зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
401 строка
14 KiB
C++
401 строка
14 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
|
||
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
|
||
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
|
||
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
|
||
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
|
||
|
||
#include "SecFetch.h"
|
||
#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
|
||
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
|
||
#include "nsIRedirectHistoryEntry.h"
|
||
#include "nsIReferrerInfo.h"
|
||
#include "mozIThirdPartyUtil.h"
|
||
#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
|
||
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
|
||
#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
|
||
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
|
||
|
||
// Helper function which maps an internal content policy type
|
||
// to the corresponding destination for the context of SecFetch.
|
||
nsCString MapInternalContentPolicyTypeToDest(nsContentPolicyType aType) {
|
||
switch (aType) {
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT_PRELOAD:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_MODULE:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_MODULE_PRELOAD:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER_IMPORT_SCRIPTS:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_CHROMEUTILS_COMPILED_SCRIPT:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FRAME_MESSAGEMANAGER_SCRIPT:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT:
|
||
return "script"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER_STATIC_MODULE:
|
||
return "worker"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER:
|
||
return "sharedworker"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER:
|
||
return "serviceworker"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_AUDIOWORKLET:
|
||
return "audioworklet"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_PAINTWORKLET:
|
||
return "paintworklet"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_PRELOAD:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_FAVICON:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE:
|
||
return "image"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_STYLESHEET:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_STYLESHEET_PRELOAD:
|
||
return "style"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_OBJECT:
|
||
return "object"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EMBED:
|
||
return "embed"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT:
|
||
return "document"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IFRAME:
|
||
return "iframe"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FRAME:
|
||
return "frame"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EVENTSOURCE:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_DTD:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FORCE_ALLOWED_DTD:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FONT_PRELOAD:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_UA_FONT:
|
||
return "font"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_AUDIO:
|
||
return "audio"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_VIDEO:
|
||
return "video"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_TRACK:
|
||
return "track"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET:
|
||
return "websocket"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT:
|
||
return "report"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT:
|
||
return "xslt"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FETCH_PRELOAD:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST:
|
||
return "manifest"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PROXIED_WEBRTC_MEDIA:
|
||
return "empty"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_IDENTITY:
|
||
return "webidentity"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_TRANSPORT:
|
||
return "webtransport"_ns;
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_END:
|
||
case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID:
|
||
break;
|
||
// Do not add default: so that compilers can catch the missing case.
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
MOZ_CRASH("Unhandled nsContentPolicyType value");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Helper function to determine if a ExpandedPrincipal is of the same-origin as
|
||
// a URI in the sec-fetch context.
|
||
void IsExpandedPrincipalSameOrigin(
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> aExpandedPrincipal, nsIURI* aURI,
|
||
bool* aRes) {
|
||
*aRes = false;
|
||
for (const auto& principal : aExpandedPrincipal->AllowList()) {
|
||
// Ignore extension principals to continue treating
|
||
// "moz-extension:"-requests as not "same-origin".
|
||
if (!mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(principal)->AddonPolicy()) {
|
||
// A ExpandedPrincipal usually has at most one ContentPrincipal, so we can
|
||
// check IsSameOrigin on it here and return early.
|
||
mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(principal)->IsSameOrigin(aURI, aRes);
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Helper function to determine whether a request (including involved
|
||
// redirects) is same-origin in the context of SecFetch.
|
||
bool IsSameOrigin(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
|
||
NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aHTTPChannel, getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
|
||
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
|
||
|
||
if (mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())
|
||
->AddonPolicy()) {
|
||
// If an extension triggered the load that has access to the URI then the
|
||
// load is considered as same-origin.
|
||
return mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())
|
||
->AddonAllowsLoad(channelURI);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
bool isSameOrigin = false;
|
||
if (nsContentUtils::IsExpandedPrincipal(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> ep =
|
||
do_QueryInterface(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal());
|
||
IsExpandedPrincipalSameOrigin(ep, channelURI, &isSameOrigin);
|
||
} else {
|
||
isSameOrigin = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSameOrigin(channelURI);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// if the initial request is not same-origin, we can return here
|
||
// because we already know it's not a same-origin request
|
||
if (!isSameOrigin) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// let's further check all the hoops in the redirectChain to
|
||
// ensure all involved redirects are same-origin
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> redirectPrincipal;
|
||
for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* entry : loadInfo->RedirectChain()) {
|
||
entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(redirectPrincipal));
|
||
if (redirectPrincipal && !redirectPrincipal->IsSameOrigin(channelURI)) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// must be a same-origin request
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Helper function to determine whether a request (including involved
|
||
// redirects) is same-site in the context of SecFetch.
|
||
bool IsSameSite(nsIChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<mozIThirdPartyUtil> thirdPartyUtil =
|
||
do_GetService(THIRDPARTYUTIL_CONTRACTID);
|
||
if (!thirdPartyUtil) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsAutoCString hostDomain;
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
|
||
nsresult rv = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->GetBaseDomain(hostDomain);
|
||
mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
|
||
|
||
nsAutoCString channelDomain;
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
|
||
NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aHTTPChannel, getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
|
||
rv = thirdPartyUtil->GetBaseDomain(channelURI, channelDomain);
|
||
mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
|
||
|
||
// if the initial request is not same-site, or not https, we can
|
||
// return here because we already know it's not a same-site request
|
||
if (!hostDomain.Equals(channelDomain) ||
|
||
(!loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->SchemeIs("https") &&
|
||
!nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackHost(
|
||
hostDomain))) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// let's further check all the hoops in the redirectChain to
|
||
// ensure all involved redirects are same-site and https
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> redirectPrincipal;
|
||
for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* entry : loadInfo->RedirectChain()) {
|
||
entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(redirectPrincipal));
|
||
if (redirectPrincipal) {
|
||
redirectPrincipal->GetBaseDomain(hostDomain);
|
||
if (!hostDomain.Equals(channelDomain) ||
|
||
!redirectPrincipal->SchemeIs("https")) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// must be a same-site request
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Helper function to determine whether a request was triggered
|
||
// by the end user in the context of SecFetch.
|
||
bool IsUserTriggeredForSecFetchSite(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
|
||
/*
|
||
* The goal is to distinguish between "webby" navigations that are controlled
|
||
* by a given website (e.g. links, the window.location setter,form
|
||
* submissions, etc.), and those that are not (e.g. user interaction with a
|
||
* user agent’s address bar, bookmarks, etc).
|
||
*/
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
|
||
ExtContentPolicyType contentType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
|
||
|
||
// A request issued by the browser is always user initiated.
|
||
if (loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal() &&
|
||
contentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER) {
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// only requests wich result in type "document" are subject to
|
||
// user initiated actions in the context of SecFetch.
|
||
if (contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
|
||
contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// The load is considered user triggered if it was triggered by an external
|
||
// application.
|
||
if (loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal()) {
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// sec-fetch-site can only be user triggered if the load was user triggered.
|
||
if (!loadInfo->GetHasValidUserGestureActivation()) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// We can assert that the navigation must be "webby" if the load was triggered
|
||
// by a meta refresh. See also Bug 1647128.
|
||
if (loadInfo->GetIsMetaRefresh()) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// All web requests have a valid "original" referrer set in the
|
||
// ReferrerInfo which we can use to determine whether a request
|
||
// was triggered by a user or not.
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo = aHTTPChannel->GetReferrerInfo();
|
||
if (referrerInfo) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalReferrer;
|
||
referrerInfo->GetOriginalReferrer(getter_AddRefs(originalReferrer));
|
||
if (originalReferrer) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchDest(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
|
||
nsContentPolicyType contentType = loadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
|
||
nsCString dest = MapInternalContentPolicyTypeToDest(contentType);
|
||
|
||
nsresult rv =
|
||
aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Dest"_ns, dest, false);
|
||
mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchMode(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
|
||
nsAutoCString mode("no-cors");
|
||
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
|
||
uint32_t securityMode = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
|
||
ExtContentPolicyType externalType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
|
||
|
||
if (securityMode ==
|
||
nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT ||
|
||
securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED) {
|
||
mode = "same-origin"_ns;
|
||
} else if (securityMode ==
|
||
nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) {
|
||
mode = "cors"_ns;
|
||
} else {
|
||
// If it's not one of the security modes above, then we ensure it's
|
||
// at least one of the others defined in nsILoadInfo
|
||
MOZ_ASSERT(
|
||
securityMode ==
|
||
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT ||
|
||
securityMode ==
|
||
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
|
||
"unhandled security mode");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
|
||
externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT ||
|
||
externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) {
|
||
mode = "navigate"_ns;
|
||
} else if (externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET) {
|
||
mode = "websocket"_ns;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsresult rv =
|
||
aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Mode"_ns, mode, false);
|
||
mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchSite(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
|
||
nsAutoCString site("same-origin");
|
||
|
||
bool isSameOrigin = IsSameOrigin(aHTTPChannel);
|
||
if (!isSameOrigin) {
|
||
bool isSameSite = IsSameSite(aHTTPChannel);
|
||
if (isSameSite) {
|
||
site = "same-site"_ns;
|
||
} else {
|
||
site = "cross-site"_ns;
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if (IsUserTriggeredForSecFetchSite(aHTTPChannel)) {
|
||
site = "none"_ns;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsresult rv =
|
||
aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Site"_ns, site, false);
|
||
mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchUser(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
|
||
ExtContentPolicyType externalType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
|
||
|
||
// sec-fetch-user only applies to loads of type document or subdocument
|
||
if (externalType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
|
||
externalType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// sec-fetch-user only applies if the request is user triggered.
|
||
// requests triggered by an external application are considerd user triggered.
|
||
if (!loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal() &&
|
||
!loadInfo->GetHasValidUserGestureActivation()) {
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
nsAutoCString user("?1");
|
||
nsresult rv =
|
||
aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-User"_ns, user, false);
|
||
mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchHeader(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
|
||
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
|
||
nsresult rv = aHTTPChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
|
||
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// if we are not dealing with a potentially trustworthy URL, then
|
||
// there is nothing to do here
|
||
if (!nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOrigin(uri)) {
|
||
return;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
AddSecFetchDest(aHTTPChannel);
|
||
AddSecFetchMode(aHTTPChannel);
|
||
AddSecFetchSite(aHTTPChannel);
|
||
AddSecFetchUser(aHTTPChannel);
|
||
}
|