gecko-dev/dom/crypto/WebCryptoTask.cpp

3227 строки
102 KiB
C++

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "cryptohi.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
#include "nsProxyRelease.h"
#include "jsapi.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "mozilla/Utf8.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/CryptoBuffer.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/CryptoKey.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/KeyAlgorithmProxy.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/TypedArray.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebCryptoCommon.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebCryptoTask.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerRef.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
// Template taken from security/nss/lib/util/templates.c
// This (or SGN_EncodeDigestInfo) would ideally be exported
// by NSS and until that happens we have to keep our own copy.
const SEC_ASN1Template SGN_DigestInfoTemplate[] = {
{SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, 0, NULL, sizeof(SGNDigestInfo)},
{SEC_ASN1_INLINE, offsetof(SGNDigestInfo, digestAlgorithm),
SEC_ASN1_GET(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)},
{SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, offsetof(SGNDigestInfo, digest)},
{
0,
}};
namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {
// Pre-defined identifiers for telemetry histograms
enum TelemetryMethod {
TM_ENCRYPT = 0,
TM_DECRYPT = 1,
TM_SIGN = 2,
TM_VERIFY = 3,
TM_DIGEST = 4,
TM_GENERATEKEY = 5,
TM_DERIVEKEY = 6,
TM_DERIVEBITS = 7,
TM_IMPORTKEY = 8,
TM_EXPORTKEY = 9,
TM_WRAPKEY = 10,
TM_UNWRAPKEY = 11
};
enum TelemetryAlgorithm {
// Please make additions at the end of the list,
// to preserve comparability of histograms over time
TA_UNKNOWN = 0,
// encrypt / decrypt
TA_AES_CBC = 1,
TA_AES_CFB = 2,
TA_AES_CTR = 3,
TA_AES_GCM = 4,
TA_RSAES_PKCS1 = 5, // NB: This algorithm has been removed
TA_RSA_OAEP = 6,
// sign/verify
TA_RSASSA_PKCS1 = 7,
TA_RSA_PSS = 8,
TA_HMAC_SHA_1 = 9,
TA_HMAC_SHA_224 = 10,
TA_HMAC_SHA_256 = 11,
TA_HMAC_SHA_384 = 12,
TA_HMAC_SHA_512 = 13,
// digest
TA_SHA_1 = 14,
TA_SHA_224 = 15,
TA_SHA_256 = 16,
TA_SHA_384 = 17,
TA_SHA_512 = 18,
// Later additions
TA_AES_KW = 19,
TA_ECDH = 20,
TA_PBKDF2 = 21,
TA_ECDSA = 22,
TA_HKDF = 23,
TA_DH = 24,
};
// Convenience functions for extracting / converting information
// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer initialization, suitable for constructors
#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(dst, src) \
if (!dst.Assign(src)) { \
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
return; \
}
// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer-to-SECItem copy, suitable for DoCrypto
#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena, dst, src) \
if (!src.ToSECItem(arena, dst)) { \
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
}
// OOM-safe CryptoBuffer copy, suitable for DoCrypto
#define ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(dst, src) \
if (!dst.Assign(src)) { \
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR; \
}
// Safety check for algorithms that use keys, suitable for constructors
#define CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(keyAlg, algName) \
{ \
if (!NORMALIZED_EQUALS(keyAlg.mName, algName)) { \
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR; \
return; \
} \
}
class ClearException {
public:
explicit ClearException(JSContext* aCx) : mCx(aCx) {}
~ClearException() { JS_ClearPendingException(mCx); }
private:
JSContext* mCx;
};
template <class OOS>
static nsresult GetAlgorithmName(JSContext* aCx, const OOS& aAlgorithm,
nsString& aName) {
ClearException ce(aCx);
if (aAlgorithm.IsString()) {
// If string, then treat as algorithm name
aName.Assign(aAlgorithm.GetAsString());
} else {
// Coerce to algorithm and extract name
JS::RootedValue value(aCx, JS::ObjectValue(*aAlgorithm.GetAsObject()));
Algorithm alg;
if (!alg.Init(aCx, value)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
aName = alg.mName;
}
if (!NormalizeToken(aName, aName)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
template <class T, class OOS>
static nsresult Coerce(JSContext* aCx, T& aTarget, const OOS& aAlgorithm) {
ClearException ce(aCx);
if (!aAlgorithm.IsObject()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
JS::RootedValue value(aCx, JS::ObjectValue(*aAlgorithm.GetAsObject()));
if (!aTarget.Init(aCx, value)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
inline size_t MapHashAlgorithmNameToBlockSize(const nsString& aName) {
if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1) ||
aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
return 512;
}
if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384) ||
aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
return 1024;
}
return 0;
}
inline nsresult GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
size_t& aLength) {
aLength = 0;
// Extract algorithm name
nsString algName;
if (NS_FAILED(GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Read AES key length from given algorithm object.
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
RootedDictionary<AesDerivedKeyParams> params(aCx);
if (NS_FAILED(Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
if (params.mLength != 128 && params.mLength != 192 &&
params.mLength != 256) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
aLength = params.mLength;
return NS_OK;
}
// Read HMAC key length from given algorithm object or
// determine key length as the block size of the given hash.
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
RootedDictionary<HmacDerivedKeyParams> params(aCx);
if (NS_FAILED(Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Return the passed length, if any.
if (params.mLength.WasPassed()) {
aLength = params.mLength.Value();
return NS_OK;
}
nsString hashName;
if (NS_FAILED(GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Return the given hash algorithm's block size as the key length.
size_t length = MapHashAlgorithmNameToBlockSize(hashName);
if (length == 0) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
aLength = length;
return NS_OK;
}
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
inline bool MapOIDTagToNamedCurve(SECOidTag aOIDTag, nsString& aResult) {
switch (aOIDTag) {
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1:
aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P256);
break;
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P384);
break;
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1:
aResult.AssignLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_NAMED_CURVE_P521);
break;
default:
return false;
}
return true;
}
inline SECOidTag MapHashAlgorithmNameToOID(const nsString& aName) {
SECOidTag hashOID(SEC_OID_UNKNOWN);
if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1)) {
hashOID = SEC_OID_SHA1;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
hashOID = SEC_OID_SHA256;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384)) {
hashOID = SEC_OID_SHA384;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
hashOID = SEC_OID_SHA512;
}
return hashOID;
}
inline CK_MECHANISM_TYPE MapHashAlgorithmNameToMgfMechanism(
const nsString& aName) {
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech(UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM);
if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1)) {
mech = CKG_MGF1_SHA1;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
mech = CKG_MGF1_SHA256;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384)) {
mech = CKG_MGF1_SHA384;
} else if (aName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
mech = CKG_MGF1_SHA512;
}
return mech;
}
// Implementation of WebCryptoTask methods
void WebCryptoTask::DispatchWithPromise(Promise* aResultPromise) {
mResultPromise = aResultPromise;
// Fail if an error was set during the constructor
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv)
// Perform pre-NSS operations, and fail if they fail
mEarlyRv = BeforeCrypto();
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv)
// Skip dispatch if we're already done. Otherwise launch a CryptoTask
if (mEarlyComplete) {
CallCallback(mEarlyRv);
return;
}
// Store calling thread
mOriginalEventTarget = GetCurrentThreadSerialEventTarget();
// If we are running on a worker thread we must hold the worker
// alive while we work on the thread pool. Otherwise the worker
// private may get torn down before we dispatch back to complete
// the transaction.
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
WorkerPrivate* workerPrivate = GetCurrentThreadWorkerPrivate();
MOZ_ASSERT(workerPrivate);
RefPtr<StrongWorkerRef> workerRef =
StrongWorkerRef::Create(workerPrivate, "WebCryptoTask");
if (NS_WARN_IF(!workerRef)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_BINDING_ABORTED;
} else {
mWorkerRef = new ThreadSafeWorkerRef(workerRef);
}
}
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv);
// dispatch to thread pool
if (!EnsureNSSInitializedChromeOrContent()) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv);
mEarlyRv = NS_DispatchBackgroundTask(this);
MAYBE_EARLY_FAIL(mEarlyRv)
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
WebCryptoTask::Run() {
// Run heavy crypto operations on the thread pool, off the original thread.
if (!IsOnOriginalThread()) {
mRv = CalculateResult();
// Back to the original thread, i.e. continue below.
mOriginalEventTarget->Dispatch(this, NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);
return NS_OK;
}
// We're now back on the calling thread.
CallCallback(mRv);
// Stop holding the worker thread alive now that the async work has
// been completed.
mWorkerRef = nullptr;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult WebCryptoTask::Cancel() {
MOZ_ASSERT(IsOnOriginalThread());
FailWithError(NS_BINDING_ABORTED);
return NS_OK;
}
void WebCryptoTask::FailWithError(nsresult aRv) {
MOZ_ASSERT(IsOnOriginalThread());
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_RESOLVED, false);
// Blindly convert nsresult to DOMException
// Individual tasks must ensure they pass the right values
mResultPromise->MaybeReject(aRv);
// Manually release mResultPromise while we're on the main thread
mResultPromise = nullptr;
mWorkerRef = nullptr;
Cleanup();
}
nsresult WebCryptoTask::CalculateResult() {
MOZ_ASSERT(!IsOnOriginalThread());
return DoCrypto();
}
void WebCryptoTask::CallCallback(nsresult rv) {
MOZ_ASSERT(IsOnOriginalThread());
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
FailWithError(rv);
return;
}
nsresult rv2 = AfterCrypto();
if (NS_FAILED(rv2)) {
FailWithError(rv2);
return;
}
Resolve();
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_RESOLVED, true);
// Manually release mResultPromise while we're on the main thread
mResultPromise = nullptr;
Cleanup();
}
// Some generic utility classes
class FailureTask : public WebCryptoTask {
public:
explicit FailureTask(nsresult aRv) { mEarlyRv = aRv; }
};
class ReturnArrayBufferViewTask : public WebCryptoTask {
protected:
CryptoBuffer mResult;
private:
// Returns mResult as an ArrayBufferView, or an error
virtual void Resolve() override {
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mResult);
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
}
};
class DeferredData {
public:
template <class T>
void SetData(const T& aData) {
mDataIsSet = mData.Assign(aData);
}
protected:
DeferredData() : mDataIsSet(false) {}
CryptoBuffer mData;
bool mDataIsSet;
};
class AesTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask, public DeferredData {
public:
AesTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt)
: mMechanism(CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM),
mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey()),
mTagLength(0),
mCounterLength(0),
mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
}
AesTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aData, bool aEncrypt)
: mMechanism(CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM),
mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey()),
mTagLength(0),
mCounterLength(0),
mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
SetData(aData);
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt) {
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// Check that we got a reasonable key
if ((mSymKey.Length() != 16) && (mSymKey.Length() != 24) &&
(mSymKey.Length() != 32)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
// Cache parameters depending on the specific algorithm
TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC)) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC);
mMechanism = CKM_AES_CBC_PAD;
telemetryAlg = TA_AES_CBC;
RootedDictionary<AesCbcParams> params(aCx);
nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mIv)
if (mIv.Length() != 16) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR)) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR);
mMechanism = CKM_AES_CTR;
telemetryAlg = TA_AES_CTR;
RootedDictionary<AesCtrParams> params(aCx);
nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mCounter)
if (mIv.Length() != 16) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mCounterLength = params.mLength;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM);
mMechanism = CKM_AES_GCM;
telemetryAlg = TA_AES_GCM;
RootedDictionary<AesGcmParams> params(aCx);
nsresult rv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mIv, params.mIv)
if (params.mAdditionalData.WasPassed()) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mAad, params.mAdditionalData.Value())
}
// 32, 64, 96, 104, 112, 120 or 128
mTagLength = 128;
if (params.mTagLength.WasPassed()) {
mTagLength = params.mTagLength.Value();
if ((mTagLength > 128) ||
!(mTagLength == 32 || mTagLength == 64 ||
(mTagLength >= 96 && mTagLength % 8 == 0))) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
}
} else {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
CryptoBuffer mIv; // Initialization vector
CryptoBuffer mAad; // Additional Authenticated Data
uint8_t mTagLength;
uint8_t mCounterLength;
bool mEncrypt;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
nsresult rv;
if (!mDataIsSet) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Construct the parameters object depending on algorithm
SECItem param = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctrParams;
CK_GCM_PARAMS gcmParams;
switch (mMechanism) {
case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &param, mIv);
break;
case CKM_AES_CTR:
ctrParams.ulCounterBits = mCounterLength;
MOZ_ASSERT(mIv.Length() == 16);
memcpy(&ctrParams.cb, mIv.Elements(), 16);
param.type = siBuffer;
param.data = (unsigned char*)&ctrParams;
param.len = sizeof(ctrParams);
break;
case CKM_AES_GCM:
gcmParams.pIv = mIv.Elements();
gcmParams.ulIvLen = mIv.Length();
gcmParams.pAAD = mAad.Elements();
gcmParams.ulAADLen = mAad.Length();
gcmParams.ulTagBits = mTagLength;
param.type = siBuffer;
param.data = (unsigned char*)&gcmParams;
param.len = sizeof(gcmParams);
break;
default:
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
// Import the key
SECItem keyItem = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &keyItem, mSymKey);
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
UniquePK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot.get(), mMechanism,
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_ENCRYPT,
&keyItem, nullptr));
if (!symKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
// Check whether the integer addition would overflow.
if (std::numeric_limits<CryptoBuffer::size_type>::max() - 16 <
mData.Length()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
// Initialize the output buffer (enough space for padding / a full tag)
if (!mResult.SetLength(mData.Length() + 16, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
uint32_t outLen = 0;
// Perform the encryption/decryption
if (mEncrypt) {
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_Encrypt(
symKey.get(), mMechanism, &param, mResult.Elements(), &outLen,
mResult.Length(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
} else {
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_Decrypt(
symKey.get(), mMechanism, &param, mResult.Elements(), &outLen,
mResult.Length(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
}
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
mResult.TruncateLength(outLen);
return rv;
}
};
// This class looks like an encrypt/decrypt task, like AesTask,
// but it is only exposed to wrapKey/unwrapKey, not encrypt/decrypt
class AesKwTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask, public DeferredData {
public:
AesKwTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt)
: mMechanism(CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP),
mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey()),
mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
}
AesKwTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aData, bool aEncrypt)
: mMechanism(CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP),
mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey()),
mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
SetData(aData);
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW);
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// Check that we got a reasonable key
if ((mSymKey.Length() != 16) && (mSymKey.Length() != 24) &&
(mSymKey.Length() != 32)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_AES_KW);
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
bool mEncrypt;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
nsresult rv;
if (!mDataIsSet) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Check that the input is a multiple of 64 bits long
if (mData.Length() == 0 || mData.Length() % 8 != 0) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Import the key
SECItem keyItem = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &keyItem, mSymKey);
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
UniquePK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot.get(), mMechanism,
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_WRAP,
&keyItem, nullptr));
if (!symKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
// Import the data to a SECItem
SECItem dataItem = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &dataItem, mData);
// Parameters for the fake keys
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE fakeMechanism = CKM_SHA_1_HMAC;
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE fakeOperation = CKA_SIGN;
if (mEncrypt) {
// Import the data into a fake PK11SymKey structure
UniquePK11SymKey keyToWrap(
PK11_ImportSymKey(slot.get(), fakeMechanism, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
fakeOperation, &dataItem, nullptr));
if (!keyToWrap) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Encrypt and return the wrapped key
// AES-KW encryption results in a wrapped key 64 bits longer
if (!mResult.SetLength(mData.Length() + 8, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
SECItem resultItem = {siBuffer, mResult.Elements(),
(unsigned int)mResult.Length()};
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_WrapSymKey(mMechanism, nullptr, symKey.get(),
keyToWrap.get(), &resultItem));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
} else {
// Decrypt the ciphertext into a temporary PK11SymKey
// Unwrapped key should be 64 bits shorter
int keySize = mData.Length() - 8;
UniquePK11SymKey unwrappedKey(
PK11_UnwrapSymKey(symKey.get(), mMechanism, nullptr, &dataItem,
fakeMechanism, fakeOperation, keySize));
if (!unwrappedKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Export the key to get the cleartext
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(unwrappedKey.get()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(unwrappedKey.get()));
}
return rv;
}
};
class RsaOaepTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask, public DeferredData {
public:
RsaOaepTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt)
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey()),
mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey()),
mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
}
RsaOaepTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aData, bool aEncrypt)
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey()),
mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey()),
mEncrypt(aEncrypt) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aEncrypt);
SetData(aData);
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
bool aEncrypt) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_RSA_OAEP);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP);
if (mEncrypt) {
if (!mPubKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
mStrength = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(mPubKey.get());
} else {
if (!mPrivKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
mStrength = PK11_GetPrivateModulusLen(mPrivKey.get());
}
// The algorithm could just be given as a string
// in which case there would be no label specified.
if (!aAlgorithm.IsString()) {
RootedDictionary<RsaOaepParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
if (params.mLabel.WasPassed()) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mLabel, params.mLabel.Value());
}
}
// Otherwise mLabel remains the empty octet string, as intended
KeyAlgorithm& hashAlg = aKey.Algorithm().mRsa.mHash;
mHashMechanism = KeyAlgorithmProxy::GetMechanism(hashAlg);
mMgfMechanism = MapHashAlgorithmNameToMgfMechanism(hashAlg.mName);
// Check we found appropriate mechanisms.
if (mHashMechanism == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM ||
mMgfMechanism == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mHashMechanism;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMgfMechanism;
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
CryptoBuffer mLabel;
uint32_t mStrength;
bool mEncrypt;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
nsresult rv;
if (!mDataIsSet) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Ciphertext is an integer mod the modulus, so it will be
// no longer than mStrength octets
if (!mResult.SetLength(mStrength, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS oaepParams;
oaepParams.source = CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED;
oaepParams.pSourceData = mLabel.Length() ? mLabel.Elements() : nullptr;
oaepParams.ulSourceDataLen = mLabel.Length();
oaepParams.mgf = mMgfMechanism;
oaepParams.hashAlg = mHashMechanism;
SECItem param;
param.type = siBuffer;
param.data = (unsigned char*)&oaepParams;
param.len = sizeof(oaepParams);
uint32_t outLen = 0;
if (mEncrypt) {
// PK11_PubEncrypt() checks the plaintext's length and fails if it is too
// long to encrypt, i.e. if it is longer than (k - 2hLen - 2) with 'k'
// being the length in octets of the RSA modulus n and 'hLen' being the
// output length in octets of the chosen hash function.
// <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#section-7.1>
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_PubEncrypt(
mPubKey.get(), CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, &param, mResult.Elements(), &outLen,
mResult.Length(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length(), nullptr));
} else {
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_PrivDecrypt(
mPrivKey.get(), CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP, &param, mResult.Elements(),
&outLen, mResult.Length(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
}
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
mResult.TruncateLength(outLen);
return NS_OK;
}
};
class HmacTask : public WebCryptoTask {
public:
HmacTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aSignature,
const CryptoOperationData& aData, bool aSign)
: mMechanism(aKey.Algorithm().Mechanism()),
mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey()),
mSign(aSign) {
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC);
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
if (!aSign) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSignature, aSignature);
}
// Check that we got a symmetric key
if (mSymKey.Length() == 0) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
switch (mMechanism) {
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_1;
break;
case CKM_SHA224_HMAC:
telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_224;
break;
case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_256;
break;
case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_384;
break;
case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
telemetryAlg = TA_HMAC_SHA_512;
break;
default:
telemetryAlg = TA_UNKNOWN;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
}
private:
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
CryptoBuffer mData;
CryptoBuffer mSignature;
CryptoBuffer mResult;
bool mSign;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
// Initialize the output buffer
if (!mResult.SetLength(HASH_LENGTH_MAX, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Import the key
uint32_t outLen;
SECItem keyItem = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &keyItem, mSymKey);
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
UniquePK11SymKey symKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot.get(), mMechanism,
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_SIGN,
&keyItem, nullptr));
if (!symKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
// Compute the MAC
SECItem param = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
UniquePK11Context ctx(
PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(mMechanism, CKA_SIGN, symKey.get(), &param));
if (!ctx.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestBegin(ctx.get()));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
rv = MapSECStatus(
PK11_DigestOp(ctx.get(), mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_DigestFinal(ctx.get(), mResult.Elements(), &outLen,
mResult.Length()));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
mResult.TruncateLength(outLen);
return rv;
}
// Returns mResult as an ArrayBufferView, or an error
virtual void Resolve() override {
if (mSign) {
// Return the computed MAC
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mResult);
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
} else {
// Compare the MAC to the provided signature
// No truncation allowed
bool equal = (mResult.Length() == mSignature.Length());
if (equal) {
int cmp = NSS_SecureMemcmp(mSignature.Elements(), mResult.Elements(),
mSignature.Length());
equal = (cmp == 0);
}
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(equal);
}
}
};
class AsymmetricSignVerifyTask : public WebCryptoTask {
public:
AsymmetricSignVerifyTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aSignature,
const CryptoOperationData& aData, bool aSign)
: mOidTag(SEC_OID_UNKNOWN),
mHashMechanism(UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM),
mMgfMechanism(UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM),
mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey()),
mPubKey(aKey.GetPublicKey()),
mSaltLength(0),
mSign(aSign),
mVerified(false),
mAlgorithm(Algorithm::UNKNOWN) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
if (!aSign) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSignature, aSignature);
}
nsString algName;
nsString hashAlgName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1)) {
mAlgorithm = Algorithm::RSA_PKCS1;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_RSASSA_PKCS1);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1);
hashAlgName = aKey.Algorithm().mRsa.mHash.mName;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS)) {
mAlgorithm = Algorithm::RSA_PSS;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_RSA_PSS);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS);
KeyAlgorithm& hashAlg = aKey.Algorithm().mRsa.mHash;
hashAlgName = hashAlg.mName;
mHashMechanism = KeyAlgorithmProxy::GetMechanism(hashAlg);
mMgfMechanism = MapHashAlgorithmNameToMgfMechanism(hashAlgName);
// Check we found appropriate mechanisms.
if (mHashMechanism == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM ||
mMgfMechanism == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
RootedDictionary<RsaPssParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
mSaltLength = params.mSaltLength;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
mAlgorithm = Algorithm::ECDSA;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_ECDSA);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA);
// For ECDSA, the hash name comes from the algorithm parameter
RootedDictionary<EcdsaParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
} else {
// This shouldn't happen; CreateSignVerifyTask shouldn't create
// one of these unless it's for the above algorithms.
MOZ_ASSERT(false);
}
// Must have a valid algorithm by now.
MOZ_ASSERT(mAlgorithm != Algorithm::UNKNOWN);
// Determine hash algorithm to use.
mOidTag = MapHashAlgorithmNameToOID(hashAlgName);
if (mOidTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
// Check that we have the appropriate key
if ((mSign && !mPrivKey) || (!mSign && !mPubKey)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
}
private:
SECOidTag mOidTag;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mHashMechanism;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMgfMechanism;
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
CryptoBuffer mSignature;
CryptoBuffer mData;
uint32_t mSaltLength;
bool mSign;
bool mVerified;
// The signature algorithm to use.
enum class Algorithm : uint8_t { ECDSA, RSA_PKCS1, RSA_PSS, UNKNOWN };
Algorithm mAlgorithm;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
SECStatus rv;
UniqueSECItem hash(
::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(mOidTag)));
if (!hash) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Compute digest over given data.
rv = PK11_HashBuf(mOidTag, hash->data, mData.Elements(), mData.Length());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(MapSECStatus(rv), NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
// Wrap hash in a digest info template (RSA-PKCS1 only).
if (mAlgorithm == Algorithm::RSA_PKCS1) {
UniqueSGNDigestInfo di(
SGN_CreateDigestInfo(mOidTag, hash->data, hash->len));
if (!di) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Reuse |hash|.
SECITEM_FreeItem(hash.get(), false);
if (!SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(nullptr, hash.get(), di.get(),
SGN_DigestInfoTemplate)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
}
SECItem* params = nullptr;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech =
PK11_MapSignKeyType((mSign ? mPrivKey->keyType : mPubKey->keyType));
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS rsaPssParams;
SECItem rsaPssParamsItem = {
siBuffer,
};
// Set up parameters for RSA-PSS.
if (mAlgorithm == Algorithm::RSA_PSS) {
rsaPssParams.hashAlg = mHashMechanism;
rsaPssParams.mgf = mMgfMechanism;
rsaPssParams.sLen = mSaltLength;
rsaPssParamsItem.data = (unsigned char*)&rsaPssParams;
rsaPssParamsItem.len = sizeof(rsaPssParams);
params = &rsaPssParamsItem;
mech = CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS;
}
// Allocate SECItem to hold the signature.
uint32_t len = mSign ? PK11_SignatureLen(mPrivKey.get()) : 0;
UniqueSECItem sig(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, len));
if (!sig) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
if (mSign) {
// Sign the hash.
rv = PK11_SignWithMechanism(mPrivKey.get(), mech, params, sig.get(),
hash.get());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(MapSECStatus(rv), NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mSignature, sig.get());
} else {
// Copy the given signature to the SECItem.
if (!mSignature.ToSECItem(nullptr, sig.get())) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Verify the signature.
rv = PK11_VerifyWithMechanism(mPubKey.get(), mech, params, sig.get(),
hash.get(), nullptr);
mVerified = NS_SUCCEEDED(MapSECStatus(rv));
}
return NS_OK;
}
virtual void Resolve() override {
if (mSign) {
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mSignature);
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
} else {
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mVerified);
}
}
};
class DigestTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask {
public:
DigestTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
const CryptoOperationData& aData) {
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mData, aData);
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
TelemetryAlgorithm telemetryAlg;
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1)) {
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_1;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256)) {
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_224;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384)) {
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_256;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
telemetryAlg = TA_SHA_384;
} else {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, telemetryAlg);
mOidTag = MapHashAlgorithmNameToOID(algName);
}
private:
SECOidTag mOidTag;
CryptoBuffer mData;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
// Resize the result buffer
uint32_t hashLen = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(mOidTag);
if (!mResult.SetLength(hashLen, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
// Compute the hash
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_HashBuf(mOidTag, mResult.Elements(),
mData.Elements(), mData.Length()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
return rv;
}
};
class ImportKeyTask : public WebCryptoTask {
public:
void Init(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
mFormat = aFormat;
mDataIsSet = false;
mDataIsJwk = false;
// This stuff pretty much always happens, so we'll do it here
mKey = new CryptoKey(aGlobal);
mKey->SetExtractable(aExtractable);
mKey->ClearUsages();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aKeyUsages.Length(); ++i) {
mEarlyRv = mKey->AddUsage(aKeyUsages[i]);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
}
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, mAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
}
static bool JwkCompatible(const JsonWebKey& aJwk, const CryptoKey* aKey) {
// Check 'ext'
if (aKey->Extractable() && aJwk.mExt.WasPassed() && !aJwk.mExt.Value()) {
return false;
}
// Check 'alg'
if (aJwk.mAlg.WasPassed() &&
aJwk.mAlg.Value() != aKey->Algorithm().JwkAlg()) {
return false;
}
// Check 'key_ops'
if (aJwk.mKey_ops.WasPassed()) {
nsTArray<nsString> usages;
aKey->GetUsages(usages);
for (size_t i = 0; i < usages.Length(); ++i) {
if (!aJwk.mKey_ops.Value().Contains(usages[i])) {
return false;
}
}
}
// Individual algorithms may still have to check 'use'
return true;
}
void SetKeyData(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData) {
mDataIsJwk = false;
// Try ArrayBuffer
RootedSpiderMonkeyInterface<ArrayBuffer> ab(aCx);
if (ab.Init(aKeyData)) {
if (!mKeyData.Assign(ab)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return;
}
// Try ArrayBufferView
RootedSpiderMonkeyInterface<ArrayBufferView> abv(aCx);
if (abv.Init(aKeyData)) {
if (!mKeyData.Assign(abv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return;
}
// Try JWK
ClearException ce(aCx);
JS::RootedValue value(aCx, JS::ObjectValue(*aKeyData));
if (!mJwk.Init(aCx, value)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mDataIsJwk = true;
}
void SetKeyDataMaybeParseJWK(const CryptoBuffer& aKeyData) {
if (!mKeyData.Assign(aKeyData)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
mDataIsJwk = false;
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
nsDependentCSubstring utf8(
(const char*)mKeyData.Elements(),
(const char*)(mKeyData.Elements() + mKeyData.Length()));
if (!IsUtf8(utf8)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
nsString json = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(utf8);
if (!mJwk.Init(json)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mDataIsJwk = true;
}
}
void SetRawKeyData(const CryptoBuffer& aKeyData) {
if (!mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
if (!mKeyData.Assign(aKeyData)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
mDataIsJwk = false;
}
protected:
nsString mFormat;
RefPtr<CryptoKey> mKey;
CryptoBuffer mKeyData;
bool mDataIsSet;
bool mDataIsJwk;
JsonWebKey mJwk;
nsString mAlgName;
private:
virtual void Resolve() override { mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mKey); }
virtual void Cleanup() override { mKey = nullptr; }
};
class ImportSymmetricKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask {
public:
ImportSymmetricKeyTask(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
ImportSymmetricKeyTask(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat,
const JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
if (mDataIsJwk && !mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
}
void Init(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
ImportKeyTask::Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable,
aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// This task only supports raw and JWK format.
if (!mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
!mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
// If this is an HMAC key, import the hash name
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
RootedDictionary<HmacImportParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, mHashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
}
}
virtual nsresult BeforeCrypto() override {
nsresult rv;
// If we're doing a JWK import, import the key data
if (mDataIsJwk) {
if (!mJwk.mK.WasPassed()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
// Import the key material
rv = mKeyData.FromJwkBase64(mJwk.mK.Value());
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
}
// Check that we have valid key data.
if (mKeyData.Length() == 0 &&
!mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
// Construct an appropriate KeyAlorithm,
// and verify that usages are appropriate
uint32_t length = 8 * mKeyData.Length(); // bytes to bits
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::DECRYPT |
CryptoKey::WRAPKEY | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::WRAPKEY | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if ((length != 128) && (length != 192) && (length != 256)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeAes(mAlgName, length);
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed() &&
!mJwk.mUse.Value().EqualsLiteral(JWK_USE_ENC)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HKDF) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY |
CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeAes(mAlgName, length);
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed()) {
// There is not a 'use' value consistent with PBKDF or HKDF
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
};
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
if (mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::SIGN | CryptoKey::VERIFY)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeHmac(length, mHashName);
if (mKey->Algorithm().Mechanism() == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
if (mDataIsJwk && mJwk.mUse.WasPassed() &&
!mJwk.mUse.Value().EqualsLiteral(JWK_USE_SIG)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
} else {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetSymKey(mKeyData))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::SECRET);
if (mDataIsJwk && !JwkCompatible(mJwk, mKey)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mEarlyComplete = true;
return NS_OK;
}
private:
nsString mHashName;
};
class ImportRsaKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask {
public:
ImportRsaKeyTask(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
bool aExtractable, const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
: mModulusLength(0) {
Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
ImportRsaKeyTask(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
: mModulusLength(0) {
Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
if (mDataIsJwk && !mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
}
void Init(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
ImportKeyTask::Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable,
aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// If this is RSA with a hash, cache the hash name
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS)) {
RootedDictionary<RsaHashedImportParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, mHashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
}
// Check support for the algorithm and hash names
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech1 = MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(mAlgName);
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech2 = MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(mHashName);
if ((mech1 == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM) || (mech2 == UNKNOWN_CK_MECHANISM)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
}
private:
nsString mHashName;
uint32_t mModulusLength;
CryptoBuffer mPublicExponent;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
// Import the key data itself
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey pubKey;
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey privKey;
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) ||
(mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
!mJwk.mD.WasPassed())) {
// Public key import
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromSpki(mKeyData);
} else {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromJwk(mJwk);
}
if (!pubKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetPublicKey(pubKey.get()))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PUBLIC);
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) ||
(mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
mJwk.mD.WasPassed())) {
// Private key import
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8)) {
privKey = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyFromPkcs8(mKeyData);
} else {
privKey = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyFromJwk(mJwk);
}
if (!privKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetPrivateKey(privKey.get()))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PRIVATE);
pubKey = UniqueSECKEYPublicKey(SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(privKey.get()));
if (!pubKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
} else {
// Invalid key format
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Extract relevant information from the public key
mModulusLength = 8 * pubKey->u.rsa.modulus.len;
if (!mPublicExponent.Assign(&pubKey->u.rsa.publicExponent)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
virtual nsresult AfterCrypto() override {
// Check permissions for the requested operation
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
if ((mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PUBLIC &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::WRAPKEY)) ||
(mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PRIVATE &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::DECRYPT |
CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS)) {
if ((mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PUBLIC &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::VERIFY)) ||
(mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PRIVATE &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(CryptoKey::SIGN))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
}
// Set an appropriate KeyAlgorithm
if (!mKey->Algorithm().MakeRsa(mAlgName, mModulusLength, mPublicExponent,
mHashName)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
if (mDataIsJwk && !JwkCompatible(mJwk, mKey)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
};
class ImportEcKeyTask : public ImportKeyTask {
public:
ImportEcKeyTask(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
bool aExtractable, const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
ImportEcKeyTask(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx,
const nsAString& aFormat, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
SetKeyData(aCx, aKeyData);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(mEarlyRv);
}
void Init(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
ImportKeyTask::Init(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aAlgorithm, aExtractable,
aKeyUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
RootedDictionary<EcKeyImportParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv) || !params.mNamedCurve.WasPassed()) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
if (!NormalizeToken(params.mNamedCurve.Value(), mNamedCurve)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
}
}
private:
nsString mNamedCurve;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
// Import the key data itself
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey pubKey;
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey privKey;
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
mJwk.mD.WasPassed()) {
// Private key import
privKey = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyFromJwk(mJwk);
if (!privKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetPrivateKey(privKey.get()))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PRIVATE);
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) ||
mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) ||
(mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK) &&
!mJwk.mD.WasPassed())) {
// Public key import
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicECKeyFromRaw(mKeyData, mNamedCurve);
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromSpki(mKeyData);
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
pubKey = CryptoKey::PublicKeyFromJwk(mJwk);
} else {
MOZ_ASSERT(false);
}
if (!pubKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
if (!CheckEncodedECParameters(&pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Construct the OID tag.
SECItem oid = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
oid.len = pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data[1];
oid.data = pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data + 2;
// Find a matching and supported named curve.
if (!MapOIDTagToNamedCurve(SECOID_FindOIDTag(&oid), mNamedCurve)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
}
if (NS_FAILED(mKey->SetPublicKey(pubKey.get()))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::PUBLIC);
} else {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
// Extract 'crv' parameter from JWKs.
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
if (!NormalizeToken(mJwk.mCrv.Value(), mNamedCurve)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
virtual nsresult AfterCrypto() override {
uint32_t privateAllowedUsages = 0, publicAllowedUsages = 0;
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH)) {
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS | CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY;
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS | CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY;
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::SIGN;
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::VERIFY;
}
// Check permissions for the requested operation
if ((mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PRIVATE &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(privateAllowedUsages)) ||
(mKey->GetKeyType() == CryptoKey::PUBLIC &&
mKey->HasUsageOtherThan(publicAllowedUsages))) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeEc(mAlgName, mNamedCurve);
if (mDataIsJwk && !JwkCompatible(mJwk, mKey)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
};
class ExportKeyTask : public WebCryptoTask {
public:
ExportKeyTask(const nsAString& aFormat, CryptoKey& aKey)
: mFormat(aFormat),
mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey()),
mPrivateKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey()),
mPublicKey(aKey.GetPublicKey()),
mKeyType(aKey.GetKeyType()),
mExtractable(aKey.Extractable()),
mAlg(aKey.Algorithm().JwkAlg()) {
aKey.GetUsages(mKeyUsages);
}
protected:
nsString mFormat;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivateKey;
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey mPublicKey;
CryptoKey::KeyType mKeyType;
bool mExtractable;
nsString mAlg;
nsTArray<nsString> mKeyUsages;
CryptoBuffer mResult;
JsonWebKey mJwk;
private:
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW)) {
if (mPublicKey && mPublicKey->keyType == dhKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
if (mPublicKey && mPublicKey->keyType == ecKey) {
nsresult rv = CryptoKey::PublicECKeyToRaw(mPublicKey.get(), mResult);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
mResult = mSymKey;
if (mResult.Length() == 0) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8)) {
if (!mPrivateKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
switch (mPrivateKey->keyType) {
case rsaKey: {
nsresult rv =
CryptoKey::PrivateKeyToPkcs8(mPrivateKey.get(), mResult);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
default:
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI)) {
if (!mPublicKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
return CryptoKey::PublicKeyToSpki(mPublicKey.get(), mResult);
} else if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
if (mKeyType == CryptoKey::SECRET) {
nsString k;
nsresult rv = mSymKey.ToJwkBase64(k);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
mJwk.mK.Construct(k);
mJwk.mKty = NS_LITERAL_STRING(JWK_TYPE_SYMMETRIC);
} else if (mKeyType == CryptoKey::PUBLIC) {
if (!mPublicKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = CryptoKey::PublicKeyToJwk(mPublicKey.get(), mJwk);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
} else if (mKeyType == CryptoKey::PRIVATE) {
if (!mPrivateKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = CryptoKey::PrivateKeyToJwk(mPrivateKey.get(), mJwk);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
}
if (!mAlg.IsEmpty()) {
mJwk.mAlg.Construct(mAlg);
}
mJwk.mExt.Construct(mExtractable);
mJwk.mKey_ops.Construct();
if (!mJwk.mKey_ops.Value().AppendElements(mKeyUsages, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
return NS_OK;
}
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
}
// Returns mResult as an ArrayBufferView or JWK, as appropriate
virtual void Resolve() override {
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mJwk);
return;
}
TypedArrayCreator<ArrayBuffer> ret(mResult);
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(ret);
}
};
class GenerateSymmetricKeyTask : public WebCryptoTask {
public:
GenerateSymmetricKeyTask(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
// Create an empty key and set easy attributes
mKey = new CryptoKey(aGlobal);
mKey->SetExtractable(aExtractable);
mKey->SetType(CryptoKey::SECRET);
// Extract algorithm name
nsString algName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// Construct an appropriate KeyAlorithm
uint32_t allowedUsages = 0;
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aAlgorithm, mLength);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeAes(algName, mLength);
allowedUsages = CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::DECRYPT |
CryptoKey::WRAPKEY | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY;
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
RootedDictionary<HmacKeyGenParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
nsString hashName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
if (params.mLength.WasPassed()) {
mLength = params.mLength.Value();
} else {
mLength = MapHashAlgorithmNameToBlockSize(hashName);
}
if (mLength == 0) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mKey->Algorithm().MakeHmac(mLength, hashName);
allowedUsages = CryptoKey::SIGN | CryptoKey::VERIFY;
} else {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
// Add key usages
mKey->ClearUsages();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aKeyUsages.Length(); ++i) {
mEarlyRv = mKey->AddUsageIntersecting(aKeyUsages[i], allowedUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
}
mLength = mLength >> 3; // bits to bytes
mMechanism = mKey->Algorithm().Mechanism();
// SetSymKey done in Resolve, after we've done the keygen
}
private:
RefPtr<CryptoKey> mKey;
size_t mLength;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
CryptoBuffer mKeyData;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
UniquePK11SymKey symKey(
PK11_KeyGen(slot.get(), mMechanism, nullptr, mLength, nullptr));
if (!symKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey.get()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
// data, so mKeyData manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mKeyData, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey.get()));
return NS_OK;
}
virtual void Resolve() override {
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mKey->SetSymKey(mKeyData))) {
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(mKey);
} else {
mResultPromise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
}
}
virtual void Cleanup() override { mKey = nullptr; }
};
GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask::GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask(
nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
bool aExtractable, const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
: mKeyPair(new CryptoKeyPair()),
mMechanism(CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM),
mRsaParams(),
mDhParams() {
mArena = UniquePLArenaPool(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!mArena) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
return;
}
// Create an empty key pair and set easy attributes
mKeyPair->mPrivateKey = new CryptoKey(aGlobal);
mKeyPair->mPublicKey = new CryptoKey(aGlobal);
// Extract algorithm name
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, mAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// Construct an appropriate KeyAlorithm
uint32_t privateAllowedUsages = 0, publicAllowedUsages = 0;
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS)) {
RootedDictionary<RsaHashedKeyGenParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
// Pull relevant info
uint32_t modulusLength = params.mModulusLength;
CryptoBuffer publicExponent;
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(publicExponent, params.mPublicExponent);
nsString hashName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// Create algorithm
if (!mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeRsa(
mAlgName, modulusLength, publicExponent, hashName)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
if (!mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeRsa(
mAlgName, modulusLength, publicExponent, hashName)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
mMechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
// Set up params struct
mRsaParams.keySizeInBits = modulusLength;
bool converted = publicExponent.GetBigIntValue(mRsaParams.pe);
if (!converted) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
RootedDictionary<EcKeyGenParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
if (!NormalizeToken(params.mNamedCurve, mNamedCurve)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
// Create algorithm.
mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeEc(mAlgName, mNamedCurve);
mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->Algorithm().MakeEc(mAlgName, mNamedCurve);
mMechanism = CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN;
} else {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
// Set key usages.
if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS) ||
mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::SIGN;
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::VERIFY;
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DECRYPT | CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY;
publicAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::ENCRYPT | CryptoKey::WRAPKEY;
} else if (mAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH)) {
privateAllowedUsages = CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY | CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS;
publicAllowedUsages = 0;
} else {
MOZ_ASSERT(false); // This shouldn't happen.
}
mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->SetExtractable(aExtractable);
mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->SetType(CryptoKey::PRIVATE);
mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->SetExtractable(true);
mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->SetType(CryptoKey::PUBLIC);
mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->ClearUsages();
mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->ClearUsages();
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aKeyUsages.Length(); ++i) {
mEarlyRv = mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->AddUsageIntersecting(
aKeyUsages[i], privateAllowedUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
mEarlyRv = mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->AddUsageIntersecting(
aKeyUsages[i], publicAllowedUsages);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
}
// If no usages ended up being allowed, DataError
if (!mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->HasAnyUsage() &&
!mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->HasAnyUsage()) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
}
nsresult GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask::DoCrypto() {
MOZ_ASSERT(mKeyPair);
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
MOZ_ASSERT(slot.get());
void* param;
switch (mMechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
param = &mRsaParams;
break;
case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
param = &mDhParams;
break;
case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN: {
param = CreateECParamsForCurve(mNamedCurve, mArena.get());
if (!param) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
break;
}
default:
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
}
SECKEYPublicKey* pubKey = nullptr;
mPrivateKey = UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey(PK11_GenerateKeyPair(
slot.get(), mMechanism, param, &pubKey, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, nullptr));
mPublicKey = UniqueSECKEYPublicKey(pubKey);
pubKey = nullptr;
if (!mPrivateKey.get() || !mPublicKey.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = mKeyPair->mPrivateKey.get()->SetPrivateKey(mPrivateKey.get());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
rv = mKeyPair->mPublicKey.get()->SetPublicKey(mPublicKey.get());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
// PK11_GenerateKeyPair() does not set a CKA_EC_POINT attribute on the
// private key, we need this later when exporting to PKCS8 and JWK though.
if (mMechanism == CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN) {
rv = mKeyPair->mPrivateKey->AddPublicKeyData(mPublicKey.get());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
}
return NS_OK;
}
void GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask::Resolve() {
mResultPromise->MaybeResolve(*mKeyPair);
}
void GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask::Cleanup() { mKeyPair = nullptr; }
class DeriveHkdfBitsTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask {
public:
DeriveHkdfBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, uint32_t aLength)
: mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey()), mMechanism(CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
}
DeriveHkdfBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, const ObjectOrString& aTargetAlgorithm)
: mLengthInBits(0),
mLengthInBytes(0),
mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey()),
mMechanism(CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
size_t length;
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aTargetAlgorithm, length);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mEarlyRv)) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, length);
}
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
uint32_t aLength) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_HKDF);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HKDF);
// Check that we have a key.
if (mSymKey.Length() == 0) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
RootedDictionary<HkdfParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
// length must be greater than zero.
if (aLength == 0) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
// Extract the hash algorithm.
nsString hashName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// Check the given hash algorithm.
switch (MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(hashName)) {
case CKM_SHA_1:
mMechanism = CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1;
break;
case CKM_SHA256:
mMechanism = CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256;
break;
case CKM_SHA384:
mMechanism = CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384;
break;
case CKM_SHA512:
mMechanism = CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512;
break;
default:
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSalt, params.mSalt)
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mInfo, params.mInfo)
mLengthInBytes = ceil((double)aLength / 8);
mLengthInBits = aLength;
}
private:
size_t mLengthInBits;
size_t mLengthInBytes;
CryptoBuffer mSalt;
CryptoBuffer mInfo;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mMechanism;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// Import the key
SECItem keyItem = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &keyItem, mSymKey);
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
if (!slot.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
UniquePK11SymKey baseKey(PK11_ImportSymKey(slot.get(), mMechanism,
PK11_OriginUnwrap, CKA_WRAP,
&keyItem, nullptr));
if (!baseKey) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
}
SECItem salt = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
SECItem info = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &salt, mSalt);
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &info, mInfo);
CK_NSS_HKDFParams hkdfParams = {true, salt.data, salt.len,
true, info.data, info.len};
SECItem params = {siBuffer, (unsigned char*)&hkdfParams,
sizeof(hkdfParams)};
// CKM_SHA512_HMAC and CKA_SIGN are key type and usage attributes of the
// derived symmetric key and don't matter because we ignore them anyway.
UniquePK11SymKey symKey(PK11_Derive(baseKey.get(), mMechanism, &params,
CKM_SHA512_HMAC, CKA_SIGN,
mLengthInBytes));
if (!symKey.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey.get()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
// data, so mResult manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey.get()));
if (mLengthInBytes > mResult.Length()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (!mResult.SetLength(mLengthInBytes, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
// If the number of bits to derive is not a multiple of 8 we need to
// zero out the remaining bits that were derived but not requested.
if (mLengthInBits % 8) {
mResult[mResult.Length() - 1] &= 0xff << (mLengthInBits % 8);
}
return NS_OK;
}
};
class DerivePbkdfBitsTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask {
public:
DerivePbkdfBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, uint32_t aLength)
: mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey()), mHashOidTag(SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
}
DerivePbkdfBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, const ObjectOrString& aTargetAlgorithm)
: mLength(0),
mIterations(0),
mSymKey(aKey.GetSymKey()),
mHashOidTag(SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
size_t length;
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aTargetAlgorithm, length);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mEarlyRv)) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, length);
}
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
uint32_t aLength) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_PBKDF2);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2);
RootedDictionary<Pbkdf2Params> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
// length must be a multiple of 8 bigger than zero.
if (aLength == 0 || aLength % 8) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
return;
}
// Extract the hash algorithm.
nsString hashName;
mEarlyRv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, params.mHash, hashName);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
// Check the given hash algorithm.
switch (MapAlgorithmNameToMechanism(hashName)) {
case CKM_SHA_1:
mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1;
break;
case CKM_SHA256:
mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;
break;
case CKM_SHA384:
mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384;
break;
case CKM_SHA512:
mHashOidTag = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA512;
break;
default:
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return;
}
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_INIT(mSalt, params.mSalt)
mLength = aLength >> 3; // bits to bytes
mIterations = params.mIterations;
}
private:
size_t mLength;
size_t mIterations;
CryptoBuffer mSalt;
CryptoBuffer mSymKey;
SECOidTag mHashOidTag;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
UniquePLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
SECItem salt = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &salt, mSalt);
// PK11_CreatePBEV2AlgorithmID will "helpfully" create PBKDF2 parameters
// with a random salt if given a SECItem* that is either null or has a null
// data pointer. This obviously isn't what we want, so we have to fake it
// out by passing in a SECItem* with a non-null data pointer but with zero
// length.
if (!salt.data) {
MOZ_ASSERT(salt.len == 0);
salt.data =
reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena.get(), 1));
if (!salt.data) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
}
// Always pass in cipherAlg=SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1 (i.e. PBMAC1) as this
// parameter is unused for key generation. It is currently only used
// for PBKDF2 authentication or key (un)wrapping when specifying an
// encryption algorithm (PBES2).
UniqueSECAlgorithmID algID(
PK11_CreatePBEV2AlgorithmID(SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1,
mHashOidTag, mLength, mIterations, &salt));
if (!algID) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalSlot());
if (!slot.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
SECItem keyItem = {siBuffer, nullptr, 0};
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_TO_SECITEM(arena.get(), &keyItem, mSymKey);
UniquePK11SymKey symKey(
PK11_PBEKeyGen(slot.get(), algID.get(), &keyItem, false, nullptr));
if (!symKey.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey.get()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
// data, so mResult manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey.get()));
return NS_OK;
}
};
template <class DeriveBitsTask>
class DeriveKeyTask : public DeriveBitsTask {
public:
DeriveKeyTask(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx,
const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aBaseKey,
const ObjectOrString& aDerivedKeyType, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages)
: DeriveBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aBaseKey, aDerivedKeyType) {
if (NS_FAILED(this->mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
NS_NAMED_LITERAL_STRING(format, WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW);
mTask = new ImportSymmetricKeyTask(aGlobal, aCx, format, aDerivedKeyType,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
protected:
RefPtr<ImportSymmetricKeyTask> mTask;
private:
virtual void Resolve() override {
mTask->SetRawKeyData(this->mResult);
mTask->DispatchWithPromise(this->mResultPromise);
}
virtual void Cleanup() override { mTask = nullptr; }
};
class DeriveEcdhBitsTask : public ReturnArrayBufferViewTask {
public:
DeriveEcdhBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, uint32_t aLength)
: mLength(aLength), mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey()) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey);
}
DeriveEcdhBitsTask(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aKey, const ObjectOrString& aTargetAlgorithm)
: mPrivKey(aKey.GetPrivateKey()) {
mEarlyRv = GetKeyLengthForAlgorithm(aCx, aTargetAlgorithm, mLength);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mEarlyRv)) {
Init(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey);
}
}
void Init(JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_ALG, TA_ECDH);
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(aKey.Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH);
// Check that we have a private key.
if (!mPrivKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
// Length must be a multiple of 8 bigger than zero.
if (mLength == 0 || mLength % 8) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
mLength = mLength >> 3; // bits to bytes
// Retrieve the peer's public key.
RootedDictionary<EcdhKeyDeriveParams> params(aCx);
mEarlyRv = Coerce(aCx, params, aAlgorithm);
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR;
return;
}
CryptoKey* publicKey = params.mPublic;
mPubKey = publicKey->GetPublicKey();
if (!mPubKey) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR;
return;
}
CHECK_KEY_ALGORITHM(publicKey->Algorithm(), WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH);
// Both keys must use the same named curve.
nsString curve1 = aKey.Algorithm().mEc.mNamedCurve;
nsString curve2 = publicKey->Algorithm().mEc.mNamedCurve;
if (!curve1.Equals(curve2)) {
mEarlyRv = NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
return;
}
}
private:
size_t mLength;
UniqueSECKEYPrivateKey mPrivKey;
UniqueSECKEYPublicKey mPubKey;
virtual nsresult DoCrypto() override {
// CKM_SHA512_HMAC and CKA_SIGN are key type and usage attributes of the
// derived symmetric key and don't matter because we ignore them anyway.
UniquePK11SymKey symKey(
PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(mPrivKey.get(), mPubKey.get(), PR_FALSE, nullptr,
nullptr, CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_SHA512_HMAC,
CKA_SIGN, 0, CKD_NULL, nullptr, nullptr));
if (!symKey.get()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
nsresult rv = MapSECStatus(PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey.get()));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
// This doesn't leak, because the SECItem* returned by PK11_GetKeyData
// just refers to a buffer managed by symKey. The assignment copies the
// data, so mResult manages one copy, while symKey manages another.
ATTEMPT_BUFFER_ASSIGN(mResult, PK11_GetKeyData(symKey.get()));
if (mLength > mResult.Length()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_DATA_ERR;
}
if (!mResult.SetLength(mLength, fallible)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_UNKNOWN_ERR;
}
return NS_OK;
}
};
template <class KeyEncryptTask>
class WrapKeyTask : public ExportKeyTask {
public:
WrapKeyTask(JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat, CryptoKey& aKey,
CryptoKey& aWrappingKey, const ObjectOrString& aWrapAlgorithm)
: ExportKeyTask(aFormat, aKey) {
if (NS_FAILED(mEarlyRv)) {
return;
}
mTask = new KeyEncryptTask(aCx, aWrapAlgorithm, aWrappingKey, true);
}
private:
RefPtr<KeyEncryptTask> mTask;
virtual nsresult AfterCrypto() override {
// If wrapping JWK, stringify the JSON
if (mFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
nsAutoString json;
if (!mJwk.ToJSON(json)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 utf8(json);
if (!mResult.Assign((const uint8_t*)utf8.BeginReading(), utf8.Length())) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
virtual void Resolve() override {
mTask->SetData(mResult);
mTask->DispatchWithPromise(mResultPromise);
}
virtual void Cleanup() override { mTask = nullptr; }
};
template <class KeyEncryptTask>
class UnwrapKeyTask : public KeyEncryptTask {
public:
UnwrapKeyTask(JSContext* aCx, const ArrayBufferViewOrArrayBuffer& aWrappedKey,
CryptoKey& aUnwrappingKey,
const ObjectOrString& aUnwrapAlgorithm, ImportKeyTask* aTask)
: KeyEncryptTask(aCx, aUnwrapAlgorithm, aUnwrappingKey, aWrappedKey,
false),
mTask(aTask) {}
private:
RefPtr<ImportKeyTask> mTask;
virtual void Resolve() override {
mTask->SetKeyDataMaybeParseJWK(KeyEncryptTask::mResult);
mTask->DispatchWithPromise(KeyEncryptTask::mResultPromise);
}
virtual void Cleanup() override { mTask = nullptr; }
};
// Task creation methods for WebCryptoTask
// Note: We do not perform algorithm normalization as a monolithic process,
// as described in the spec. Instead:
// * Each method handles its slice of the supportedAlgorithms structure
// * Task constructors take care of:
// * Coercing the algorithm to the proper concrete type
// * Cloning subordinate data items
// * Cloning input data as needed
//
// Thus, support for different algorithms is determined by the if-statements
// below, rather than a data structure.
//
// This results in algorithm normalization coming after some other checks,
// and thus slightly more steps being done synchronously than the spec calls
// for. But none of these steps is especially time-consuming.
WebCryptoTask* WebCryptoTask::CreateEncryptDecryptTask(
JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aData, bool aEncrypt) {
TelemetryMethod method = (aEncrypt) ? TM_ENCRYPT : TM_DECRYPT;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, method);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_ENC,
aKey.Extractable());
// Ensure key is usable for this operation
if ((aEncrypt && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::ENCRYPT)) ||
(!aEncrypt && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::DECRYPT))) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
return new AesTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aData, aEncrypt);
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
return new RsaOaepTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aData, aEncrypt);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask* WebCryptoTask::CreateSignVerifyTask(
JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
const CryptoOperationData& aSignature, const CryptoOperationData& aData,
bool aSign) {
TelemetryMethod method = (aSign) ? TM_SIGN : TM_VERIFY;
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, method);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_SIG,
aKey.Extractable());
// Ensure key is usable for this operation
if ((aSign && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::SIGN)) ||
(!aSign && !aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::VERIFY))) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
return new HmacTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aSignature, aData, aSign);
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
return new AsymmetricSignVerifyTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aSignature,
aData, aSign);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask* WebCryptoTask::CreateDigestTask(
JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
const CryptoOperationData& aData) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_DIGEST);
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA1) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA256) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA384) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_SHA512)) {
return new DigestTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aData);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask* WebCryptoTask::CreateImportKeyTask(
nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
JS::Handle<JSObject*> aKeyData, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
bool aExtractable, const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_IMPORTKEY);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_IMPORT, aExtractable);
// Verify that the format is recognized
if (!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
// SPEC-BUG: PBKDF2 is not supposed to be supported for this operation.
// However, the spec should be updated to allow it.
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HKDF) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
return new ImportSymmetricKeyTask(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aKeyData,
aAlgorithm, aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS)) {
return new ImportRsaKeyTask(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aKeyData, aAlgorithm,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
return new ImportEcKeyTask(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aKeyData, aAlgorithm,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
}
WebCryptoTask* WebCryptoTask::CreateExportKeyTask(const nsAString& aFormat,
CryptoKey& aKey) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_EXPORTKEY);
// Verify that the format is recognized
if (!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
// Verify that the key is extractable
if (!aKey.Extractable()) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
// Verify that the algorithm supports export
// SPEC-BUG: PBKDF2 is not supposed to be supported for this operation.
// However, the spec should be updated to allow it.
nsString algName = aKey.Algorithm().mName;
if (algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA) ||
algName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH)) {
return new ExportKeyTask(aFormat, aKey);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask* WebCryptoTask::CreateGenerateKeyTask(
nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
bool aExtractable, const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_GENERATEKEY);
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_EXTRACTABLE_GENERATE,
aExtractable);
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
// SPEC-BUG: Spec says that this should be InvalidAccessError, but that
// is inconsistent with other analogous points in the spec
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
return new GenerateSymmetricKeyTask(aGlobal, aCx, aAlgorithm, aExtractable,
aKeyUsages);
} else if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH) ||
algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDSA)) {
return new GenerateAsymmetricKeyTask(aGlobal, aCx, aAlgorithm, aExtractable,
aKeyUsages);
} else {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
}
WebCryptoTask* WebCryptoTask::CreateDeriveKeyTask(
nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm,
CryptoKey& aBaseKey, const ObjectOrString& aDerivedKeyType,
bool aExtractable, const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_DERIVEKEY);
// Ensure baseKey is usable for this operation
if (!aBaseKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::DERIVEKEY)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HKDF)) {
return new DeriveKeyTask<DeriveHkdfBitsTask>(aGlobal, aCx, aAlgorithm,
aBaseKey, aDerivedKeyType,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
return new DeriveKeyTask<DerivePbkdfBitsTask>(aGlobal, aCx, aAlgorithm,
aBaseKey, aDerivedKeyType,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH)) {
return new DeriveKeyTask<DeriveEcdhBitsTask>(aGlobal, aCx, aAlgorithm,
aBaseKey, aDerivedKeyType,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask* WebCryptoTask::CreateDeriveBitsTask(
JSContext* aCx, const ObjectOrString& aAlgorithm, CryptoKey& aKey,
uint32_t aLength) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_DERIVEBITS);
// Ensure baseKey is usable for this operation
if (!aKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::DERIVEBITS)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
nsString algName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aAlgorithm, algName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_PBKDF2)) {
return new DerivePbkdfBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_ECDH)) {
return new DeriveEcdhBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
}
if (algName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HKDF)) {
return new DeriveHkdfBitsTask(aCx, aAlgorithm, aKey, aLength);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask* WebCryptoTask::CreateWrapKeyTask(
JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat, CryptoKey& aKey,
CryptoKey& aWrappingKey, const ObjectOrString& aWrapAlgorithm) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_WRAPKEY);
// Verify that the format is recognized
if (!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_RAW) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_SPKI) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_PKCS8) &&
!aFormat.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_KEY_FORMAT_JWK)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
// Ensure wrappingKey is usable for this operation
if (!aWrappingKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::WRAPKEY)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
// Ensure key is extractable
if (!aKey.Extractable()) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
nsString wrapAlgName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aWrapAlgorithm, wrapAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
return new WrapKeyTask<AesTask>(aCx, aFormat, aKey, aWrappingKey,
aWrapAlgorithm);
} else if (wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
return new WrapKeyTask<AesKwTask>(aCx, aFormat, aKey, aWrappingKey,
aWrapAlgorithm);
} else if (wrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
return new WrapKeyTask<RsaOaepTask>(aCx, aFormat, aKey, aWrappingKey,
aWrapAlgorithm);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask* WebCryptoTask::CreateUnwrapKeyTask(
nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, JSContext* aCx, const nsAString& aFormat,
const ArrayBufferViewOrArrayBuffer& aWrappedKey, CryptoKey& aUnwrappingKey,
const ObjectOrString& aUnwrapAlgorithm,
const ObjectOrString& aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm, bool aExtractable,
const Sequence<nsString>& aKeyUsages) {
Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::WEBCRYPTO_METHOD, TM_UNWRAPKEY);
// Ensure key is usable for this operation
if (!aUnwrappingKey.HasUsage(CryptoKey::UNWRAPKEY)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_INVALID_ACCESS_ERR);
}
// Verify that aKeyUsages does not contain an unrecognized value
if (!CryptoKey::AllUsagesRecognized(aKeyUsages)) {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_SYNTAX_ERR);
}
nsString keyAlgName;
nsresult rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm, keyAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
CryptoOperationData dummy;
RefPtr<ImportKeyTask> importTask;
if (keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM) ||
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HKDF) ||
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_HMAC)) {
importTask = new ImportSymmetricKeyTask(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat,
aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else if (keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1) ||
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP) ||
keyAlgName.EqualsASCII(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_PSS)) {
importTask =
new ImportRsaKeyTask(aGlobal, aCx, aFormat, aUnwrappedKeyAlgorithm,
aExtractable, aKeyUsages);
} else {
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
nsString unwrapAlgName;
rv = GetAlgorithmName(aCx, aUnwrapAlgorithm, unwrapAlgName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return new FailureTask(rv);
}
if (unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CBC) ||
unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_CTR) ||
unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_GCM)) {
return new UnwrapKeyTask<AesTask>(aCx, aWrappedKey, aUnwrappingKey,
aUnwrapAlgorithm, importTask);
} else if (unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_AES_KW)) {
return new UnwrapKeyTask<AesKwTask>(aCx, aWrappedKey, aUnwrappingKey,
aUnwrapAlgorithm, importTask);
} else if (unwrapAlgName.EqualsLiteral(WEBCRYPTO_ALG_RSA_OAEP)) {
return new UnwrapKeyTask<RsaOaepTask>(aCx, aWrappedKey, aUnwrappingKey,
aUnwrapAlgorithm, importTask);
}
return new FailureTask(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
}
WebCryptoTask::WebCryptoTask()
: CancelableRunnable("WebCryptoTask"),
mEarlyRv(NS_OK),
mEarlyComplete(false),
mOriginalEventTarget(nullptr),
mRv(NS_ERROR_NOT_INITIALIZED) {}
WebCryptoTask::~WebCryptoTask() = default;
} // namespace dom
} // namespace mozilla