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gecko-dev/security/certverifier/NSSCertDBTrustDomain.cpp

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "NSSCertDBTrustDomain.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include "ExtendedValidation.h"
#include "OCSPRequestor.h"
#include "OCSPVerificationTrustDomain.h"
#include "certdb.h"
#include "cert.h"
#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
#include "nss.h"
#include "NSSErrorsService.h"
#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "pkix/pkix.h"
#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
#include "prerror.h"
#include "prmem.h"
#include "prprf.h"
#include "PublicKeyPinningService.h"
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "CNNICHashWhitelist.inc"
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::pkix;
extern PRLogModuleInfo* gCertVerifierLog;
static const uint64_t ServerFailureDelaySeconds = 5 * 60;
namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
const char BUILTIN_ROOTS_MODULE_DEFAULT_NAME[] = "Builtin Roots Module";
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NSSCertDBTrustDomain(SECTrustType certDBTrustType,
OCSPFetching ocspFetching,
OCSPCache& ocspCache,
/*optional but shouldn't be*/ void* pinArg,
CertVerifier::OcspGetConfig ocspGETConfig,
uint32_t certShortLifetimeInDays,
CertVerifier::PinningMode pinningMode,
unsigned int minRSABits,
ValidityCheckingMode validityCheckingMode,
SignatureDigestOption signatureDigestOption,
CertVerifier::SHA1Mode sha1Mode,
/*optional*/ PinningTelemetryInfo* pinningTelemetryInfo,
/*optional*/ const char* hostname,
/*optional*/ ScopedCERTCertList* builtChain)
: mCertDBTrustType(certDBTrustType)
, mOCSPFetching(ocspFetching)
, mOCSPCache(ocspCache)
, mPinArg(pinArg)
, mOCSPGetConfig(ocspGETConfig)
, mCertShortLifetimeInDays(certShortLifetimeInDays)
, mPinningMode(pinningMode)
, mMinRSABits(minRSABits)
, mValidityCheckingMode(validityCheckingMode)
, mSignatureDigestOption(signatureDigestOption)
, mSHA1Mode(sha1Mode)
, mPinningTelemetryInfo(pinningTelemetryInfo)
, mHostname(hostname)
, mBuiltChain(builtChain)
, mCertBlocklist(do_GetService(NS_CERTBLOCKLIST_CONTRACTID))
, mOCSPStaplingStatus(CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NEVER_CHECKED)
{
}
// If useRoots is true, we only use root certificates in the candidate list.
// If useRoots is false, we only use non-root certificates in the list.
static Result
FindIssuerInner(ScopedCERTCertList& candidates, bool useRoots,
Input encodedIssuerName, TrustDomain::IssuerChecker& checker,
/*out*/ bool& keepGoing)
{
keepGoing = true;
for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(candidates);
!CERT_LIST_END(n, candidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
bool candidateIsRoot = !!n->cert->isRoot;
if (candidateIsRoot != useRoots) {
continue;
}
Input certDER;
Result rv = certDER.Init(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len);
if (rv != Success) {
continue; // probably too big
}
const SECItem encodedIssuerNameItem = {
siBuffer,
const_cast<unsigned char*>(encodedIssuerName.UnsafeGetData()),
encodedIssuerName.GetLength()
};
ScopedSECItem nameConstraints(::SECITEM_AllocItem(nullptr, nullptr, 0));
SECStatus srv = CERT_GetImposedNameConstraints(&encodedIssuerNameItem,
nameConstraints.get());
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
if (PR_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
// If no imposed name constraints were found, continue without them
rv = checker.Check(certDER, nullptr, keepGoing);
} else {
// Otherwise apply the constraints
Input nameConstraintsInput;
if (nameConstraintsInput.Init(
nameConstraints->data,
nameConstraints->len) != Success) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
rv = checker.Check(certDER, &nameConstraintsInput, keepGoing);
}
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
if (!keepGoing) {
break;
}
}
return Success;
}
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName,
IssuerChecker& checker, Time)
{
// TODO: NSS seems to be ambiguous between "no potential issuers found" and
// "there was an error trying to retrieve the potential issuers."
SECItem encodedIssuerNameItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(encodedIssuerName);
ScopedCERTCertList
candidates(CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
&encodedIssuerNameItem, 0,
false));
if (candidates) {
// First, try all the root certs; then try all the non-root certs.
bool keepGoing;
Result rv = FindIssuerInner(candidates, true, encodedIssuerName, checker,
keepGoing);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
if (keepGoing) {
rv = FindIssuerInner(candidates, false, encodedIssuerName, checker,
keepGoing);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
}
}
return Success;
}
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
const CertPolicyId& policy,
Input candidateCertDER,
/*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel)
{
#ifdef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
if (!policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
return Result::ERROR_POLICY_VALIDATION_FAILED;
}
#endif
// XXX: This would be cleaner and more efficient if we could get the trust
// information without constructing a CERTCertificate here, but NSS doesn't
// expose it in any other easy-to-use fashion. The use of
// CERT_NewTempCertificate to get a CERTCertificate shouldn't be a
// performance problem because NSS will just find the existing
// CERTCertificate in its in-memory cache and return it.
SECItem candidateCertDERSECItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(candidateCertDER);
ScopedCERTCertificate candidateCert(
CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &candidateCertDERSECItem,
nullptr, false, true));
if (!candidateCert) {
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
}
// Check the certificate against the OneCRL cert blocklist
if (!mCertBlocklist) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
bool isCertRevoked;
nsresult nsrv = mCertBlocklist->IsCertRevoked(
candidateCert->derIssuer.data,
candidateCert->derIssuer.len,
candidateCert->serialNumber.data,
candidateCert->serialNumber.len,
candidateCert->derSubject.data,
candidateCert->derSubject.len,
candidateCert->derPublicKey.data,
candidateCert->derPublicKey.len,
&isCertRevoked);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
if (isCertRevoked) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: certificate is in blocklist"));
return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
}
// XXX: CERT_GetCertTrust seems to be abusing SECStatus as a boolean, where
// SECSuccess means that there is a trust record and SECFailure means there
// is not a trust record. I looked at NSS's internal uses of
// CERT_GetCertTrust, and all that code uses the result as a boolean meaning
// "We have a trust record."
CERTCertTrust trust;
if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert.get(), &trust) == SECSuccess) {
uint32_t flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, mCertDBTrustType);
// For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
// because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
// CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
// relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
// distrusted.
uint32_t relevantTrustBit =
endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA ? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
: CERTDB_TRUSTED;
if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit|CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
== CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
trustLevel = TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted;
return Success;
}
// For TRUST, we only use the CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit, because Gecko hasn't
// needed to consider end-entity certs to be their own trust anchors since
// Gecko implemented nsICertOverrideService.
if (flags & CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA) {
if (policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
return Success;
}
#ifndef MOZ_NO_EV_CERTS
if (CertIsAuthoritativeForEVPolicy(candidateCert.get(), policy)) {
trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
return Success;
}
#endif
}
}
trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
return Success;
}
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::DigestBuf(Input item, DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
/*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf, size_t digestBufLen)
{
return DigestBufNSS(item, digestAlg, digestBuf, digestBufLen);
}
static PRIntervalTime
OCSPFetchingTypeToTimeoutTime(NSSCertDBTrustDomain::OCSPFetching ocspFetching)
{
switch (ocspFetching) {
case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail:
return PR_SecondsToInterval(2);
case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForEV:
case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::FetchOCSPForDVHardFail:
return PR_SecondsToInterval(10);
// The rest of these are error cases. Assert in debug builds, but return
// the default value corresponding to 2 seconds in release builds.
case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::NeverFetchOCSP:
case NSSCertDBTrustDomain::LocalOnlyOCSPForEV:
PR_NOT_REACHED("we should never see this OCSPFetching type here");
default:
PR_NOT_REACHED("we're not handling every OCSPFetching type");
}
return PR_SecondsToInterval(2);
}
// Copied and modified from CERT_GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation and
// CERT_GetGeneralNameByType. Returns SECFailure on error, SECSuccess
// with url == nullptr when an OCSP URI was not found, and SECSuccess with
// url != nullptr when an OCSP URI was found. The output url will be owned
// by the arena.
static Result
GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation(PLArenaPool* arena,
Input aiaExtension,
/*out*/ char const*& url)
{
url = nullptr;
SECItem aiaExtensionSECItem = UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(aiaExtension);
CERTAuthInfoAccess** aia =
CERT_DecodeAuthInfoAccessExtension(arena, &aiaExtensionSECItem);
if (!aia) {
return Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
}
for (size_t i = 0; aia[i]; ++i) {
if (SECOID_FindOIDTag(&aia[i]->method) == SEC_OID_PKIX_OCSP) {
// NSS chooses the **last** OCSP URL; we choose the **first**
CERTGeneralName* current = aia[i]->location;
if (!current) {
continue;
}
do {
if (current->type == certURI) {
const SECItem& location = current->name.other;
// (location.len + 1) must be small enough to fit into a uint32_t,
// but we limit it to a smaller bound to reduce OOM risk.
if (location.len > 1024 || memchr(location.data, 0, location.len)) {
// Reject embedded nulls. (NSS doesn't do this)
return Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
}
// Copy the non-null-terminated SECItem into a null-terminated string.
char* nullTerminatedURL(static_cast<char*>(
PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, location.len + 1)));
if (!nullTerminatedURL) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
memcpy(nullTerminatedURL, location.data, location.len);
nullTerminatedURL[location.len] = 0;
url = nullTerminatedURL;
return Success;
}
current = CERT_GetNextGeneralName(current);
} while (current != aia[i]->location);
}
}
return Success;
}
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
const CertID& certID, Time time,
Duration validityDuration,
/*optional*/ const Input* stapledOCSPResponse,
/*optional*/ const Input* aiaExtension)
{
// Actively distrusted certificates will have already been blocked by
// GetCertTrust.
// TODO: need to verify that IsRevoked isn't called for trust anchors AND
// that that fact is documented in mozillapkix.
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: Top of CheckRevocation\n"));
// Bug 991815: The BR allow OCSP for intermediates to be up to one year old.
// Since this affects EV there is no reason why DV should be more strict
// so all intermediatates are allowed to have OCSP responses up to one year
// old.
uint16_t maxOCSPLifetimeInDays = 10;
if (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA) {
maxOCSPLifetimeInDays = 365;
}
// If we have a stapled OCSP response then the verification of that response
// determines the result unless the OCSP response is expired. We make an
// exception for expired responses because some servers, nginx in particular,
// are known to serve expired responses due to bugs.
// We keep track of the result of verifying the stapled response but don't
// immediately return failure if the response has expired.
//
// We only set the OCSP stapling status if we're validating the end-entity
// certificate. Non-end-entity certificates would always be
// OCSP_STAPLING_NONE unless/until we implement multi-stapling.
Result stapledOCSPResponseResult = Success;
if (stapledOCSPResponse) {
PR_ASSERT(endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity);
bool expired;
stapledOCSPResponseResult =
VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(certID, time,
maxOCSPLifetimeInDays,
*stapledOCSPResponse,
ResponseWasStapled, expired);
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult == Success) {
// stapled OCSP response present and good
mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_GOOD;
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: stapled OCSP response: good"));
return Success;
}
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE ||
expired) {
// stapled OCSP response present but expired
mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_EXPIRED;
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: expired stapled OCSP response"));
} else {
// stapled OCSP response present but invalid for some reason
mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_INVALID;
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: stapled OCSP response: failure"));
return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
}
} else if (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity) {
// no stapled OCSP response
mOCSPStaplingStatus = CertVerifier::OCSP_STAPLING_NONE;
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: no stapled OCSP response"));
}
Result cachedResponseResult = Success;
Time cachedResponseValidThrough(Time::uninitialized);
bool cachedResponsePresent = mOCSPCache.Get(certID,
cachedResponseResult,
cachedResponseValidThrough);
if (cachedResponsePresent) {
if (cachedResponseResult == Success && cachedResponseValidThrough >= time) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: good"));
return Success;
}
// If we have a cached revoked response, use it.
if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: revoked"));
return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
}
// The cached response may indicate an unknown certificate or it may be
// expired. Don't return with either of these statuses yet - we may be
// able to fetch a more recent one.
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: cached OCSP response: error %ld valid "
"until %lld", cachedResponseResult, cachedResponseValidThrough));
// When a good cached response has expired, it is more convenient
// to convert that to an error code and just deal with
// cachedResponseResult from here on out.
if (cachedResponseResult == Success && cachedResponseValidThrough < time) {
cachedResponseResult = Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
}
// We may have a cached indication of server failure. Ignore it if
// it has expired.
if (cachedResponseResult != Success &&
cachedResponseResult != Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT &&
cachedResponseResult != Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE &&
cachedResponseValidThrough < time) {
cachedResponseResult = Success;
cachedResponsePresent = false;
}
} else {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: no cached OCSP response"));
}
// At this point, if and only if cachedErrorResult is Success, there was no
// cached response.
PR_ASSERT((!cachedResponsePresent && cachedResponseResult == Success) ||
(cachedResponsePresent && cachedResponseResult != Success));
// If we have a fresh OneCRL Blocklist we can skip OCSP for CA certs
bool blocklistIsFresh;
nsresult nsrv = mCertBlocklist->IsBlocklistFresh(&blocklistIsFresh);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
// TODO: We still need to handle the fallback for expired responses. But,
// if/when we disable OCSP fetching by default, it would be ambiguous whether
// security.OCSP.enable==0 means "I want the default" or "I really never want
// you to ever fetch OCSP."
Duration shortLifetime(mCertShortLifetimeInDays * Time::ONE_DAY_IN_SECONDS);
if ((mOCSPFetching == NeverFetchOCSP) ||
(validityDuration < shortLifetime) ||
(endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA &&
(mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVHardFail ||
mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail ||
blocklistIsFresh))) {
// We're not going to be doing any fetching, so if there was a cached
// "unknown" response, say so.
if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
}
// If we're doing hard-fail, we want to know if we have a cached response
// that has expired.
if (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForDVHardFail &&
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
}
return Success;
}
if (mOCSPFetching == LocalOnlyOCSPForEV) {
if (cachedResponseResult != Success) {
return cachedResponseResult;
}
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
}
ScopedPLArenaPool arena(PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE));
if (!arena) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
Result rv;
const char* url = nullptr; // owned by the arena
if (aiaExtension) {
rv = GetOCSPAuthorityInfoAccessLocation(arena.get(), *aiaExtension, url);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
}
if (!url) {
if (mOCSPFetching == FetchOCSPForEV ||
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
}
if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
return Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE;
}
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
}
// Nothing to do if we don't have an OCSP responder URI for the cert; just
// assume it is good. Note that this is the confusing, but intended,
// interpretation of "strict" revocation checking in the face of a
// certificate that lacks an OCSP responder URI.
return Success;
}
// Only request a response if we didn't have a cached indication of failure
// (don't keep requesting responses from a failing server).
Input response;
bool attemptedRequest;
if (cachedResponseResult == Success ||
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT ||
cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_OLD_RESPONSE) {
uint8_t ocspRequest[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t ocspRequestLength;
rv = CreateEncodedOCSPRequest(*this, certID, ocspRequest,
ocspRequestLength);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
SECItem ocspRequestItem = {
siBuffer,
ocspRequest,
static_cast<unsigned int>(ocspRequestLength)
};
// Owned by arena
const SECItem* responseSECItem =
DoOCSPRequest(arena.get(), url, &ocspRequestItem,
OCSPFetchingTypeToTimeoutTime(mOCSPFetching),
mOCSPGetConfig == CertVerifier::ocspGetEnabled);
if (!responseSECItem) {
rv = MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
} else if (response.Init(responseSECItem->data, responseSECItem->len)
!= Success) {
rv = Result::ERROR_OCSP_MALFORMED_RESPONSE; // too big
}
attemptedRequest = true;
} else {
rv = cachedResponseResult;
attemptedRequest = false;
}
if (response.GetLength() == 0) {
Result error = rv;
if (attemptedRequest) {
Time timeout(time);
if (timeout.AddSeconds(ServerFailureDelaySeconds) != Success) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; // integer overflow
}
rv = mOCSPCache.Put(certID, error, time, timeout);
if (rv != Success) {
return rv;
}
}
if (mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure after "
"OCSP request failure"));
return error;
}
if (cachedResponseResult == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from cached "
"response after OCSP request failure"));
return cachedResponseResult;
}
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from expired "
"stapled response after OCSP request failure"));
return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
}
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECSuccess after "
"OCSP request failure"));
return Success; // Soft fail -> success :(
}
// If the response from the network has expired but indicates a revoked
// or unknown certificate, PR_GetError() will return the appropriate error.
// We actually ignore expired here.
bool expired;
rv = VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(certID, time,
maxOCSPLifetimeInDays,
response, ResponseIsFromNetwork,
expired);
if (rv == Success || mOCSPFetching != FetchOCSPForDVSoftFail) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning after VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse"));
return rv;
}
if (rv == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT ||
rv == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) {
return rv;
}
if (stapledOCSPResponseResult != Success) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: returning SECFailure from expired stapled "
"response after OCSP request verification failure"));
return stapledOCSPResponseResult;
}
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: end of CheckRevocation"));
return Success; // Soft fail -> success :(
}
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifyAndMaybeCacheEncodedOCSPResponse(
const CertID& certID, Time time, uint16_t maxLifetimeInDays,
Input encodedResponse, EncodedResponseSource responseSource,
/*out*/ bool& expired)
{
Time thisUpdate(Time::uninitialized);
Time validThrough(Time::uninitialized);
// We use a try and fallback approach which first mandates good signature
// digest algorithms, then falls back to SHA-1 if this fails. If a delegated
// OCSP response signing certificate was issued with a SHA-1 signature,
// verification initially fails. We cache the failure and then re-use that
// result even when doing fallback (i.e. when weak signature digest algorithms
// should succeed). To address this we use an OCSPVerificationTrustDomain
// here, rather than using *this, to ensure verification succeeds for all
// allowed signature digest algorithms.
OCSPVerificationTrustDomain trustDomain(*this);
Result rv = VerifyEncodedOCSPResponse(trustDomain, certID, time,
maxLifetimeInDays, encodedResponse,
expired, &thisUpdate, &validThrough);
// If a response was stapled and expired, we don't want to cache it. Return
// early to simplify the logic here.
if (responseSource == ResponseWasStapled && expired) {
PR_ASSERT(rv != Success);
return rv;
}
// validThrough is only trustworthy if the response successfully verifies
// or it indicates a revoked or unknown certificate.
// If this isn't the case, store an indication of failure (to prevent
// repeatedly requesting a response from a failing server).
if (rv != Success && rv != Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE &&
rv != Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
validThrough = time;
if (validThrough.AddSeconds(ServerFailureDelaySeconds) != Success) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE; // integer overflow
}
}
if (responseSource == ResponseIsFromNetwork ||
rv == Success ||
rv == Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE ||
rv == Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: caching OCSP response"));
Result putRV = mOCSPCache.Put(certID, rv, thisUpdate, validThrough);
if (putRV != Success) {
return putRV;
}
}
return rv;
}
static const uint8_t CNNIC_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA[] =
"\x30\x32\x31\x0B\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13\x02\x43\x4E\x31\x0E\x30"
"\x0C\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0A\x13\x05\x43\x4E\x4E\x49\x43\x31\x13\x30\x11\x06"
"\x03\x55\x04\x03\x13\x0A\x43\x4E\x4E\x49\x43\x20\x52\x4F\x4F\x54";
static const uint8_t CNNIC_EV_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA[] =
"\x30\x81\x8A\x31\x0B\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13\x02\x43\x4E\x31\x32"
"\x30\x30\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0A\x0C\x29\x43\x68\x69\x6E\x61\x20\x49\x6E\x74"
"\x65\x72\x6E\x65\x74\x20\x4E\x65\x74\x77\x6F\x72\x6B\x20\x49\x6E\x66\x6F"
"\x72\x6D\x61\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x20\x43\x65\x6E\x74\x65\x72\x31\x47\x30\x45"
"\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0C\x3E\x43\x68\x69\x6E\x61\x20\x49\x6E\x74\x65\x72"
"\x6E\x65\x74\x20\x4E\x65\x74\x77\x6F\x72\x6B\x20\x49\x6E\x66\x6F\x72\x6D"
"\x61\x74\x69\x6F\x6E\x20\x43\x65\x6E\x74\x65\x72\x20\x45\x56\x20\x43\x65"
"\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x73\x20\x52\x6F\x6F\x74";
class WhitelistedCNNICHashBinarySearchComparator
{
public:
explicit WhitelistedCNNICHashBinarySearchComparator(const uint8_t* aTarget,
size_t aTargetLength)
: mTarget(aTarget)
{
MOZ_ASSERT(aTargetLength == CNNIC_WHITELIST_HASH_LEN,
"Hashes should be of the same length.");
}
int operator()(const WhitelistedCNNICHash val) const {
return memcmp(mTarget, val.hash, CNNIC_WHITELIST_HASH_LEN);
}
private:
const uint8_t* mTarget;
};
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certArray, Time time)
{
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: IsChainValid"));
ScopedCERTCertList certList;
SECStatus srv = ConstructCERTCertListFromReversedDERArray(certArray,
certList);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
}
if (CERT_LIST_EMPTY(certList)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
// If the certificate appears to have been issued by a CNNIC root, only allow
// it if it is on the whitelist.
CERTCertListNode* rootNode = CERT_LIST_TAIL(certList);
if (!rootNode) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
CERTCertificate* root = rootNode->cert;
if (!root) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
if ((root->derSubject.len == sizeof(CNNIC_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA) - 1 &&
memcmp(root->derSubject.data, CNNIC_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA,
root->derSubject.len) == 0) ||
(root->derSubject.len == sizeof(CNNIC_EV_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA) - 1 &&
memcmp(root->derSubject.data, CNNIC_EV_ROOT_CA_SUBJECT_DATA,
root->derSubject.len) == 0)) {
CERTCertListNode* certNode = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
if (!certNode) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
CERTCertificate* cert = certNode->cert;
if (!cert) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
Digest digest;
nsresult nsrv = digest.DigestBuf(SEC_OID_SHA256, cert->derCert.data,
cert->derCert.len);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
const uint8_t* certHash(
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(digest.get().data));
size_t certHashLen = digest.get().len;
size_t unused;
if (!mozilla::BinarySearchIf(WhitelistedCNNICHashes, 0,
ArrayLength(WhitelistedCNNICHashes),
WhitelistedCNNICHashBinarySearchComparator(
certHash, certHashLen),
&unused)) {
return Result::ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
}
}
bool isBuiltInRoot = false;
srv = IsCertBuiltInRoot(root, isBuiltInRoot);
if (srv != SECSuccess) {
return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
}
bool skipPinningChecksBecauseOfMITMMode =
(!isBuiltInRoot && mPinningMode == CertVerifier::pinningAllowUserCAMITM);
// If mHostname isn't set, we're not verifying in the context of a TLS
// handshake, so don't verify HPKP in those cases.
if (mHostname && (mPinningMode != CertVerifier::pinningDisabled) &&
!skipPinningChecksBecauseOfMITMMode) {
bool enforceTestMode =
(mPinningMode == CertVerifier::pinningEnforceTestMode);
bool chainHasValidPins;
nsresult nsrv = PublicKeyPinningService::ChainHasValidPins(
certList, mHostname, time, enforceTestMode, chainHasValidPins,
mPinningTelemetryInfo);
if (NS_FAILED(nsrv)) {
return Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
}
if (!chainHasValidPins) {
return Result::ERROR_KEY_PINNING_FAILURE;
}
}
if (mBuiltChain) {
*mBuiltChain = certList.forget();
}
return Success;
}
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(DigestAlgorithm aAlg,
EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
Time notBefore)
{
// (new Date("2016-01-01T00:00:00Z")).getTime() / 1000
static const Time JANUARY_FIRST_2016 = TimeFromEpochInSeconds(1451606400);
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("NSSCertDBTrustDomain: CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm"));
if (aAlg == DigestAlgorithm::sha1) {
// First check based on SHA1Mode
switch (mSHA1Mode) {
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Forbidden:
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("SHA-1 certificate rejected"));
return Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::OnlyBefore2016:
if (JANUARY_FIRST_2016 <= notBefore) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("Post-2015 SHA-1 certificate rejected"));
return Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
}
break;
case CertVerifier::SHA1Mode::Allowed:
default:
break;
}
// Then check the signatureDigestOption values
if (mSignatureDigestOption == DisableSHA1Everywhere) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("SHA-1 certificate rejected"));
return Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED;
}
if (endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA) {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("CA cert is SHA-1"));
return mSignatureDigestOption == DisableSHA1ForCA
? Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED
: Success;
} else {
MOZ_LOG(gCertVerifierLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("EE cert is SHA-1"));
return mSignatureDigestOption == DisableSHA1ForEE
? Result::ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED
: Success;
}
}
return Success;
}
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(
EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, unsigned int modulusSizeInBits)
{
if (modulusSizeInBits < mMinRSABits) {
return Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE;
}
return Success;
}
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(
const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
{
return VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
mPinArg);
}
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(
EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, NamedCurve curve)
{
switch (curve) {
case NamedCurve::secp256r1: // fall through
case NamedCurve::secp384r1: // fall through
case NamedCurve::secp521r1:
return Success;
}
return Result::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE;
}
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::VerifyECDSASignedDigest(const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
{
return VerifyECDSASignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
mPinArg);
}
Result
NSSCertDBTrustDomain::CheckValidityIsAcceptable(Time notBefore, Time notAfter,
EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
KeyPurposeId keyPurpose)
{
if (endEntityOrCA != EndEntityOrCA::MustBeEndEntity) {
return Success;
}
if (keyPurpose == KeyPurposeId::id_kp_OCSPSigning) {
return Success;
}
Duration DURATION_27_MONTHS_PLUS_SLOP((2 * 365 + 3 * 31 + 7) *
Time::ONE_DAY_IN_SECONDS);
Duration maxValidityDuration(UINT64_MAX);
Duration validityDuration(notBefore, notAfter);
switch (mValidityCheckingMode) {
case ValidityCheckingMode::CheckingOff:
return Success;
case ValidityCheckingMode::CheckForEV:
// The EV Guidelines say the maximum is 27 months, but we use a slightly
// higher limit here to (hopefully) minimize compatibility breakage.
maxValidityDuration = DURATION_27_MONTHS_PLUS_SLOP;
break;
default:
PR_NOT_REACHED("We're not handling every ValidityCheckingMode type");
}
if (validityDuration > maxValidityDuration) {
return Result::ERROR_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG;
}
return Success;
}
namespace {
static char*
nss_addEscape(const char* string, char quote)
{
char* newString = 0;
size_t escapes = 0, size = 0;
const char* src;
char* dest;
for (src = string; *src; src++) {
if ((*src == quote) || (*src == '\\')) {
escapes++;
}
size++;
}
newString = (char*) PORT_ZAlloc(escapes + size + 1u);
if (!newString) {
return nullptr;
}
for (src = string, dest = newString; *src; src++, dest++) {
if ((*src == quote) || (*src == '\\')) {
*dest++ = '\\';
}
*dest = *src;
}
return newString;
}
} // unnamed namespace
SECStatus
InitializeNSS(const char* dir, bool readOnly, bool loadPKCS11Modules)
{
// The NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT flag turns off the loading of the root certs
// module by NSS_Initialize because we will load it in InstallLoadableRoots
// later. It also allows us to work around a bug in the system NSS in
// Ubuntu 8.04, which loads any nonexistent "<configdir>/libnssckbi.so" as
// "/usr/lib/nss/libnssckbi.so".
uint32_t flags = NSS_INIT_NOROOTINIT | NSS_INIT_OPTIMIZESPACE;
if (readOnly) {
flags |= NSS_INIT_READONLY;
}
if (!loadPKCS11Modules) {
flags |= NSS_INIT_NOMODDB;
}
return ::NSS_Initialize(dir, "", "", SECMOD_DB, flags);
}
void
DisableMD5()
{
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_MD5,
0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBE_WITH_MD5_AND_DES_CBC,
0, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE);
}
SECStatus
LoadLoadableRoots(/*optional*/ const char* dir, const char* modNameUTF8)
{
PR_ASSERT(modNameUTF8);
if (!modNameUTF8) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
UniquePtr<char, void(&)(char*)>
fullLibraryPath(PR_GetLibraryName(dir, "nssckbi"), PR_FreeLibraryName);
if (!fullLibraryPath) {
return SECFailure;
}
UniquePtr<char, void(&)(void*)>
escaped_fullLibraryPath(nss_addEscape(fullLibraryPath.get(), '\"'),
PORT_Free);
if (!escaped_fullLibraryPath) {
return SECFailure;
}
// If a module exists with the same name, delete it.
int modType;
SECMOD_DeleteModule(modNameUTF8, &modType);
UniquePtr<char, void(&)(char*)>
pkcs11ModuleSpec(PR_smprintf("name=\"%s\" library=\"%s\"", modNameUTF8,
escaped_fullLibraryPath.get()),
PR_smprintf_free);
if (!pkcs11ModuleSpec) {
return SECFailure;
}
ScopedSECMODModule rootsModule(SECMOD_LoadUserModule(pkcs11ModuleSpec.get(),
nullptr, false));
if (!rootsModule) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (!rootsModule->loaded) {
PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
void
UnloadLoadableRoots(const char* modNameUTF8)
{
PR_ASSERT(modNameUTF8);
ScopedSECMODModule rootsModule(SECMOD_FindModule(modNameUTF8));
if (rootsModule) {
SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(rootsModule.get());
}
}
char*
DefaultServerNicknameForCert(CERTCertificate* cert)
{
char* nickname = nullptr;
int count;
bool conflict;
char* servername = nullptr;
servername = CERT_GetCommonName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
// Certs without common names are strange, but they do exist...
// Let's try to use another string for the nickname
servername = CERT_GetOrgUnitName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
servername = CERT_GetOrgName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
servername = CERT_GetLocalityName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
servername = CERT_GetStateName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
servername = CERT_GetCountryName(&cert->subject);
if (!servername) {
// We tried hard, there is nothing more we can do.
// A cert without any names doesn't really make sense.
return nullptr;
}
}
}
}
}
}
count = 1;
while (1) {
if (count == 1) {
nickname = PR_smprintf("%s", servername);
}
else {
nickname = PR_smprintf("%s #%d", servername, count);
}
if (!nickname) {
break;
}
conflict = SEC_CertNicknameConflict(nickname, &cert->derSubject,
cert->dbhandle);
if (!conflict) {
break;
}
PR_Free(nickname);
count++;
}
PR_FREEIF(servername);
return nickname;
}
void
SaveIntermediateCerts(const ScopedCERTCertList& certList)
{
if (!certList) {
return;
}
bool isEndEntity = true;
for (CERTCertListNode* node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
!CERT_LIST_END(node, certList);
node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
if (isEndEntity) {
// Skip the end-entity; we only want to store intermediates
isEndEntity = false;
continue;
}
if (node->cert->slot) {
// This cert was found on a token, no need to remember it in the temp db.
continue;
}
if (node->cert->isperm) {
// We don't need to remember certs already stored in perm db.
continue;
}
// We have found a signer cert that we want to remember.
char* nickname = DefaultServerNicknameForCert(node->cert);
if (nickname && *nickname) {
ScopedPK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetInternalKeySlot());
if (slot) {
PK11_ImportCert(slot.get(), node->cert, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
nickname, false);
}
}
PR_FREEIF(nickname);
}
}
} } // namespace mozilla::psm
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