gecko-dev/netwerk/dns/nsIDNService.cpp

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "nsIDNService.h"
#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
#include "nsCRT.h"
#include "nsUnicharUtils.h"
#include "nsUnicodeProperties.h"
#include "nsUnicodeScriptCodes.h"
#include "harfbuzz/hb.h"
#include "nsIServiceManager.h"
#include "nsIObserverService.h"
#include "nsISupportsPrimitives.h"
#include "punycode.h"
// Currently we use the non-transitional processing option -- see
// http://unicode.org/reports/tr46/
// To switch to transitional processing, change the value of this flag
// and kTransitionalProcessing in netwerk/test/unit/test_idna2008.js to true
// (revert bug 1218179).
const bool kIDNA2008_TransitionalProcessing = false;
#include "ICUUtils.h"
#include "unicode/uscript.h"
using namespace mozilla::unicode;
using namespace mozilla::net;
using mozilla::Preferences;
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// RFC 1034 - 3.1. Name space specifications and terminology
static const uint32_t kMaxDNSNodeLen = 63;
// RFC 3490 - 5. ACE prefix
static const char kACEPrefix[] = "xn--";
#define kACEPrefixLen 4
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define NS_NET_PREF_EXTRAALLOWED "network.IDN.extra_allowed_chars"
#define NS_NET_PREF_EXTRABLOCKED "network.IDN.extra_blocked_chars"
#define NS_NET_PREF_SHOWPUNYCODE "network.IDN_show_punycode"
#define NS_NET_PREF_IDNWHITELIST "network.IDN.whitelist."
#define NS_NET_PREF_IDNUSEWHITELIST "network.IDN.use_whitelist"
#define NS_NET_PREF_IDNRESTRICTION "network.IDN.restriction_profile"
static inline bool isOnlySafeChars(const nsString& in,
const nsTArray<BlocklistRange>& aBlocklist) {
if (aBlocklist.IsEmpty()) {
return true;
}
const char16_t* cur = in.BeginReading();
const char16_t* end = in.EndReading();
for (; cur < end; ++cur) {
if (CharInBlocklist(*cur, aBlocklist)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// nsIDNService
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
/* Implementation file */
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsIDNService, nsIIDNService, nsISupportsWeakReference)
static const char* gCallbackPrefs[] = {
NS_NET_PREF_EXTRAALLOWED, NS_NET_PREF_EXTRABLOCKED,
NS_NET_PREF_SHOWPUNYCODE, NS_NET_PREF_IDNRESTRICTION,
NS_NET_PREF_IDNUSEWHITELIST, nullptr,
};
nsresult nsIDNService::Init() {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
MutexAutoLock lock(mLock);
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefService> prefs(do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID));
if (prefs)
prefs->GetBranch(NS_NET_PREF_IDNWHITELIST,
getter_AddRefs(mIDNWhitelistPrefBranch));
Preferences::RegisterPrefixCallbacks(PrefChanged, gCallbackPrefs, this);
prefsChanged(nullptr);
InitializeBlocklist(mIDNBlocklist);
return NS_OK;
}
void nsIDNService::prefsChanged(const char* pref) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
mLock.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();
if (pref && NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(NS_NET_PREF_EXTRAALLOWED).Equals(pref)) {
InitializeBlocklist(mIDNBlocklist);
}
if (pref && NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(NS_NET_PREF_EXTRABLOCKED).Equals(pref)) {
InitializeBlocklist(mIDNBlocklist);
}
if (!pref || NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(NS_NET_PREF_SHOWPUNYCODE).Equals(pref)) {
bool val;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(Preferences::GetBool(NS_NET_PREF_SHOWPUNYCODE, &val)))
mShowPunycode = val;
}
if (!pref || NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(NS_NET_PREF_IDNUSEWHITELIST).Equals(pref)) {
bool val;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(Preferences::GetBool(NS_NET_PREF_IDNUSEWHITELIST, &val)))
mIDNUseWhitelist = val;
}
if (!pref || NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(NS_NET_PREF_IDNRESTRICTION).Equals(pref)) {
nsAutoCString profile;
if (NS_FAILED(
Preferences::GetCString(NS_NET_PREF_IDNRESTRICTION, profile))) {
profile.Truncate();
}
if (profile.EqualsLiteral("moderate")) {
mRestrictionProfile = eModeratelyRestrictiveProfile;
} else if (profile.EqualsLiteral("high")) {
mRestrictionProfile = eHighlyRestrictiveProfile;
} else {
mRestrictionProfile = eASCIIOnlyProfile;
}
}
}
nsIDNService::nsIDNService()
: mLock("DNService pref value lock"),
mShowPunycode(false),
mRestrictionProfile(static_cast<restrictionProfile>(0)),
mIDNUseWhitelist(false) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
uint32_t IDNAOptions = UIDNA_CHECK_BIDI | UIDNA_CHECK_CONTEXTJ;
if (!kIDNA2008_TransitionalProcessing) {
IDNAOptions |= UIDNA_NONTRANSITIONAL_TO_UNICODE;
}
UErrorCode errorCode = U_ZERO_ERROR;
mIDNA = uidna_openUTS46(IDNAOptions, &errorCode);
}
nsIDNService::~nsIDNService() {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
Preferences::UnregisterPrefixCallbacks(PrefChanged, gCallbackPrefs, this);
uidna_close(mIDNA);
}
nsresult nsIDNService::IDNA2008ToUnicode(const nsACString& input,
nsAString& output) {
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 inputStr(input);
UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER;
UErrorCode errorCode = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t inLen = inputStr.Length();
int32_t outMaxLen = kMaxDNSNodeLen + 1;
UChar outputBuffer[kMaxDNSNodeLen + 1];
int32_t outLen =
uidna_labelToUnicode(mIDNA, (const UChar*)inputStr.get(), inLen,
outputBuffer, outMaxLen, &info, &errorCode);
if (info.errors != 0) {
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
}
if (U_SUCCESS(errorCode)) {
ICUUtils::AssignUCharArrayToString(outputBuffer, outLen, output);
}
nsresult rv = ICUUtils::UErrorToNsResult(errorCode);
if (rv == NS_ERROR_FAILURE) {
rv = NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
}
return rv;
}
nsresult nsIDNService::IDNA2008StringPrep(const nsAString& input,
nsAString& output,
stringPrepFlag flag) {
UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER;
UErrorCode errorCode = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t inLen = input.Length();
int32_t outMaxLen = kMaxDNSNodeLen + 1;
UChar outputBuffer[kMaxDNSNodeLen + 1];
int32_t outLen =
uidna_labelToUnicode(mIDNA, (const UChar*)PromiseFlatString(input).get(),
inLen, outputBuffer, outMaxLen, &info, &errorCode);
nsresult rv = ICUUtils::UErrorToNsResult(errorCode);
if (rv == NS_ERROR_FAILURE) {
rv = NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
}
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Output the result of nameToUnicode even if there were errors.
// But in the case of invalid punycode, the uidna_labelToUnicode result
// appears to get an appended U+FFFD REPLACEMENT CHARACTER, which will
// confuse our subsequent processing, so we drop that.
// (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1399540#c9)
if ((info.errors & UIDNA_ERROR_PUNYCODE) && outLen > 0 &&
outputBuffer[outLen - 1] == 0xfffd) {
--outLen;
}
ICUUtils::AssignUCharArrayToString(outputBuffer, outLen, output);
if (flag == eStringPrepIgnoreErrors) {
return NS_OK;
}
if (info.errors != 0) {
if (flag == eStringPrepForDNS) {
output.Truncate();
}
rv = NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
}
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP nsIDNService::ConvertUTF8toACE(const nsACString& input,
nsACString& ace) {
return UTF8toACE(input, ace, eStringPrepForDNS);
}
nsresult nsIDNService::UTF8toACE(const nsACString& input, nsACString& ace,
stringPrepFlag flag) {
nsresult rv;
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 ustr(input);
// map ideographic period to ASCII period etc.
normalizeFullStops(ustr);
uint32_t len, offset;
len = 0;
offset = 0;
nsAutoCString encodedBuf;
nsAString::const_iterator start, end;
ustr.BeginReading(start);
ustr.EndReading(end);
ace.Truncate();
// encode nodes if non ASCII
while (start != end) {
len++;
if (*start++ == (char16_t)'.') {
rv = stringPrepAndACE(Substring(ustr, offset, len - 1), encodedBuf, flag);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
ace.Append(encodedBuf);
ace.Append('.');
offset += len;
len = 0;
}
}
// encode the last node if non ASCII
if (len) {
rv = stringPrepAndACE(Substring(ustr, offset, len), encodedBuf, flag);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
ace.Append(encodedBuf);
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP nsIDNService::ConvertACEtoUTF8(const nsACString& input,
nsACString& _retval) {
return ACEtoUTF8(input, _retval, eStringPrepForDNS);
}
nsresult nsIDNService::ACEtoUTF8(const nsACString& input, nsACString& _retval,
stringPrepFlag flag) {
// RFC 3490 - 4.2 ToUnicode
// ToUnicode never fails. If any step fails, then the original input
// sequence is returned immediately in that step.
//
// Note that this refers to the decoding of a single label.
// ACEtoUTF8 may be called with a sequence of labels separated by dots;
// this test applies individually to each label.
uint32_t len = 0, offset = 0;
nsAutoCString decodedBuf;
nsACString::const_iterator start, end;
input.BeginReading(start);
input.EndReading(end);
_retval.Truncate();
// loop and decode nodes
while (start != end) {
len++;
if (*start++ == '.') {
nsDependentCSubstring origLabel(input, offset, len - 1);
if (NS_FAILED(decodeACE(origLabel, decodedBuf, flag))) {
// If decoding failed, use the original input sequence
// for this label.
_retval.Append(origLabel);
} else {
_retval.Append(decodedBuf);
}
_retval.Append('.');
offset += len;
len = 0;
}
}
// decode the last node
if (len) {
nsDependentCSubstring origLabel(input, offset, len);
if (NS_FAILED(decodeACE(origLabel, decodedBuf, flag))) {
_retval.Append(origLabel);
} else {
_retval.Append(decodedBuf);
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP nsIDNService::IsACE(const nsACString& input, bool* _retval) {
const char* data = input.BeginReading();
uint32_t dataLen = input.Length();
// look for the ACE prefix in the input string. it may occur
// at the beginning of any segment in the domain name. for
// example: "www.xn--ENCODED.com"
const char* p = PL_strncasestr(data, kACEPrefix, dataLen);
*_retval = p && (p == data || *(p - 1) == '.');
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP nsIDNService::Normalize(const nsACString& input,
nsACString& output) {
// protect against bogus input
NS_ENSURE_TRUE(IsUTF8(input), NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 inUTF16(input);
normalizeFullStops(inUTF16);
// pass the domain name to stringprep label by label
nsAutoString outUTF16, outLabel;
uint32_t len = 0, offset = 0;
nsresult rv;
nsAString::const_iterator start, end;
inUTF16.BeginReading(start);
inUTF16.EndReading(end);
while (start != end) {
len++;
if (*start++ == char16_t('.')) {
rv = stringPrep(Substring(inUTF16, offset, len - 1), outLabel,
eStringPrepIgnoreErrors);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
outUTF16.Append(outLabel);
outUTF16.Append(char16_t('.'));
offset += len;
len = 0;
}
}
if (len) {
rv = stringPrep(Substring(inUTF16, offset, len), outLabel,
eStringPrepIgnoreErrors);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
outUTF16.Append(outLabel);
}
CopyUTF16toUTF8(outUTF16, output);
return NS_OK;
}
namespace {
class MOZ_STACK_CLASS MutexSettableAutoUnlock final {
Mutex* mMutex;
public:
MutexSettableAutoUnlock() : mMutex(nullptr) {}
void Acquire(mozilla::Mutex& aMutex) {
MOZ_ASSERT(!mMutex);
mMutex = &aMutex;
mMutex->Lock();
}
~MutexSettableAutoUnlock() {
if (mMutex) {
mMutex->Unlock();
}
}
};
} // anonymous namespace
NS_IMETHODIMP nsIDNService::ConvertToDisplayIDN(const nsACString& input,
bool* _isASCII,
nsACString& _retval) {
MutexSettableAutoUnlock lock;
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
lock.Acquire(mLock);
}
// If host is ACE, then convert to UTF-8 if the host is in the IDN whitelist.
// Else, if host is already UTF-8, then make sure it is normalized per IDN.
nsresult rv = NS_OK;
// Even if the hostname is not ASCII, individual labels may still be ACE, so
// test IsACE before testing IsASCII
bool isACE;
IsACE(input, &isACE);
if (IsASCII(input)) {
// first, canonicalize the host to lowercase, for whitelist lookup
_retval = input;
ToLowerCase(_retval);
if (isACE && !mShowPunycode) {
// ACEtoUTF8() can't fail, but might return the original ACE string
nsAutoCString temp(_retval);
// If the domain is in the whitelist, return the host in UTF-8.
// Otherwise convert from ACE to UTF8 only those labels which are
// considered safe for display
ACEtoUTF8(
temp, _retval,
isInWhitelist(temp) ? eStringPrepIgnoreErrors : eStringPrepForUI);
*_isASCII = IsASCII(_retval);
} else {
*_isASCII = true;
}
} else {
// We have to normalize the hostname before testing against the domain
// whitelist (see bug 315411), and to ensure the entire string gets
// normalized.
//
// Normalization and the tests for safe display below, assume that the
// input is Unicode, so first convert any ACE labels to UTF8
if (isACE) {
nsAutoCString temp;
ACEtoUTF8(input, temp, eStringPrepIgnoreErrors);
rv = Normalize(temp, _retval);
} else {
rv = Normalize(input, _retval);
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
if (mShowPunycode &&
NS_SUCCEEDED(UTF8toACE(_retval, _retval, eStringPrepIgnoreErrors))) {
*_isASCII = true;
return NS_OK;
}
// normalization could result in an ASCII-only hostname. alternatively, if
// the host is converted to ACE by the normalizer, then the host may contain
// unsafe characters, so leave it ACE encoded. see bug 283016, bug 301694,
// and bug 309311.
*_isASCII = IsASCII(_retval);
if (!*_isASCII && !isInWhitelist(_retval)) {
// UTF8toACE with eStringPrepForUI may return a domain name where
// some labels are in UTF-8 and some are in ACE, depending on
// whether they are considered safe for display
rv = UTF8toACE(_retval, _retval, eStringPrepForUI);
*_isASCII = IsASCII(_retval);
return rv;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
static nsresult utf16ToUcs4(const nsAString& in, uint32_t* out,
uint32_t outBufLen, uint32_t* outLen) {
uint32_t i = 0;
nsAString::const_iterator start, end;
in.BeginReading(start);
in.EndReading(end);
while (start != end) {
char16_t curChar;
curChar = *start++;
if (start != end && NS_IS_HIGH_SURROGATE(curChar) &&
NS_IS_LOW_SURROGATE(*start)) {
out[i] = SURROGATE_TO_UCS4(curChar, *start);
++start;
} else
out[i] = curChar;
i++;
if (i >= outBufLen) return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
}
out[i] = (uint32_t)'\0';
*outLen = i;
return NS_OK;
}
static nsresult punycode(const nsAString& in, nsACString& out) {
uint32_t ucs4Buf[kMaxDNSNodeLen + 1];
uint32_t ucs4Len = 0u;
nsresult rv = utf16ToUcs4(in, ucs4Buf, kMaxDNSNodeLen, &ucs4Len);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// need maximum 20 bits to encode 16 bit Unicode character
// (include null terminator)
const uint32_t kEncodedBufSize = kMaxDNSNodeLen * 20 / 8 + 1 + 1;
char encodedBuf[kEncodedBufSize];
punycode_uint encodedLength = kEncodedBufSize;
enum punycode_status status =
punycode_encode(ucs4Len, ucs4Buf, nullptr, &encodedLength, encodedBuf);
if (punycode_success != status || encodedLength >= kEncodedBufSize)
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
encodedBuf[encodedLength] = '\0';
out.Assign(nsDependentCString(kACEPrefix) + nsDependentCString(encodedBuf));
return rv;
}
// RFC 3454
//
// 1) Map -- For each character in the input, check if it has a mapping
// and, if so, replace it with its mapping. This is described in section 3.
//
// 2) Normalize -- Possibly normalize the result of step 1 using Unicode
// normalization. This is described in section 4.
//
// 3) Prohibit -- Check for any characters that are not allowed in the
// output. If any are found, return an error. This is described in section
// 5.
//
// 4) Check bidi -- Possibly check for right-to-left characters, and if any
// are found, make sure that the whole string satisfies the requirements
// for bidirectional strings. If the string does not satisfy the requirements
// for bidirectional strings, return an error. This is described in section 6.
//
// 5) Check unassigned code points -- If allowUnassigned is false, check for
// any unassigned Unicode points and if any are found return an error.
// This is described in section 7.
//
nsresult nsIDNService::stringPrep(const nsAString& in, nsAString& out,
stringPrepFlag flag) {
return IDNA2008StringPrep(in, out, flag);
}
nsresult nsIDNService::stringPrepAndACE(const nsAString& in, nsACString& out,
stringPrepFlag flag) {
nsresult rv = NS_OK;
out.Truncate();
if (in.Length() > kMaxDNSNodeLen) {
NS_WARNING("IDN node too large");
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
}
if (IsASCII(in)) {
LossyCopyUTF16toASCII(in, out);
return NS_OK;
}
nsAutoString strPrep;
rv = stringPrep(in, strPrep, flag);
if (flag == eStringPrepForDNS) {
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
if (IsASCII(strPrep)) {
LossyCopyUTF16toASCII(strPrep, out);
return NS_OK;
}
if (flag == eStringPrepForUI && NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && isLabelSafe(in)) {
CopyUTF16toUTF8(strPrep, out);
return NS_OK;
}
rv = punycode(strPrep, out);
// Check that the encoded output isn't larger than the maximum length
// of a DNS node per RFC 1034.
// This test isn't necessary in the code paths above where the input
// is ASCII (since the output will be the same length as the input) or
// where we convert to UTF-8 (since the output is only used for
// display in the UI and not passed to DNS and can legitimately be
// longer than the limit).
if (out.Length() > kMaxDNSNodeLen) {
NS_WARNING("IDN node too large");
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
}
return rv;
}
// RFC 3490
// 1) Whenever dots are used as label separators, the following characters
// MUST be recognized as dots: U+002E (full stop), U+3002 (ideographic full
// stop), U+FF0E (fullwidth full stop), U+FF61 (halfwidth ideographic full
// stop).
void nsIDNService::normalizeFullStops(nsAString& s) {
nsAString::const_iterator start, end;
s.BeginReading(start);
s.EndReading(end);
int32_t index = 0;
while (start != end) {
switch (*start) {
case 0x3002:
case 0xFF0E:
case 0xFF61:
s.ReplaceLiteral(index, 1, u".");
break;
default:
break;
}
start++;
index++;
}
}
nsresult nsIDNService::decodeACE(const nsACString& in, nsACString& out,
stringPrepFlag flag) {
bool isAce;
IsACE(in, &isAce);
if (!isAce) {
out.Assign(in);
return NS_OK;
}
nsAutoString utf16;
nsresult result = IDNA2008ToUnicode(in, utf16);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(result, result);
if (flag != eStringPrepForUI || isLabelSafe(utf16)) {
CopyUTF16toUTF8(utf16, out);
} else {
out.Assign(in);
return NS_OK;
}
// Validation: encode back to ACE and compare the strings
nsAutoCString ace;
nsresult rv = UTF8toACE(out, ace, flag);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (flag == eStringPrepForDNS &&
!ace.Equals(in, nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator())) {
return NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI;
}
return NS_OK;
}
bool nsIDNService::isInWhitelist(const nsACString& host) {
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
mLock.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();
}
if (mIDNUseWhitelist && mIDNWhitelistPrefBranch) {
nsAutoCString tld(host);
// make sure the host is ACE for lookup and check that there are no
// unassigned codepoints
if (!IsASCII(tld) && NS_FAILED(UTF8toACE(tld, tld, eStringPrepForDNS))) {
return false;
}
// truncate trailing dots first
tld.Trim(".");
int32_t pos = tld.RFind(".");
if (pos == kNotFound) return false;
tld.Cut(0, pos + 1);
bool safe;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mIDNWhitelistPrefBranch->GetBoolPref(tld.get(), &safe)))
return safe;
}
return false;
}
bool nsIDNService::isLabelSafe(const nsAString& label) {
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
mLock.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();
}
if (!isOnlySafeChars(PromiseFlatString(label), mIDNBlocklist)) {
return false;
}
// We should never get here if the label is ASCII
NS_ASSERTION(!IsASCII(label), "ASCII label in IDN checking");
if (mRestrictionProfile == eASCIIOnlyProfile) {
return false;
}
nsAString::const_iterator current, end;
label.BeginReading(current);
label.EndReading(end);
Script lastScript = Script::INVALID;
uint32_t previousChar = 0;
uint32_t baseChar = 0; // last non-diacritic seen (base char for marks)
uint32_t savedNumberingSystem = 0;
// Simplified/Traditional Chinese check temporarily disabled -- bug 857481
#if 0
HanVariantType savedHanVariant = HVT_NotHan;
#endif
int32_t savedScript = -1;
while (current != end) {
uint32_t ch = *current++;
if (NS_IS_HIGH_SURROGATE(ch) && current != end &&
NS_IS_LOW_SURROGATE(*current)) {
ch = SURROGATE_TO_UCS4(ch, *current++);
}
IdentifierType idType = GetIdentifierType(ch);
if (idType == IDTYPE_RESTRICTED) {
return false;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(idType == IDTYPE_ALLOWED);
// Check for mixed script
Script script = GetScriptCode(ch);
if (script != Script::COMMON && script != Script::INHERITED &&
script != lastScript) {
if (illegalScriptCombo(script, savedScript)) {
return false;
}
}
// Check for mixed numbering systems
auto genCat = GetGeneralCategory(ch);
if (genCat == HB_UNICODE_GENERAL_CATEGORY_DECIMAL_NUMBER) {
uint32_t zeroCharacter = ch - GetNumericValue(ch);
if (savedNumberingSystem == 0) {
// If we encounter a decimal number, save the zero character from that
// numbering system.
savedNumberingSystem = zeroCharacter;
} else if (zeroCharacter != savedNumberingSystem) {
return false;
}
}
if (genCat == HB_UNICODE_GENERAL_CATEGORY_NON_SPACING_MARK) {
// Check for consecutive non-spacing marks.
if (previousChar != 0 && previousChar == ch) {
return false;
}
// Check for marks whose expected script doesn't match the base script.
if (lastScript != Script::INVALID) {
const size_t kMaxScripts = 32; // more than ample for current values
// of ScriptExtensions property
UScriptCode scripts[kMaxScripts];
UErrorCode errorCode = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int nScripts =
uscript_getScriptExtensions(ch, scripts, kMaxScripts, &errorCode);
MOZ_ASSERT(U_SUCCESS(errorCode), "uscript_getScriptExtensions failed");
if (U_FAILURE(errorCode)) {
return false;
}
// nScripts will always be >= 1, because even for undefined characters
// uscript_getScriptExtensions will return Script::INVALID.
// If the mark just has script=COMMON or INHERITED, we can't check any
// more carefully, but if it has specific scriptExtension codes, then
// assume those are the only valid scripts to use it with.
if (nScripts > 1 || (Script(scripts[0]) != Script::COMMON &&
Script(scripts[0]) != Script::INHERITED)) {
while (--nScripts >= 0) {
if (Script(scripts[nScripts]) == lastScript) {
break;
}
}
if (nScripts == -1) {
return false;
}
}
}
// Check for diacritics on dotless-i, which would be indistinguishable
// from normal accented letter i.
if (baseChar == 0x0131 &&
((ch >= 0x0300 && ch <= 0x0314) || ch == 0x031a)) {
return false;
}
} else {
baseChar = ch;
}
if (script != Script::COMMON && script != Script::INHERITED) {
lastScript = script;
}
// Simplified/Traditional Chinese check temporarily disabled -- bug 857481
#if 0
// Check for both simplified-only and traditional-only Chinese characters
HanVariantType hanVariant = GetHanVariant(ch);
if (hanVariant == HVT_SimplifiedOnly || hanVariant == HVT_TraditionalOnly) {
if (savedHanVariant == HVT_NotHan) {
savedHanVariant = hanVariant;
} else if (hanVariant != savedHanVariant) {
return false;
}
}
#endif
previousChar = ch;
}
return true;
}
// Scripts that we care about in illegalScriptCombo
static const Script scriptTable[] = {
Script::BOPOMOFO, Script::CYRILLIC, Script::GREEK, Script::HANGUL,
Script::HAN, Script::HIRAGANA, Script::KATAKANA, Script::LATIN};
#define BOPO 0
#define CYRL 1
#define GREK 2
#define HANG 3
#define HANI 4
#define HIRA 5
#define KATA 6
#define LATN 7
#define OTHR 8
#define JPAN 9 // Latin + Han + Hiragana + Katakana
#define CHNA 10 // Latin + Han + Bopomofo
#define KORE 11 // Latin + Han + Hangul
#define HNLT 12 // Latin + Han (could be any of the above combinations)
#define FAIL 13
static inline int32_t findScriptIndex(Script aScript) {
int32_t tableLength = mozilla::ArrayLength(scriptTable);
for (int32_t index = 0; index < tableLength; ++index) {
if (aScript == scriptTable[index]) {
return index;
}
}
return OTHR;
}
static const int32_t scriptComboTable[13][9] = {
/* thisScript: BOPO CYRL GREK HANG HANI HIRA KATA LATN OTHR
* savedScript */
/* BOPO */ {BOPO, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, CHNA, FAIL},
/* CYRL */ {FAIL, CYRL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL},
/* GREK */ {FAIL, FAIL, GREK, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL},
/* HANG */ {FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, HANG, KORE, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, FAIL},
/* HANI */ {CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, HANI, JPAN, JPAN, HNLT, FAIL},
/* HIRA */ {FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, JPAN, HIRA, JPAN, JPAN, FAIL},
/* KATA */ {FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, JPAN, JPAN, KATA, JPAN, FAIL},
/* LATN */ {CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, HNLT, JPAN, JPAN, LATN, OTHR},
/* OTHR */ {FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, OTHR, FAIL},
/* JPAN */ {FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, JPAN, JPAN, JPAN, JPAN, FAIL},
/* CHNA */ {CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, CHNA, FAIL},
/* KORE */ {FAIL, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, KORE, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, FAIL},
/* HNLT */ {CHNA, FAIL, FAIL, KORE, HNLT, JPAN, JPAN, HNLT, FAIL}};
bool nsIDNService::illegalScriptCombo(Script script, int32_t& savedScript) {
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
mLock.AssertCurrentThreadOwns();
}
if (savedScript == -1) {
savedScript = findScriptIndex(script);
return false;
}
savedScript = scriptComboTable[savedScript][findScriptIndex(script)];
/*
* Special case combinations that depend on which profile is in use
* In the Highly Restrictive profile Latin is not allowed with any
* other script
*
* In the Moderately Restrictive profile Latin mixed with any other
* single script is allowed.
*/
return ((savedScript == OTHR &&
mRestrictionProfile == eHighlyRestrictiveProfile) ||
savedScript == FAIL);
}
#undef BOPO
#undef CYRL
#undef GREK
#undef HANG
#undef HANI
#undef HIRA
#undef KATA
#undef LATN
#undef OTHR
#undef JPAN
#undef CHNA
#undef KORE
#undef HNLT
#undef FAIL