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gecko-dev/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsArray.h"
#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h"
#include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h"
#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h"
#include "nsEscape.h"
#include "nsDataHandler.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsIContentPolicy.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
#include "nsINode.h"
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
#include "nsIOService.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsCORSListenerProxy.h"
#include "nsIParentChannel.h"
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsIRedirectHistoryEntry.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
#include "nsSandboxFlags.h"
#include "nsIXPConnect.h"
#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
#include "mozilla/CmdLineAndEnvUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/BrowserChild.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/ContentChild.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/ContentParent.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
#include "mozilla/Components.h"
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "mozilla/Maybe.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "mozilla/TelemetryComms.h"
#include "xpcpublic.h"
#include "nsMimeTypes.h"
#include "jsapi.h"
#include "js/RegExp.h"
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::dom;
using namespace mozilla::Telemetry;
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsContentSecurityManager, nsIContentSecurityManager,
nsIChannelEventSink)
mozilla::LazyLogModule sCSMLog("CSMLog");
// These first two are used for off-the-main-thread checks of
// general.config.filename
// (which can't be checked off-main-thread).
Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sJSHacksChecked(false);
Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sJSHacksPresent(false);
Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sCSSHacksChecked(false);
Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sCSSHacksPresent(false);
Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sTelemetryEventEnabled(false);
/* static */
bool nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
nsIChannel* aChannel) {
// Let's block all toplevel document navigations to a data: URI.
// In all cases where the toplevel document is navigated to a
// data: URI the triggeringPrincipal is a contentPrincipal, or
// a NullPrincipal. In other cases, e.g. typing a data: URL into
// the URL-Bar, the triggeringPrincipal is a SystemPrincipal;
// we don't want to block those loads. Only exception, loads coming
// from an external applicaton (e.g. Thunderbird) don't load
// using a contentPrincipal, but we want to block those loads.
if (!StaticPrefs::security_data_uri_block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations()) {
return true;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
return true;
}
if (loadInfo->GetForceAllowDataURI()) {
// if the loadinfo explicitly allows the data URI navigation, let's allow it
// now
return true;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
bool isDataURI = uri->SchemeIs("data");
if (!isDataURI) {
return true;
}
nsAutoCString spec;
rv = uri->GetSpec(spec);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
nsAutoCString contentType;
bool base64;
rv = nsDataHandler::ParseURI(spec, contentType, nullptr, base64, nullptr);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
// Allow data: images as long as they are not SVGs
if (StringBeginsWith(contentType, "image/"_ns) &&
!contentType.EqualsLiteral("image/svg+xml")) {
return true;
}
// Allow all data: PDFs. or JSON documents
if (contentType.EqualsLiteral(APPLICATION_JSON) ||
contentType.EqualsLiteral(TEXT_JSON) ||
contentType.EqualsLiteral(APPLICATION_PDF)) {
return true;
}
// Redirecting to a toplevel data: URI is not allowed, hence we make
// sure the RedirectChain is empty.
if (!loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal() &&
loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal() &&
loadInfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty()) {
return true;
}
nsAutoCString dataSpec;
uri->GetSpec(dataSpec);
if (dataSpec.Length() > 50) {
dataSpec.Truncate(50);
dataSpec.AppendLiteral("...");
}
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> context = loadInfo->ContextForTopLevelLoad();
nsCOMPtr<nsIBrowserChild> browserChild = do_QueryInterface(context);
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc;
if (browserChild) {
doc = static_cast<mozilla::dom::BrowserChild*>(browserChild.get())
->GetTopLevelDocument();
}
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(dataSpec), *params.AppendElement());
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
"DATA_URI_BLOCKED"_ns, doc,
nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
"BlockTopLevelDataURINavigation", params);
return false;
}
/* static */
bool nsContentSecurityManager::AllowInsecureRedirectToDataURI(
nsIChannel* aNewChannel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aNewChannel->LoadInfo();
if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT) {
return true;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aNewChannel, getter_AddRefs(newURI));
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !newURI) {
return true;
}
bool isDataURI = newURI->SchemeIs("data");
if (!isDataURI) {
return true;
}
// Web Extensions are exempt from that restriction and are allowed to redirect
// a channel to a data: URI. When a web extension redirects a channel, we set
// a flag on the loadInfo which allows us to identify such redirects here.
if (loadInfo->GetAllowInsecureRedirectToDataURI()) {
return true;
}
nsAutoCString dataSpec;
newURI->GetSpec(dataSpec);
if (dataSpec.Length() > 50) {
dataSpec.Truncate(50);
dataSpec.AppendLiteral("...");
}
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc;
nsINode* node = loadInfo->LoadingNode();
if (node) {
doc = node->OwnerDoc();
}
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(dataSpec), *params.AppendElement());
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
"DATA_URI_BLOCKED"_ns, doc,
nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
"BlockSubresourceRedirectToData", params);
return false;
}
/* static */
nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::CheckFTPSubresourceLoad(
nsIChannel* aChannel) {
// We dissallow using FTP resources as a subresource everywhere.
// The only valid way to use FTP resources is loading it as
// a top level document.
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
ExtContentPolicyType type = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
// Allow top-level FTP documents and save-as download of FTP files on
// HTTP pages.
if (type == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
type == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD) {
return NS_OK;
}
// Allow the system principal to load everything. This is meant to
// temporarily fix downloads and pdf.js.
nsIPrincipal* triggeringPrincipal = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
if (triggeringPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (!uri) {
return NS_OK;
}
bool isFtpURI = uri->SchemeIs("ftp");
if (!isFtpURI) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc;
if (nsINode* node = loadInfo->LoadingNode()) {
doc = node->OwnerDoc();
}
nsAutoCString spec;
uri->GetSpec(spec);
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(spec), *params.AppendElement());
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(
nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "FTP_URI_BLOCKED"_ns, doc,
nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, "BlockSubresourceFTP", params);
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
static nsresult ValidateSecurityFlags(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
nsSecurityFlags securityMode = aLoadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
// We should never perform a security check on a loadInfo that uses the flag
// SEC_ONLY_FOR_EXPLICIT_CONTENTSEC_CHECK, because that is only used for
// temporary loadInfos used for explicit nsIContentPolicy checks, but never be
// set as a security flag on an actual channel.
if (securityMode !=
nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT &&
securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED &&
securityMode !=
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT &&
securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL &&
securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) {
MOZ_ASSERT(
false,
"need one securityflag from nsILoadInfo to perform security checks");
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// all good, found the right security flags
return NS_OK;
}
static already_AddRefed<nsIPrincipal> GetExtensionSandboxPrincipal(
nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
// An extension is allowed to load resources from itself when its pages are
// loaded into a sandboxed frame. Extension resources in a sandbox have
// a null principal and no access to extension APIs. See "sandbox" in
// MDN extension docs for more information.
if (!aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->GetIsNullPrincipal()) {
return nullptr;
}
RefPtr<Document> doc;
aLoadInfo->GetLoadingDocument(getter_AddRefs(doc));
if (!doc || !(doc->GetSandboxFlags() & SANDBOXED_ORIGIN)) {
return nullptr;
}
// node principal is also a null principal here, so we need to
// create a principal using documentURI, which is the moz-extension
// uri for the page if this is an extension sandboxed page.
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> docPrincipal = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(
doc->GetDocumentURI(), doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef());
if (!BasePrincipal::Cast(docPrincipal)->AddonPolicy()) {
return nullptr;
}
return docPrincipal.forget();
}
static bool IsImageLoadInEditorAppType(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
// Editor apps get special treatment here, editors can load images
// from anywhere. This allows editor to insert images from file://
// into documents that are being edited.
nsContentPolicyType type = aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
if (type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE &&
type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_PRELOAD &&
type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_FAVICON &&
type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET) {
return false;
}
auto appType = nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
nsINode* node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
if (!node) {
return false;
}
Document* doc = node->OwnerDoc();
if (!doc) {
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> docShellTreeItem = doc->GetDocShell();
if (!docShellTreeItem) {
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> root;
docShellTreeItem->GetInProcessRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(root));
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell(do_QueryInterface(root));
if (docShell) {
appType = docShell->GetAppType();
}
return appType == nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_EDITOR;
}
static nsresult DoCheckLoadURIChecks(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
// In practice, these DTDs are just used for localization, so applying the
// same principal check as Fluent.
if (aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType() ==
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_DTD) {
RefPtr<Document> doc;
aLoadInfo->GetLoadingDocument(getter_AddRefs(doc));
bool allowed = false;
aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsL10nAllowed(
doc ? doc->GetDocumentURI() : nullptr, &allowed);
return allowed ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
// This is used in order to allow a privileged DOMParser to parse documents
// that need to access localization DTDs. We just allow through
// TYPE_INTERNAL_FORCE_ALLOWED_DTD no matter what the triggering principal is.
if (aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType() ==
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FORCE_ALLOWED_DTD) {
return NS_OK;
}
if (IsImageLoadInEditorAppType(aLoadInfo)) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrincipal = aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> addonPrincipal =
GetExtensionSandboxPrincipal(aLoadInfo);
if (addonPrincipal) {
// call CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal() as below to continue other checks, but
// with the addon principal.
triggeringPrincipal = addonPrincipal;
}
// Only call CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal() using the TriggeringPrincipal and not
// the LoadingPrincipal when SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_* security flags are set,
// to allow, e.g. user stylesheets to load chrome:// URIs.
return nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(
triggeringPrincipal, aURI, aLoadInfo->CheckLoadURIFlags(),
aLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID());
}
static bool URIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aURIFlags) {
bool hasFlags;
nsresult rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &hasFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
return hasFlags;
}
static nsresult DoSOPChecks(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
nsIChannel* aChannel) {
if (aLoadInfo->GetAllowChrome() &&
(URIHasFlags(aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE) ||
nsContentUtils::SchemeIs(aURI, "moz-safe-about"))) {
// UI resources are allowed.
return DoCheckLoadURIChecks(aURI, aLoadInfo);
}
if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel, true)) {
NS_SetRequestBlockingReason(aLoadInfo,
nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_NOT_SAME_ORIGIN);
return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
}
return NS_OK;
}
static nsresult DoCORSChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener) {
MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(aInAndOutListener,
"can not perform CORS checks without a listener");
// No need to set up CORS if TriggeringPrincipal is the SystemPrincipal.
if (aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
return NS_OK;
}
// We use the triggering principal here, rather than the loading principal
// to ensure that anonymous CORS content in the browser resources and in
// WebExtensions is allowed to load.
nsIPrincipal* principal = aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
RefPtr<nsCORSListenerProxy> corsListener = new nsCORSListenerProxy(
aInAndOutListener, principal,
aLoadInfo->GetCookiePolicy() == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE);
// XXX: @arg: DataURIHandling::Allow
// lets use DataURIHandling::Allow for now and then decide on callsite basis.
// see also:
// http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/dom/security/nsCORSListenerProxy.h#33
nsresult rv = corsListener->Init(aChannel, DataURIHandling::Allow);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
aInAndOutListener = corsListener;
return NS_OK;
}
static nsresult DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel,
nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
ExtContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType =
aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
nsCString mimeTypeGuess;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
switch (contentPolicyType) {
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT: {
mimeTypeGuess = "application/javascript"_ns;
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET: {
mimeTypeGuess = "text/css"_ns;
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: {
mimeTypeGuess = "text/html"_ns;
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_PING: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: {
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
"type_xml requires requestingContext of type Document");
}
#endif
// We're checking for the external TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST here in case
// an addon creates a request with that type.
if (internalContentPolicyType ==
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_XMLHTTPREQUEST ||
internalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST) {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
} else {
MOZ_ASSERT(internalContentPolicyType ==
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EVENTSOURCE,
"can not set mime type guess for unexpected internal type");
mimeTypeGuess = nsLiteralCString(TEXT_EVENT_STREAM);
}
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(
!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::ELEMENT_NODE,
"type_subrequest requires requestingContext of type Element");
}
#endif
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
"type_dtd requires requestingContext of type Document");
}
#endif
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT:
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_UA_FONT: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA: {
if (internalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_TRACK) {
mimeTypeGuess = "text/vtt"_ns;
} else {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
}
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::ELEMENT_NODE,
"type_media requires requestingContext of type Element");
}
#endif
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET: {
// Websockets have to use the proxied URI:
// ws:// instead of http:// for CSP checks
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> httpChannelInternal =
do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
MOZ_ASSERT(httpChannelInternal);
if (httpChannelInternal) {
rv = httpChannelInternal->GetProxyURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
}
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT: {
mimeTypeGuess = "application/xml"_ns;
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
"type_xslt requires requestingContext of type Document");
}
#endif
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
"type_beacon requires requestingContext of type Document");
}
#endif
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST: {
mimeTypeGuess = "application/manifest+json"_ns;
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_PROXIED_WEBRTC_MEDIA: {
mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
break;
}
case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID:
MOZ_ASSERT(false,
"can not perform security check without a valid contentType");
// Do not add default: so that compilers can catch the missing case.
}
int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(uri, aLoadInfo, mimeTypeGuess, &shouldLoad,
nsContentUtils::GetContentPolicy());
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
NS_SetRequestBlockingReasonIfNull(
aLoadInfo, nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_GENERAL);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) &&
(contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT)) {
if (shouldLoad == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE) {
// for docshell loads we might have to return SHOW_ALT.
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED_SHOW_ALT;
}
if (shouldLoad == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_POLICY) {
return NS_ERROR_BLOCKED_BY_POLICY;
}
}
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
return NS_OK;
}
static void LogHTTPSOnlyInfo(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, (" httpsOnlyFirstStatus:"));
uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = aLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UNINITIALIZED) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, (" - HTTPS_ONLY_UNINITIALIZED"));
}
if (httpsOnlyStatus &
nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_NOT_REGISTERED) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" - HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_NOT_REGISTERED"));
}
if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_REGISTERED) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" - HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_REGISTERED"));
}
if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, (" - HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT"));
}
if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" - HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS"));
}
if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_DO_NOT_LOG_TO_CONSOLE) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" - HTTPS_ONLY_DO_NOT_LOG_TO_CONSOLE"));
}
if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_HTTPS_FIRST) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" - HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_HTTPS_FIRST"));
}
}
static void LogPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
const nsAString& aPrincipalName,
const uint8_t& aNestingLevel) {
nsPrintfCString aIndentationString("%*s", aNestingLevel * 2, "");
if (aPrincipal && aPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("%s%s: SystemPrincipal\n", aIndentationString.get(),
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPrincipalName).get()));
return;
}
if (aPrincipal) {
if (aPrincipal->GetIsNullPrincipal()) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("%s%s: NullPrincipal\n", aIndentationString.get(),
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPrincipalName).get()));
return;
}
if (aPrincipal->GetIsExpandedPrincipal()) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> expanded(do_QueryInterface(aPrincipal));
nsAutoCString origin;
origin.AssignLiteral("[Expanded Principal [");
StringJoinAppend(origin, ", "_ns, expanded->AllowList(),
[](nsACString& dest, nsIPrincipal* principal) {
nsAutoCString subOrigin;
DebugOnly<nsresult> rv =
principal->GetOrigin(subOrigin);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
dest.Append(subOrigin);
});
origin.AppendLiteral("]]");
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("%s%s: %s\n", aIndentationString.get(),
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPrincipalName).get(), origin.get()));
return;
}
nsAutoCString principalSpec;
aPrincipal->GetAsciiSpec(principalSpec);
if (aPrincipalName.IsEmpty()) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("%s - \"%s\"\n", aIndentationString.get(), principalSpec.get()));
} else {
MOZ_LOG(
sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("%s%s: \"%s\"\n", aIndentationString.get(),
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPrincipalName).get(), principalSpec.get()));
}
return;
}
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("%s%s: nullptr\n", aIndentationString.get(),
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPrincipalName).get()));
}
static void LogSecurityFlags(nsSecurityFlags securityFlags) {
struct DebugSecFlagType {
unsigned long secFlag;
char secTypeStr[128];
};
static const DebugSecFlagType secTypes[] = {
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_ONLY_FOR_EXPLICIT_CONTENTSEC_CHECK,
"SEC_ONLY_FOR_EXPLICIT_CONTENTSEC_CHECK"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT,
"SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED,
"SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT,
"SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
"SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT,
"SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT, "SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE, "SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN, "SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_OMIT, "SEC_COOKIES_OMIT"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL, "SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_ABOUT_BLANK_INHERITS, "SEC_ABOUT_BLANK_INHERITS"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CHROME, "SEC_ALLOW_CHROME"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_DISALLOW_SCRIPT, "SEC_DISALLOW_SCRIPT"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS, "SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_LOAD_ERROR_PAGE, "SEC_LOAD_ERROR_PAGE"},
{nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL_OVERRULE_OWNER,
"SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL_OVERRULE_OWNER"}};
for (const DebugSecFlagType& flag : secTypes) {
if (securityFlags & flag.secFlag) {
// the logging level should be in sync with the logging level in
// DebugDoContentSecurityCheck()
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, (" - %s\n", flag.secTypeStr));
}
}
}
static void DebugDoContentSecurityCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel(do_QueryInterface(aChannel));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("\n#DebugDoContentSecurityCheck Begin\n"));
// we only log http channels, unless loglevel is 5.
if (httpChannel || MOZ_LOG_TEST(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose)) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
nsAutoCString channelSpec;
nsAutoCString channelMethod;
NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
if (channelURI) {
channelURI->GetSpec(channelSpec);
}
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("doContentSecurityCheck:\n"));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" channelURI: \"%s\"\n", channelSpec.get()));
// Log HTTP-specific things
if (httpChannel) {
nsresult rv;
rv = httpChannel->GetRequestMethod(channelMethod);
if (!NS_FAILED(rv)) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" httpMethod: %s\n", channelMethod.get()));
}
}
// Log Principals
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> requestPrincipal = aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
LogPrincipal(aLoadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal(), u"loadingPrincipal"_ns, 1);
LogPrincipal(requestPrincipal, u"triggeringPrincipal"_ns, 1);
LogPrincipal(aLoadInfo->PrincipalToInherit(), u"principalToInherit"_ns, 1);
// Log Redirect Chain
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, (" redirectChain:\n"));
for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* redirectHistoryEntry :
aLoadInfo->RedirectChain()) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
redirectHistoryEntry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(principal));
LogPrincipal(principal, u""_ns, 2);
}
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" internalContentPolicyType: %s\n",
NS_CP_ContentTypeName(aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType())));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" externalContentPolicyType: %s\n",
NS_CP_ContentTypeName(aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType())));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" upgradeInsecureRequests: %s\n",
aLoadInfo->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests() ? "true" : "false"));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" initialSecurityChecksDone: %s\n",
aLoadInfo->GetInitialSecurityCheckDone() ? "true" : "false"));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" allowDeprecatedSystemRequests: %s\n",
aLoadInfo->GetAllowDeprecatedSystemRequests() ? "true" : "false"));
// Log CSPrequestPrincipal
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp = aLoadInfo->GetCsp();
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug, (" CSP:"));
if (csp) {
nsAutoString parsedPolicyStr;
uint32_t count = 0;
csp->GetPolicyCount(&count);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
csp->GetPolicyString(i, parsedPolicyStr);
// we need to add quotation marks, as otherwise yaml parsers may fail
// with CSP directives
// no need to escape quote marks in the parsed policy string, as URLs in
// there are already encoded
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
(" - \"%s\"\n", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(parsedPolicyStr).get()));
}
}
// Security Flags
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, (" securityFlags:"));
LogSecurityFlags(aLoadInfo->GetSecurityFlags());
LogHTTPSOnlyInfo(aLoadInfo);
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("\n#DebugDoContentSecurityCheck End\n"));
}
}
/* static */
void nsContentSecurityManager::MeasureUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads(
nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, nsIURI* aFinalURI, const nsACString& aRemoteType) {
if (!StaticPrefs::dom_security_unexpected_system_load_telemetry_enabled()) {
return;
}
nsContentSecurityUtils::DetectJsHacks();
nsContentSecurityUtils::DetectCssHacks();
// The detection only work on the main-thread.
// To avoid races and early reports, we need to ensure the checks actually
// happened.
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(sJSHacksPresent || !sJSHacksChecked || sCSSHacksPresent ||
!sCSSHacksChecked)) {
return;
}
ExtContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
// restricting reported types to script, styles and documents
// to be continued in follow-ups of bug 1697163.
if (contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_SCRIPT &&
contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_STYLESHEET &&
contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
return;
}
// Gather redirected schemes in string
nsAutoCString loggedRedirects;
const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIRedirectHistoryEntry>>& redirects =
aLoadInfo->RedirectChain();
if (!redirects.IsEmpty()) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIRedirectHistoryEntry> end = redirects.LastElement();
for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* entry : redirects) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(principal));
if (principal) {
nsAutoCString scheme;
principal->GetScheme(scheme);
loggedRedirects.Append(scheme);
if (entry != end) {
loggedRedirects.AppendLiteral(", ");
}
}
}
}
nsAutoCString uriString;
if (aFinalURI) {
aFinalURI->GetAsciiSpec(uriString);
} else {
uriString.AssignLiteral("");
}
FilenameTypeAndDetails fileNameTypeAndDetails =
nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriString), true);
nsCString loggedFileDetails = "unknown"_ns;
if (fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.isSome()) {
loggedFileDetails.Assign(
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.value()));
}
// sanitize remoteType because it may contain sensitive
// info, like URLs. e.g. `webIsolated=https://example.com`
nsAutoCString loggedRemoteType(dom::RemoteTypePrefix(aRemoteType));
nsAutoCString loggedContentType(NS_CP_ContentTypeName(contentPolicyType));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("UnexpectedPrivilegedLoadTelemetry:\n"));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("- contentType: %s\n", loggedContentType.get()));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("- URL (not to be reported): %s\n", uriString.get()));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("- remoteType: %s\n", loggedRemoteType.get()));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("- fileInfo: %s\n", fileNameTypeAndDetails.first.get()));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("- fileDetails: %s\n", loggedFileDetails.get()));
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("- redirects: %s\n\n", loggedRedirects.get()));
// Send Telemetry
auto extra = Some<nsTArray<EventExtraEntry>>(
{EventExtraEntry{"contenttype"_ns, loggedContentType},
EventExtraEntry{"remotetype"_ns, loggedRemoteType},
EventExtraEntry{"filedetails"_ns, loggedFileDetails},
EventExtraEntry{"redirects"_ns, loggedRedirects}});
if (!sTelemetryEventEnabled.exchange(true)) {
Telemetry::SetEventRecordingEnabled("security"_ns, true);
}
Telemetry::EventID eventType =
Telemetry::EventID::Security_Unexpectedload_Systemprincipal;
Telemetry::RecordEvent(eventType, mozilla::Some(fileNameTypeAndDetails.first),
extra);
}
/* static */
nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::CheckAllowLoadInSystemPrivilegedContext(
nsIChannel* aChannel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
// loads with the allow flag are waived through
// until refactored (e.g., Shavar, OCSP)
if (loadInfo->GetAllowDeprecatedSystemRequests()) {
return NS_OK;
}
ExtContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
// For now, let's not inspect top-level document loads
if (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
return NS_OK;
}
// We mostly care about the triggeringPrincipal,
// unless this is a TYPE_DOCUMENT request, which has none.
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> inspectedPrincipal;
if (contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
inspectedPrincipal = loadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
} else {
inspectedPrincipal = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
}
// Check if we are actually dealing with a SystemPrincipal request
if (!inspectedPrincipal || !inspectedPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
return NS_OK;
}
// allowing some fetches due to their lowered risk
// i.e., data & downloads fetches do limited parsing, no rendering
// remote images are too widely used (favicons, about:addons etc.)
if ((contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH) ||
(contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST) ||
(contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET) ||
(contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD) ||
(contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE)) {
return NS_OK;
}
// Allow the user interface (e.g., schemes like chrome, resource)
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> finalURI;
NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(finalURI));
bool isUiResource = false;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
finalURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE, &isUiResource)) &&
isUiResource) {
return NS_OK;
}
// For about: and extension-based URIs, which don't get
// URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE, first remove layers of view-source:, if present.
while (finalURI && finalURI->SchemeIs("view-source")) {
nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nested = do_QueryInterface(finalURI);
if (nested) {
nested->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(finalURI));
}
}
nsAutoCString remoteType;
if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIParentChannel> parentChannel;
NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(aChannel, parentChannel);
if (parentChannel) {
parentChannel->GetRemoteType(remoteType);
}
} else {
remoteType.Assign(
mozilla::dom::ContentChild::GetSingleton()->GetRemoteType());
}
// This is our escape hatch, if things break in release.
// We expect to remove the pref in bug 1638770
bool cancelNonLocalSystemPrincipal = StaticPrefs::
security_cancel_non_local_loads_triggered_by_systemprincipal();
// GetInnerURI can return null for malformed nested URIs like moz-icon:trash
if (!finalURI) {
MeasureUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads(loadInfo, finalURI, remoteType);
if (cancelNonLocalSystemPrincipal) {
aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
}
// loads of userContent.css during startup and tests that show up as file:
if (finalURI->SchemeIs("file")) {
if ((contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET) ||
(contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER)) {
return NS_OK;
}
}
// (1)loads from within omni.ja and system add-ons use jar:
// this is safe to allow, because we do not support remote jar.
// (2) about: resources are always allowed: they are part of the build.
// (3) extensions are signed or the user has made bad decisions.
if (finalURI->SchemeIs("jar") || finalURI->SchemeIs("about") ||
finalURI->SchemeIs("moz-extension")) {
return NS_OK;
}
// Telemetry for unexpected privileged loads.
// pref check & data sanitization happens in the called function
MeasureUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads(loadInfo, finalURI, remoteType);
// Relaxing restrictions for our test suites:
// (1) AreNonLocalConnectionsDisabled() disables network, so http://mochitest
// is actually local and allowed. (2) The marionette test framework uses
// injections and data URLs to execute scripts, checking for the environment
// variable breaks the attack but not the tests.
if (xpc::AreNonLocalConnectionsDisabled() ||
mozilla::EnvHasValue("MOZ_MARIONETTE")) {
bool disallowSystemPrincipalRemoteDocuments = Preferences::GetBool(
"security.disallow_non_local_systemprincipal_in_tests");
if (disallowSystemPrincipalRemoteDocuments) {
// our own mochitest needs NS_ASSERTION instead of MOZ_ASSERT
NS_ASSERTION(false, "SystemPrincipal must not load remote documents.");
aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
// but other mochitest are exempt from this
return NS_OK;
}
nsAutoCString requestedURL;
finalURI->GetAsciiSpec(requestedURL);
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Warning,
("SystemPrincipal should not load remote resources. URL: %s, type %d",
requestedURL.get(), int(contentPolicyType)));
// The load types that we want to disallow, will extend over time and
// prioritized by risk. The most risky/dangerous are load-types are documents,
// subdocuments, scripts and styles in that order. The most dangerous URL
// schemes to cover are HTTP, HTTPS, data, blob in that order. Meta bug
// 1725112 will track upcoming restrictions
if (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
if (StaticPrefs::security_disallow_privileged_https_subdocuments_loads() &&
(finalURI->SchemeIs("http") || finalURI->SchemeIs("https"))) {
#ifdef DEBUG
MOZ_CRASH("Disallowing SystemPrincipal load of subdocuments on HTTP(S).");
#endif
aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
if ((StaticPrefs::security_disallow_privileged_data_subdocuments_loads()) &&
(finalURI->SchemeIs("data"))) {
#ifdef DEBUG
MOZ_CRASH(
"Disallowing SystemPrincipal load of subdocuments on data URL.");
#endif
aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
}
if (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET) {
if (StaticPrefs::security_disallow_privileged_https_stylesheet_loads() &&
(finalURI->SchemeIs("http") || finalURI->SchemeIs("https"))) {
#ifdef DEBUG
MOZ_CRASH("Disallowing SystemPrincipal load of stylesheets on HTTP(S).");
#endif
aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
}
if (cancelNonLocalSystemPrincipal) {
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "SystemPrincipal must not load remote documents.");
aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
return NS_OK;
}
/*
* Every protocol handler must set one of the five security flags
* defined in nsIProtocolHandler - if not - deny the load.
*/
nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannelHasProtocolSecurityFlag(
nsIChannel* aChannel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsAutoCString scheme;
rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> ios = do_GetIOService(&rv);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsIProtocolHandler> handler;
rv = ios->GetProtocolHandler(scheme.get(), getter_AddRefs(handler));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
uint32_t flags;
rv = handler->DoGetProtocolFlags(uri, &flags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
uint32_t securityFlagsSet = 0;
if (flags & nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE) {
securityFlagsSet += 1;
}
if (flags & nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD) {
securityFlagsSet += 1;
}
if (flags & nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE) {
securityFlagsSet += 1;
}
if (flags & nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE) {
securityFlagsSet += 1;
}
if (flags & nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS) {
securityFlagsSet += 1;
}
// Ensure that only "1" valid security flags is set.
if (securityFlagsSet == 1) {
return NS_OK;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "protocol must use one valid security flag");
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
/*
* Based on the security flags provided in the loadInfo of the channel,
* doContentSecurityCheck() performs the following content security checks
* before opening the channel:
*
* (1) Same Origin Policy Check (if applicable)
* (2) Allow Cross Origin but perform sanity checks whether a principal
* is allowed to access the following URL.
* (3) Perform CORS check (if applicable)
* (4) ContentPolicy checks (Content-Security-Policy, Mixed Content, ...)
*
* @param aChannel
* The channel to perform the security checks on.
* @param aInAndOutListener
* The streamListener that is passed to channel->AsyncOpen() that is now
* potentially wrappend within nsCORSListenerProxy() and becomes the
* corsListener that now needs to be set as new streamListener on the channel.
*/
nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::doContentSecurityCheck(
nsIChannel* aChannel, nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener) {
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aChannel);
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(MOZ_LOG_TEST(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose))) {
DebugDoContentSecurityCheck(aChannel, loadInfo);
}
nsresult rv = CheckAllowLoadInSystemPrivilegedContext(aChannel);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
rv = CheckChannelHasProtocolSecurityFlag(aChannel);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// if dealing with a redirected channel then we have already installed
// streamlistener and redirect proxies and so we are done.
if (loadInfo->GetInitialSecurityCheckDone()) {
return NS_OK;
}
// make sure that only one of the five security flags is set in the loadinfo
// e.g. do not require same origin and allow cross origin at the same time
rv = ValidateSecurityFlags(loadInfo);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (loadInfo->GetSecurityMode() ==
nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) {
rv = DoCORSChecks(aChannel, loadInfo, aInAndOutListener);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
rv = CheckChannel(aChannel);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Perform all ContentPolicy checks (MixedContent, CSP, ...)
rv = DoContentSecurityChecks(aChannel, loadInfo);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Apply this after CSP to match Chrome.
rv = CheckFTPSubresourceLoad(aChannel);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// now lets set the initialSecurityFlag for subsequent calls
loadInfo->SetInitialSecurityCheckDone(true);
// all security checks passed - lets allow the load
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsContentSecurityManager::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(
nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aRedirFlags,
nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCb) {
// Since we compare the principal from the loadInfo to the URI's
// princicpal, it's possible that the checks fail when doing an internal
// redirect. We can just return early instead, since we should never
// need to block an internal redirect.
if (aRedirFlags & nsIChannelEventSink::REDIRECT_INTERNAL) {
aCb->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aOldChannel->LoadInfo();
nsresult rv = CheckChannel(aNewChannel);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
rv = CheckFTPSubresourceLoad(aNewChannel);
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
aOldChannel->Cancel(rv);
return rv;
}
// Also verify that the redirecting server is allowed to redirect to the
// given URI
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> oldPrincipal;
nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->GetChannelResultPrincipal(
aOldChannel, getter_AddRefs(oldPrincipal));
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
Unused << NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aNewChannel, getter_AddRefs(newURI));
NS_ENSURE_STATE(oldPrincipal && newURI);
// Do not allow insecure redirects to data: URIs
if (!AllowInsecureRedirectToDataURI(aNewChannel)) {
// cancel the old channel and return an error
aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
const uint32_t flags =
nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT |
nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT;
rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(
oldPrincipal, newURI, flags, loadInfo->GetInnerWindowID());
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
aCb->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
return NS_OK;
}
static void AddLoadFlags(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsLoadFlags aNewFlags) {
nsLoadFlags flags;
aRequest->GetLoadFlags(&flags);
flags |= aNewFlags;
aRequest->SetLoadFlags(flags);
}
/*
* Check that this channel passes all security checks. Returns an error code
* if this requesst should not be permitted.
*/
nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Handle cookie policies
uint32_t cookiePolicy = loadInfo->GetCookiePolicy();
if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN) {
// We shouldn't have the SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN flag for top level loads
MOZ_ASSERT(loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT);
nsIPrincipal* loadingPrincipal = loadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
// It doesn't matter what we pass for the second, data-inherits, argument.
// Any protocol which inherits won't pay attention to cookies anyway.
rv = loadingPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(uri, false);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
AddLoadFlags(aChannel, nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS);
}
} else if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_OMIT) {
AddLoadFlags(aChannel, nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS);
}
nsSecurityFlags securityMode = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
// CORS mode is handled by nsCORSListenerProxy
if (securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) {
if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel)) {
loadInfo->MaybeIncreaseTainting(LoadTainting::CORS);
}
return NS_OK;
}
// Allow subresource loads if TriggeringPrincipal is the SystemPrincipal.
if (loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal() &&
loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
return NS_OK;
}
// if none of the REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN flags are set, then SOP does not apply
if ((securityMode ==
nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) ||
(securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED)) {
rv = DoSOPChecks(uri, loadInfo, aChannel);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
if ((securityMode ==
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) ||
(securityMode ==
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL)) {
if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel)) {
NS_ENSURE_FALSE(loadInfo->GetDontFollowRedirects(), NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
loadInfo->MaybeIncreaseTainting(LoadTainting::Opaque);
}
// Please note that DoCheckLoadURIChecks should only be enforced for
// cross origin requests. If the flag SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT
// is set within the loadInfo, then CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal is performed
// within nsCorsListenerProxy
rv = DoCheckLoadURIChecks(uri, loadInfo);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// TODO: Bug 1371237
// consider calling SetBlockedRequest in
// nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel
}
return NS_OK;
}
// ==== nsIContentSecurityManager implementation =====
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsContentSecurityManager::PerformSecurityCheck(
nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIStreamListener* aStreamListener,
nsIStreamListener** outStreamListener) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> inAndOutListener = aStreamListener;
nsresult rv = doContentSecurityCheck(aChannel, inAndOutListener);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
inAndOutListener.forget(outStreamListener);
return NS_OK;
}
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