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README.md
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@ -11,8 +11,12 @@ Current version: **0.0.x**
# Table of Content
- [**Introduction**](#introduction)
- [Protocol Example](#protocol-example)
- [Usage Example](#usage-example)
- [Protocol Example](#protocol-example)
<p></p>
- [**Security Considerations**](#security-considerations)
<p></p>
- [**Frequently Asked Questions**](#frequently-asked-questions)
# Introduction
@ -42,63 +46,6 @@ Digest, this mechanism is not intended to protect the key itself (user's passwor
and server both have access to the key material in the clear.
## Protocol Example
The client attempts to access a protected resource without authentication, sending the following HTTP request to
the resource server:
```
GET /resource/1?b=1&a=2 HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8000
```
The resource server returns the following authentication challenge:
```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Hawk
```
The client has previously obtained a set of **Hawk** credentials for accessing resources on the "http://example.com/"
server. The **Hawk** credentials issued to the client include the following attributes:
* Key identifier: dh37fgj492je
* Key: werxhqb98rpaxn39848xrunpaw3489ruxnpa98w4rxn
* Algorithm: hmac-sha-256
The client generates the authentication header by calculating a timestamp (e.g. the number of seconds since January 1,
1970 00:00:00 GMT) and constructs the normalized request string (newline separated values):
```
1353832234
dh37fgj492je
GET
/resource/1?b=1&a=2
127.0.0.1
8000
some-app-data
```
The request MAC is calculated using the specified algorithm "hmac-sha-256" and the key over the normalized request string.
The result is base64-encoded to produce the request MAC:
```
/uYWR6W5vTbY3WKUAN6fa+7p1t+1Yl6hFxKeMLfR6kk=
```
The client includes the **Hawk** key identifier, timestamp, and request MAC with the request using the HTTP "Authorization"
request header field:
```
GET /resource/1?b=1&a=2 HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8000
Authorization: Hawk id="dh37fgj492je", ts="1353832234", ext="some-app-data", mac="/uYWR6W5vTbY3WKUAN6fa+7p1t+1Yl6hFxKeMLfR6kk="
```
The server validates the request by calculating the request MAC again based on the request received and verifies the validity
and scope of the **Hawk** credentials. If valid, the server responds with the requested resource.
## Usage Example
Server code:
@ -165,3 +112,144 @@ Request(options, function (error, response, body) {
console.log(response.statusCode + ': ' + body);
});
```
## Protocol Example
The client attempts to access a protected resource without authentication, sending the following HTTP request to
the resource server:
```
GET /resource/1?b=1&a=2 HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8000
```
The resource server returns the following authentication challenge:
```
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Hawk
```
The client has previously obtained a set of **Hawk** credentials for accessing resources on the "http://example.com/"
server. The **Hawk** credentials issued to the client include the following attributes:
* Key identifier: dh37fgj492je
* Key: werxhqb98rpaxn39848xrunpaw3489ruxnpa98w4rxn
* Algorithm: hmac-sha-256
The client generates the authentication header by calculating a timestamp (e.g. the number of seconds since January 1,
1970 00:00:00 GMT) and constructs the normalized request string (newline separated values):
```
1353832234
dh37fgj492je
GET
/resource/1?b=1&a=2
127.0.0.1
8000
some-app-data
```
The request MAC is calculated using the specified algorithm "hmac-sha-256" and the key over the normalized request string.
The result is base64-encoded to produce the request MAC:
```
/uYWR6W5vTbY3WKUAN6fa+7p1t+1Yl6hFxKeMLfR6kk=
```
The client includes the **Hawk** key identifier, timestamp, and request MAC with the request using the HTTP "Authorization"
request header field:
```
GET /resource/1?b=1&a=2 HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8000
Authorization: Hawk id="dh37fgj492je", ts="1353832234", ext="some-app-data", mac="/uYWR6W5vTbY3WKUAN6fa+7p1t+1Yl6hFxKeMLfR6kk="
```
The server validates the request by calculating the request MAC again based on the request received and verifies the validity
and scope of the **Hawk** credentials. If valid, the server responds with the requested resource.
# Security Considerations
The greatest sources of security risks are usually found not in **Hawk** but in the policies and procedures surrounding its use.
Implementers are strongly encouraged to assess how this module addresses their security requirements. This section includes
an incomplete list of security considerations that must be reviewed and understood before deploying **Hawk** on the server.
## MAC Keys Transmission
**Hawk** does not provide any mechanism for obtaining or transmitting the set of shared credentials required. Any mechanism used
to obtain **Hawk** credentials must ensure that these transmissions are protected using transport-layer mechanisms such as TLS.
## Confidentiality of Requests
While **Hawk** provides a mechanism for verifying the integrity of HTTP requests, it provides no guarantee of request
confidentiality. Unless other precautions are taken, eavesdroppers will have full access to the request content. Servers should
carefully consider the types of data likely to be sent as part of such requests, and employ transport-layer security mechanisms
to protect sensitive resources.
## Spoofing by Counterfeit Servers
**Hawk** makes no attempt to verify the authenticity of the server. A hostile party could take advantage of this by intercepting
the client's requests and returning misleading or otherwise incorrect responses. Service providers should consider such attacks
when developing services using this protocol, and should require transport-layer security for any requests where the authenticity
of the resource server or of server responses is an issue.
## Plaintext Storage of Credentials
The **Hawk** key functions the same way passwords do in traditional authentication systems. In order to compute the request MAC,
the server must have access to the key in plaintext form. This is in contrast, for example, to modern operating systems, which
store only a one-way hash of user credentials.
If an attacker were to gain access to these keys - or worse, to the server's database of all such keys - he or she would be able
to perform any action on behalf of any resource owner. Accordingly, it is critical that servers protect these keys from unauthorized
access.
## Entropy of Keys
Unless a transport-layer security protocol is used, eavesdroppers will have full access to authenticated requests and request
MAC values, and will thus be able to mount offline brute-force attacks to recover the key used. Servers should be careful to
assign keys which are long enough, and random enough, to resist such attacks for at least the length of time that the **Hawk**
credentials are valid.
For example, if the credentials are valid for two weeks, servers should ensure that it is not possible to mount a brute force
attack that recovers the key in less than two weeks. Of course, servers are urged to err on the side of caution, and use the
longest key reasonable.
It is equally important that the pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) used to generate these keys be of sufficiently high
quality. Many PRNG implementations generate number sequences that may appear to be random, but which nevertheless exhibit
patterns or other weaknesses which make cryptanalysis or brute force attacks easier. Implementers should be careful to use
cryptographically secure PRNGs to avoid these problems.
## Coverage Limitations
The request MAC only covers the HTTP `Host` header and does not cover any other headers which can often affect how the request
body is interpreted by the server (i.e. Content-Type). If the server behavior is influenced by the presence or value of such headers,
an attacker can manipulate the request header without being detected. Implementers should use the `ext` feature to pass
application-specific information via the Authorization header which is protected by the request MAC.
# Frequently Asked Questions
### Where is the protocol specification?
If you are looking for some prose explaining how all this works, there isn't any. **Hawk** is being developed as an open source
project instead of a standard. In other words, the [code](tree/master/lib) is the specification.
### Does **Hawk** have anything to do with OAuth?
Short answer: no.
**Hawk** was originally proposed as the OAuth MAC Token specification. However, the OAuth working group in its consistent
incompetence failed to produce a final, usable solution to address one of the most popular use cases of OAuth 1.0 - using it
to authenticate simple client-server transactions (i.e. two-legged).
**Hawk** provides a simple HTTP authentication scheme for making client-server requests. It does not address the OAuth use case
of delegating access to a third party. If you are looking for an OAuth alternative, check out [Oz](/hueniverse/oz).
### Where can I find **Hawk** implementations in other languages?
At this time, **Hawk** is only implemented in JavaScript as a node.js module. Check this space for future support of other
languages (and such contributions are always welcome).