зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
295 строки
9.3 KiB
C++
295 строки
9.3 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "AppTrustDomain.h"
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#include "certdb.h"
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#include "pkix/pkixnss.h"
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#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
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#include "nsIX509CertDB.h"
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#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
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#include "prerror.h"
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#include "secerr.h"
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// Generated in Makefile.in
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#include "marketplace-prod-public.inc"
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#include "marketplace-prod-reviewers.inc"
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#include "marketplace-dev-public.inc"
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#include "marketplace-dev-reviewers.inc"
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#include "marketplace-stage.inc"
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#include "xpcshell.inc"
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// Trusted Hosted Apps Certificates
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#include "manifest-signing-root.inc"
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#include "manifest-signing-test-root.inc"
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using namespace mozilla::pkix;
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#ifdef PR_LOGGING
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extern PRLogModuleInfo* gPIPNSSLog;
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#endif
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static const unsigned int DEFAULT_MIN_RSA_BITS = 2048;
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namespace mozilla { namespace psm {
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AppTrustDomain::AppTrustDomain(ScopedCERTCertList& certChain, void* pinArg)
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: mCertChain(certChain)
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, mPinArg(pinArg)
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, mMinRSABits(DEFAULT_MIN_RSA_BITS)
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{
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}
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SECStatus
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AppTrustDomain::SetTrustedRoot(AppTrustedRoot trustedRoot)
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{
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SECItem trustedDER;
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// Load the trusted certificate into the in-memory NSS database so that
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// CERT_CreateSubjectCertList can find it.
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switch (trustedRoot)
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{
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case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdPublicRoot:
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trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
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trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdPublicRoot);
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break;
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case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceProdReviewersRoot:
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trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
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trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceProdReviewersRoot);
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break;
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case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevPublicRoot:
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trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
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trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevPublicRoot);
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break;
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case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceDevReviewersRoot:
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trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
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trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceDevReviewersRoot);
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break;
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case nsIX509CertDB::AppMarketplaceStageRoot:
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trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(marketplaceStageRoot);
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trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(marketplaceStageRoot);
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// The staging root was generated with a 1024-bit key.
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mMinRSABits = 1024u;
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break;
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case nsIX509CertDB::AppXPCShellRoot:
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trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(xpcshellRoot);
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trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(xpcshellRoot);
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break;
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case nsIX509CertDB::TrustedHostedAppPublicRoot:
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trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(trustedAppPublicRoot);
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trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(trustedAppPublicRoot);
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break;
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case nsIX509CertDB::TrustedHostedAppTestRoot:
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trustedDER.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(trustedAppTestRoot);
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trustedDER.len = mozilla::ArrayLength(trustedAppTestRoot);
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break;
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default:
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PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS, 0);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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mTrustedRoot = CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
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&trustedDER, nullptr, false, true);
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if (!mTrustedRoot) {
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return SECFailure;
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}
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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Result
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AppTrustDomain::FindIssuer(Input encodedIssuerName, IssuerChecker& checker,
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Time)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
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if (!mTrustedRoot) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
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}
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// TODO(bug 1035418): If/when mozilla::pkix relaxes the restriction that
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// FindIssuer must only pass certificates with a matching subject name to
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// checker.Check, we can stop using CERT_CreateSubjectCertList and instead
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// use logic like this:
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//
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// 1. First, try the trusted trust anchor.
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// 2. Secondly, iterate through the certificates that were stored in the CMS
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// message, passing each one to checker.Check.
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SECItem encodedIssuerNameSECItem =
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UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(encodedIssuerName);
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ScopedCERTCertList
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candidates(CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(nullptr, CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(),
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&encodedIssuerNameSECItem, 0,
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false));
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if (candidates) {
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for (CERTCertListNode* n = CERT_LIST_HEAD(candidates);
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!CERT_LIST_END(n, candidates); n = CERT_LIST_NEXT(n)) {
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Input certDER;
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Result rv = certDER.Init(n->cert->derCert.data, n->cert->derCert.len);
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if (rv != Success) {
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continue; // probably too big
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}
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bool keepGoing;
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rv = checker.Check(certDER, nullptr/*additionalNameConstraints*/,
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keepGoing);
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if (rv != Success) {
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return rv;
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}
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if (!keepGoing) {
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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return Success;
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}
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Result
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AppTrustDomain::GetCertTrust(EndEntityOrCA endEntityOrCA,
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const CertPolicyId& policy,
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Input candidateCertDER,
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/*out*/ TrustLevel& trustLevel)
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(policy.IsAnyPolicy());
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MOZ_ASSERT(mTrustedRoot);
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if (!policy.IsAnyPolicy()) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS;
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}
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if (!mTrustedRoot) {
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return Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
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}
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// Handle active distrust of the certificate.
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// XXX: This would be cleaner and more efficient if we could get the trust
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// information without constructing a CERTCertificate here, but NSS doesn't
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// expose it in any other easy-to-use fashion.
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SECItem candidateCertDERSECItem =
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UnsafeMapInputToSECItem(candidateCertDER);
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ScopedCERTCertificate candidateCert(
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CERT_NewTempCertificate(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), &candidateCertDERSECItem,
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nullptr, false, true));
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if (!candidateCert) {
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return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
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}
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CERTCertTrust trust;
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if (CERT_GetCertTrust(candidateCert.get(), &trust) == SECSuccess) {
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uint32_t flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&trust, trustObjectSigning);
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// For DISTRUST, we use the CERTDB_TRUSTED or CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA bit,
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// because we can have active distrust for either type of cert. Note that
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// CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD means "stop trying to inherit trust" so if the
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// relevant trust bit isn't set then that means the cert must be considered
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// distrusted.
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uint32_t relevantTrustBit = endEntityOrCA == EndEntityOrCA::MustBeCA
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? CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA
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: CERTDB_TRUSTED;
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if (((flags & (relevantTrustBit | CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD)))
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== CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) {
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trustLevel = TrustLevel::ActivelyDistrusted;
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return Success;
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}
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}
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// mTrustedRoot is the only trust anchor for this validation.
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if (CERT_CompareCerts(mTrustedRoot.get(), candidateCert.get())) {
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trustLevel = TrustLevel::TrustAnchor;
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return Success;
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}
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trustLevel = TrustLevel::InheritsTrust;
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return Success;
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}
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Result
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AppTrustDomain::DigestBuf(Input item,
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DigestAlgorithm digestAlg,
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/*out*/ uint8_t* digestBuf,
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size_t digestBufLen)
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{
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return DigestBufNSS(item, digestAlg, digestBuf, digestBufLen);
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}
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Result
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AppTrustDomain::CheckRevocation(EndEntityOrCA, const CertID&, Time,
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/*optional*/ const Input*,
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/*optional*/ const Input*)
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{
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// We don't currently do revocation checking. If we need to distrust an Apps
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// certificate, we will use the active distrust mechanism.
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return Success;
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}
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Result
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AppTrustDomain::IsChainValid(const DERArray& certChain, Time time)
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{
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SECStatus srv = ConstructCERTCertListFromReversedDERArray(certChain,
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mCertChain);
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if (srv != SECSuccess) {
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return MapPRErrorCodeToResult(PR_GetError());
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}
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return Success;
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}
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Result
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AppTrustDomain::CheckSignatureDigestAlgorithm(DigestAlgorithm)
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{
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// TODO: We should restrict signatures to SHA-256 or better.
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return Success;
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}
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Result
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AppTrustDomain::CheckRSAPublicKeyModulusSizeInBits(
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EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/, unsigned int modulusSizeInBits)
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{
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if (modulusSizeInBits < mMinRSABits) {
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return Result::ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_SIZE;
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}
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return Success;
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}
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Result
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AppTrustDomain::VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigest(const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
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Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
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{
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// TODO: We should restrict signatures to SHA-256 or better.
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return VerifyRSAPKCS1SignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
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mPinArg);
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}
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Result
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AppTrustDomain::CheckECDSACurveIsAcceptable(EndEntityOrCA /*endEntityOrCA*/,
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NamedCurve curve)
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{
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switch (curve) {
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case NamedCurve::secp256r1: // fall through
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case NamedCurve::secp384r1: // fall through
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case NamedCurve::secp521r1:
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return Success;
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}
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return Result::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE;
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}
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Result
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AppTrustDomain::VerifyECDSASignedDigest(const SignedDigest& signedDigest,
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Input subjectPublicKeyInfo)
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{
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return VerifyECDSASignedDigestNSS(signedDigest, subjectPublicKeyInfo,
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mPinArg);
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}
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} } // namespace mozilla::psm
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