gecko-dev/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp

1020 строки
27 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsCSPUtils.h"
#include "nsDebug.h"
#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
#include "nsIScriptError.h"
#include "nsIServiceManager.h"
#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsAttrValue.h"
#include "nsSandboxFlags.h"
#if defined(PR_LOGGING)
static PRLogModuleInfo*
GetCspUtilsLog()
{
static PRLogModuleInfo* gCspUtilsPRLog;
if (!gCspUtilsPRLog)
gCspUtilsPRLog = PR_NewLogModule("CSPUtils");
return gCspUtilsPRLog;
}
#endif
#define CSPUTILSLOG(args) PR_LOG(GetCspUtilsLog(), 4, args)
void
CSP_GetLocalizedStr(const char16_t* aName,
const char16_t** aParams,
uint32_t aLength,
char16_t** outResult)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> keyStringBundle;
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> stringBundleService =
mozilla::services::GetStringBundleService();
NS_ASSERTION(stringBundleService, "String bundle service must be present!");
stringBundleService->CreateBundle("chrome://global/locale/security/csp.properties",
getter_AddRefs(keyStringBundle));
NS_ASSERTION(keyStringBundle, "Key string bundle must be available!");
if (!keyStringBundle) {
return;
}
keyStringBundle->FormatStringFromName(aName, aParams, aLength, outResult);
}
void
CSP_LogStrMessage(const nsAString& aMsg)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
if (!console) {
return;
}
nsString msg = PromiseFlatString(aMsg);
console->LogStringMessage(msg.get());
}
void
CSP_LogMessage(const nsAString& aMessage,
const nsAString& aSourceName,
const nsAString& aSourceLine,
uint32_t aLineNumber,
uint32_t aColumnNumber,
uint32_t aFlags,
const char *aCategory,
uint32_t aInnerWindowID)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID));
nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptError> error(do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID));
if (!console || !error) {
return;
}
// Prepending CSP to the outgoing console message
nsString cspMsg;
cspMsg.Append(NS_LITERAL_STRING("Content Security Policy: "));
cspMsg.Append(aMessage);
nsresult rv;
if (aInnerWindowID > 0) {
nsCString catStr;
catStr.AssignASCII(aCategory);
rv = error->InitWithWindowID(cspMsg, aSourceName,
aSourceLine, aLineNumber,
aColumnNumber, aFlags,
catStr, aInnerWindowID);
}
else {
rv = error->Init(cspMsg, aSourceName,
aSourceLine, aLineNumber,
aColumnNumber, aFlags,
aCategory);
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
console->LogMessage(error);
}
/**
* Combines CSP_LogMessage and CSP_GetLocalizedStr into one call.
*/
void
CSP_LogLocalizedStr(const char16_t* aName,
const char16_t** aParams,
uint32_t aLength,
const nsAString& aSourceName,
const nsAString& aSourceLine,
uint32_t aLineNumber,
uint32_t aColumnNumber,
uint32_t aFlags,
const char* aCategory,
uint32_t aInnerWindowID)
{
nsXPIDLString logMsg;
CSP_GetLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, aLength, getter_Copies(logMsg));
CSP_LogMessage(logMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine,
aLineNumber, aColumnNumber, aFlags,
aCategory, aInnerWindowID);
}
/* ===== Helpers ============================ */
CSPDirective
CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(nsContentPolicyType aType)
{
switch (aType) {
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
// BLock XSLT as script, see bug 910139
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XBL:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD:
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
// csp shold not block top level loads, e.g. in case
// of a redirect.
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT:
// CSP can not block csp reports
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT:
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE;
// Fall through to error for all other directives
default:
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Can not map nsContentPolicyType to CSPDirective");
}
return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
}
nsCSPHostSrc*
CSP_CreateHostSrcFromURI(nsIURI* aURI)
{
// Create the host first
nsCString host;
aURI->GetHost(host);
nsCSPHostSrc *hostsrc = new nsCSPHostSrc(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(host));
// Add the scheme.
nsCString scheme;
aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
hostsrc->setScheme(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(scheme));
int32_t port;
aURI->GetPort(&port);
// Only add port if it's not default port.
if (port > 0) {
nsAutoString portStr;
portStr.AppendInt(port);
hostsrc->setPort(portStr);
}
return hostsrc;
}
bool
CSP_IsValidDirective(const nsAString& aDir)
{
uint32_t numDirs = (sizeof(CSPStrDirectives) / sizeof(CSPStrDirectives[0]));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numDirs; i++) {
if (aDir.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSPStrDirectives[i])) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool
CSP_IsDirective(const nsAString& aValue, CSPDirective aDir)
{
return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDir));
}
bool
CSP_IsKeyword(const nsAString& aValue, enum CSPKeyword aKey)
{
return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKey));
}
bool
CSP_IsQuotelessKeyword(const nsAString& aKey)
{
nsString lowerKey = PromiseFlatString(aKey);
ToLowerCase(lowerKey);
static_assert(CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE ==
(sizeof(CSPStrKeywords) / sizeof(CSPStrKeywords[0])),
"CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE does not match length of CSPStrKeywords");
nsAutoString keyword;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE; i++) {
// skipping the leading ' and trimming the trailing '
keyword.AssignASCII(CSPStrKeywords[i] + 1);
keyword.Trim("'", false, true);
if (lowerKey.Equals(keyword)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/* ===== nsCSPSrc ============================ */
nsCSPBaseSrc::nsCSPBaseSrc()
{
}
nsCSPBaseSrc::~nsCSPBaseSrc()
{
}
// ::permits is only called for external load requests, therefore:
// nsCSPKeywordSrc and nsCSPHashSource fall back to this base class
// implementation which will never allow the load.
bool
nsCSPBaseSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected) const
{
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
{
nsAutoCString spec;
aUri->GetSpec(spec);
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPBaseSrc::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get()));
}
#endif
return false;
}
// ::allows is only called for inlined loads, therefore:
// nsCSPSchemeSrc, nsCSPHostSrc fall back
// to this base class implementation which will never allow the load.
bool
nsCSPBaseSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
{
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPBaseSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
aKeyword == CSP_HASH ? "hash" : CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword),
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
return false;
}
/* ====== nsCSPSchemeSrc ===================== */
nsCSPSchemeSrc::nsCSPSchemeSrc(const nsAString& aScheme)
: mScheme(aScheme)
{
ToLowerCase(mScheme);
}
nsCSPSchemeSrc::~nsCSPSchemeSrc()
{
}
bool
nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected) const
{
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
{
nsAutoCString spec;
aUri->GetSpec(spec);
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get()));
}
#endif
NS_ASSERTION((!mScheme.EqualsASCII("")), "scheme can not be the empty string");
nsAutoCString scheme;
nsresult rv = aUri->GetScheme(scheme);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
return mScheme.EqualsASCII(scheme.get());
}
void
nsCSPSchemeSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
{
outStr.Append(mScheme);
outStr.AppendASCII(":");
}
/* ===== nsCSPHostSrc ======================== */
nsCSPHostSrc::nsCSPHostSrc(const nsAString& aHost)
: mHost(aHost)
, mAllowHttps(false)
{
ToLowerCase(mHost);
}
nsCSPHostSrc::~nsCSPHostSrc()
{
}
bool
nsCSPHostSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected) const
{
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
{
nsAutoCString spec;
aUri->GetSpec(spec);
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPHostSrc::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get()));
}
#endif
// we are following the enforcement rules from the spec, see:
// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#match-source-expression
// 4.3) scheme matching: Check if the scheme matches.
nsAutoCString scheme;
nsresult rv = aUri->GetScheme(scheme);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
if (!mScheme.IsEmpty() &&
!mScheme.EqualsASCII(scheme.get())) {
// We should not return false for scheme-less sources where the protected resource
// is http and the load is https, see:
// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#match-source-expression
bool isHttpsScheme =
(NS_SUCCEEDED(aUri->SchemeIs("https", &isHttpsScheme)) && isHttpsScheme);
if (!(isHttpsScheme && mAllowHttps)) {
return false;
}
}
// The host in nsCSpHostSrc should never be empty. In case we are enforcing
// just a specific scheme, the parser should generate a nsCSPSchemeSource.
NS_ASSERTION((!mHost.IsEmpty()), "host can not be the empty string");
// 2) host matching: Enforce a single *
if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*")) {
return true;
}
// Before we can check if the host matches, we have to
// extract the host part from aUri.
nsAutoCString uriHost;
rv = aUri->GetHost(uriHost);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
// 4.5) host matching: Check if the allowed host starts with a wilcard.
if (mHost.First() == '*') {
NS_ASSERTION(mHost[1] == '.', "Second character needs to be '.' whenever host starts with '*'");
// Eliminate leading "*", but keeping the FULL STOP (.) thereafter before checking
// if the remaining characters match
nsString wildCardHost = mHost;
wildCardHost = Substring(wildCardHost, 1, wildCardHost.Length() - 1);
if (!StringEndsWith(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriHost), wildCardHost)) {
return false;
}
}
// 4.6) host matching: Check if hosts match.
else if (!mHost.Equals(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriHost))) {
return false;
}
// 4.9) Path matching: If there is a path, we have to enforce
// path-level matching, unless the channel got redirected, see:
// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list-paths-and-redirects
if (!aWasRedirected && !mPath.IsEmpty()) {
// cloning uri so we can ignore the ref
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
aUri->CloneIgnoringRef(getter_AddRefs(uri));
nsAutoCString uriPath;
rv = uri->GetPath(uriPath);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
// check if the last character of mPath is '/'; if so
// we just have to check loading resource is within
// the allowed path.
if (mPath.Last() == '/') {
if (!StringBeginsWith(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriPath), mPath)) {
return false;
}
}
// otherwise mPath whitelists a specific file, and we have to
// check if the loading resource matches that whitelisted file.
else {
if (!mPath.Equals(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriPath))) {
return false;
}
}
}
// 4.8) Port matching: If port uses wildcard, allow the load.
if (mPort.EqualsASCII("*")) {
return true;
}
// Before we can check if the port matches, we have to
// query the port from aUri.
int32_t uriPort;
rv = aUri->GetPort(&uriPort);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
uriPort = (uriPort > 0) ? uriPort : NS_GetDefaultPort(scheme.get());
// 4.7) Default port matching: If mPort is empty, we have to compare default ports.
if (mPort.IsEmpty()) {
int32_t port = NS_GetDefaultPort(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mScheme).get());
if (port != uriPort) {
// We should not return false for scheme-less sources where the protected resource
// is http and the load is https, see: http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#match-source-expression
// BUT, we only allow scheme-less sources to be upgraded from http to https if CSP
// does not explicitly define a port.
if (!(uriPort == NS_GetDefaultPort("https") && mAllowHttps)) {
return false;
}
}
}
// 4.7) Port matching: Compare the ports.
else {
nsString portStr;
portStr.AppendInt(uriPort);
if (!mPort.Equals(portStr)) {
return false;
}
}
// At the end: scheme, host, path, and port match -> allow the load.
return true;
}
void
nsCSPHostSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
{
// If mHost is a single "*", we append the wildcard and return.
if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*") &&
mScheme.IsEmpty() &&
mPort.IsEmpty()) {
outStr.Append(mHost);
return;
}
// append scheme
outStr.Append(mScheme);
// append host
outStr.AppendASCII("://");
outStr.Append(mHost);
// append port
if (!mPort.IsEmpty()) {
outStr.AppendASCII(":");
outStr.Append(mPort);
}
// append path
outStr.Append(mPath);
}
void
nsCSPHostSrc::setScheme(const nsAString& aScheme, bool aAllowHttps)
{
mScheme = aScheme;
ToLowerCase(mScheme);
mAllowHttps = aAllowHttps;
}
void
nsCSPHostSrc::setPort(const nsAString& aPort)
{
mPort = aPort;
}
void
nsCSPHostSrc::appendPath(const nsAString& aPath)
{
mPath.Append(aPath);
}
/* ===== nsCSPKeywordSrc ===================== */
nsCSPKeywordSrc::nsCSPKeywordSrc(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword)
{
NS_ASSERTION((aKeyword != CSP_SELF),
"'self' should have been replaced in the parser");
mKeyword = aKeyword;
}
nsCSPKeywordSrc::~nsCSPKeywordSrc()
{
}
bool
nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
{
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
return mKeyword == aKeyword;
}
void
nsCSPKeywordSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
{
outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(mKeyword));
}
/* ===== nsCSPNonceSrc ==================== */
nsCSPNonceSrc::nsCSPNonceSrc(const nsAString& aNonce)
: mNonce(aNonce)
{
}
nsCSPNonceSrc::~nsCSPNonceSrc()
{
}
bool
nsCSPNonceSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected) const
{
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
{
nsAutoCString spec;
aUri->GetSpec(spec);
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::permits, aUri: %s, aNonce: %s",
spec.get(), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aNonce).get()));
}
#endif
return mNonce.Equals(aNonce);
}
bool
nsCSPNonceSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
{
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
if (aKeyword != CSP_NONCE) {
return false;
}
return mNonce.Equals(aHashOrNonce);
}
void
nsCSPNonceSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
{
outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_EnumToKeyword(CSP_NONCE));
outStr.Append(mNonce);
outStr.AppendASCII("'");
}
/* ===== nsCSPHashSrc ===================== */
nsCSPHashSrc::nsCSPHashSrc(const nsAString& aAlgo, const nsAString& aHash)
: mAlgorithm(aAlgo)
, mHash(aHash)
{
// Only the algo should be rewritten to lowercase, the hash must remain the same.
ToLowerCase(mAlgorithm);
}
nsCSPHashSrc::~nsCSPHashSrc()
{
}
bool
nsCSPHashSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
{
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPHashSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
if (aKeyword != CSP_HASH) {
return false;
}
// Convert aHashOrNonce to UTF-8
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 utf8_hash(aHashOrNonce);
nsresult rv;
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hasher;
hasher = do_CreateInstance("@mozilla.org/security/hash;1", &rv);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
rv = hasher->InitWithString(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mAlgorithm));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
rv = hasher->Update((uint8_t *)utf8_hash.get(), utf8_hash.Length());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
nsAutoCString hash;
rv = hasher->Finish(true, hash);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
// The NSS Base64 encoder automatically adds linebreaks "\r\n" every 64
// characters. We need to remove these so we can properly validate longer
// (SHA-512) base64-encoded hashes
hash.StripChars("\r\n");
return NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mHash).Equals(hash);
}
void
nsCSPHashSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
{
outStr.AppendASCII("'");
outStr.Append(mAlgorithm);
outStr.AppendASCII("-");
outStr.Append(mHash);
outStr.AppendASCII("'");
}
/* ===== nsCSPReportURI ===================== */
nsCSPReportURI::nsCSPReportURI(nsIURI *aURI)
:mReportURI(aURI)
{
}
nsCSPReportURI::~nsCSPReportURI()
{
}
void
nsCSPReportURI::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
{
nsAutoCString spec;
nsresult rv = mReportURI->GetSpec(spec);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
outStr.AppendASCII(spec.get());
}
/* ===== nsCSPSandboxFlags ===================== */
nsCSPSandboxFlags::nsCSPSandboxFlags(const nsAString& aFlags)
: mFlags(aFlags)
{
}
nsCSPSandboxFlags::~nsCSPSandboxFlags()
{
}
void
nsCSPSandboxFlags::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
{
outStr.Append(mFlags);
}
/* ===== nsCSPDirective ====================== */
nsCSPDirective::nsCSPDirective(CSPDirective aDirective)
{
mDirective = aDirective;
}
nsCSPDirective::~nsCSPDirective()
{
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
delete mSrcs[i];
}
}
bool
nsCSPDirective::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected) const
{
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
{
nsAutoCString spec;
aUri->GetSpec(spec);
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPDirective::permits, aUri: %s", spec.get()));
}
#endif
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
if (mSrcs[i]->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool
nsCSPDirective::permits(nsIURI* aUri) const
{
nsString dummyNonce;
return permits(aUri, dummyNonce, false);
}
bool
nsCSPDirective::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
{
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPDirective::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
if (mSrcs[i]->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
void
nsCSPDirective::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
{
// Append directive name
outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(mDirective));
outStr.AppendASCII(" ");
// Append srcs
uint32_t length = mSrcs.Length();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < length; i++) {
mSrcs[i]->toString(outStr);
if (i != (length - 1)) {
outStr.AppendASCII(" ");
}
}
}
bool
nsCSPDirective::restrictsContentType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType) const
{
// make sure we do not check for the default src before any other sources
if (isDefaultDirective()) {
return false;
}
return mDirective == CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(aContentType);
}
void
nsCSPDirective::getReportURIs(nsTArray<nsString> &outReportURIs) const
{
NS_ASSERTION((mDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE), "not a report-uri directive");
// append uris
nsString tmpReportURI;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
tmpReportURI.Truncate();
mSrcs[i]->toString(tmpReportURI);
outReportURIs.AppendElement(tmpReportURI);
}
}
/* ===== nsCSPPolicy ========================= */
nsCSPPolicy::nsCSPPolicy()
: mReportOnly(false)
{
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::nsCSPPolicy"));
}
nsCSPPolicy::~nsCSPPolicy()
{
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::~nsCSPPolicy"));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
delete mDirectives[i];
}
}
bool
nsCSPPolicy::permits(CSPDirective aDir,
nsIURI* aUri,
bool aSpecific) const
{
nsString outp;
return this->permits(aDir, aUri, EmptyString(), false, aSpecific, outp);
}
bool
nsCSPPolicy::permits(CSPDirective aDir,
nsIURI* aUri,
const nsAString& aNonce,
bool aWasRedirected,
bool aSpecific,
nsAString& outViolatedDirective) const
{
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
{
nsAutoCString spec;
aUri->GetSpec(spec);
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %d, aSpecific: %s",
spec.get(), aDir, aSpecific ? "true" : "false"));
}
#endif
NS_ASSERTION(aUri, "permits needs an uri to perform the check!");
nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr;
// Try to find a relevant directive
// These directive arrays are short (1-5 elements), not worth using a hashtable.
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) {
if (!mDirectives[i]->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected)) {
mDirectives[i]->toString(outViolatedDirective);
return false;
}
return true;
}
if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) {
defaultDir = mDirectives[i];
}
}
// If the above loop runs through, we haven't found a matching directive.
// Avoid relooping, just store the result of default-src while looping.
if (!aSpecific && defaultDir) {
if (!defaultDir->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected)) {
defaultDir->toString(outViolatedDirective);
return false;
}
return true;
}
// Nothing restricts this, so we're allowing the load
// See bug 764937
return true;
}
bool
nsCSPPolicy::allows(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
const nsAString& aHashOrNonce) const
{
CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
CSP_EnumToKeyword(aKeyword), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr;
// Try to find a matching directive
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
if (mDirectives[i]->restrictsContentType(aContentType)) {
if (mDirectives[i]->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) {
defaultDir = mDirectives[i];
}
}
// Only match {nonce,hash}-source on specific directives (not default-src)
if (aKeyword == CSP_NONCE || aKeyword == CSP_HASH) {
return false;
}
// If the above loop runs through, we haven't found a matching directive.
// Avoid relooping, just store the result of default-src while looping.
if (defaultDir) {
return defaultDir->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce);
}
// Allowing the load; see Bug 885433
// a) inline scripts (also unsafe eval) should only be blocked
// if there is a [script-src] or [default-src]
// b) inline styles should only be blocked
// if there is a [style-src] or [default-src]
return true;
}
bool
nsCSPPolicy::allows(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
enum CSPKeyword aKeyword) const
{
return allows(aContentType, aKeyword, NS_LITERAL_STRING(""));
}
void
nsCSPPolicy::toString(nsAString& outStr) const
{
uint32_t length = mDirectives.Length();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REFERRER_DIRECTIVE)) {
outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REFERRER_DIRECTIVE));
outStr.AppendASCII(" ");
outStr.Append(mReferrerPolicy);
} else {
mDirectives[i]->toString(outStr);
}
if (i != (length - 1)) {
outStr.AppendASCII("; ");
}
}
}
bool
nsCSPPolicy::hasDirective(CSPDirective aDir) const
{
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/*
* Use this function only after ::allows() returned 'false'. Most and
* foremost it's used to get the violated directive before sending reports.
* The parameter outDirective is the equivalent of 'outViolatedDirective'
* for the ::permits() function family.
*/
void
nsCSPPolicy::getDirectiveStringForContentType(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
nsAString& outDirective) const
{
nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
if (mDirectives[i]->restrictsContentType(aContentType)) {
mDirectives[i]->toString(outDirective);
return;
}
if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) {
defaultDir = mDirectives[i];
}
}
// if we haven't found a matching directive yet,
// the contentType must be restricted by the default directive
if (defaultDir) {
defaultDir->toString(outDirective);
return;
}
NS_ASSERTION(false, "Can not query directive string for contentType!");
outDirective.AppendASCII("couldNotQueryViolatedDirective");
}
void
nsCSPPolicy::getDirectiveAsString(CSPDirective aDir, nsAString& outDirective) const
{
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) {
mDirectives[i]->toString(outDirective);
return;
}
}
}
void
nsCSPPolicy::getReportURIs(nsTArray<nsString>& outReportURIs) const
{
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE)) {
mDirectives[i]->getReportURIs(outReportURIs);
return;
}
}
}
/*
* Helper function that returns the underlying bit representation of
* sandbox flags. The function returns SANDBOXED_NONE if there is no
* sandbox directives.
*/
uint32_t
nsCSPPolicy::getSandboxFlags() const
{
nsAutoString flags;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SANDBOX_DIRECTIVE)) {
flags.Truncate();
mDirectives[i]->toString(flags);
nsAttrValue attr;
attr.ParseAtomArray(flags);
return nsContentUtils::ParseSandboxAttributeToFlags(&attr);
}
}
return SANDBOXED_NONE;
}