gecko-dev/dom/webauthn/WebAuthnManager.cpp

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Этот файл содержит неоднозначные символы Юникода!

Этот файл содержит неоднозначные символы Юникода, которые могут быть перепутаны с другими в текущей локали. Если это намеренно, можете спокойно проигнорировать это предупреждение. Используйте кнопку Экранировать, чтобы подсветить эти символы.

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
* You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "hasht.h"
#include "nsHTMLDocument.h"
#include "nsIURIMutator.h"
#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
#include "WebAuthnCoseIdentifiers.h"
#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/AuthenticatorAssertionResponse.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/AuthenticatorAttestationResponse.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/PublicKeyCredential.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Promise.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/PWebAuthnTransaction.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnManager.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnTransactionChild.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WebAuthnUtil.h"
#include "mozilla/ipc/BackgroundChild.h"
#include "mozilla/ipc/PBackgroundChild.h"
#include "authenticator/src/u2fhid-capi.h"
#ifdef OS_WIN
# include "WinWebAuthnManager.h"
#endif
using namespace mozilla::ipc;
namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {
/***********************************************************************
* Statics
**********************************************************************/
namespace {
static mozilla::LazyLogModule gWebAuthnManagerLog("webauthnmanager");
}
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS_CYCLE_COLLECTION_INHERITED_0(WebAuthnManager,
WebAuthnManagerBase)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_CLASS(WebAuthnManager)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_BEGIN_INHERITED(WebAuthnManager,
WebAuthnManagerBase)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK(mTransaction)
tmp->mTransaction.reset();
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_UNLINK_END
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_BEGIN_INHERITED(WebAuthnManager,
WebAuthnManagerBase)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE(mTransaction)
NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_TRAVERSE_END
/***********************************************************************
* Utility Functions
**********************************************************************/
static nsresult AssembleClientData(
const nsAString& aOrigin, const CryptoBuffer& aChallenge,
const nsAString& aType,
const AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs& aExtensions,
/* out */ nsACString& aJsonOut) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
nsString challengeBase64;
nsresult rv = aChallenge.ToJwkBase64(challengeBase64);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
CollectedClientData clientDataObject;
clientDataObject.mType.Assign(aType);
clientDataObject.mChallenge.Assign(challengeBase64);
clientDataObject.mOrigin.Assign(aOrigin);
clientDataObject.mHashAlgorithm.AssignLiteral(u"SHA-256");
clientDataObject.mClientExtensions = aExtensions;
nsAutoString temp;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!clientDataObject.ToJSON(temp))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
aJsonOut.Assign(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(temp));
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult GetOrigin(nsPIDOMWindowInner* aParent,
/*out*/ nsAString& aOrigin, /*out*/ nsACString& aHost) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aParent);
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = aParent->GetDoc();
MOZ_ASSERT(doc);
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = doc->NodePrincipal();
nsresult rv = nsContentUtils::GetUTFOrigin(principal, aOrigin);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv)) || NS_WARN_IF(aOrigin.IsEmpty())) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (principal->GetIsIpAddress()) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR;
}
if (aOrigin.EqualsLiteral("null")) {
// 4.1.1.3 If callerOrigin is an opaque origin, reject promise with a
// DOMException whose name is "NotAllowedError", and terminate this
// algorithm
MOZ_LOG(gWebAuthnManagerLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Rejecting due to opaque origin"));
return NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_ALLOWED_ERR;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originUri;
auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(principal);
if (NS_FAILED(basePrin->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(originUri)))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (NS_FAILED(originUri->GetAsciiHost(aHost))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult RelaxSameOrigin(nsPIDOMWindowInner* aParent,
const nsAString& aInputRpId,
/* out */ nsACString& aRelaxedRpId) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aParent);
nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = aParent->GetDoc();
MOZ_ASSERT(doc);
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = doc->NodePrincipal();
auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(principal);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
if (NS_FAILED(basePrin->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsAutoCString originHost;
if (NS_FAILED(uri->GetAsciiHost(originHost))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsCOMPtr<Document> document = aParent->GetDoc();
if (!document || !document->IsHTMLDocument()) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
nsHTMLDocument* html = document->AsHTMLDocument();
// See if the given RP ID is a valid domain string.
// (We use the document's URI here as a template so we don't have to come up
// with our own scheme, etc. If we can successfully set the host as the given
// RP ID, then it should be a valid domain string.)
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> inputRpIdURI;
nsresult rv = NS_MutateURI(uri)
.SetHost(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aInputRpId))
.Finalize(inputRpIdURI);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR;
}
nsAutoCString inputRpId;
if (NS_FAILED(inputRpIdURI->GetAsciiHost(inputRpId))) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (!html->IsRegistrableDomainSuffixOfOrEqualTo(
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(inputRpId), originHost)) {
return NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR;
}
aRelaxedRpId.Assign(inputRpId);
return NS_OK;
}
/***********************************************************************
* WebAuthnManager Implementation
**********************************************************************/
void WebAuthnManager::ClearTransaction() {
if (!mTransaction.isNothing()) {
StopListeningForVisibilityEvents();
}
mTransaction.reset();
Unfollow();
}
void WebAuthnManager::RejectTransaction(const nsresult& aError) {
if (!NS_WARN_IF(mTransaction.isNothing())) {
mTransaction.ref().mPromise->MaybeReject(aError);
}
ClearTransaction();
}
void WebAuthnManager::CancelTransaction(const nsresult& aError) {
if (!NS_WARN_IF(!mChild || mTransaction.isNothing())) {
mChild->SendRequestCancel(mTransaction.ref().mId);
}
RejectTransaction(aError);
}
void WebAuthnManager::HandleVisibilityChange() {
if (mTransaction.isSome()) {
mTransaction.ref().mVisibilityChanged = true;
}
}
WebAuthnManager::~WebAuthnManager() {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
if (mTransaction.isSome()) {
ClearTransaction();
}
if (mChild) {
RefPtr<WebAuthnTransactionChild> c;
mChild.swap(c);
c->Disconnect();
}
}
already_AddRefed<Promise> WebAuthnManager::MakeCredential(
const PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions& aOptions,
const Optional<OwningNonNull<AbortSignal>>& aSignal) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = do_QueryInterface(mParent);
ErrorResult rv;
RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(global, rv);
if (rv.Failed()) {
return nullptr;
}
if (mTransaction.isSome()) {
// If there hasn't been a visibility change during the current
// transaction, then let's let that one complete rather than
// cancelling it on a subsequent call.
if (!mTransaction.ref().mVisibilityChanged) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_ABORT_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// Otherwise, the user may well have clicked away, so let's
// abort the old transaction and take over control from here.
CancelTransaction(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
}
// Abort the request if aborted flag is already set.
if (aSignal.WasPassed() && aSignal.Value().Aborted()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_ABORT_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsString origin;
nsCString rpId;
rv = GetOrigin(mParent, origin, rpId);
if (NS_WARN_IF(rv.Failed())) {
promise->MaybeReject(std::move(rv));
return promise.forget();
}
// Enforce 5.4.3 User Account Parameters for Credential Generation
// When we add UX, we'll want to do more with this value, but for now
// we just have to verify its correctness.
CryptoBuffer userId;
userId.Assign(aOptions.mUser.mId);
if (userId.Length() > 64) {
promise->MaybeRejectWithTypeError("user.id is too long");
return promise.forget();
}
// If timeoutSeconds was specified, check if its value lies within a
// reasonable range as defined by the platform and if not, correct it to the
// closest value lying within that range.
uint32_t adjustedTimeout = 30000;
if (aOptions.mTimeout.WasPassed()) {
adjustedTimeout = aOptions.mTimeout.Value();
adjustedTimeout = std::max(15000u, adjustedTimeout);
adjustedTimeout = std::min(120000u, adjustedTimeout);
}
if (aOptions.mRp.mId.WasPassed()) {
// If rpId is specified, then invoke the procedure used for relaxing the
// same-origin restriction by setting the document.domain attribute, using
// rpId as the given value but without changing the current documents
// domain. If no errors are thrown, set rpId to the value of host as
// computed by this procedure, and rpIdHash to the SHA-256 hash of rpId.
// Otherwise, reject promise with a DOMException whose name is
// "SecurityError", and terminate this algorithm.
if (NS_FAILED(RelaxSameOrigin(mParent, aOptions.mRp.mId.Value(), rpId))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
}
// <https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#sctn-appid-extension>
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mAppid.WasPassed()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// Process each element of mPubKeyCredParams using the following steps, to
// produce a new sequence coseAlgos.
nsTArray<CoseAlg> coseAlgos;
for (size_t a = 0; a < aOptions.mPubKeyCredParams.Length(); ++a) {
// If current.type does not contain a PublicKeyCredentialType
// supported by this implementation, then stop processing current and move
// on to the next element in mPubKeyCredParams.
if (aOptions.mPubKeyCredParams[a].mType !=
PublicKeyCredentialType::Public_key) {
continue;
}
coseAlgos.AppendElement(aOptions.mPubKeyCredParams[a].mAlg);
}
// If there are algorithms specified, but none are Public_key algorithms,
// reject the promise.
if (coseAlgos.IsEmpty() && !aOptions.mPubKeyCredParams.IsEmpty()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// If excludeList is undefined, set it to the empty list.
//
// If extensions was specified, process any extensions supported by this
// client platform, to produce the extension data that needs to be sent to the
// authenticator. If an error is encountered while processing an extension,
// skip that extension and do not produce any extension data for it. Call the
// result of this processing clientExtensions.
//
// Currently no extensions are supported
//
// Use attestationChallenge, callerOrigin and rpId, along with the token
// binding key associated with callerOrigin (if any), to create a ClientData
// structure representing this request. Choose a hash algorithm for hashAlg
// and compute the clientDataJSON and clientDataHash.
CryptoBuffer challenge;
if (!challenge.Assign(aOptions.mChallenge)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsAutoCString clientDataJSON;
nsresult srv = AssembleClientData(origin, challenge, u"webauthn.create"_ns,
aOptions.mExtensions, clientDataJSON);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsTArray<WebAuthnScopedCredential> excludeList;
for (const auto& s : aOptions.mExcludeCredentials) {
WebAuthnScopedCredential c;
CryptoBuffer cb;
cb.Assign(s.mId);
c.id() = cb;
excludeList.AppendElement(c);
}
if (!MaybeCreateBackgroundActor()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// TODO: Add extension list building
nsTArray<WebAuthnExtension> extensions;
// <https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html#sctn-hmac-secret-extension>
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mHmacCreateSecret.WasPassed()) {
bool hmacCreateSecret = aOptions.mExtensions.mHmacCreateSecret.Value();
if (hmacCreateSecret) {
extensions.AppendElement(WebAuthnExtensionHmacSecret(hmacCreateSecret));
}
}
const auto& selection = aOptions.mAuthenticatorSelection;
const auto& attachment = selection.mAuthenticatorAttachment;
const AttestationConveyancePreference& attestation = aOptions.mAttestation;
// Attachment
Maybe<AuthenticatorAttachment> authenticatorAttachment;
if (attachment.WasPassed()) {
authenticatorAttachment.emplace(attachment.Value());
}
// Create and forward authenticator selection criteria.
WebAuthnAuthenticatorSelection authSelection(selection.mRequireResidentKey,
selection.mUserVerification,
authenticatorAttachment);
nsString rpIcon;
if (aOptions.mRp.mIcon.WasPassed()) {
rpIcon = aOptions.mRp.mIcon.Value();
}
nsString userIcon;
if (aOptions.mUser.mIcon.WasPassed()) {
userIcon = aOptions.mUser.mIcon.Value();
}
WebAuthnMakeCredentialRpInfo rpInfo(aOptions.mRp.mName, rpIcon);
WebAuthnMakeCredentialUserInfo userInfo(
userId, aOptions.mUser.mName, userIcon, aOptions.mUser.mDisplayName);
WebAuthnMakeCredentialExtraInfo extra(rpInfo, userInfo, coseAlgos, extensions,
authSelection, attestation);
BrowsingContext* context = mParent->GetBrowsingContext();
if (!context) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
WebAuthnMakeCredentialInfo info(
origin, NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(rpId), challenge, clientDataJSON,
adjustedTimeout, excludeList, Some(extra), context->Top()->Id());
#ifdef OS_WIN
if (!WinWebAuthnManager::AreWebAuthNApisAvailable()) {
ListenForVisibilityEvents();
}
#else
ListenForVisibilityEvents();
#endif
AbortSignal* signal = nullptr;
if (aSignal.WasPassed()) {
signal = &aSignal.Value();
Follow(signal);
}
MOZ_ASSERT(mTransaction.isNothing());
mTransaction = Some(WebAuthnTransaction(promise));
mChild->SendRequestRegister(mTransaction.ref().mId, info);
return promise.forget();
}
already_AddRefed<Promise> WebAuthnManager::GetAssertion(
const PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions& aOptions,
const Optional<OwningNonNull<AbortSignal>>& aSignal) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = do_QueryInterface(mParent);
ErrorResult rv;
RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(global, rv);
if (rv.Failed()) {
return nullptr;
}
if (mTransaction.isSome()) {
// If there hasn't been a visibility change during the current
// transaction, then let's let that one complete rather than
// cancelling it on a subsequent call.
if (!mTransaction.ref().mVisibilityChanged) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_ABORT_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// Otherwise, the user may well have clicked away, so let's
// abort the old transaction and take over control from here.
CancelTransaction(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
}
// Abort the request if aborted flag is already set.
if (aSignal.WasPassed() && aSignal.Value().Aborted()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_ABORT_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsString origin;
nsCString rpId;
rv = GetOrigin(mParent, origin, rpId);
if (NS_WARN_IF(rv.Failed())) {
promise->MaybeReject(std::move(rv));
return promise.forget();
}
// If timeoutSeconds was specified, check if its value lies within a
// reasonable range as defined by the platform and if not, correct it to the
// closest value lying within that range.
uint32_t adjustedTimeout = 30000;
if (aOptions.mTimeout.WasPassed()) {
adjustedTimeout = aOptions.mTimeout.Value();
adjustedTimeout = std::max(15000u, adjustedTimeout);
adjustedTimeout = std::min(120000u, adjustedTimeout);
}
if (aOptions.mRpId.WasPassed()) {
// If rpId is specified, then invoke the procedure used for relaxing the
// same-origin restriction by setting the document.domain attribute, using
// rpId as the given value but without changing the current documents
// domain. If no errors are thrown, set rpId to the value of host as
// computed by this procedure, and rpIdHash to the SHA-256 hash of rpId.
// Otherwise, reject promise with a DOMException whose name is
// "SecurityError", and terminate this algorithm.
if (NS_FAILED(RelaxSameOrigin(mParent, aOptions.mRpId.Value(), rpId))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
}
CryptoBuffer rpIdHash;
if (!rpIdHash.SetLength(SHA256_LENGTH, fallible)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return promise.forget();
}
// Use assertionChallenge, callerOrigin and rpId, along with the token binding
// key associated with callerOrigin (if any), to create a ClientData structure
// representing this request. Choose a hash algorithm for hashAlg and compute
// the clientDataJSON and clientDataHash.
CryptoBuffer challenge;
if (!challenge.Assign(aOptions.mChallenge)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsAutoCString clientDataJSON;
nsresult srv = AssembleClientData(origin, challenge, u"webauthn.get"_ns,
aOptions.mExtensions, clientDataJSON);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
nsTArray<WebAuthnScopedCredential> allowList;
for (const auto& s : aOptions.mAllowCredentials) {
if (s.mType == PublicKeyCredentialType::Public_key) {
WebAuthnScopedCredential c;
CryptoBuffer cb;
cb.Assign(s.mId);
c.id() = cb;
// Serialize transports.
if (s.mTransports.WasPassed()) {
uint8_t transports = 0;
// Transports is a string, but we match it to an enumeration so
// that we have forward-compatibility, ignoring unknown transports.
for (const nsAString& str : s.mTransports.Value()) {
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 cStr(str);
int i = FindEnumStringIndexImpl(
cStr.get(), cStr.Length(), AuthenticatorTransportValues::strings);
if (i < 0) {
continue; // Unknown enum
}
AuthenticatorTransport t = static_cast<AuthenticatorTransport>(i);
if (t == AuthenticatorTransport::Usb) {
transports |= U2F_AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_USB;
}
if (t == AuthenticatorTransport::Nfc) {
transports |= U2F_AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_NFC;
}
if (t == AuthenticatorTransport::Ble) {
transports |= U2F_AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_BLE;
}
if (t == AuthenticatorTransport::Internal) {
transports |= CTAP_AUTHENTICATOR_TRANSPORT_INTERNAL;
}
}
c.transports() = transports;
}
allowList.AppendElement(c);
}
}
if (!MaybeCreateBackgroundActor()) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// If extensions were specified, process any extensions supported by this
// client platform, to produce the extension data that needs to be sent to the
// authenticator. If an error is encountered while processing an extension,
// skip that extension and do not produce any extension data for it. Call the
// result of this processing clientExtensions.
nsTArray<WebAuthnExtension> extensions;
// <https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#sctn-appid-extension>
if (aOptions.mExtensions.mAppid.WasPassed()) {
nsString appId(aOptions.mExtensions.mAppid.Value());
// Check that the appId value is allowed.
if (!EvaluateAppID(mParent, origin, appId)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
CryptoBuffer appIdHash;
if (!appIdHash.SetLength(SHA256_LENGTH, fallible)) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return promise.forget();
}
// We need the SHA-256 hash of the appId.
srv = HashCString(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(appId), appIdHash);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(srv))) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_SECURITY_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// Append the hash and send it to the backend.
extensions.AppendElement(WebAuthnExtensionAppId(appIdHash, appId));
}
WebAuthnGetAssertionExtraInfo extra(extensions, aOptions.mUserVerification);
BrowsingContext* context = mParent->GetBrowsingContext();
if (!context) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_OPERATION_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
WebAuthnGetAssertionInfo info(origin, NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(rpId), challenge,
clientDataJSON, adjustedTimeout, allowList,
Some(extra), context->Top()->Id());
#ifdef OS_WIN
if (!WinWebAuthnManager::AreWebAuthNApisAvailable()) {
ListenForVisibilityEvents();
}
#else
ListenForVisibilityEvents();
#endif
AbortSignal* signal = nullptr;
if (aSignal.WasPassed()) {
signal = &aSignal.Value();
Follow(signal);
}
MOZ_ASSERT(mTransaction.isNothing());
mTransaction = Some(WebAuthnTransaction(promise));
mChild->SendRequestSign(mTransaction.ref().mId, info);
return promise.forget();
}
already_AddRefed<Promise> WebAuthnManager::Store(
const Credential& aCredential) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = do_QueryInterface(mParent);
ErrorResult rv;
RefPtr<Promise> promise = Promise::Create(global, rv);
if (rv.Failed()) {
return nullptr;
}
if (mTransaction.isSome()) {
// If there hasn't been a visibility change during the current
// transaction, then let's let that one complete rather than
// cancelling it on a subsequent call.
if (!mTransaction.ref().mVisibilityChanged) {
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_ABORT_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
// Otherwise, the user may well have clicked away, so let's
// abort the old transaction and take over control from here.
CancelTransaction(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
}
promise->MaybeReject(NS_ERROR_DOM_NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR);
return promise.forget();
}
void WebAuthnManager::FinishMakeCredential(
const uint64_t& aTransactionId,
const WebAuthnMakeCredentialResult& aResult) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
// Check for a valid transaction.
if (mTransaction.isNothing() || mTransaction.ref().mId != aTransactionId) {
return;
}
CryptoBuffer clientDataBuf;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!clientDataBuf.Assign(aResult.ClientDataJSON()))) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer attObjBuf;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!attObjBuf.Assign(aResult.AttestationObject()))) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer keyHandleBuf;
if (NS_WARN_IF(!keyHandleBuf.Assign(aResult.KeyHandle()))) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
nsAutoString keyHandleBase64Url;
nsresult rv = keyHandleBuf.ToJwkBase64(keyHandleBase64Url);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
RejectTransaction(rv);
return;
}
// Create a new PublicKeyCredential object and populate its fields with the
// values returned from the authenticator as well as the clientDataJSON
// computed earlier.
RefPtr<AuthenticatorAttestationResponse> attestation =
new AuthenticatorAttestationResponse(mParent);
attestation->SetClientDataJSON(clientDataBuf);
attestation->SetAttestationObject(attObjBuf);
RefPtr<PublicKeyCredential> credential = new PublicKeyCredential(mParent);
credential->SetId(keyHandleBase64Url);
credential->SetType(u"public-key"_ns);
credential->SetRawId(keyHandleBuf);
credential->SetResponse(attestation);
// Forward client extension results.
for (auto& ext : aResult.Extensions()) {
if (ext.type() ==
WebAuthnExtensionResult::TWebAuthnExtensionResultHmacSecret) {
bool hmacCreateSecret =
ext.get_WebAuthnExtensionResultHmacSecret().hmacCreateSecret();
credential->SetClientExtensionResultHmacSecret(hmacCreateSecret);
}
}
mTransaction.ref().mPromise->MaybeResolve(credential);
ClearTransaction();
}
void WebAuthnManager::FinishGetAssertion(
const uint64_t& aTransactionId, const WebAuthnGetAssertionResult& aResult) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
// Check for a valid transaction.
if (mTransaction.isNothing() || mTransaction.ref().mId != aTransactionId) {
return;
}
CryptoBuffer clientDataBuf;
if (!clientDataBuf.Assign(aResult.ClientDataJSON())) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer credentialBuf;
if (!credentialBuf.Assign(aResult.KeyHandle())) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer signatureBuf;
if (!signatureBuf.Assign(aResult.Signature())) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer authenticatorDataBuf;
if (!authenticatorDataBuf.Assign(aResult.AuthenticatorData())) {
RejectTransaction(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
return;
}
nsAutoString credentialBase64Url;
nsresult rv = credentialBuf.ToJwkBase64(credentialBase64Url);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
RejectTransaction(rv);
return;
}
CryptoBuffer userHandleBuf;
// U2FTokenManager don't return user handle.
// Best effort.
userHandleBuf.Assign(aResult.UserHandle());
// If any authenticator returns success:
// Create a new PublicKeyCredential object named value and populate its fields
// with the values returned from the authenticator as well as the
// clientDataJSON computed earlier.
RefPtr<AuthenticatorAssertionResponse> assertion =
new AuthenticatorAssertionResponse(mParent);
assertion->SetClientDataJSON(clientDataBuf);
assertion->SetAuthenticatorData(authenticatorDataBuf);
assertion->SetSignature(signatureBuf);
if (!userHandleBuf.IsEmpty()) {
assertion->SetUserHandle(userHandleBuf);
}
RefPtr<PublicKeyCredential> credential = new PublicKeyCredential(mParent);
credential->SetId(credentialBase64Url);
credential->SetType(u"public-key"_ns);
credential->SetRawId(credentialBuf);
credential->SetResponse(assertion);
// Forward client extension results.
for (auto& ext : aResult.Extensions()) {
if (ext.type() == WebAuthnExtensionResult::TWebAuthnExtensionResultAppId) {
bool appid = ext.get_WebAuthnExtensionResultAppId().AppId();
credential->SetClientExtensionResultAppId(appid);
}
}
mTransaction.ref().mPromise->MaybeResolve(credential);
ClearTransaction();
}
void WebAuthnManager::RequestAborted(const uint64_t& aTransactionId,
const nsresult& aError) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
if (mTransaction.isSome() && mTransaction.ref().mId == aTransactionId) {
RejectTransaction(aError);
}
}
void WebAuthnManager::RunAbortAlgorithm() {
CancelTransaction(NS_ERROR_DOM_ABORT_ERR);
}
} // namespace dom
} // namespace mozilla