylesheets can insert scripts. CSS positioning
// and other advanced CSS features can possibly be exploited to cause
// spoofing attacks (e.g. make a "grant permission" button look like a
// "refuse permission" button).
//
// TYPE_BEACON: Beacon requests are similar to TYPE_PING, and are blocked by
// default.
//
// TYPE_WEBSOCKET: The Websockets API requires browsers to
// reject mixed-content websockets: "If secure is false but the origin of
// the entry script has a scheme component that is itself a secure protocol,
// e.g. HTTPS, then throw a SecurityError exception." We already block mixed
// content websockets within the websockets implementation, so we don't need
// to do any blocking here, nor do we need to provide a way to undo or
// override the blocking. Websockets without TLS are very flaky anyway in the
// face of many HTTP-aware proxies. Compared to passive content, there is
// additional risk that the script using WebSockets will disclose sensitive
// information from the HTTPS page and/or eval (directly or indirectly)
// received data.
//
// TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: XHR requires either same origin or CORS, so most
// mixed-content XHR will already be blocked by that check. This will also
// block HTTPS-to-HTTP XHR with CORS. The same security concerns mentioned
// above for WebSockets apply to XHR, and XHR should have the same security
// properties as WebSockets w.r.t. mixed content. XHR's handling of redirects
// amplifies these concerns.
//
// TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD: Save-link-as feature is used to download a resource
// without involving a docShell. This kind of loading must be always be
// allowed.
static_assert(TYPE_DATAREQUEST == TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST,
"TYPE_DATAREQUEST is not a synonym for "
"TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST");
switch (aContentType) {
// The top-level document cannot be mixed content by definition
case TYPE_DOCUMENT:
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
// Creating insecure websocket connections in a secure page is blocked
// already in the websocket constructor. We don't need to check the blocking
// here and we don't want to un-block
case TYPE_WEBSOCKET:
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
// Creating insecure connections for a save-as link download is acceptable.
// This download is completely disconnected from the docShell, but still
// using the same loading principal.
case TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD:
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
// Static display content is considered moderate risk for mixed content so
// these will be blocked according to the mixed display preference
case TYPE_IMAGE:
case TYPE_MEDIA:
classification = eMixedDisplay;
break;
case TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST:
if (StaticPrefs::security_mixed_content_block_object_subrequest()) {
classification = eMixedScript;
} else {
classification = eMixedDisplay;
}
break;
// Active content (or content with a low value/risk-of-blocking ratio)
// that has been explicitly evaluated; listed here for documentation
// purposes and to avoid the assertion and warning for the default case.
case TYPE_BEACON:
case TYPE_CSP_REPORT:
case TYPE_DTD:
case TYPE_FETCH:
case TYPE_FONT:
case TYPE_IMAGESET:
case TYPE_OBJECT:
case TYPE_SCRIPT:
case TYPE_STYLESHEET:
case TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
case TYPE_PING:
case TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST:
case TYPE_XBL:
case TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
case TYPE_XSLT:
case TYPE_OTHER:
case TYPE_SPECULATIVE:
break;
// This content policy works as a whitelist.
default:
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Mixed content of unknown type");
}
// Make sure to get the URI the load started with. No need to check
// outer schemes because all the wrapping pseudo protocols inherit the
// security properties of the actual network request represented
// by the innerMost URL.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerContentLocation = NS_GetInnermostURI(aContentLocation);
if (!innerContentLocation) {
NS_ERROR("Can't get innerURI from aContentLocation");
*aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
return NS_OK;
}
// TYPE_IMAGE redirects are cached based on the original URI, not the final
// destination and hence cache hits for images may not have the correct
// innerContentLocation. Check if the cached hit went through an http
// redirect, and if it did, we can't treat this as a secure subresource.
if (!aHadInsecureImageRedirect &&
URISafeToBeLoadedInSecureContext(innerContentLocation)) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
// Since there are cases where aRequestingLocation and aRequestPrincipal are
// definitely not the owning document, we try to ignore them by extracting the
// requestingLocation in the following order:
// 1) from the aRequestingContext, either extracting
// a) the node's principal, or the
// b) script object's principal.
// 2) if aRequestingContext yields a principal but no location, we check
// if its the system principal. If it is, allow the load.
// 3) Special case handling for:
// a) speculative loads, where shouldLoad is called twice (bug 839235)
// and the first speculative load does not include a context.
// In this case we use aRequestingLocation to set requestingLocation.
// b) TYPE_CSP_REPORT which does not provide a context. In this case we
// use aRequestingLocation to set requestingLocation.
// c) content scripts from addon code that do not provide
// aRequestingContext or aRequestingLocation, but do provide
// aRequestPrincipal. If aRequestPrincipal is an expanded principal,
// we allow the load.
// 4) If we still end up not having a requestingLocation, we reject the load.
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
// 1a) Try to get the principal if aRequestingContext is a node.
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = do_QueryInterface(aRequestingContext);
if (node) {
principal = node->NodePrincipal();
}
// 1b) Try using the window's script object principal if it's not a node.
if (!principal) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptObjectPrincipal> scriptObjPrin =
do_QueryInterface(aRequestingContext);
if (scriptObjPrin) {
principal = scriptObjPrin->GetPrincipal();
}
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> requestingLocation;
// We need to get a Requesting Location if possible
// so we're casting to BasePrincipal to acess GetURI
auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(principal);
if (basePrin) {
basePrin->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(requestingLocation));
}
// 2) if aRequestingContext yields a principal but no location, we check if
// its a system principal.
if (principal && !requestingLocation) {
if (principal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
}
// 3a,b) Special case handling for speculative loads and TYPE_CSP_REPORT. In
// such cases, aRequestingContext doesn't exist, so we use
// aRequestingLocation. Unfortunately we can not distinguish between
// speculative and normal loads here, otherwise we could special case this
// assignment.
if (!requestingLocation) {
requestingLocation = aRequestingLocation;
}
// 3c) Special case handling for content scripts from addons code, which only
// provide a aRequestPrincipal; aRequestingContext and aRequestingLocation are
// both null; if the aRequestPrincipal is an expandedPrincipal, we allow the
// load.
if (!principal && !requestingLocation && aRequestPrincipal) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> expanded =
do_QueryInterface(aRequestPrincipal);
if (expanded) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
}
// 4) Giving up. We still don't have a requesting location, therefore we can't
// tell
// if this is a mixed content load. Deny to be safe.
if (!requestingLocation) {
*aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
return NS_OK;
}
// Check the parent scheme. If it is not an HTTPS page then mixed content
// restrictions do not apply.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerRequestingLocation =
NS_GetInnermostURI(requestingLocation);
if (!innerRequestingLocation) {
NS_ERROR("Can't get innerURI from requestingLocation");
*aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
return NS_OK;
}
bool parentIsHttps = innerRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("https");
if (!parentIsHttps) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
// Disallow mixed content loads for workers, shared workers and service
// workers.
if (isWorkerType) {
// For workers, we can assume that we're mixed content at this point, since
// the parent is https, and the protocol associated with
// innerContentLocation doesn't map to the secure URI flags checked above.
// Assert this for sanity's sake
#ifdef DEBUG
bool isHttpsScheme = innerContentLocation->SchemeIs("https");
MOZ_ASSERT(!isHttpsScheme);
#endif
*aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
return NS_OK;
}
bool isHttpScheme = innerContentLocation->SchemeIs("http");
if (isHttpScheme && IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOrigin(innerContentLocation)) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
// If https-only mode is enabled we'll upgrade this later anyway
if (StaticPrefs::dom_security_https_only_mode()) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
// The page might have set the CSP directive 'upgrade-insecure-requests'. In
// such a case allow the http: load to succeed with the promise that the
// channel will get upgraded to https before fetching any data from the
// netwerk. Please see: nsHttpChannel::Connect()
//
// Please note that the CSP directive 'upgrade-insecure-requests' only applies
// to http: and ws: (for websockets). Websockets are not subject to mixed
// content blocking since insecure websockets are not allowed within secure
// pages. Hence, we only have to check against http: here. Skip mixed content
// blocking if the subresource load uses http: and the CSP directive
// 'upgrade-insecure-requests' is present on the page.
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell =
NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(aRequestingContext);
// Carve-out: if we're in the parent and we're loading media, e.g. through
// webbrowserpersist, don't reject it if we can't find a docshell.
if (XRE_IsParentProcess() && !docShell &&
(aContentType == TYPE_IMAGE || aContentType == TYPE_MEDIA)) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
// Otherwise, we must have a docshell
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(docShell, NS_OK);
Document* document = docShell->GetDocument();
MOZ_ASSERT(document, "Expected a document");
if (isHttpScheme && document->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(isPreload)) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
// Allow http: mixed content if we are choosing to upgrade them when the
// pref "security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content" is true.
// This behaves like GetUpgradeInsecureRequests above in that the channel will
// be upgraded to https before fetching any data from the netwerk.
bool isUpgradableDisplayType =
nsContentUtils::IsUpgradableDisplayType(aContentType) &&
StaticPrefs::security_mixed_content_upgrade_display_content();
if (isHttpScheme && isUpgradableDisplayType) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
// The page might have set the CSP directive 'block-all-mixed-content' which
// should block not only active mixed content loads but in fact all mixed
// content loads, see https://www.w3.org/TR/mixed-content/#strict-checking
// Block all non secure loads in case the CSP directive is present. Please
// note that at this point we already know, based on |schemeSecure| that the
// load is not secure, so we can bail out early at this point.
if (document->GetBlockAllMixedContent(isPreload)) {
// log a message to the console before returning.
nsAutoCString spec;
nsresult rv = aContentLocation->GetSpec(spec);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
CopyUTF8toUTF16(spec, *params.AppendElement());
CSP_LogLocalizedStr(
"blockAllMixedContent", params,
EmptyString(), // aSourceFile
EmptyString(), // aScriptSample
0, // aLineNumber
0, // aColumnNumber
nsIScriptError::errorFlag, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("blockAllMixedContent"),
document->InnerWindowID(),
!!document->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId);
*aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
return NS_OK;
}
// Determine if the rootDoc is https and if the user decided to allow Mixed
// Content
bool rootHasSecureConnection = false;
bool allowMixedContent = false;
bool isRootDocShell = false;
nsresult rv = docShell->GetAllowMixedContentAndConnectionData(
&rootHasSecureConnection, &allowMixedContent, &isRootDocShell);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
*aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
return rv;
}
// Get the sameTypeRoot tree item from the docshell
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> sameTypeRoot;
docShell->GetInProcessSameTypeRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(sameTypeRoot));
NS_ASSERTION(sameTypeRoot, "No root tree item from docshell!");
// When navigating an iframe, the iframe may be https
// but its parents may not be. Check the parents to see if any of them are
// https. If none of the parents are https, allow the load.
if (aContentType == TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT && !rootHasSecureConnection) {
bool httpsParentExists = false;
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> parentTreeItem;
parentTreeItem = docShell;
while (!httpsParentExists && parentTreeItem) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIWebNavigation> parentAsNav(do_QueryInterface(parentTreeItem));
NS_ASSERTION(parentAsNav,
"No web navigation object from parent's docshell tree item");
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> parentURI;
parentAsNav->GetCurrentURI(getter_AddRefs(parentURI));
if (!parentURI) {
// if getting the URI fails, assume there is a https parent and break.
httpsParentExists = true;
break;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerParentURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(parentURI);
if (!innerParentURI) {
NS_ERROR("Can't get innerURI from parentURI");
*aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
return NS_OK;
}
httpsParentExists = innerParentURI->SchemeIs("https");
// When the parent and the root are the same, we have traversed all the
// way up the same type docshell tree. Break out of the while loop.
if (sameTypeRoot == parentTreeItem) {
break;
}
// update the parent to the grandparent.
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> newParentTreeItem;
parentTreeItem->GetInProcessSameTypeParent(
getter_AddRefs(newParentTreeItem));
parentTreeItem = newParentTreeItem;
} // end while loop.
if (!httpsParentExists) {
*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
}
// Get the root document from the sameTypeRoot
nsCOMPtr<Document> rootDoc = sameTypeRoot->GetDocument();
NS_ASSERTION(rootDoc, "No root document from document shell root tree item.");
nsDocShell* nativeDocShell = nsDocShell::Cast(docShell);
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> rootShell = do_GetInterface(sameTypeRoot);
NS_ASSERTION(rootShell,
"No root docshell from document shell root tree item.");
uint32_t state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
nsCOMPtr<nsISecureBrowserUI> securityUI;
rootShell->GetSecurityUI(getter_AddRefs(securityUI));
// If there is no securityUI, document doesn't have a security state.
// Allow load and return early.
if (!securityUI) {
*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult stateRV = securityUI->GetState(&state);
OriginAttributes originAttributes;
if (principal) {
originAttributes = principal->OriginAttributesRef();
} else if (aRequestPrincipal) {
originAttributes = aRequestPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef();
}
// At this point we know that the request is mixed content, and the only
// question is whether we block it. Record telemetry at this point as to
// whether HSTS would have fixed things by making the content location
// into an HTTPS URL.
//
// Note that we count this for redirects as well as primary requests. This
// will cause some degree of double-counting, especially when mixed content
// is not blocked (e.g., for images). For more detail, see:
// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1198572#c19
//
// We do not count requests aHadInsecureImageRedirect=true, since these are
// just an artifact of the image caching system.
bool active = (classification == eMixedScript);
if (!aHadInsecureImageRedirect) {
if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
AccumulateMixedContentHSTS(innerContentLocation, active,
originAttributes);
} else {
// Ask the parent process to do the same call
mozilla::dom::ContentChild* cc =
mozilla::dom::ContentChild::GetSingleton();
if (cc) {
cc->SendAccumulateMixedContentHSTS(innerContentLocation, active,
originAttributes);
}
}
}
// set hasMixedContentObjectSubrequest on this object if necessary
if (aContentType == TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST) {
if (!StaticPrefs::security_mixed_content_block_object_subrequest()) {
rootDoc->WarnOnceAbout(Document::eMixedDisplayObjectSubrequest);
}
}
// If the content is display content, and the pref says display content should
// be blocked, block it.
if (StaticPrefs::security_mixed_content_block_display_content() &&
classification == eMixedDisplay) {
if (allowMixedContent) {
LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc,
eUserOverride);
*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
// See if mixed display content has already loaded on the page or if the
// state needs to be updated here. If mixed display hasn't loaded
// previously, then we need to call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI.
if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded()) {
return NS_OK;
}
rootDoc->SetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded(true);
if (rootHasSecureConnection) {
// reset state security flag
state = state >> 4 << 4;
// set state security flag to broken, since there is mixed content
state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
// If mixed active content is loaded, make sure to include that in the
// state.
if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded()) {
state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT;
}
nativeDocShell->nsDocLoader::OnSecurityChange(
aRequestingContext,
(state |
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT));
} else {
// User has overriden the pref and the root is not https;
// mixed display content was allowed on an https subframe.
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
nativeDocShell->nsDocLoader::OnSecurityChange(
aRequestingContext,
(state |
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT));
}
}
} else {
*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST;
LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc,
eBlocked);
if (!rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentBlocked() &&
NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
rootDoc->SetHasMixedDisplayContentBlocked(true);
nativeDocShell->nsDocLoader::OnSecurityChange(
aRequestingContext,
(state |
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_BLOCKED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT));
}
}
return NS_OK;
} else if (StaticPrefs::security_mixed_content_block_active_content() &&
classification == eMixedScript) {
// If the content is active content, and the pref says active content should
// be blocked, block it unless the user has choosen to override the pref
if (allowMixedContent) {
LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc,
eUserOverride);
*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
// See if the state will change here. If it will, only then do we need to
// call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI.
if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded()) {
return NS_OK;
}
rootDoc->SetHasMixedActiveContentLoaded(true);
if (rootHasSecureConnection) {
// reset state security flag
state = state >> 4 << 4;
// set state security flag to broken, since there is mixed content
state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
// If mixed display content is loaded, make sure to include that in the
// state.
if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedDisplayContentLoaded()) {
state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT;
}
nativeDocShell->nsDocLoader::OnSecurityChange(
aRequestingContext,
(state |
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT));
return NS_OK;
} else {
// User has already overriden the pref and the root is not https;
// mixed active content was allowed on an https subframe.
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
nativeDocShell->nsDocLoader::OnSecurityChange(
aRequestingContext,
(state |
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT));
}
return NS_OK;
}
} else {
// User has not overriden the pref by Disabling protection. Reject the
// request and update the security state.
*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST;
LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc,
eBlocked);
// See if the pref will change here. If it will, only then do we need to
// call OnSecurityChange() to update the UI.
if (rootDoc->GetHasMixedActiveContentBlocked()) {
return NS_OK;
}
rootDoc->SetHasMixedActiveContentBlocked(true);
// The user has not overriden the pref, so make sure they still have an
// option by calling nativeDocShell which will invoke the doorhanger
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(stateRV)) {
nativeDocShell->nsDocLoader::OnSecurityChange(
aRequestingContext,
(state |
nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_BLOCKED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT));
}
return NS_OK;
}
} else {
// The content is not blocked by the mixed content prefs.
// Log a message that we are loading mixed content.
LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, rootDoc,
eUserOverride);
// Fire the event from a script runner as it is unsafe to run script
// from within ShouldLoad
nsContentUtils::AddScriptRunner(new nsMixedContentEvent(
aRequestingContext, classification, rootHasSecureConnection));
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
}
bool nsMixedContentBlocker::URISafeToBeLoadedInSecureContext(nsIURI* aURI) {
/* Returns a bool if the URI can be loaded as a sub resource safely.
*
* Check Protocol Flags to determine if scheme is safe to load:
* URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA - e.g.
* "mailto"
* URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE - e.g.
* "data",
* "resource",
* "moz-icon"
* URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT - e.g.
* "javascript"
* URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY - e.g.
* "https",
* "moz-safe-about"
*
*/
bool schemeLocal = false;
bool schemeNoReturnData = false;
bool schemeInherits = false;
bool schemeSecure = false;
if (NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE, &schemeLocal)) ||
NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA,
&schemeNoReturnData)) ||
NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT,
&schemeInherits)) ||
NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY,
&schemeSecure))) {
return false;
}
return (schemeLocal || schemeNoReturnData || schemeInherits || schemeSecure);
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldProcess(nsIURI* aContentLocation,
nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
const nsACString& aMimeGuess,
int16_t* aDecision) {
if (!aContentLocation) {
// aContentLocation may be null when a plugin is loading without an
// associated URI resource
if (aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() == TYPE_OBJECT) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_SetRequestBlockingReason(aLoadInfo,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_MIXED_BLOCKED);
*aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
return ShouldLoad(aContentLocation, aLoadInfo, aMimeGuess, aDecision);
}
// Record information on when HSTS would have made mixed content not mixed
// content (regardless of whether it was actually blocked)
void nsMixedContentBlocker::AccumulateMixedContentHSTS(
nsIURI* aURI, bool aActive, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes) {
// This method must only be called in the parent, because
// nsSiteSecurityService is only available in the parent
if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
MOZ_ASSERT(false);
return;
}
bool hsts;
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsISiteSecurityService> sss =
do_GetService(NS_SSSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
rv = sss->IsSecureURI(nsISiteSecurityService::HEADER_HSTS, aURI, 0,
aOriginAttributes, nullptr, nullptr, &hsts);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
// states: would upgrade, would prime, hsts info cached
// active, passive
//
if (!aActive) {
if (!hsts) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_NO_HSTS);
} else {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_WITH_HSTS);
}
} else {
if (!hsts) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_NO_HSTS);
} else {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_WITH_HSTS);
}
}
}
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