зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
543 строки
18 KiB
C++
543 строки
18 KiB
C++
#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h"
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#include "nsIChannel.h"
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#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
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#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
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#include "nsContentUtils.h"
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#include "nsCORSListenerProxy.h"
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#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
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#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
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NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsContentSecurityManager,
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nsIContentSecurityManager,
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nsIChannelEventSink)
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static nsresult
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ValidateSecurityFlags(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
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{
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nsSecurityFlags securityMode = aLoadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
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if (securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS &&
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securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED &&
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securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS &&
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securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL &&
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securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) {
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MOZ_ASSERT(false, "need one securityflag from nsILoadInfo to perform security checks");
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return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
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}
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// all good, found the right security flags
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return NS_OK;
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}
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static bool SchemeIs(nsIURI* aURI, const char* aScheme)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> baseURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(aURI);
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(baseURI, false);
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bool isScheme = false;
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return NS_SUCCEEDED(baseURI->SchemeIs(aScheme, &isScheme)) && isScheme;
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}
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static nsresult
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DoCheckLoadURIChecks(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
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{
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// Bug 1228117: determine the correct security policy for DTD loads
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if (aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD) {
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return NS_OK;
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}
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nsresult rv = NS_OK;
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal = aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
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uint32_t flags = nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD;
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if (aLoadInfo->GetAllowChrome()) {
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flags |= nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME;
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}
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rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
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CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(loadingPrincipal,
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aURI,
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flags);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// If the loadingPrincipal and the triggeringPrincipal are different, then make
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// sure the triggeringPrincipal is allowed to access that URI.
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrincipal = aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
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if (loadingPrincipal != triggeringPrincipal) {
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rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
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CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(triggeringPrincipal,
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aURI,
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flags);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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static bool
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URIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aURIFlags)
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{
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bool hasFlags;
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nsresult rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &hasFlags);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
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return hasFlags;
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}
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static nsresult
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DoSOPChecks(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, nsIChannel* aChannel)
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{
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if (aLoadInfo->GetAllowChrome() &&
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(URIHasFlags(aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE) ||
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SchemeIs(aURI, "moz-safe-about"))) {
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// UI resources are allowed.
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return DoCheckLoadURIChecks(aURI, aLoadInfo);
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}
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NS_ENSURE_FALSE(NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel, true),
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NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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static nsresult
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DoCORSChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
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nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener)
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{
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MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(aInAndOutListener, "can not perform CORS checks without a listener");
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nsIPrincipal* loadingPrincipal = aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
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RefPtr<nsCORSListenerProxy> corsListener =
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new nsCORSListenerProxy(aInAndOutListener,
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loadingPrincipal,
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aLoadInfo->GetCookiePolicy() ==
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nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE);
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// XXX: @arg: DataURIHandling::Allow
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// lets use DataURIHandling::Allow for now and then decide on callsite basis. see also:
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// http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/dom/security/nsCORSListenerProxy.h#33
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nsresult rv = corsListener->Init(aChannel, DataURIHandling::Allow);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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aInAndOutListener = corsListener;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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static nsresult
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DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
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{
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nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
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aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
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nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType =
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aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
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nsCString mimeTypeGuess;
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nsCOMPtr<nsINode> requestingContext = nullptr;
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switch(contentPolicyType) {
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER: {
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mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT: {
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mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/javascript");
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT:
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: {
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MOZ_ASSERT(false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet");
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: {
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mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/html");
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
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requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
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"type_subdocument requires requestingContext of type Document");
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_REFRESH: {
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MOZ_ASSERT(false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet");
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XBL: {
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mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING: {
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mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: {
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// alias nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DATAREQUEST:
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
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requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
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"type_xml requires requestingContext of type Document");
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// We're checking for the external TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST here in case
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// an addon creates a request with that type.
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if (internalContentPolicyType ==
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nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_XMLHTTPREQUEST ||
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internalContentPolicyType ==
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nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST) {
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mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
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}
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else {
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MOZ_ASSERT(internalContentPolicyType ==
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nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EVENTSOURCE,
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"can not set mime type guess for unexpected internal type");
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mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(TEXT_EVENT_STREAM);
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}
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST: {
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mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
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requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE,
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"type_subrequest requires requestingContext of type Element");
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD: {
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mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
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requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
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"type_dtd requires requestingContext of type Document");
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT: {
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MOZ_ASSERT(false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet");
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA: {
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if (internalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_TRACK) {
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mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/vtt");
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}
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else {
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mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
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}
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
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requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::ELEMENT_NODE,
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"type_media requires requestingContext of type Element");
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET: {
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MOZ_ASSERT(false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet");
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT: {
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mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT: {
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mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/xml");
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
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requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
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"type_xslt requires requestingContext of type Document");
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON: {
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mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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MOZ_ASSERT(!requestingContext ||
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requestingContext->NodeType() == nsIDOMNode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
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"type_beacon requires requestingContext of type Document");
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH: {
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mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
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requestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
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break;
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}
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET: {
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MOZ_ASSERT(false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet");
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break;
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}
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default:
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// nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID
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MOZ_ASSERT(false, "can not perform security check without a valid contentType");
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}
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int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
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nsresult rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(internalContentPolicyType,
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aURI,
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aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal(),
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requestingContext,
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mimeTypeGuess,
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nullptr, //extra,
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&shouldLoad,
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nsContentUtils::GetContentPolicy(),
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nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager());
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
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return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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/*
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* Based on the security flags provided in the loadInfo of the channel,
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* doContentSecurityCheck() performs the following content security checks
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* before opening the channel:
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*
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* (1) Same Origin Policy Check (if applicable)
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* (2) Allow Cross Origin but perform sanity checks whether a principal
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* is allowed to access the following URL.
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* (3) Perform CORS check (if applicable)
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* (4) ContentPolicy checks (Content-Security-Policy, Mixed Content, ...)
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*
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* @param aChannel
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* The channel to perform the security checks on.
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* @param aInAndOutListener
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* The streamListener that is passed to channel->AsyncOpen2() that is now potentially
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* wrappend within nsCORSListenerProxy() and becomes the corsListener that now needs
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* to be set as new streamListener on the channel.
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*/
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nsresult
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nsContentSecurityManager::doContentSecurityCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
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nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener)
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{
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NS_ENSURE_ARG(aChannel);
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nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
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if (!loadInfo) {
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MOZ_ASSERT(false, "channel needs to have loadInfo to perform security checks");
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return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
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}
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// if dealing with a redirected channel then we have already installed
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// streamlistener and redirect proxies and so we are done.
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if (loadInfo->GetInitialSecurityCheckDone()) {
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// make sure that only one of the five security flags is set in the loadinfo
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// e.g. do not require same origin and allow cross origin at the same time
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nsresult rv = ValidateSecurityFlags(loadInfo);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// since aChannel was openend using asyncOpen2() we have to make sure
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// that redirects of that channel also get openend using asyncOpen2()
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// please note that some implementations of ::AsyncOpen2 might already
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// have set that flag to true (e.g. nsViewSourceChannel) in which case
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// we just set the flag again.
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rv = loadInfo->SetEnforceSecurity(true);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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if (loadInfo->GetSecurityMode() == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) {
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rv = DoCORSChecks(aChannel, loadInfo, aInAndOutListener);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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}
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rv = CheckChannel(aChannel);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> finalChannelURI;
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rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(finalChannelURI));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// Perform all ContentPolicy checks (MixedContent, CSP, ...)
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rv = DoContentSecurityChecks(finalChannelURI, loadInfo);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// now lets set the initalSecurityFlag for subsequent calls
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rv = loadInfo->SetInitialSecurityCheckDone(true);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// all security checks passed - lets allow the load
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsContentSecurityManager::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* aOldChannel,
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nsIChannel* aNewChannel,
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uint32_t aRedirFlags,
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nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback *aCb)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aOldChannel->GetLoadInfo();
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// Are we enforcing security using LoadInfo?
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if (loadInfo && loadInfo->GetEnforceSecurity()) {
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nsresult rv = CheckChannel(aNewChannel);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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aOldChannel->Cancel(rv);
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return rv;
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}
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}
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// Also verify that the redirecting server is allowed to redirect to the
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// given URI
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nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> oldPrincipal;
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nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
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GetChannelResultPrincipal(aOldChannel, getter_AddRefs(oldPrincipal));
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
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aNewChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(newURI));
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newOriginalURI;
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aNewChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(newOriginalURI));
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NS_ENSURE_STATE(oldPrincipal && newURI && newOriginalURI);
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const uint32_t flags =
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nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT |
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nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT;
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nsresult rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
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CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(oldPrincipal, newURI, flags);
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && newOriginalURI != newURI) {
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rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
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CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(oldPrincipal, newOriginalURI, flags);
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}
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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aCb->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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static void
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AddLoadFlags(nsIRequest *aRequest, nsLoadFlags aNewFlags)
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{
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nsLoadFlags flags;
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aRequest->GetLoadFlags(&flags);
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flags |= aNewFlags;
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aRequest->SetLoadFlags(flags);
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}
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/*
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* Check that this channel passes all security checks. Returns an error code
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* if this requesst should not be permitted.
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*/
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nsresult
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nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
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MOZ_ASSERT(loadInfo);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
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nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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// Handle cookie policies
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uint32_t cookiePolicy = loadInfo->GetCookiePolicy();
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if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN) {
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nsIPrincipal* loadingPrincipal = loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
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// It doesn't matter what we pass for the third, data-inherits, argument.
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// Any protocol which inherits won't pay attention to cookies anyway.
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rv = loadingPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(uri, false, false);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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AddLoadFlags(aChannel, nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS);
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}
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}
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else if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_OMIT) {
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AddLoadFlags(aChannel, nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS);
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}
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nsSecurityFlags securityMode = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
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// CORS mode is handled by nsCORSListenerProxy
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if (securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) {
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if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel)) {
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loadInfo->MaybeIncreaseTainting(LoadTainting::CORS);
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}
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// if none of the REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN flags are set, then SOP does not apply
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if ((securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS) ||
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(securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED)) {
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rv = DoSOPChecks(uri, loadInfo, aChannel);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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}
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if ((securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS) ||
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(securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL)) {
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if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel)) {
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loadInfo->MaybeIncreaseTainting(LoadTainting::Opaque);
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}
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// Please note that DoCheckLoadURIChecks should only be enforced for
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// cross origin requests. If the flag SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS is set
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// within the loadInfo, then then CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal is performed
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// within nsCorsListenerProxy
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rv = DoCheckLoadURIChecks(uri, loadInfo);
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ==== nsIContentSecurityManager implementation =====
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsContentSecurityManager::PerformSecurityCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
|
|
nsIStreamListener* aStreamListener,
|
|
nsIStreamListener** outStreamListener)
|
|
{
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> inAndOutListener = aStreamListener;
|
|
nsresult rv = doContentSecurityCheck(aChannel, inAndOutListener);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
|
|
|
|
inAndOutListener.forget(outStreamListener);
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NS_IMETHODIMP
|
|
nsContentSecurityManager::IsURIPotentiallyTrustworthy(nsIURI* aURI, bool* aIsTrustWorthy)
|
|
{
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
|
|
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aURI);
|
|
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aIsTrustWorthy);
|
|
|
|
*aIsTrustWorthy = false;
|
|
nsAutoCString scheme;
|
|
nsresult rv = aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("https") ||
|
|
scheme.EqualsLiteral("file") ||
|
|
scheme.EqualsLiteral("app") ||
|
|
scheme.EqualsLiteral("wss")) {
|
|
*aIsTrustWorthy = true;
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsAutoCString host;
|
|
rv = aURI->GetHost(host);
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (host.Equals("127.0.0.1") ||
|
|
host.Equals("localhost") ||
|
|
host.Equals("::1")) {
|
|
*aIsTrustWorthy = true;
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
return NS_OK;
|
|
}
|