зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
597 строки
21 KiB
C
597 строки
21 KiB
C
/*
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* Gather (Read) entire SSL3 records from socket into buffer.
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*
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* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "cert.h"
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#include "ssl.h"
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#include "sslimpl.h"
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#include "sslproto.h"
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#include "ssl3prot.h"
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struct ssl2GatherStr {
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/* true when ssl3_GatherData encounters an SSLv2 handshake */
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PRBool isV2;
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/* number of bytes of padding appended to the message content */
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PRUint8 padding;
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};
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typedef struct ssl2GatherStr ssl2Gather;
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/* Caller should hold RecvBufLock. */
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SECStatus
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ssl3_InitGather(sslGather *gs)
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{
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SECStatus status;
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gs->state = GS_INIT;
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gs->writeOffset = 0;
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gs->readOffset = 0;
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gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
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gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
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gs->rejectV2Records = PR_FALSE;
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status = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->buf, 4096);
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return status;
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}
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/* Caller must hold RecvBufLock. */
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void
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ssl3_DestroyGather(sslGather *gs)
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{
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if (gs) { /* the PORT_*Free functions check for NULL pointers. */
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PORT_ZFree(gs->buf.buf, gs->buf.space);
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PORT_Free(gs->inbuf.buf);
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PORT_Free(gs->dtlsPacket.buf);
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}
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}
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/* Checks whether a given buffer is likely an SSLv3 record header. */
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PRBool
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ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(const unsigned char *buf)
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{
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/* Even if this was a V2 record header we couldn't possibly parse it
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* correctly as the second bit denotes a vaguely-defined security escape. */
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if (buf[0] & 0x40) {
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return PR_TRUE;
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}
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/* Check for a typical V3 record header. */
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return (PRBool)(buf[0] >= content_change_cipher_spec &&
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buf[0] <= content_application_data &&
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buf[1] == MSB(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
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}
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/*
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* Attempt to read in an entire SSL3 record.
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* Blocks here for blocking sockets, otherwise returns -1 with
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* PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR when socket would block.
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*
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* returns 1 if received a complete SSL3 record.
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* returns 0 if recv returns EOF
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* returns -1 if recv returns < 0
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* (The error value may have already been set to PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
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*
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* Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
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*
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* The Gather state machine has 3 states: GS_INIT, GS_HEADER, GS_DATA.
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* GS_HEADER: waiting for the 5-byte SSL3 record header to come in.
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* GS_DATA: waiting for the body of the SSL3 record to come in.
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*
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* This loop returns when either
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* (a) an error or EOF occurs,
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* (b) PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR,
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* (c) data (entire SSL3 record) has been received.
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*/
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static int
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ssl3_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags, ssl2Gather *ssl2gs)
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{
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unsigned char *bp;
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unsigned char *lbp;
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int nb;
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int err;
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int rv = 1;
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PRUint8 v2HdrLength = 0;
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PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
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if (gs->state == GS_INIT) {
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gs->state = GS_HEADER;
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gs->remainder = ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders ? 2 : 5;
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gs->offset = 0;
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gs->writeOffset = 0;
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gs->readOffset = 0;
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gs->inbuf.len = 0;
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}
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lbp = gs->inbuf.buf;
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for (;;) {
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SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: gather state %d (need %d more)",
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SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->state, gs->remainder));
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bp = ((gs->state != GS_HEADER) ? lbp : gs->hdr) + gs->offset;
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nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, bp, gs->remainder, flags);
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if (nb > 0) {
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PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", bp, nb));
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} else if (nb == 0) {
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/* EOF */
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SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
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rv = 0;
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break;
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} else /* if (nb < 0) */ {
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SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
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PR_GetError()));
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rv = SECFailure;
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break;
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}
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PORT_Assert((unsigned int)nb <= gs->remainder);
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if ((unsigned int)nb > gs->remainder) {
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/* ssl_DefRecv is misbehaving! this error is fatal to SSL. */
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gs->state = GS_INIT; /* so we don't crash next time */
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rv = SECFailure;
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break;
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}
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gs->offset += nb;
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gs->remainder -= nb;
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if (gs->state == GS_DATA)
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gs->inbuf.len += nb;
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/* if there's more to go, read some more. */
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if (gs->remainder > 0) {
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continue;
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}
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/* have received entire record header, or entire record. */
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switch (gs->state) {
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case GS_HEADER:
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/* Check for SSLv2 handshakes. Always assume SSLv3 on clients,
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* support SSLv2 handshakes only when ssl2gs != NULL.
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* Always assume v3 after we received the first record. */
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if (!ssl2gs ||
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ss->gs.rejectV2Records ||
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ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(gs->hdr)) {
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/* Should have a non-SSLv2 record header in gs->hdr. Extract
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* the length of the following encrypted data, and then
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* read in the rest of the record into gs->inbuf. */
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if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) {
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PRUint16 len = (gs->hdr[0] << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
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if (!(len & 0x8000)) {
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SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: incorrectly formatted header"));
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SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
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gs->state = GS_INIT;
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_MAC_READ);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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gs->remainder = len & ~0x8000;
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} else {
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gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[3] << 8) | gs->hdr[4];
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}
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} else {
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/* Probably an SSLv2 record header. No need to handle any
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* security escapes (gs->hdr[0] & 0x40) as we wouldn't get
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* here if one was set. See ssl3_isLikelyV3Hello(). */
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gs->remainder = ((gs->hdr[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | gs->hdr[1];
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ssl2gs->isV2 = PR_TRUE;
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v2HdrLength = 2;
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/* Is it a 3-byte header with padding? */
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if (!(gs->hdr[0] & 0x80)) {
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ssl2gs->padding = gs->hdr[2];
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v2HdrLength++;
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}
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}
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/* This is the max length for an encrypted SSLv3+ fragment. */
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if (!v2HdrLength &&
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gs->remainder > (MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048)) {
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SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, record_overflow);
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gs->state = GS_INIT;
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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gs->state = GS_DATA;
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gs->offset = 0;
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gs->inbuf.len = 0;
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if (gs->remainder > gs->inbuf.space) {
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err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->inbuf, gs->remainder);
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if (err) { /* realloc has set error code to no mem. */
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return err;
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}
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lbp = gs->inbuf.buf;
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}
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/* When we encounter an SSLv2 hello we've read 2 or 3 bytes too
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* many into the gs->hdr[] buffer. Copy them over into inbuf so
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* that we can properly process the hello record later. */
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if (v2HdrLength) {
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/* Reject v2 records that don't even carry enough data to
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* resemble a valid ClientHello header. */
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if (gs->remainder < SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES) {
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SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
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PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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PORT_Assert(lbp);
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gs->inbuf.len = 5 - v2HdrLength;
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PORT_Memcpy(lbp, gs->hdr + v2HdrLength, gs->inbuf.len);
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gs->remainder -= gs->inbuf.len;
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lbp += gs->inbuf.len;
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}
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if (gs->remainder > 0) {
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break; /* End this case. Continue around the loop. */
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}
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/* FALL THROUGH if (gs->remainder == 0) as we just received
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* an empty record and there's really no point in calling
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* ssl_DefRecv() with buf=NULL and len=0. */
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case GS_DATA:
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/*
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** SSL3 record has been completely received.
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*/
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SSL_TRC(10, ("%d: SSL[%d]: got record of %d bytes",
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SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, gs->inbuf.len));
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/* reject any v2 records from now on */
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ss->gs.rejectV2Records = PR_TRUE;
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gs->state = GS_INIT;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return rv;
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}
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/*
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* Read in an entire DTLS record.
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*
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* Blocks here for blocking sockets, otherwise returns -1 with
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* PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR when socket would block.
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*
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* This is simpler than SSL because we are reading on a datagram socket
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* and datagrams must contain >=1 complete records.
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*
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* returns 1 if received a complete DTLS record.
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* returns 0 if recv returns EOF
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* returns -1 if recv returns < 0
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* (The error value may have already been set to PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)
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*
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* Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
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*
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* This loop returns when either
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* (a) an error or EOF occurs,
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* (b) PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR,
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* (c) data (entire DTLS record) has been received.
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*/
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static int
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dtls_GatherData(sslSocket *ss, sslGather *gs, int flags)
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{
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int nb;
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int err;
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int rv = 1;
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SSL_TRC(30, ("dtls_GatherData"));
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PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
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gs->state = GS_HEADER;
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gs->offset = 0;
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if (gs->dtlsPacketOffset == gs->dtlsPacket.len) { /* No data left */
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gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
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gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
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/* Resize to the maximum possible size so we can fit a full datagram */
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/* This is the max fragment length for an encrypted fragment
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** plus the size of the record header.
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** This magic constant is copied from ssl3_GatherData, with 5 changed
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** to 13 (the size of the record header).
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*/
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if (gs->dtlsPacket.space < MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048 + 13) {
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err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->dtlsPacket,
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MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH + 2048 + 13);
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if (err) { /* realloc has set error code to no mem. */
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return err;
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}
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}
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/* recv() needs to read a full datagram at a time */
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nb = ssl_DefRecv(ss, gs->dtlsPacket.buf, gs->dtlsPacket.space, flags);
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if (nb > 0) {
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PRINT_BUF(60, (ss, "raw gather data:", gs->dtlsPacket.buf, nb));
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} else if (nb == 0) {
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/* EOF */
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SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: EOF", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
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rv = 0;
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return rv;
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} else /* if (nb < 0) */ {
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SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: recv error %d", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd,
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PR_GetError()));
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rv = SECFailure;
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return rv;
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}
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gs->dtlsPacket.len = nb;
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}
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/* At this point we should have >=1 complete records lined up in
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* dtlsPacket. Read off the header.
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*/
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if ((gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset) < 13) {
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SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: rest of DTLS packet "
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"too short to contain header",
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SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
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PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
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gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
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gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
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rv = SECFailure;
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return rv;
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}
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memcpy(gs->hdr, gs->dtlsPacket.buf + gs->dtlsPacketOffset, 13);
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gs->dtlsPacketOffset += 13;
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/* Have received SSL3 record header in gs->hdr. */
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gs->remainder = (gs->hdr[11] << 8) | gs->hdr[12];
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if ((gs->dtlsPacket.len - gs->dtlsPacketOffset) < gs->remainder) {
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SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL3[%d]: rest of DTLS packet too short "
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"to contain rest of body",
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SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
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PR_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, 0);
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gs->dtlsPacketOffset = 0;
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gs->dtlsPacket.len = 0;
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rv = SECFailure;
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return rv;
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}
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/* OK, we have at least one complete packet, copy into inbuf */
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if (gs->remainder > gs->inbuf.space) {
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err = sslBuffer_Grow(&gs->inbuf, gs->remainder);
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if (err) { /* realloc has set error code to no mem. */
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return err;
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}
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}
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memcpy(gs->inbuf.buf, gs->dtlsPacket.buf + gs->dtlsPacketOffset,
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gs->remainder);
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gs->inbuf.len = gs->remainder;
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gs->offset = gs->remainder;
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gs->dtlsPacketOffset += gs->remainder;
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gs->state = GS_INIT;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Gather in a record and when complete, Handle that record.
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* Repeat this until the handshake is complete,
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* or until application data is available.
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*
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* Returns 1 when the handshake is completed without error, or
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* application data is available.
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* Returns 0 if ssl3_GatherData hits EOF.
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* Returns -1 on read error, or PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, or handleRecord error.
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* Returns -2 on SECWouldBlock return from ssl3_HandleRecord.
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*
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* Called from ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake in sslcon.c,
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* and from SSL_ForceHandshake in sslsecur.c
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* and from ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord below (<- DoRecv in sslsecur.c).
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*
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* Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
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*/
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int
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ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
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{
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int rv;
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SSL3Ciphertext cText;
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PRBool keepGoing = PR_TRUE;
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SSL_TRC(30, ("ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake"));
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/* ssl3_HandleRecord may end up eventually calling ssl_FinishHandshake,
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* which requires the 1stHandshakeLock, which must be acquired before the
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* RecvBufLock.
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*/
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PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
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PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
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do {
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PRBool handleRecordNow = PR_FALSE;
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ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
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/* Without this, we may end up wrongly reporting
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* SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_* errors if we receive any records from the
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* peer while we are waiting to be restarted.
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*/
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if (ss->ssl3.hs.restartTarget) {
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ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
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PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
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return (int)SECFailure;
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}
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/* Treat an empty msgState like a NULL msgState. (Most of the time
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* when ssl3_HandleHandshake returns SECWouldBlock, it leaves
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* behind a non-NULL but zero-length msgState).
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* Test: async_cert_restart_server_sends_hello_request_first_in_separate_record
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*/
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if (ss->ssl3.hs.msgState.buf) {
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if (ss->ssl3.hs.msgState.len == 0) {
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ss->ssl3.hs.msgState.buf = NULL;
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} else {
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handleRecordNow = PR_TRUE;
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}
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}
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ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
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if (handleRecordNow) {
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/* ssl3_HandleHandshake previously returned SECWouldBlock and the
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* as-yet-unprocessed plaintext of that previous handshake record.
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* We need to process it now before we overwrite it with the next
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* handshake record.
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*/
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rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, NULL, &ss->gs.buf);
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} else {
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/* State for SSLv2 client hello support. */
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ssl2Gather ssl2gs = { PR_FALSE, 0 };
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ssl2Gather *ssl2gs_ptr = NULL;
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/* If we're a server and waiting for a client hello, accept v2. */
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if (ss->sec.isServer && ss->ssl3.hs.ws == wait_client_hello) {
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ssl2gs_ptr = &ssl2gs;
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}
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/* bring in the next sslv3 record. */
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if (ss->recvdCloseNotify) {
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/* RFC 5246 Section 7.2.1:
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* Any data received after a closure alert is ignored.
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*/
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return 0;
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}
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if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
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/* If we're a server waiting for a ClientHello then pass
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* ssl2gs to support SSLv2 ClientHello messages. */
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rv = ssl3_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags, ssl2gs_ptr);
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} else {
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rv = dtls_GatherData(ss, &ss->gs, flags);
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/* If we got a would block error, that means that no data was
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* available, so we check the timer to see if it's time to
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* retransmit */
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if (rv == SECFailure &&
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(PORT_GetError() == PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR)) {
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dtls_CheckTimer(ss);
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/* Restore the error in case something succeeded */
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PORT_SetError(PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR);
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}
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}
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if (rv <= 0) {
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return rv;
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}
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|
|
if (ssl2gs.isV2) {
|
|
rv = ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(ss, ss->gs.inbuf.buf,
|
|
ss->gs.inbuf.len,
|
|
ssl2gs.padding);
|
|
if (rv < 0) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* decipher it, and handle it if it's a handshake.
|
|
* If it's application data, ss->gs.buf will not be empty upon return.
|
|
* If it's a change cipher spec, alert, or handshake message,
|
|
* ss->gs.buf.len will be 0 when ssl3_HandleRecord returns SECSuccess.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ss->ssl3.hs.shortHeaders) {
|
|
cText.type = content_application_data;
|
|
cText.version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
cText.type = (SSL3ContentType)ss->gs.hdr[0];
|
|
cText.version = (ss->gs.hdr[1] << 8) | ss->gs.hdr[2];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
|
|
sslSequenceNumber seq_num;
|
|
|
|
cText.version = dtls_DTLSVersionToTLSVersion(cText.version);
|
|
/* DTLS sequence number */
|
|
PORT_Memcpy(&seq_num, &ss->gs.hdr[3], sizeof(seq_num));
|
|
cText.seq_num = PR_ntohll(seq_num);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cText.buf = &ss->gs.inbuf;
|
|
rv = ssl3_HandleRecord(ss, &cText, &ss->gs.buf);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv < 0) {
|
|
return ss->recvdCloseNotify ? 0 : rv;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ss->gs.buf.len > 0) {
|
|
/* We have application data to return to the application. This
|
|
* prioritizes returning application data to the application over
|
|
* completing any renegotiation handshake we may be doing.
|
|
*/
|
|
PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
|
|
PORT_Assert(cText.type == content_application_data);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PORT_Assert(keepGoing);
|
|
ssl_GetSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
|
|
if (ss->ssl3.hs.ws == idle_handshake) {
|
|
/* We are done with the current handshake so stop trying to
|
|
* handshake. Note that it would be safe to test ss->firstHsDone
|
|
* instead of ss->ssl3.hs.ws. By testing ss->ssl3.hs.ws instead,
|
|
* we prioritize completing a renegotiation handshake over sending
|
|
* application data.
|
|
*/
|
|
PORT_Assert(ss->firstHsDone);
|
|
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart);
|
|
keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
|
|
} else if (ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart) {
|
|
/* Prioritize sending application data over trying to complete
|
|
* the handshake if we're false starting.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we were to do this check at the beginning of the loop instead
|
|
* of here, then this function would become be a no-op after
|
|
* receiving the ServerHelloDone in the false start case, and we
|
|
* would never complete the handshake.
|
|
*/
|
|
PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);
|
|
|
|
if (ssl3_WaitingForServerSecondRound(ss)) {
|
|
keepGoing = PR_FALSE;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ss->ssl3.hs.canFalseStart = PR_FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ssl_ReleaseSSL3HandshakeLock(ss);
|
|
} while (keepGoing);
|
|
|
|
/* Service the DTLS timer so that the holddown timer eventually fires. */
|
|
if (IS_DTLS(ss)) {
|
|
dtls_CheckTimer(ss);
|
|
}
|
|
ss->gs.readOffset = 0;
|
|
ss->gs.writeOffset = ss->gs.buf.len;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Repeatedly gather in a record and when complete, Handle that record.
|
|
* Repeat this until some application data is received.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 when application data is available.
|
|
* Returns 0 if ssl3_GatherData hits EOF.
|
|
* Returns -1 on read error, or PR_WOULD_BLOCK_ERROR, or handleRecord error.
|
|
* Returns -2 on SECWouldBlock return from ssl3_HandleRecord.
|
|
*
|
|
* Called from DoRecv in sslsecur.c
|
|
* Caller must hold the recv buf lock.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
ssl3_GatherAppDataRecord(sslSocket *ss, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
/* ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake requires both of these locks. */
|
|
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_Have1stHandshakeLock(ss));
|
|
PORT_Assert(ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveRecvBufLock(ss));
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
rv = ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake(ss, flags);
|
|
} while (rv > 0 && ss->gs.buf.len == 0);
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|