зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
509 строки
17 KiB
C++
509 строки
17 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=8 sts=4 et sw=4 tw=99: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "AccessCheck.h"
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#include "nsJSPrincipals.h"
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#include "BasePrincipal.h"
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#include "nsGlobalWindow.h"
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#include "XPCWrapper.h"
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#include "XrayWrapper.h"
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#include "FilteringWrapper.h"
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#include "jsfriendapi.h"
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#include "mozilla/ErrorResult.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/BindingUtils.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/LocationBinding.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/WindowBinding.h"
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#include "mozilla/jsipc/CrossProcessObjectWrappers.h"
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#include "nsIDOMWindowCollection.h"
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#include "nsJSUtils.h"
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#include "xpcprivate.h"
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using namespace mozilla;
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using namespace JS;
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using namespace js;
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namespace xpc {
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nsIPrincipal*
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GetCompartmentPrincipal(JSCompartment* compartment)
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{
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return nsJSPrincipals::get(JS_GetCompartmentPrincipals(compartment));
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}
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nsIPrincipal*
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GetObjectPrincipal(JSObject* obj)
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{
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return GetCompartmentPrincipal(js::GetObjectCompartment(obj));
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}
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// Does the principal of compartment a subsume the principal of compartment b?
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bool
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AccessCheck::subsumes(JSCompartment* a, JSCompartment* b)
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{
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nsIPrincipal* aprin = GetCompartmentPrincipal(a);
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nsIPrincipal* bprin = GetCompartmentPrincipal(b);
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return BasePrincipal::Cast(aprin)->FastSubsumes(bprin);
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}
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bool
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AccessCheck::subsumes(JSObject* a, JSObject* b)
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{
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return subsumes(js::GetObjectCompartment(a), js::GetObjectCompartment(b));
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}
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// Same as above, but considering document.domain.
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bool
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AccessCheck::subsumesConsideringDomain(JSCompartment* a, JSCompartment* b)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(OriginAttributes::IsRestrictOpenerAccessForFPI());
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nsIPrincipal* aprin = GetCompartmentPrincipal(a);
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nsIPrincipal* bprin = GetCompartmentPrincipal(b);
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return BasePrincipal::Cast(aprin)->FastSubsumesConsideringDomain(bprin);
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}
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bool
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AccessCheck::subsumesConsideringDomainIgnoringFPD(JSCompartment* a,
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JSCompartment* b)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(!OriginAttributes::IsRestrictOpenerAccessForFPI());
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nsIPrincipal* aprin = GetCompartmentPrincipal(a);
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nsIPrincipal* bprin = GetCompartmentPrincipal(b);
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return BasePrincipal::Cast(aprin)->FastSubsumesConsideringDomainIgnoringFPD(bprin);
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}
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// Does the compartment of the wrapper subsumes the compartment of the wrappee?
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bool
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AccessCheck::wrapperSubsumes(JSObject* wrapper)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(js::IsWrapper(wrapper));
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JSObject* wrapped = js::UncheckedUnwrap(wrapper);
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return AccessCheck::subsumes(js::GetObjectCompartment(wrapper),
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js::GetObjectCompartment(wrapped));
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}
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bool
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AccessCheck::isChrome(JSCompartment* compartment)
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{
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nsIPrincipal* principal = GetCompartmentPrincipal(compartment);
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return nsXPConnect::SystemPrincipal() == principal;
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}
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bool
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AccessCheck::isChrome(JSObject* obj)
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{
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return isChrome(js::GetObjectCompartment(obj));
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}
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nsIPrincipal*
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AccessCheck::getPrincipal(JSCompartment* compartment)
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{
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return GetCompartmentPrincipal(compartment);
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}
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// Hardcoded policy for cross origin property access. See the HTML5 Spec.
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static bool
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IsPermitted(CrossOriginObjectType type, JSFlatString* prop, bool set)
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{
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size_t propLength = JS_GetStringLength(JS_FORGET_STRING_FLATNESS(prop));
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if (!propLength)
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return false;
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char16_t propChar0 = JS_GetFlatStringCharAt(prop, 0);
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if (type == CrossOriginLocation)
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return dom::LocationBinding::IsPermitted(prop, propChar0, set);
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if (type == CrossOriginWindow)
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return dom::WindowBinding::IsPermitted(prop, propChar0, set);
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return false;
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}
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static bool
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IsFrameId(JSContext* cx, JSObject* obj, jsid idArg)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(!js::IsWrapper(obj));
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RootedId id(cx, idArg);
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nsGlobalWindow* win = WindowOrNull(obj);
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if (!win) {
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return false;
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}
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindowCollection> col = win->GetFrames();
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if (!col) {
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return false;
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}
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nsCOMPtr<mozIDOMWindowProxy> domwin;
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if (JSID_IS_INT(id)) {
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col->Item(JSID_TO_INT(id), getter_AddRefs(domwin));
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} else if (JSID_IS_STRING(id)) {
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nsAutoJSString idAsString;
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if (!idAsString.init(cx, JSID_TO_STRING(id))) {
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return false;
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}
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col->NamedItem(idAsString, getter_AddRefs(domwin));
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}
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return domwin != nullptr;
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}
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CrossOriginObjectType
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IdentifyCrossOriginObject(JSObject* obj)
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{
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obj = js::UncheckedUnwrap(obj, /* stopAtWindowProxy = */ false);
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const js::Class* clasp = js::GetObjectClass(obj);
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MOZ_ASSERT(!XrayUtils::IsXPCWNHolderClass(Jsvalify(clasp)), "shouldn't have a holder here");
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if (clasp->name[0] == 'L' && !strcmp(clasp->name, "Location"))
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return CrossOriginLocation;
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if (clasp->name[0] == 'W' && !strcmp(clasp->name, "Window"))
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return CrossOriginWindow;
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return CrossOriginOpaque;
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}
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bool
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AccessCheck::isCrossOriginAccessPermitted(JSContext* cx, HandleObject wrapper, HandleId id,
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Wrapper::Action act)
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{
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if (act == Wrapper::CALL)
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return false;
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if (act == Wrapper::ENUMERATE)
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return true;
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// For the case of getting a property descriptor, we allow if either GET or SET
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// is allowed, and rely on FilteringWrapper to filter out any disallowed accessors.
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if (act == Wrapper::GET_PROPERTY_DESCRIPTOR) {
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return isCrossOriginAccessPermitted(cx, wrapper, id, Wrapper::GET) ||
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isCrossOriginAccessPermitted(cx, wrapper, id, Wrapper::SET);
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}
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RootedObject obj(cx, js::UncheckedUnwrap(wrapper, /* stopAtWindowProxy = */ false));
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CrossOriginObjectType type = IdentifyCrossOriginObject(obj);
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if (JSID_IS_STRING(id)) {
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if (IsPermitted(type, JSID_TO_FLAT_STRING(id), act == Wrapper::SET))
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return true;
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} else if (type != CrossOriginOpaque &&
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IsCrossOriginWhitelistedSymbol(cx, id)) {
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// We always allow access to @@toStringTag, @@hasInstance, and
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// @@isConcatSpreadable. But then we nerf them to be a value descriptor
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// with value undefined in CrossOriginXrayWrapper.
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return true;
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}
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if (act != Wrapper::GET)
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return false;
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// Check for frame IDs. If we're resolving named frames, make sure to only
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// resolve ones that don't shadow native properties. See bug 860494.
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if (type == CrossOriginWindow) {
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if (JSID_IS_STRING(id)) {
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bool wouldShadow = false;
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if (!XrayUtils::HasNativeProperty(cx, wrapper, id, &wouldShadow) ||
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wouldShadow)
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{
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// If the named subframe matches the name of a DOM constructor,
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// the global resolve triggered by the HasNativeProperty call
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// above will try to perform a CheckedUnwrap on |wrapper|, and
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// throw a security error if it fails. That exception isn't
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// really useful for our callers, so we silence it and just
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// deny access to the property (since it matched a builtin).
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//
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// Note that this would be a problem if the resolve code ever
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// tried to CheckedUnwrap the wrapper _before_ concluding that
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// the name corresponds to a builtin global property, since it
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// would mean that we'd never permit cross-origin named subframe
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// access (something we regrettably need to support).
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JS_ClearPendingException(cx);
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return false;
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}
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}
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return IsFrameId(cx, obj, id);
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}
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return false;
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}
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bool
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AccessCheck::checkPassToPrivilegedCode(JSContext* cx, HandleObject wrapper, HandleValue v)
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{
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// Primitives are fine.
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if (!v.isObject())
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return true;
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RootedObject obj(cx, &v.toObject());
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// Non-wrappers are fine.
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if (!js::IsWrapper(obj))
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return true;
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// CPOWs use COWs (in the unprivileged junk scope) for all child->parent
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// references. Without this test, the child process wouldn't be able to
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// pass any objects at all to CPOWs.
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if (mozilla::jsipc::IsWrappedCPOW(obj) &&
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js::GetObjectCompartment(wrapper) == js::GetObjectCompartment(xpc::UnprivilegedJunkScope()) &&
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XRE_IsParentProcess())
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{
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return true;
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}
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// COWs are fine to pass to chrome if and only if they have __exposedProps__,
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// since presumably content should never have a reason to pass an opaque
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// object back to chrome.
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if (AccessCheck::isChrome(js::UncheckedUnwrap(wrapper)) && WrapperFactory::IsCOW(obj)) {
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RootedObject target(cx, js::UncheckedUnwrap(obj));
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JSAutoCompartment ac(cx, target);
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RootedId id(cx, GetJSIDByIndex(cx, XPCJSContext::IDX_EXPOSEDPROPS));
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bool found = false;
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if (!JS_HasPropertyById(cx, target, id, &found))
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return false;
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if (found)
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return true;
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}
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// Same-origin wrappers are fine.
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if (AccessCheck::wrapperSubsumes(obj))
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return true;
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// Badness.
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JS_ReportErrorASCII(cx, "Permission denied to pass object to privileged code");
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return false;
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}
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bool
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AccessCheck::checkPassToPrivilegedCode(JSContext* cx, HandleObject wrapper, const CallArgs& args)
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{
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if (!checkPassToPrivilegedCode(cx, wrapper, args.thisv()))
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return false;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < args.length(); ++i) {
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if (!checkPassToPrivilegedCode(cx, wrapper, args[i]))
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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void
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AccessCheck::reportCrossOriginDenial(JSContext* cx, JS::HandleId id,
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const nsACString& accessType)
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{
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// This function exists because we want to report DOM SecurityErrors, not JS
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// Errors, when denying access on cross-origin DOM objects. It's
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// conceptually pretty similar to
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// AutoEnterPolicy::reportErrorIfExceptionIsNotPending.
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if (JS_IsExceptionPending(cx)) {
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return;
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}
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nsAutoCString message;
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if (JSID_IS_VOID(id)) {
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message = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("Permission denied to access object");
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} else {
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// We want to use JS_ValueToSource here, because that most closely
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// matches what AutoEnterPolicy::reportErrorIfExceptionIsNotPending
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// does.
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JS::RootedValue idVal(cx, js::IdToValue(id));
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nsAutoJSString propName;
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JS::RootedString idStr(cx, JS_ValueToSource(cx, idVal));
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if (!idStr || !propName.init(cx, idStr)) {
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return;
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}
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message = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("Permission denied to ") +
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accessType +
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NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(" property ") +
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NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(propName) +
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NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(" on cross-origin object");
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}
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ErrorResult rv;
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rv.ThrowDOMException(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR, message);
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MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(rv.MaybeSetPendingException(cx));
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}
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enum Access { READ = (1<<0), WRITE = (1<<1), NO_ACCESS = 0 };
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static void
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EnterAndThrowASCII(JSContext* cx, JSObject* wrapper, const char* msg)
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{
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JSAutoCompartment ac(cx, wrapper);
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JS_ReportErrorASCII(cx, "%s", msg);
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}
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bool
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ExposedPropertiesOnly::check(JSContext* cx, HandleObject wrapper, HandleId id, Wrapper::Action act)
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{
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RootedObject wrappedObject(cx, Wrapper::wrappedObject(wrapper));
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if (act == Wrapper::CALL)
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return false;
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// For the case of getting a property descriptor, we allow if either GET or SET
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// is allowed, and rely on FilteringWrapper to filter out any disallowed accessors.
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if (act == Wrapper::GET_PROPERTY_DESCRIPTOR) {
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return check(cx, wrapper, id, Wrapper::GET) ||
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check(cx, wrapper, id, Wrapper::SET);
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}
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RootedId exposedPropsId(cx, GetJSIDByIndex(cx, XPCJSContext::IDX_EXPOSEDPROPS));
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// We need to enter the wrappee's compartment to look at __exposedProps__,
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// but we want to be in the wrapper's compartment if we call Deny().
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//
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// Unfortunately, |cx| can be in either compartment when we call ::check. :-(
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JSAutoCompartment ac(cx, wrappedObject);
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bool found = false;
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if (!JS_HasPropertyById(cx, wrappedObject, exposedPropsId, &found))
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return false;
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// If no __exposedProps__ existed, deny access.
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if (!found) {
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// Previously we automatically granted access to indexed properties and
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// .length for Array COWs. We're not doing that anymore, so make sure to
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// let people know what's going on.
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bool isArray;
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if (!JS_IsArrayObject(cx, wrappedObject, &isArray))
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return false;
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if (!isArray)
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isArray = JS_IsTypedArrayObject(wrappedObject);
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bool isIndexedAccessOnArray = isArray && JSID_IS_INT(id) && JSID_TO_INT(id) >= 0;
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bool isLengthAccessOnArray = isArray && JSID_IS_STRING(id) &&
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JS_FlatStringEqualsAscii(JSID_TO_FLAT_STRING(id), "length");
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if (isIndexedAccessOnArray || isLengthAccessOnArray) {
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JSAutoCompartment ac2(cx, wrapper);
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ReportWrapperDenial(cx, id, WrapperDenialForCOW,
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"Access to elements and length of privileged Array not permitted");
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}
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return false;
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}
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if (id == JSID_VOID)
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return true;
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Rooted<PropertyDescriptor> desc(cx);
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if (!JS_GetPropertyDescriptorById(cx, wrappedObject, exposedPropsId, &desc))
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return false;
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if (!desc.object())
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return false;
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if (desc.hasGetterOrSetter()) {
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EnterAndThrowASCII(cx, wrapper, "__exposedProps__ must be a value property");
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return false;
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}
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RootedValue exposedProps(cx, desc.value());
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if (exposedProps.isNullOrUndefined())
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return false;
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if (!exposedProps.isObject()) {
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EnterAndThrowASCII(cx, wrapper, "__exposedProps__ must be undefined, null, or an Object");
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return false;
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}
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RootedObject hallpass(cx, &exposedProps.toObject());
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if (!AccessCheck::subsumes(js::UncheckedUnwrap(hallpass), wrappedObject)) {
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EnterAndThrowASCII(cx, wrapper, "Invalid __exposedProps__");
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return false;
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}
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Access access = NO_ACCESS;
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if (!JS_GetPropertyDescriptorById(cx, hallpass, id, &desc)) {
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return false; // Error
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}
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if (!desc.object() || !desc.enumerable())
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return false;
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if (!desc.value().isString()) {
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EnterAndThrowASCII(cx, wrapper, "property must be a string");
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return false;
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}
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JSFlatString* flat = JS_FlattenString(cx, desc.value().toString());
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if (!flat)
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return false;
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size_t length = JS_GetStringLength(JS_FORGET_STRING_FLATNESS(flat));
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for (size_t i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
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char16_t ch = JS_GetFlatStringCharAt(flat, i);
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switch (ch) {
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case 'r':
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if (access & READ) {
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EnterAndThrowASCII(cx, wrapper, "duplicate 'readable' property flag");
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return false;
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}
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access = Access(access | READ);
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break;
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case 'w':
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if (access & WRITE) {
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EnterAndThrowASCII(cx, wrapper, "duplicate 'writable' property flag");
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return false;
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}
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access = Access(access | WRITE);
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break;
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default:
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EnterAndThrowASCII(cx, wrapper, "properties can only be readable or read and writable");
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return false;
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}
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}
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if (access == NO_ACCESS) {
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EnterAndThrowASCII(cx, wrapper, "specified properties must have a permission bit set");
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return false;
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}
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if ((act == Wrapper::SET && !(access & WRITE)) ||
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(act != Wrapper::SET && !(access & READ))) {
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return false;
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}
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// Inspect the property on the underlying object to check for red flags.
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if (!JS_GetPropertyDescriptorById(cx, wrappedObject, id, &desc))
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return false;
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// Reject accessor properties.
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if (desc.hasGetterOrSetter()) {
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EnterAndThrowASCII(cx, wrapper, "Exposing privileged accessor properties is prohibited");
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return false;
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}
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// Reject privileged or cross-origin callables.
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if (desc.value().isObject()) {
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RootedObject maybeCallable(cx, js::UncheckedUnwrap(&desc.value().toObject()));
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if (JS::IsCallable(maybeCallable) && !AccessCheck::subsumes(wrapper, maybeCallable)) {
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EnterAndThrowASCII(cx, wrapper, "Exposing privileged or cross-origin callable is prohibited");
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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bool
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ExposedPropertiesOnly::deny(JSContext* cx, js::Wrapper::Action act, HandleId id,
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bool mayThrow)
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{
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// Fail silently for GET, ENUMERATE, and GET_PROPERTY_DESCRIPTOR.
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if (act == js::Wrapper::GET || act == js::Wrapper::ENUMERATE ||
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act == js::Wrapper::GET_PROPERTY_DESCRIPTOR)
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{
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// Note that ReportWrapperDenial doesn't do any _exception_ reporting,
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// so we want to do this regardless of the value of mayThrow.
|
|
return ReportWrapperDenial(cx, id, WrapperDenialForCOW,
|
|
"Access to privileged JS object not permitted");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
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|
|
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} // namespace xpc
|