gecko-dev/dom/security/nsCSPService.cpp

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs.h"
#include "nsString.h"
#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
#include "nsIURI.h"
#include "nsIPrincipal.h"
#include "nsIObserver.h"
#include "nsIContent.h"
#include "nsCSPService.h"
#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
#include "nsError.h"
#include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h"
#include "nsAsyncRedirectVerifyHelper.h"
#include "nsIScriptError.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
using namespace mozilla;
static LazyLogModule gCspPRLog("CSP");
CSPService::CSPService() {}
CSPService::~CSPService() {}
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPService, nsIContentPolicy, nsIChannelEventSink)
// Helper function to identify protocols and content types not subject to CSP.
bool subjectToCSP(nsIURI *aURI, nsContentPolicyType aContentType) {
nsContentPolicyType contentType =
nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(aContentType);
// These content types are not subject to CSP content policy checks:
// TYPE_CSP_REPORT -- csp can't block csp reports
// TYPE_REFRESH -- never passed to ShouldLoad (see nsIContentPolicy.idl)
// TYPE_DOCUMENT -- used for frame-ancestors
if (contentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT ||
contentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_REFRESH ||
contentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
return false;
}
// The three protocols: data:, blob: and filesystem: share the same
// protocol flag (URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE) with other protocols,
// but those three protocols get special attention in CSP and
// are subject to CSP, hence we have to make sure those
// protocols are subject to CSP, see:
// http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#source-list-guid-matching
bool match = false;
nsresult rv = aURI->SchemeIs("data", &match);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) {
return true;
}
rv = aURI->SchemeIs("blob", &match);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) {
return true;
}
rv = aURI->SchemeIs("filesystem", &match);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) {
return true;
}
// Finally we have to whitelist "about:" which does not fall into
// the category underneath and also "javascript:" which is not
// subject to CSP content loading rules.
rv = aURI->SchemeIs("about", &match);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) {
return false;
}
rv = aURI->SchemeIs("javascript", &match);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) {
return false;
}
// Please note that it should be possible for websites to
// whitelist their own protocol handlers with respect to CSP,
// hence we use protocol flags to accomplish that, but we also
// want resource:, chrome: and moz-icon to be subject to CSP
// (which also use URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE).
// Exception to the rule are images, styles, localization DTDs,
// and XBLs using a scheme of resource: or chrome:
bool isImgOrStyleOrDTDorXBL =
contentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE ||
contentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET ||
contentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD ||
contentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XBL;
rv = aURI->SchemeIs("resource", &match);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match && !isImgOrStyleOrDTDorXBL) {
return true;
}
rv = aURI->SchemeIs("chrome", &match);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match && !isImgOrStyleOrDTDorXBL) {
return true;
}
rv = aURI->SchemeIs("moz-icon", &match);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) {
return true;
}
rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE,
&match);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) {
return false;
}
// all other protocols are subject To CSP.
return true;
}
/* nsIContentPolicy implementation */
NS_IMETHODIMP
CSPService::ShouldLoad(nsIURI *aContentLocation, nsILoadInfo *aLoadInfo,
const nsACString &aMimeTypeGuess, int16_t *aDecision) {
if (!aContentLocation) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
uint32_t contentType = aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> requestContext = aLoadInfo->GetLoadingContext();
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> requestPrincipal = aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> requestOrigin;
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal = aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
if (loadingPrincipal) {
loadingPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(requestOrigin));
}
nsCOMPtr<nsICSPEventListener> cspEventListener;
nsresult rv =
aLoadInfo->GetCspEventListener(getter_AddRefs(cspEventListener));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug)) {
MOZ_LOG(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("CSPService::ShouldLoad called for %s",
aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
}
// default decision, CSP can revise it if there's a policy to enforce
*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
// No need to continue processing if CSP is disabled or if the protocol
// or type is *not* subject to CSP.
// Please note, the correct way to opt-out of CSP using a custom
// protocolHandler is to set one of the nsIProtocolHandler flags
// that are whitelistet in subjectToCSP()
if (!StaticPrefs::security_csp_enable() ||
!subjectToCSP(aContentLocation, contentType)) {
return NS_OK;
}
// Find a principal to retrieve the CSP from. If we don't have a context node
// (because, for instance, the load originates in a service worker), or the
// requesting principal's CSP overrides our document CSP, use the request
// principal. Otherwise, use the document principal.
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node(do_QueryInterface(requestContext));
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
if (!node ||
(requestPrincipal && BasePrincipal::Cast(requestPrincipal)
->OverridesCSP(node->NodePrincipal()))) {
principal = requestPrincipal;
} else {
principal = node->NodePrincipal();
}
if (!principal) {
// if we can't query a principal, then there is nothing to do.
return NS_OK;
}
nsAutoString cspNonce;
rv = aLoadInfo->GetCspNonce(cspNonce);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// 1) Apply speculate CSP for preloads
bool isPreload = nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(contentType);
if (isPreload) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> preloadCsp;
rv = principal->GetPreloadCsp(getter_AddRefs(preloadCsp));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (preloadCsp) {
// obtain the enforcement decision
rv = preloadCsp->ShouldLoad(
contentType, cspEventListener, aContentLocation, requestOrigin,
requestContext, aMimeTypeGuess,
nullptr, // no redirect, aOriginal URL is null.
aLoadInfo->GetSendCSPViolationEvents(), cspNonce, aDecision);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// if the preload policy already denied the load, then there
// is no point in checking the real policy
if (NS_CP_REJECTED(*aDecision)) {
NS_SetRequestBlockingReason(
aLoadInfo, nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_PRELOAD);
return NS_OK;
}
}
}
// 2) Apply actual CSP to all loads
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp;
rv = principal->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (csp) {
// obtain the enforcement decision
rv = csp->ShouldLoad(contentType, cspEventListener, aContentLocation,
requestOrigin, requestContext, aMimeTypeGuess,
nullptr, // no redirect, aOriginal URL is null.
aLoadInfo->GetSendCSPViolationEvents(), cspNonce,
aDecision);
if (NS_CP_REJECTED(*aDecision)) {
NS_SetRequestBlockingReason(
aLoadInfo, nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_GENERAL);
}
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
CSPService::ShouldProcess(nsIURI *aContentLocation, nsILoadInfo *aLoadInfo,
const nsACString &aMimeTypeGuess,
int16_t *aDecision) {
if (!aContentLocation) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
uint32_t contentType = aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug)) {
MOZ_LOG(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("CSPService::ShouldProcess called for %s",
aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
}
// ShouldProcess is only relevant to TYPE_OBJECT, so let's convert the
// internal contentPolicyType to the mapping external one.
// If it is not TYPE_OBJECT, we can return at this point.
// Note that we should still pass the internal contentPolicyType
// (contentType) to ShouldLoad().
uint32_t policyType =
nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(contentType);
if (policyType != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) {
*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
}
return ShouldLoad(aContentLocation, aLoadInfo, aMimeTypeGuess, aDecision);
}
/* nsIChannelEventSink implementation */
NS_IMETHODIMP
CSPService::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel *oldChannel,
nsIChannel *newChannel, uint32_t flags,
nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback *callback) {
net::nsAsyncRedirectAutoCallback autoCallback(callback);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newUri;
nsresult rv = newChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(newUri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = oldChannel->LoadInfo();
nsCOMPtr<nsICSPEventListener> cspEventListener;
rv = loadInfo->GetCspEventListener(getter_AddRefs(cspEventListener));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// No need to continue processing if CSP is disabled or if the protocol
// is *not* subject to CSP.
// Please note, the correct way to opt-out of CSP using a custom
// protocolHandler is to set one of the nsIProtocolHandler flags
// that are whitelistet in subjectToCSP()
nsContentPolicyType policyType = loadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
if (!StaticPrefs::security_csp_enable() ||
!subjectToCSP(newUri, policyType)) {
return NS_OK;
}
/* Since redirecting channels don't call into nsIContentPolicy, we call our
* Content Policy implementation directly when redirects occur using the
* information set in the LoadInfo when channels are created.
*
* We check if the CSP permits this host for this type of load, if not,
* we cancel the load now.
*/
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalUri;
rv = oldChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(originalUri));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
autoCallback.DontCallback();
oldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
return rv;
}
nsAutoString cspNonce;
rv = loadInfo->GetCspNonce(cspNonce);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
bool isPreload = nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(policyType);
/* On redirect, if the content policy is a preload type, rejecting the preload
* results in the load silently failing, so we convert preloads to the actual
* type. See Bug 1219453.
*/
policyType =
nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternalOrWorker(policyType);
int16_t aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> requestContext = loadInfo->GetLoadingContext();
// 1) Apply speculative CSP for preloads
if (isPreload) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> preloadCsp;
loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal()->GetPreloadCsp(getter_AddRefs(preloadCsp));
if (preloadCsp) {
// Pass originalURI to indicate the redirect
preloadCsp->ShouldLoad(
policyType, // load type per nsIContentPolicy (uint32_t)
cspEventListener,
newUri, // nsIURI
nullptr, // nsIURI
requestContext, // nsISupports
EmptyCString(), // ACString - MIME guess
originalUri, // Original nsIURI
true, // aSendViolationReports
cspNonce, // nonce
&aDecision);
// if the preload policy already denied the load, then there
// is no point in checking the real policy
if (NS_CP_REJECTED(aDecision)) {
autoCallback.DontCallback();
oldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
return NS_BINDING_FAILED;
}
}
}
// 2) Apply actual CSP to all loads
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp;
loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal()->GetCsp(getter_AddRefs(csp));
if (csp) {
// Pass originalURI to indicate the redirect
csp->ShouldLoad(policyType, // load type per nsIContentPolicy (uint32_t)
cspEventListener,
newUri, // nsIURI
nullptr, // nsIURI
requestContext, // nsISupports
EmptyCString(), // ACString - MIME guess
originalUri, // Original nsIURI
true, // aSendViolationReports
cspNonce, // nonce
&aDecision);
}
// if ShouldLoad doesn't accept the load, cancel the request
if (!NS_CP_ACCEPTED(aDecision)) {
autoCallback.DontCallback();
oldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
return NS_BINDING_FAILED;
}
return NS_OK;
}