зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
1043 строки
39 KiB
C++
1043 строки
39 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "CertVerifier.h"
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include "CTDiversityPolicy.h"
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#include "CTKnownLogs.h"
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#include "CTLogVerifier.h"
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#include "CSTrustDomain.h"
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#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
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#include "MultiLogCTVerifier.h"
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#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
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#include "NSSErrorsService.h"
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#include "cert.h"
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#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
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#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
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#include "mozilla/IntegerPrintfMacros.h"
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#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
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#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
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#include "nsPromiseFlatString.h"
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#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
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#include "pk11pub.h"
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#include "mozpkix/pkix.h"
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#include "mozpkix/pkixnss.h"
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#include "mozpkix/pkixutil.h"
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#include "secmod.h"
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using namespace mozilla::ct;
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using namespace mozilla::pkix;
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using namespace mozilla::psm;
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mozilla::LazyLogModule gCertVerifierLog("certverifier");
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// Returns the certificate validity period in calendar months (rounded down).
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// "extern" to allow unit tests in CTPolicyEnforcerTest.cpp.
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extern mozilla::pkix::Result GetCertLifetimeInFullMonths(PRTime certNotBefore,
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PRTime certNotAfter,
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size_t& months) {
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if (certNotBefore >= certNotAfter) {
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MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Expected notBefore < notAfter");
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return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
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}
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PRExplodedTime explodedNotBefore;
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PRExplodedTime explodedNotAfter;
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PR_ExplodeTime(certNotBefore, PR_LocalTimeParameters, &explodedNotBefore);
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PR_ExplodeTime(certNotAfter, PR_LocalTimeParameters, &explodedNotAfter);
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PRInt32 signedMonths =
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(explodedNotAfter.tm_year - explodedNotBefore.tm_year) * 12 +
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(explodedNotAfter.tm_month - explodedNotBefore.tm_month);
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if (explodedNotAfter.tm_mday < explodedNotBefore.tm_mday) {
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--signedMonths;
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}
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// Can't use `mozilla::AssertedCast<size_t>(signedMonths)` below
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// since it currently generates a warning on Win x64 debug.
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if (signedMonths < 0) {
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MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Expected explodedNotBefore < explodedNotAfter");
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return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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months = static_cast<size_t>(signedMonths);
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return Success;
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}
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namespace mozilla {
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namespace psm {
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const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY = 1;
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const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_MUST_BE_EV = 2;
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const CertVerifier::Flags CertVerifier::FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST = 4;
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static const unsigned int MIN_RSA_BITS = 2048;
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static const unsigned int MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK = 1024;
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void CertificateTransparencyInfo::Reset() {
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enabled = false;
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verifyResult.Reset();
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policyCompliance = CTPolicyCompliance::Unknown;
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}
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CertVerifier::CertVerifier(OcspDownloadConfig odc, OcspStrictConfig osc,
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mozilla::TimeDuration ocspTimeoutSoft,
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mozilla::TimeDuration ocspTimeoutHard,
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uint32_t certShortLifetimeInDays,
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PinningMode pinningMode, SHA1Mode sha1Mode,
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BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode nameMatchingMode,
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NetscapeStepUpPolicy netscapeStepUpPolicy,
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CertificateTransparencyMode ctMode,
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CRLiteMode crliteMode,
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uint64_t crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds,
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const Vector<EnterpriseCert>& thirdPartyCerts)
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: mOCSPDownloadConfig(odc),
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mOCSPStrict(osc == ocspStrict),
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mOCSPTimeoutSoft(ocspTimeoutSoft),
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mOCSPTimeoutHard(ocspTimeoutHard),
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mCertShortLifetimeInDays(certShortLifetimeInDays),
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mPinningMode(pinningMode),
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mSHA1Mode(sha1Mode),
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mNameMatchingMode(nameMatchingMode),
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mNetscapeStepUpPolicy(netscapeStepUpPolicy),
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mCTMode(ctMode),
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mCRLiteMode(crliteMode),
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mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds(crliteCTMergeDelaySeconds) {
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LoadKnownCTLogs();
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for (const auto& root : thirdPartyCerts) {
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EnterpriseCert rootCopy;
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// Best-effort. If we run out of memory, users might see untrusted issuer
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// errors, but the browser will probably crash before then.
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rootCopy.Init(root))) {
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Unused << mThirdPartyCerts.append(std::move(rootCopy));
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}
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}
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for (const auto& root : mThirdPartyCerts) {
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Input input;
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if (root.GetInput(input) == Success) {
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// mThirdPartyCerts consists of roots and intermediates.
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if (root.GetIsRoot()) {
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// Best effort again.
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Unused << mThirdPartyRootInputs.append(input);
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} else {
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Unused << mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs.append(input);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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CertVerifier::~CertVerifier() = default;
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Result IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(const UniqueCERTCertList& chain,
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bool& result) {
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if (!chain || CERT_LIST_EMPTY(chain)) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(chain);
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if (!rootNode) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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CERTCertificate* root = rootNode->cert;
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if (!root) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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return IsCertBuiltInRoot(root, result);
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}
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Result IsDelegatedCredentialAcceptable(const DelegatedCredentialInfo& dcInfo,
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SECOidTag evOidPolicyTag) {
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bool isEcdsa = dcInfo.scheme == ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 ||
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dcInfo.scheme == ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 ||
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dcInfo.scheme == ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512;
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// Firefox currently does not advertise any RSA schemes for use
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// with Delegated Credentials. As a secondary (on top of NSS)
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// check, disallow any RSA SPKI here. When ssl_sig_rsa_pss_pss_*
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// schemes are supported, check the modulus size and allow RSA here.
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if (!isEcdsa) {
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return Result::ERROR_INVALID_KEY;
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}
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return Result::Success;
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}
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// The term "builtin root" traditionally refers to a root CA certificate that
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// has been added to the NSS trust store, because it has been approved
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// for inclusion according to the Mozilla CA policy, and might be accepted
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// by Mozilla applications as an issuer for certificates seen on the public web.
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Result IsCertBuiltInRoot(CERTCertificate* cert, bool& result) {
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if (NS_FAILED(BlockUntilLoadableCertsLoaded())) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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result = false;
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#ifdef DEBUG
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nsCOMPtr<nsINSSComponent> component(do_GetService(PSM_COMPONENT_CONTRACTID));
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if (!component) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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nsresult rv = component->IsCertTestBuiltInRoot(cert, &result);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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if (result) {
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return Success;
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}
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#endif // DEBUG
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AutoSECMODListReadLock lock;
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for (SECMODModuleList* list = SECMOD_GetDefaultModuleList(); list;
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list = list->next) {
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for (int i = 0; i < list->module->slotCount; i++) {
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PK11SlotInfo* slot = list->module->slots[i];
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// We're searching for the "builtin root module", which is a module that
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// contains an object with a CKA_CLASS of CKO_NETSCAPE_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST.
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// We use PK11_HasRootCerts() to identify a module with that property.
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// In the past, we exclusively used the PKCS#11 module named nssckbi,
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// which is provided by the NSS library.
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// Nowadays, some distributions use a replacement module, which contains
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// the builtin roots, but which also contains additional CA certificates,
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// such as CAs trusted in a local deployment.
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// We want to be able to distinguish between these two categories,
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// because a CA, which may issue certificates for the public web,
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// is expected to comply with additional requirements.
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// If the certificate has attribute CKA_NSS_MOZILLA_CA_POLICY set to true,
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// then we treat it as a "builtin root".
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if (PK11_IsPresent(slot) && PK11_HasRootCerts(slot)) {
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CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle = PK11_FindCertInSlot(slot, cert, nullptr);
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if (handle != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
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PK11_HasAttributeSet(slot, handle, CKA_NSS_MOZILLA_CA_POLICY,
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false)) {
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// Attribute was found, and is set to true
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result = true;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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return Success;
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}
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static Result BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain& trustDomain, Input certDER, Time time, KeyUsage ku1,
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KeyUsage ku2, KeyUsage ku3, KeyPurposeId eku,
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const CertPolicyId& requiredPolicy, const Input* stapledOCSPResponse,
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/*optional out*/ CertVerifier::OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus) {
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trustDomain.ResetAccumulatedState();
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Result rv =
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BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
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ku1, eku, requiredPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
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if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
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trustDomain.ResetAccumulatedState();
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rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
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EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, ku2, eku,
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requiredPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
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if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
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trustDomain.ResetAccumulatedState();
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rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
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EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity, ku3, eku,
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requiredPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
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if (rv != Success) {
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rv = Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE;
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}
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}
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}
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if (ocspStaplingStatus) {
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*ocspStaplingStatus = trustDomain.GetOCSPStaplingStatus();
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}
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return rv;
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}
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void CertVerifier::LoadKnownCTLogs() {
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if (mCTMode == CertificateTransparencyMode::Disabled) {
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return;
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}
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mCTVerifier = MakeUnique<MultiLogCTVerifier>();
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for (const CTLogInfo& log : kCTLogList) {
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Input publicKey;
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Result rv = publicKey.Init(
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BitwiseCast<const uint8_t*, const char*>(log.key), log.keyLength);
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if (rv != Success) {
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MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Failed reading a log key for a known CT Log");
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continue;
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}
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CTLogVerifier logVerifier;
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const CTLogOperatorInfo& logOperator =
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kCTLogOperatorList[log.operatorIndex];
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rv = logVerifier.Init(publicKey, logOperator.id, log.status,
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log.disqualificationTime);
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if (rv != Success) {
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MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Failed initializing a known CT Log");
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continue;
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}
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mCTVerifier->AddLog(std::move(logVerifier));
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}
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// TBD: Initialize mCTDiversityPolicy with the CA dependency map
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// of the known CT logs operators.
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mCTDiversityPolicy = MakeUnique<CTDiversityPolicy>();
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}
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Result CertVerifier::VerifyCertificateTransparencyPolicy(
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NSSCertDBTrustDomain& trustDomain, const UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain,
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Input sctsFromTLS, Time time,
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/*optional out*/ CertificateTransparencyInfo* ctInfo) {
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if (ctInfo) {
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ctInfo->Reset();
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}
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if (mCTMode == CertificateTransparencyMode::Disabled) {
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return Success;
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}
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if (ctInfo) {
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ctInfo->enabled = true;
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}
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if (!builtChain || CERT_LIST_EMPTY(builtChain)) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
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}
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Input embeddedSCTs = trustDomain.GetSCTListFromCertificate();
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if (embeddedSCTs.GetLength() > 0) {
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MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("Got embedded SCT data of length %zu\n",
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static_cast<size_t>(embeddedSCTs.GetLength())));
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}
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Input sctsFromOCSP = trustDomain.GetSCTListFromOCSPStapling();
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if (sctsFromOCSP.GetLength() > 0) {
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MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("Got OCSP SCT data of length %zu\n",
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static_cast<size_t>(sctsFromOCSP.GetLength())));
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}
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if (sctsFromTLS.GetLength() > 0) {
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MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("Got TLS SCT data of length %zu\n",
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static_cast<size_t>(sctsFromTLS.GetLength())));
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}
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CERTCertListNode* endEntityNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(builtChain);
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if (!endEntityNode || CERT_LIST_END(endEntityNode, builtChain)) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
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}
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CERTCertListNode* issuerNode = CERT_LIST_NEXT(endEntityNode);
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if (!issuerNode || CERT_LIST_END(issuerNode, builtChain)) {
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// Issuer certificate is required for SCT verification.
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// If we've arrived here, we probably have a "trust chain" with only one
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// certificate (i.e. a self-signed end-entity that has been set as a trust
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// anchor either by a third party modifying our trust DB or via the
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// enterprise roots feature). If this is the case, certificate transparency
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// information will probably not be present, and it certainly won't verify
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// correctly. To simplify things, we return an empty CTVerifyResult and a
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// "not enough SCTs" CTPolicyCompliance result.
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if (ctInfo) {
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CTVerifyResult emptyResult;
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ctInfo->verifyResult = std::move(emptyResult);
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ctInfo->policyCompliance = CTPolicyCompliance::NotEnoughScts;
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}
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return Success;
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}
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CERTCertificate* endEntity = endEntityNode->cert;
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CERTCertificate* issuer = issuerNode->cert;
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if (!endEntity || !issuer) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
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}
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if (endEntity->subjectName) {
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MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("Verifying CT Policy compliance of subject %s\n",
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endEntity->subjectName));
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}
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Input endEntityDER;
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Result rv =
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endEntityDER.Init(endEntity->derCert.data, endEntity->derCert.len);
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if (rv != Success) {
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return rv;
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}
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Input issuerPublicKeyDER;
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rv = issuerPublicKeyDER.Init(issuer->derPublicKey.data,
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issuer->derPublicKey.len);
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if (rv != Success) {
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return rv;
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}
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CTVerifyResult result;
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rv = mCTVerifier->Verify(endEntityDER, issuerPublicKeyDER, embeddedSCTs,
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sctsFromOCSP, sctsFromTLS, time, result);
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if (rv != Success) {
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MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("SCT verification failed with fatal error %" PRId32 "\n",
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static_cast<uint32_t>(rv)));
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return rv;
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}
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if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug)) {
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size_t validCount = 0;
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size_t unknownLogCount = 0;
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size_t disqualifiedLogCount = 0;
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size_t invalidSignatureCount = 0;
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size_t invalidTimestampCount = 0;
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for (const VerifiedSCT& verifiedSct : result.verifiedScts) {
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switch (verifiedSct.status) {
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case VerifiedSCT::Status::Valid:
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validCount++;
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break;
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case VerifiedSCT::Status::ValidFromDisqualifiedLog:
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disqualifiedLogCount++;
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break;
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case VerifiedSCT::Status::UnknownLog:
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unknownLogCount++;
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break;
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case VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidSignature:
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invalidSignatureCount++;
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break;
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case VerifiedSCT::Status::InvalidTimestamp:
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invalidTimestampCount++;
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break;
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case VerifiedSCT::Status::None:
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default:
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MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unexpected SCT verification status");
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}
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}
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MOZ_LOG(
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gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
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("SCT verification result: "
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"valid=%zu unknownLog=%zu disqualifiedLog=%zu "
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"invalidSignature=%zu invalidTimestamp=%zu "
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"decodingErrors=%zu\n",
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validCount, unknownLogCount, disqualifiedLogCount,
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invalidSignatureCount, invalidTimestampCount, result.decodingErrors));
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}
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PRTime notBefore;
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PRTime notAfter;
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if (CERT_GetCertTimes(endEntity, ¬Before, ¬After) != SECSuccess) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
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}
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size_t lifetimeInMonths;
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rv = GetCertLifetimeInFullMonths(notBefore, notAfter, lifetimeInMonths);
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if (rv != Success) {
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return rv;
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}
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CTLogOperatorList allOperators;
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GetCTLogOperatorsFromVerifiedSCTList(result.verifiedScts, allOperators);
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CTLogOperatorList dependentOperators;
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rv = mCTDiversityPolicy->GetDependentOperators(builtChain.get(), allOperators,
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dependentOperators);
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if (rv != Success) {
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return rv;
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}
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CTPolicyEnforcer ctPolicyEnforcer;
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CTPolicyCompliance ctPolicyCompliance;
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ctPolicyEnforcer.CheckCompliance(result.verifiedScts, lifetimeInMonths,
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dependentOperators, ctPolicyCompliance);
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if (ctInfo) {
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ctInfo->verifyResult = std::move(result);
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ctInfo->policyCompliance = ctPolicyCompliance;
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}
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return Success;
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}
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bool CertVerifier::SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(SHA1Mode mode) {
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switch (mSHA1Mode) {
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case SHA1Mode::Forbidden:
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return mode != SHA1Mode::Forbidden;
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case SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot:
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return mode != SHA1Mode::Forbidden && mode != SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot;
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case SHA1Mode::ImportedRootOrBefore2016:
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return mode == SHA1Mode::Allowed;
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case SHA1Mode::Allowed:
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return false;
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// MSVC warns unless we explicitly handle this now-unused option.
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case SHA1Mode::UsedToBeBefore2016ButNowIsForbidden:
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default:
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MOZ_ASSERT(false, "unexpected SHA1Mode type");
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return true;
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}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Result CertVerifier::VerifyCert(
|
|
CERTCertificate* cert, SECCertificateUsage usage, Time time, void* pinArg,
|
|
const char* hostname,
|
|
/*out*/ UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain,
|
|
/*optional*/ const Flags flags,
|
|
/*optional*/ const Maybe<nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>>& extraCertificates,
|
|
/*optional*/ const Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& stapledOCSPResponseArg,
|
|
/*optional*/ const Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& sctsFromTLS,
|
|
/*optional*/ const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
|
|
/*optional out*/ SECOidTag* evOidPolicy,
|
|
/*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus,
|
|
/*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus,
|
|
/*optional out*/ SHA1ModeResult* sha1ModeResult,
|
|
/*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo,
|
|
/*optional out*/ CertificateTransparencyInfo* ctInfo,
|
|
/*optional out*/ CRLiteLookupResult* crliteLookupResult) {
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Top of VerifyCert\n"));
|
|
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !(flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV));
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !keySizeStatus);
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(usage == certificateUsageSSLServer || !sha1ModeResult);
|
|
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(BlockUntilLoadableCertsLoaded())) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
if (NS_FAILED(CheckForSmartCardChanges())) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (evOidPolicy) {
|
|
*evOidPolicy = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ocspStaplingStatus) {
|
|
if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
|
|
}
|
|
*ocspStaplingStatus = OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (keySizeStatus) {
|
|
if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
|
|
}
|
|
*keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::NeverChecked;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sha1ModeResult) {
|
|
if (usage != certificateUsageSSLServer) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
|
|
}
|
|
*sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::NeverChecked;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!cert ||
|
|
(usage != certificateUsageSSLServer && (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV))) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Input certDER;
|
|
Result rv = certDER.Init(cert->derCert.data, cert->derCert.len);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We configure the OCSP fetching modes separately for EV and non-EV
|
|
// verifications.
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching defaultOCSPFetching =
|
|
(mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspOff) || (mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspEVOnly) ||
|
|
(flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY)
|
|
? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP
|
|
: !mOCSPStrict ? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail
|
|
: NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVHardFail;
|
|
|
|
Input stapledOCSPResponseInput;
|
|
const Input* stapledOCSPResponse = nullptr;
|
|
if (stapledOCSPResponseArg) {
|
|
rv = stapledOCSPResponseInput.Init(stapledOCSPResponseArg->Elements(),
|
|
stapledOCSPResponseArg->Length());
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
// The stapled OCSP response was too big.
|
|
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE;
|
|
}
|
|
stapledOCSPResponse = &stapledOCSPResponseInput;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Input sctsFromTLSInput;
|
|
if (sctsFromTLS) {
|
|
rv = sctsFromTLSInput.Init(sctsFromTLS->Elements(), sctsFromTLS->Length());
|
|
if (rv != Success && sctsFromTLSInput.GetLength() != 0) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (usage) {
|
|
case certificateUsageSSLClient: {
|
|
// XXX: We don't really have a trust bit for SSL client authentication so
|
|
// just use trustEmail as it is the closest alternative.
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(
|
|
trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, mOCSPTimeoutSoft,
|
|
mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, pinningDisabled,
|
|
MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
|
|
SHA1Mode::Allowed, NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, mCRLiteMode,
|
|
mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds, originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,
|
|
mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr,
|
|
nullptr);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(
|
|
trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
|
|
KeyUsage::digitalSignature, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_clientAuth,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case certificateUsageSSLServer: {
|
|
// TODO: When verifying a certificate in an SSL handshake, we should
|
|
// restrict the acceptable key usage based on the key exchange method
|
|
// chosen by the server.
|
|
|
|
// These configurations are in order of most restrictive to least
|
|
// restrictive. This enables us to gather telemetry on the expected
|
|
// results of setting the default policy to a particular configuration.
|
|
SHA1Mode sha1ModeConfigurations[] = {
|
|
SHA1Mode::Forbidden,
|
|
SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot,
|
|
SHA1Mode::ImportedRootOrBefore2016,
|
|
SHA1Mode::Allowed,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
SHA1ModeResult sha1ModeResults[] = {
|
|
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithoutSHA1,
|
|
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithImportedRoot,
|
|
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithImportedRootOrSHA1Before2016,
|
|
SHA1ModeResult::SucceededWithSHA1,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
size_t sha1ModeConfigurationsCount =
|
|
MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeConfigurations);
|
|
|
|
static_assert(MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeConfigurations) ==
|
|
MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(sha1ModeResults),
|
|
"digestAlgorithm array lengths differ");
|
|
|
|
rv = Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
// Try to validate for EV first.
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching evOCSPFetching =
|
|
(mOCSPDownloadConfig == ocspOff) || (flags & FLAG_LOCAL_ONLY)
|
|
? NSSCertDBTrustDomain::LocalOnlyOCSPForEV
|
|
: NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForEV;
|
|
|
|
CertPolicyId evPolicy;
|
|
SECOidTag evPolicyOidTag;
|
|
bool foundEVPolicy = GetFirstEVPolicy(*cert, evPolicy, evPolicyOidTag);
|
|
for (size_t i = 0;
|
|
i < sha1ModeConfigurationsCount && rv != Success && foundEVPolicy;
|
|
i++) {
|
|
// Don't attempt verification if the SHA1 mode set by preferences
|
|
// (mSHA1Mode) is more restrictive than the SHA1 mode option we're on.
|
|
// (To put it another way, only attempt verification if the SHA1 mode
|
|
// option we're on is as restrictive or more restrictive than
|
|
// mSHA1Mode.) This allows us to gather telemetry information while
|
|
// still enforcing the mode set by preferences.
|
|
if (SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(sha1ModeConfigurations[i])) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Because of the try-strict and fallback approach, we have to clear any
|
|
// previously noted telemetry information.
|
|
if (pinningTelemetryInfo) {
|
|
pinningTelemetryInfo->Reset();
|
|
}
|
|
if (crliteLookupResult) {
|
|
*crliteLookupResult = CRLiteLookupResult::NeverChecked;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(
|
|
trustSSL, evOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, mOCSPTimeoutSoft,
|
|
mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, mPinningMode,
|
|
MIN_RSA_BITS, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckForEV,
|
|
sha1ModeConfigurations[i], mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, mCRLiteMode,
|
|
mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds, originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,
|
|
mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain,
|
|
pinningTelemetryInfo, crliteLookupResult, hostname);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(
|
|
trustDomain, certDER, time,
|
|
KeyUsage::digitalSignature, // (EC)DHE
|
|
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
|
|
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // (EC)DH
|
|
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, evPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse,
|
|
ocspStaplingStatus);
|
|
if (rv == Success &&
|
|
sha1ModeConfigurations[i] == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
|
|
bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
|
|
rv = IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(builtChain, isBuiltInRoot);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (isBuiltInRoot) {
|
|
rv = Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv == Success) {
|
|
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
|
|
("cert is EV with status %i\n",
|
|
static_cast<int>(sha1ModeResults[i])));
|
|
if (evOidPolicy) {
|
|
*evOidPolicy = evPolicyOidTag;
|
|
}
|
|
if (sha1ModeResult) {
|
|
*sha1ModeResult = sha1ModeResults[i];
|
|
}
|
|
rv = VerifyCertificateTransparencyPolicy(
|
|
trustDomain, builtChain, sctsFromTLSInput, time, ctInfo);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv == Success) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (flags & FLAG_MUST_BE_EV) {
|
|
rv = Result::ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Now try non-EV.
|
|
unsigned int keySizeOptions[] = {MIN_RSA_BITS, MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK};
|
|
|
|
KeySizeStatus keySizeStatuses[] = {KeySizeStatus::LargeMinimumSucceeded,
|
|
KeySizeStatus::CompatibilityRisk};
|
|
|
|
static_assert(
|
|
MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeOptions) == MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeStatuses),
|
|
"keySize array lengths differ");
|
|
|
|
size_t keySizeOptionsCount = MOZ_ARRAY_LENGTH(keySizeStatuses);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < keySizeOptionsCount && rv != Success; i++) {
|
|
for (size_t j = 0; j < sha1ModeConfigurationsCount && rv != Success;
|
|
j++) {
|
|
// Don't attempt verification if the SHA1 mode set by preferences
|
|
// (mSHA1Mode) is more restrictive than the SHA1 mode option we're on.
|
|
// (To put it another way, only attempt verification if the SHA1 mode
|
|
// option we're on is as restrictive or more restrictive than
|
|
// mSHA1Mode.) This allows us to gather telemetry information while
|
|
// still enforcing the mode set by preferences.
|
|
if (SHA1ModeMoreRestrictiveThanGivenMode(sha1ModeConfigurations[j])) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// invalidate any telemetry info relating to failed chains
|
|
if (pinningTelemetryInfo) {
|
|
pinningTelemetryInfo->Reset();
|
|
}
|
|
if (crliteLookupResult) {
|
|
*crliteLookupResult = CRLiteLookupResult::NeverChecked;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(
|
|
trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg,
|
|
mOCSPTimeoutSoft, mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays,
|
|
mPinningMode, keySizeOptions[i],
|
|
ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff, sha1ModeConfigurations[j],
|
|
mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, mCRLiteMode, mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds,
|
|
originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,
|
|
mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain,
|
|
pinningTelemetryInfo, crliteLookupResult, hostname);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChainForOneKeyUsage(
|
|
trustDomain, certDER, time,
|
|
KeyUsage::digitalSignature, //(EC)DHE
|
|
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
|
|
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, //(EC)DH
|
|
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth, CertPolicyId::anyPolicy,
|
|
stapledOCSPResponse, ocspStaplingStatus);
|
|
if (rv != Success && !IsFatalError(rv) &&
|
|
rv != Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE &&
|
|
trustDomain.GetIsErrorDueToDistrustedCAPolicy()) {
|
|
// Bug 1444440 - If there are multiple paths, at least one to a CA
|
|
// distrusted-by-policy, and none of them ending in a trusted root,
|
|
// then we might show a different error (UNKNOWN_ISSUER) than we
|
|
// intend, confusing users.
|
|
rv = Result::ERROR_ADDITIONAL_POLICY_CONSTRAINT_FAILED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv == Success &&
|
|
sha1ModeConfigurations[j] == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
|
|
bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
|
|
rv = IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(builtChain, isBuiltInRoot);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (isBuiltInRoot) {
|
|
rv = Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv == Success) {
|
|
if (keySizeStatus) {
|
|
*keySizeStatus = keySizeStatuses[i];
|
|
}
|
|
if (sha1ModeResult) {
|
|
*sha1ModeResult = sha1ModeResults[j];
|
|
}
|
|
rv = VerifyCertificateTransparencyPolicy(
|
|
trustDomain, builtChain, sctsFromTLSInput, time, ctInfo);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rv == Success) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (keySizeStatus) {
|
|
*keySizeStatus = KeySizeStatus::AlreadyBad;
|
|
}
|
|
// The telemetry probe CERT_CHAIN_SHA1_POLICY_STATUS gives us feedback on
|
|
// the result of setting a specific policy. However, we don't want noise
|
|
// from users who have manually set the policy to something other than the
|
|
// default, so we only collect for ImportedRoot (which is the default).
|
|
if (sha1ModeResult && mSHA1Mode == SHA1Mode::ImportedRoot) {
|
|
*sha1ModeResult = SHA1ModeResult::Failed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case certificateUsageSSLCA: {
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(
|
|
trustSSL, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, mOCSPTimeoutSoft,
|
|
mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, pinningDisabled,
|
|
MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
|
|
SHA1Mode::Allowed, mNetscapeStepUpPolicy, mCRLiteMode,
|
|
mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds, originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,
|
|
mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr,
|
|
nullptr);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA,
|
|
KeyUsage::keyCertSign, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_serverAuth,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case certificateUsageEmailSigner: {
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(
|
|
trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, mOCSPTimeoutSoft,
|
|
mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, pinningDisabled,
|
|
MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
|
|
SHA1Mode::Allowed, NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, mCRLiteMode,
|
|
mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds, originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,
|
|
mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr,
|
|
nullptr);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(
|
|
trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
|
|
KeyUsage::digitalSignature, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(
|
|
trustDomain, certDER, time, EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
|
|
KeyUsage::nonRepudiation, KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case certificateUsageEmailRecipient: {
|
|
// TODO: The higher level S/MIME processing should pass in which key
|
|
// usage it is trying to verify for, and base its algorithm choices
|
|
// based on the result of the verification(s).
|
|
NSSCertDBTrustDomain trustDomain(
|
|
trustEmail, defaultOCSPFetching, mOCSPCache, pinArg, mOCSPTimeoutSoft,
|
|
mOCSPTimeoutHard, mCertShortLifetimeInDays, pinningDisabled,
|
|
MIN_RSA_BITS_WEAK, ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff,
|
|
SHA1Mode::Allowed, NetscapeStepUpPolicy::NeverMatch, mCRLiteMode,
|
|
mCRLiteCTMergeDelaySeconds, originAttributes, mThirdPartyRootInputs,
|
|
mThirdPartyIntermediateInputs, extraCertificates, builtChain, nullptr,
|
|
nullptr);
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
|
|
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
|
|
KeyUsage::keyEncipherment, // RSA
|
|
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
if (rv == Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE) {
|
|
rv = BuildCertChain(trustDomain, certDER, time,
|
|
EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity,
|
|
KeyUsage::keyAgreement, // ECDH/DH
|
|
KeyPurposeId::id_kp_emailProtection,
|
|
CertPolicyId::anyPolicy, stapledOCSPResponse);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
rv = Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return Success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool CertIsSelfSigned(const UniqueCERTCertificate& cert, void* pinarg) {
|
|
Input certInput;
|
|
Result rv = certInput.Init(cert->derCert.data, cert->derCert.len);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
// we don't use the certificate for path building, so this parameter doesn't
|
|
// matter
|
|
EndEntityOrCA notUsedForPaths = EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity;
|
|
BackCert backCert(certInput, notUsedForPaths, nullptr);
|
|
rv = backCert.Init();
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!InputsAreEqual(backCert.GetIssuer(), backCert.GetSubject())) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>> emptyCertList;
|
|
// CSTrustDomain is only used for the signature verification callbacks
|
|
mozilla::psm::CSTrustDomain trustDomain(emptyCertList);
|
|
rv = VerifySignedData(trustDomain, backCert.GetSignedData(),
|
|
backCert.GetSubjectPublicKeyInfo());
|
|
return rv == Success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Result CertVerifier::VerifySSLServerCert(
|
|
const UniqueCERTCertificate& peerCert, Time time,
|
|
/*optional*/ void* pinarg, const nsACString& hostname,
|
|
/*out*/ UniqueCERTCertList& builtChain,
|
|
/*optional*/ Flags flags,
|
|
/*optional*/ const Maybe<nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>>& extraCertificates,
|
|
/*optional*/ const Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& stapledOCSPResponse,
|
|
/*optional*/ const Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>>& sctsFromTLS,
|
|
/*optional*/ const Maybe<DelegatedCredentialInfo>& dcInfo,
|
|
/*optional*/ const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
|
|
/*optional out*/ SECOidTag* evOidPolicy,
|
|
/*optional out*/ OCSPStaplingStatus* ocspStaplingStatus,
|
|
/*optional out*/ KeySizeStatus* keySizeStatus,
|
|
/*optional out*/ SHA1ModeResult* sha1ModeResult,
|
|
/*optional out*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo,
|
|
/*optional out*/ CertificateTransparencyInfo* ctInfo,
|
|
/*optional out*/ CRLiteLookupResult* crliteLookupResult,
|
|
/*optional out*/ bool* isBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot) {
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(peerCert);
|
|
// XXX: MOZ_ASSERT(pinarg);
|
|
MOZ_ASSERT(!hostname.IsEmpty());
|
|
|
|
SECOidTag evPolicyOidTag = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
|
|
|
|
if (isBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot) {
|
|
*isBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (evOidPolicy) {
|
|
*evOidPolicy = evPolicyOidTag;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hostname.IsEmpty()) {
|
|
return Result::ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CreateCertErrorRunnable assumes that CheckCertHostname is only called
|
|
// if VerifyCert succeeded.
|
|
Result rv = VerifyCert(peerCert.get(), certificateUsageSSLServer, time,
|
|
pinarg, PromiseFlatCString(hostname).get(), builtChain,
|
|
flags, extraCertificates, stapledOCSPResponse,
|
|
sctsFromTLS, originAttributes, &evPolicyOidTag,
|
|
ocspStaplingStatus, keySizeStatus, sha1ModeResult,
|
|
pinningTelemetryInfo, ctInfo, crliteLookupResult);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER &&
|
|
CertIsSelfSigned(peerCert, pinarg)) {
|
|
// In this case we didn't find any issuer for the certificate and the
|
|
// certificate is self-signed.
|
|
return Result::ERROR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv == Result::ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER) {
|
|
// In this case we didn't get any valid path for the cert. Let's see if
|
|
// the issuer is the same as the issuer for our canary probe. If yes, this
|
|
// connection is connecting via a misconfigured proxy.
|
|
// Note: The MitM canary might not be set. In this case we consider this
|
|
// an unknown issuer error.
|
|
nsCOMPtr<nsINSSComponent> component(
|
|
do_GetService(PSM_COMPONENT_CONTRACTID));
|
|
if (!component) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
|
|
}
|
|
// IssuerMatchesMitmCanary succeeds if the issuer matches the canary and
|
|
// the feature is enabled.
|
|
nsresult rv = component->IssuerMatchesMitmCanary(peerCert->issuerName);
|
|
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
|
|
return Result::ERROR_MITM_DETECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (dcInfo) {
|
|
rv = IsDelegatedCredentialAcceptable(*dcInfo, evPolicyOidTag);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Input peerCertInput;
|
|
rv = peerCertInput.Init(peerCert->derCert.data, peerCert->derCert.len);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Input stapledOCSPResponseInput;
|
|
Input* responseInputPtr = nullptr;
|
|
if (stapledOCSPResponse) {
|
|
rv = stapledOCSPResponseInput.Init(stapledOCSPResponse->Elements(),
|
|
stapledOCSPResponse->Length());
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
// The stapled OCSP response was too big.
|
|
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE;
|
|
}
|
|
responseInputPtr = &stapledOCSPResponseInput;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(flags & FLAG_TLS_IGNORE_STATUS_REQUEST)) {
|
|
rv = CheckTLSFeaturesAreSatisfied(peerCertInput, responseInputPtr);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Input hostnameInput;
|
|
rv = hostnameInput.Init(
|
|
BitwiseCast<const uint8_t*, const char*>(hostname.BeginReading()),
|
|
hostname.Length());
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
|
|
}
|
|
bool isBuiltInRoot;
|
|
rv = IsCertChainRootBuiltInRoot(builtChain, isBuiltInRoot);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (isBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot) {
|
|
*isBuiltCertChainRootBuiltInRoot = isBuiltInRoot;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BRNameMatchingPolicy nameMatchingPolicy(
|
|
isBuiltInRoot ? mNameMatchingMode
|
|
: BRNameMatchingPolicy::Mode::DoNotEnforce);
|
|
rv = CheckCertHostname(peerCertInput, hostnameInput, nameMatchingPolicy);
|
|
if (rv != Success) {
|
|
// Treat malformed name information as a domain mismatch.
|
|
if (rv == Result::ERROR_BAD_DER) {
|
|
return Result::ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (evOidPolicy) {
|
|
*evOidPolicy = evPolicyOidTag;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return Success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // namespace psm
|
|
} // namespace mozilla
|