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gecko-dev/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h"
#include "nsEscape.h"
#include "nsDataHandler.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
#include "nsINode.h"
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
#include "nsIOService.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsCORSListenerProxy.h"
#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
#include "nsCDefaultURIFixup.h"
#include "nsIURIFixup.h"
#include "nsIImageLoadingContent.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/TabChild.h"
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsContentSecurityManager,
nsIContentSecurityManager,
nsIChannelEventSink)
/* static */ bool
nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(nsIChannel* aChannel)
{
// Let's block all toplevel document navigations to a data: URI.
// In all cases where the toplevel document is navigated to a
// data: URI the triggeringPrincipal is a codeBasePrincipal, or
// a NullPrincipal. In other cases, e.g. typing a data: URL into
// the URL-Bar, the triggeringPrincipal is a SystemPrincipal;
// we don't want to block those loads. Only exception, loads coming
// from an external applicaton (e.g. Thunderbird) don't load
// using a codeBasePrincipal, but we want to block those loads.
if (!mozilla::net::nsIOService::BlockToplevelDataUriNavigations()) {
return true;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
if (!loadInfo) {
return true;
}
if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
return true;
}
if (loadInfo->GetForceAllowDataURI()) {
// if the loadinfo explicitly allows the data URI navigation, let's allow it now
return true;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
bool isDataURI =
(NS_SUCCEEDED(uri->SchemeIs("data", &isDataURI)) && isDataURI);
if (!isDataURI) {
return true;
}
nsAutoCString spec;
rv = uri->GetSpec(spec);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
nsAutoCString contentType;
bool base64;
rv = nsDataHandler::ParseURI(spec, contentType, nullptr,
base64, nullptr);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
// Whitelist data: images as long as they are not SVGs
if (StringBeginsWith(contentType, NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("image/")) &&
!contentType.EqualsLiteral("image/svg+xml")) {
return true;
}
// Whitelist all plain text types as well as data: PDFs.
if (nsContentUtils::IsPlainTextType(contentType) ||
contentType.EqualsLiteral("application/pdf")) {
return true;
}
// Redirecting to a toplevel data: URI is not allowed, hence we make
// sure the RedirectChain is empty.
if (!loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal() &&
nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()) &&
loadInfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty()) {
return true;
}
nsAutoCString dataSpec;
uri->GetSpec(dataSpec);
if (dataSpec.Length() > 50) {
dataSpec.Truncate(50);
dataSpec.AppendLiteral("...");
}
nsCOMPtr<nsITabChild> tabChild = do_QueryInterface(loadInfo->ContextForTopLevelLoad());
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc;
if (tabChild) {
doc = static_cast<mozilla::dom::TabChild*>(tabChild.get())->GetDocument();
}
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 specUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(dataSpec));
const char16_t* params[] = { specUTF16.get() };
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("DATA_URI_BLOCKED"),
doc,
nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
"BlockTopLevelDataURINavigation",
params, ArrayLength(params));
return false;
}
/* static */ bool
nsContentSecurityManager::AllowInsecureRedirectToDataURI(nsIChannel* aNewChannel)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aNewChannel->GetLoadInfo();
if (!loadInfo) {
return true;
}
if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT) {
return true;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aNewChannel, getter_AddRefs(newURI));
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !newURI) {
return true;
}
bool isDataURI = (NS_SUCCEEDED(newURI->SchemeIs("data", &isDataURI)) && isDataURI);
if (!isDataURI) {
return true;
}
// Web Extensions are exempt from that restriction and are allowed to redirect
// a channel to a data: URI. When a web extension redirects a channel, we set
// a flag on the loadInfo which allows us to identify such redirects here.
if (loadInfo->GetAllowInsecureRedirectToDataURI()) {
return true;
}
nsAutoCString dataSpec;
newURI->GetSpec(dataSpec);
if (dataSpec.Length() > 50) {
dataSpec.Truncate(50);
dataSpec.AppendLiteral("...");
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc;
nsINode* node = loadInfo->LoadingNode();
if (node) {
doc = node->OwnerDoc();
}
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 specUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(dataSpec));
const char16_t* params[] = { specUTF16.get() };
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("DATA_URI_BLOCKED"),
doc,
nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
"BlockSubresourceRedirectToData",
params, ArrayLength(params));
return false;
}
/* static */ nsresult
nsContentSecurityManager::CheckFTPSubresourceLoad(nsIChannel* aChannel)
{
// We dissallow using FTP resources as a subresource almost everywhere.
// The only valid way to use FTP resources is loading it as
// a top level document.
if (!mozilla::net::nsIOService::BlockFTPSubresources()) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
if (!loadInfo) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsContentPolicyType type = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
if (type == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (!uri) {
return NS_OK;
}
bool isFtpURI = (NS_SUCCEEDED(uri->SchemeIs("ftp", &isFtpURI)) && isFtpURI);
if (!isFtpURI) {
return NS_OK;
}
// Allow loading FTP subresources in FTP documents, like XML.
nsIPrincipal* triggeringPrincipal = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> triggeringURI;
triggeringPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(triggeringURI));
if (triggeringURI && nsContentUtils::SchemeIs(triggeringURI, "ftp")) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocument> doc;
if (nsINode* node = loadInfo->LoadingNode()) {
doc = node->OwnerDoc();
}
nsAutoCString spec;
uri->GetSpec(spec);
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 specUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(spec));
const char16_t* params[] = { specUTF16.get() };
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("FTP_URI_BLOCKED"),
doc,
nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
"BlockSubresourceFTP",
params, ArrayLength(params));
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
static nsresult
ValidateSecurityFlags(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
{
nsSecurityFlags securityMode = aLoadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
// We should never perform a security check on a loadInfo that uses the flag
// SEC_ONLY_FOR_EXPLICIT_CONTENTSEC_CHECK, because that is only used for temporary
// loadInfos used for explicit nsIContentPolicy checks, but never be set as
// a security flag on an actual channel.
if (securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS &&
securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED &&
securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS &&
securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL &&
securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) {
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "need one securityflag from nsILoadInfo to perform security checks");
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
// all good, found the right security flags
return NS_OK;
}
static bool IsImageLoadInEditorAppType(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
{
// Editor apps get special treatment here, editors can load images
// from anywhere. This allows editor to insert images from file://
// into documents that are being edited.
nsContentPolicyType type = aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
if (type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE &&
type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_PRELOAD &&
type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_FAVICON &&
type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET) {
return false;
}
uint32_t appType = nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
nsINode* node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
if (!node) {
return false;
}
nsIDocument* doc = node->OwnerDoc();
if (!doc) {
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> docShellTreeItem = doc->GetDocShell();
if (!docShellTreeItem) {
return false;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> root;
docShellTreeItem->GetRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(root));
nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell(do_QueryInterface(root));
if (!docShell || NS_FAILED(docShell->GetAppType(&appType))) {
appType = nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
return appType == nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_EDITOR;
}
static nsresult
DoCheckLoadURIChecks(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
{
// Bug 1228117: determine the correct security policy for DTD loads
if (aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD) {
return NS_OK;
}
if (IsImageLoadInEditorAppType(aLoadInfo)) {
return NS_OK;
}
uint32_t flags = nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD;
if (aLoadInfo->GetAllowChrome()) {
flags |= nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME;
}
if (aLoadInfo->GetDisallowScript()) {
flags |= nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT;
}
// Only call CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal() using the TriggeringPrincipal and not
// the LoadingPrincipal when SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_* security flags are set,
// to allow, e.g. user stylesheets to load chrome:// URIs.
return nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal(),
aURI,
flags);
}
static bool
URIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aURIFlags)
{
bool hasFlags;
nsresult rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &hasFlags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
return hasFlags;
}
static nsresult
DoSOPChecks(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, nsIChannel* aChannel)
{
if (aLoadInfo->GetAllowChrome() &&
(URIHasFlags(aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE) ||
nsContentUtils::SchemeIs(aURI, "moz-safe-about"))) {
// UI resources are allowed.
return DoCheckLoadURIChecks(aURI, aLoadInfo);
}
NS_ENSURE_FALSE(NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel, true),
NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
return NS_OK;
}
static nsresult
DoCORSChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener)
{
MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(aInAndOutListener, "can not perform CORS checks without a listener");
// No need to set up CORS if TriggeringPrincipal is the SystemPrincipal.
// For example, allow user stylesheets to load XBL from external files
// without requiring CORS.
if (nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())) {
return NS_OK;
}
nsIPrincipal* loadingPrincipal = aLoadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
RefPtr<nsCORSListenerProxy> corsListener =
new nsCORSListenerProxy(aInAndOutListener,
loadingPrincipal,
aLoadInfo->GetCookiePolicy() ==
nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE);
// XXX: @arg: DataURIHandling::Allow
// lets use DataURIHandling::Allow for now and then decide on callsite basis. see also:
// http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/dom/security/nsCORSListenerProxy.h#33
nsresult rv = corsListener->Init(aChannel, DataURIHandling::Allow);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
aInAndOutListener = corsListener;
return NS_OK;
}
static nsresult
DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
{
nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType =
aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
nsCString mimeTypeGuess;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
if (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
// TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT loads might potentially
// be wyciwyg:// channels. Let's fix up the URI so we can
// perform proper security checks.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> urifixup(do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID, &rv));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && urifixup) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> fixedURI;
rv = urifixup->CreateExposableURI(uri, getter_AddRefs(fixedURI));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
uri = fixedURI;
}
}
}
switch(contentPolicyType) {
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT: {
mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/javascript");
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET: {
mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/css");
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: {
mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/html");
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_REFRESH: {
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "contentPolicyType not supported yet");
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XBL: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: {
// alias nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DATAREQUEST:
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
"type_xml requires requestingContext of type Document");
}
#endif
// We're checking for the external TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST here in case
// an addon creates a request with that type.
if (internalContentPolicyType ==
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_XMLHTTPREQUEST ||
internalContentPolicyType ==
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST) {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
}
else {
MOZ_ASSERT(internalContentPolicyType ==
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EVENTSOURCE,
"can not set mime type guess for unexpected internal type");
mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING(TEXT_EVENT_STREAM);
}
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::ELEMENT_NODE,
"type_subrequest requires requestingContext of type Element");
}
#endif
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
"type_dtd requires requestingContext of type Document");
}
#endif
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA: {
if (internalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_TRACK) {
mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("text/vtt");
}
else {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
}
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::ELEMENT_NODE,
"type_media requires requestingContext of type Element");
}
#endif
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET: {
// Websockets have to use the proxied URI:
// ws:// instead of http:// for CSP checks
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> httpChannelInternal
= do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
MOZ_ASSERT(httpChannelInternal);
if (httpChannelInternal) {
rv = httpChannelInternal->GetProxyURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
}
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT: {
mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/xml");
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
"type_xslt requires requestingContext of type Document");
}
#endif
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
#ifdef DEBUG
{
nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
"type_beacon requires requestingContext of type Document");
}
#endif
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST: {
mimeTypeGuess = NS_LITERAL_CSTRING("application/manifest+json");
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE: {
mimeTypeGuess = EmptyCString();
break;
}
default:
// nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "can not perform security check without a valid contentType");
}
int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(uri,
aLoadInfo,
mimeTypeGuess,
&shouldLoad,
nsContentUtils::GetContentPolicy());
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
if ((NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && shouldLoad == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE) &&
(contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT)) {
// for docshell loads we might have to return SHOW_ALT.
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED_SHOW_ALT;
}
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
return NS_OK;
}
/*
* Based on the security flags provided in the loadInfo of the channel,
* doContentSecurityCheck() performs the following content security checks
* before opening the channel:
*
* (1) Same Origin Policy Check (if applicable)
* (2) Allow Cross Origin but perform sanity checks whether a principal
* is allowed to access the following URL.
* (3) Perform CORS check (if applicable)
* (4) ContentPolicy checks (Content-Security-Policy, Mixed Content, ...)
*
* @param aChannel
* The channel to perform the security checks on.
* @param aInAndOutListener
* The streamListener that is passed to channel->AsyncOpen2() that is now potentially
* wrappend within nsCORSListenerProxy() and becomes the corsListener that now needs
* to be set as new streamListener on the channel.
*/
nsresult
nsContentSecurityManager::doContentSecurityCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener)
{
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aChannel);
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
if (!loadInfo) {
MOZ_ASSERT(false, "channel needs to have loadInfo to perform security checks");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
// if dealing with a redirected channel then we have already installed
// streamlistener and redirect proxies and so we are done.
if (loadInfo->GetInitialSecurityCheckDone()) {
return NS_OK;
}
// make sure that only one of the five security flags is set in the loadinfo
// e.g. do not require same origin and allow cross origin at the same time
nsresult rv = ValidateSecurityFlags(loadInfo);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// since aChannel was openend using asyncOpen2() we have to make sure
// that redirects of that channel also get openend using asyncOpen2()
// please note that some implementations of ::AsyncOpen2 might already
// have set that flag to true (e.g. nsViewSourceChannel) in which case
// we just set the flag again.
loadInfo->SetEnforceSecurity(true);
if (loadInfo->GetSecurityMode() == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) {
rv = DoCORSChecks(aChannel, loadInfo, aInAndOutListener);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
rv = CheckChannel(aChannel);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Perform all ContentPolicy checks (MixedContent, CSP, ...)
rv = DoContentSecurityChecks(aChannel, loadInfo);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// Apply this after CSP to match Chrome.
rv = CheckFTPSubresourceLoad(aChannel);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// now lets set the initalSecurityFlag for subsequent calls
loadInfo->SetInitialSecurityCheckDone(true);
// all security checks passed - lets allow the load
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsContentSecurityManager::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* aOldChannel,
nsIChannel* aNewChannel,
uint32_t aRedirFlags,
nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback *aCb)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aOldChannel->GetLoadInfo();
// Are we enforcing security using LoadInfo?
if (loadInfo && loadInfo->GetEnforceSecurity()) {
nsresult rv = CheckChannel(aNewChannel);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
rv = CheckFTPSubresourceLoad(aNewChannel);
}
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
aOldChannel->Cancel(rv);
return rv;
}
}
// Also verify that the redirecting server is allowed to redirect to the
// given URI
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> oldPrincipal;
nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
GetChannelResultPrincipal(aOldChannel, getter_AddRefs(oldPrincipal));
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
Unused << NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aNewChannel, getter_AddRefs(newURI));
NS_ENSURE_STATE(oldPrincipal && newURI);
// Do not allow insecure redirects to data: URIs
if (!AllowInsecureRedirectToDataURI(aNewChannel)) {
// cancel the old channel and return an error
aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
}
const uint32_t flags =
nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT |
nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT;
nsresult rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->
CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(oldPrincipal, newURI, flags);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
aCb->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
return NS_OK;
}
static void
AddLoadFlags(nsIRequest *aRequest, nsLoadFlags aNewFlags)
{
nsLoadFlags flags;
aRequest->GetLoadFlags(&flags);
flags |= aNewFlags;
aRequest->SetLoadFlags(flags);
}
/*
* Check that this channel passes all security checks. Returns an error code
* if this requesst should not be permitted.
*/
nsresult
nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->GetLoadInfo();
MOZ_ASSERT(loadInfo);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
nsContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
if (contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
contentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
// TYPE_DOCUMENT and TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT loads might potentially
// be wyciwyg:// channels. Let's fix up the URI so we can
// perform proper security checks.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURIFixup> urifixup(do_GetService(NS_URIFIXUP_CONTRACTID, &rv));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && urifixup) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> fixedURI;
rv = urifixup->CreateExposableURI(uri, getter_AddRefs(fixedURI));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
uri = fixedURI;
}
}
}
// Handle cookie policies
uint32_t cookiePolicy = loadInfo->GetCookiePolicy();
if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN) {
// We shouldn't have the SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN flag for top level loads
MOZ_ASSERT(loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT);
nsIPrincipal* loadingPrincipal = loadInfo->LoadingPrincipal();
// It doesn't matter what we pass for the third, data-inherits, argument.
// Any protocol which inherits won't pay attention to cookies anyway.
rv = loadingPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(uri, false, false);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
AddLoadFlags(aChannel, nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS);
}
}
else if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_OMIT) {
AddLoadFlags(aChannel, nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS);
}
nsSecurityFlags securityMode = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
// CORS mode is handled by nsCORSListenerProxy
if (securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS) {
if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel)) {
loadInfo->MaybeIncreaseTainting(LoadTainting::CORS);
}
return NS_OK;
}
// Allow subresource loads if TriggeringPrincipal is the SystemPrincipal.
// For example, allow user stylesheets to load XBL from external files.
if (nsContentUtils::IsSystemPrincipal(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()) &&
loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
return NS_OK;
}
// if none of the REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN flags are set, then SOP does not apply
if ((securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS) ||
(securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED)) {
rv = DoSOPChecks(uri, loadInfo, aChannel);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
if ((securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_INHERITS) ||
(securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_NULL)) {
if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel)) {
NS_ENSURE_FALSE(loadInfo->GetDontFollowRedirects(), NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
loadInfo->MaybeIncreaseTainting(LoadTainting::Opaque);
}
// Please note that DoCheckLoadURIChecks should only be enforced for
// cross origin requests. If the flag SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_DATA_INHERITS is set
// within the loadInfo, then then CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal is performed
// within nsCorsListenerProxy
rv = DoCheckLoadURIChecks(uri, loadInfo);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
// TODO: Bug 1371237
// consider calling SetBlockedRequest in nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel
}
return NS_OK;
}
// ==== nsIContentSecurityManager implementation =====
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsContentSecurityManager::PerformSecurityCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
nsIStreamListener* aStreamListener,
nsIStreamListener** outStreamListener)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> inAndOutListener = aStreamListener;
nsresult rv = doContentSecurityCheck(aChannel, inAndOutListener);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
inAndOutListener.forget(outStreamListener);
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsContentSecurityManager::IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
bool* aIsTrustWorthy)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aPrincipal);
NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aIsTrustWorthy);
if (aPrincipal->GetIsSystemPrincipal()) {
*aIsTrustWorthy = true;
return NS_OK;
}
// The following implements:
// https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy
*aIsTrustWorthy = false;
if (aPrincipal->GetIsNullPrincipal()) {
return NS_OK;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal->GetIsCodebasePrincipal(),
"Nobody is expected to call us with an nsIExpandedPrincipal");
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
aPrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
nsAutoCString scheme;
nsresult rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_OK;
}
// Blobs are expected to inherit their principal so we don't expect to have
// a codebase principal with scheme 'blob' here. We can't assert that though
// since someone could mess with a non-blob URI to give it that scheme.
NS_WARNING_ASSERTION(!scheme.EqualsLiteral("blob"),
"IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy ignoring blob scheme");
// According to the specification, the user agent may choose to extend the
// trust to other, vendor-specific URL schemes. We use this for "resource:",
// which is technically a substituting protocol handler that is not limited to
// local resource mapping, but in practice is never mapped remotely as this
// would violate assumptions a lot of code makes.
if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("https") ||
scheme.EqualsLiteral("file") ||
scheme.EqualsLiteral("resource") ||
scheme.EqualsLiteral("app") ||
scheme.EqualsLiteral("moz-extension") ||
scheme.EqualsLiteral("wss")) {
*aIsTrustWorthy = true;
return NS_OK;
}
nsAutoCString host;
rv = uri->GetHost(host);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_OK;
}
if (host.EqualsLiteral("127.0.0.1") ||
host.EqualsLiteral("localhost") ||
host.EqualsLiteral("::1")) {
*aIsTrustWorthy = true;
return NS_OK;
}
// If a host is not considered secure according to the default algorithm, then
// check to see if it has been whitelisted by the user. We only apply this
// whitelist for network resources, i.e., those with scheme "http" or "ws".
// The pref should contain a comma-separated list of hostnames.
if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("http") || scheme.EqualsLiteral("ws")) {
nsAutoCString whitelist;
nsresult rv =
Preferences::GetCString("dom.securecontext.whitelist", whitelist);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
nsCCharSeparatedTokenizer tokenizer(whitelist, ',');
while (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) {
const nsACString& allowedHost = tokenizer.nextToken();
if (host.Equals(allowedHost)) {
*aIsTrustWorthy = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
}
// Maybe we have a .onion URL. Treat it as whitelisted as well if
// `dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions` is `true`.
if (nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(uri)) {
*aIsTrustWorthy = true;
return NS_OK;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
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