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b=130949 Fix lock icon issues 

r=ddrinan sr=rpotts a=valeski
This commit is contained in:
kaie%netscape.com 2002-03-27 07:56:02 +00:00
Родитель 53d54a1fd2
Коммит 7394a0617f
4 изменённых файлов: 698 добавлений и 294 удалений
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1
security/manager/boot/src/Makefile.in
Просмотреть файл

@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ REQUIRES = nspr \
xpcom \
string \
necko \
necko2 \
uriloader \
caps \
dom \

86
security/manager/boot/src/makefile.win
Просмотреть файл

@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
#!nmake
# ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
# Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
#
# The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
# 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
# the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
# http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
#
# Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
# WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
# for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
# License.
#
# The Original Code is mozilla.org code.
#
# The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
# Netscape Communications Corporation.
# Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 2001
# the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Contributor(s):
# Terry Hayes <thayes@netscape.com>
# Kai Engert <kaie@netscape.com>
#
# Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
# either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
# the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
# in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
# of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
# under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
# use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
# decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
# and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
# the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
# the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
#
# ***** END LICENSE BLOCK *****
MODULE = pipboot
DEPTH=..\..\..\..
IGNORE_MANIFEST=1
LIBRARY_NAME = pipboot
PDBFILE = $(LIBRARY_NAME).pdb
MAPFILE = $(LIBRARY_NAME).map
MODULE_NAME = BOOT
META_COMPONENT = crypto
REQUIRES = \
xpcom \
string \
dom \
pref \
intl \
locale \
windowwatcher \
necko \
pipnss \
layout \
layout_xul \
uriloader \
docshell \
widget \
content \
$(NULL)
include <$(DEPTH)/config/config.mak>
LLIBS = \
$(DIST)/lib/js3250.lib \
$(LIBNSPR) \
$(DIST)\lib\xpcom.lib \
$(NULL)
EXPORTS = \
$(NULL)
OBJS = \
.\$(OBJDIR)\nsEntropyCollector.obj \
.\$(OBJDIR)\nsSecureBrowserUIImpl.obj \
.\$(OBJDIR)\nsBOOTModule.obj \
$(NULL)
include <$(DEPTH)\config\rules.mak>

869
security/manager/boot/src/nsSecureBrowserUIImpl.cpp
Просмотреть файл

@ -57,6 +57,8 @@
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
#include "nsIFileChannel.h"
#include "nsIWyciwygChannel.h"
#include "nsIFTPChannel.h"
#include "nsITransportSecurityInfo.h"
#include "nsIURI.h"
#include "nsISecurityEventSink.h"
@ -87,10 +89,11 @@ PRLogModuleInfo* gSecureDocLog = nsnull;
nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::nsSecureBrowserUIImpl()
: mMixContentAlertShown(PR_FALSE),
mSecurityState(STATE_IS_INSECURE)
: mIsViewSource(PR_FALSE),
mPreviousSecurityState(lis_no_security)
{
NS_INIT_ISUPPORTS();
ResetStateTracking();
#if defined(PR_LOGGING)
if (!gSecureDocLog)
@ -120,6 +123,9 @@ NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS6(nsSecureBrowserUIImpl,
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::Init(nsIDOMWindow *window)
{
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: Init\n", this));
nsresult rv = NS_OK;
mWindow = window;
@ -130,9 +136,6 @@ nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::Init(nsIDOMWindow *window)
getter_AddRefs(mStringBundle));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
GetBundleString(NS_LITERAL_STRING("SecurityButtonTooltipText").get(),
mTooltipText);
// hook up to the form post notifications:
nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> svc(do_GetService("@mozilla.org/observer-service;1", &rv));
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
@ -160,14 +163,49 @@ nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::Init(nsIDOMWindow *window)
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::GetState(PRInt32* aState)
{
*aState = mSecurityState;
NS_ENSURE_ARG(aState);
switch (mPreviousSecurityState)
{
case lis_broken_security:
*aState = STATE_IS_BROKEN;
break;
case lis_mixed_security:
*aState = STATE_IS_BROKEN;
break;
case lis_low_security:
*aState = STATE_IS_SECURE | STATE_SECURE_LOW;
break;
case lis_high_security:
*aState = STATE_IS_SECURE | STATE_SECURE_HIGH;
break;
default:
case lis_no_security:
*aState = STATE_IS_INSECURE;
break;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::GetTooltipText(nsAString& aText)
{
aText = mTooltipText;
if (!mInfoTooltip.IsEmpty())
{
aText = mInfoTooltip;
}
else
{
GetBundleString(NS_LITERAL_STRING("SecurityButtonTooltipText").get(),
aText);
}
return NS_OK;
}
@ -277,129 +315,653 @@ nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::OnProgressChange(nsIWebProgress* aWebProgress,
return NS_OK;
}
void nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::ResetStateTracking()
{
mNewToplevelSecurityState = STATE_IS_INSECURE;
mInfoTooltip.Truncate();
mDocumentRequestsInProgress = 0;
mSubRequestsInProgress = 0;
mSubRequestsHighSecurity = 0;
mSubRequestsLowSecurity = 0;
mSubRequestsBrokenSecurity = 0;
mSubRequestsNoSecurity = 0;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::OnStateChange(nsIWebProgress* aWebProgress,
nsIRequest* aRequest,
PRInt32 aProgressStateFlags,
nsresult aStatus)
{
/*
All discussion, unless otherwise mentioned, only refers to
http, https, file or wyciwig requests.
Redirects are evil, well, some of them.
There are mutliple forms of redirects.
Redirects caused by http refresh content are ok, because experiments show,
with those redirects, the old page contents and their requests will come to STOP
completely, before any progress from new refreshed page content is reported.
So we can safely treat them as separate page loading transactions.
Evil are redirects at the http protocol level, like code 302.
If the toplevel documents gets replaced, i.e. redirected with 302, we do not care for the
security state of the initial transaction, which has now been redirected,
we only care for the new page load.
For the implementation of the security UI, we make an assumption, that is hopefully true.
Imagine, the received page that was delivered with the 302 redirection answer,
also delivered html content.
What happens if the parser starts to analyze the content and tries to load contained sub objects?
In that case we would see start and stop requests for subdocuments, some for the previous document,
some for the new target document. And only those for the new toplevel document may be
taken into consideration, when deciding about the security state of the next toplevel document.
Because security state is being looked at, when loading stops for (sub)documents, this
could cause real confusion, because we have to decide, whether an incoming progress
belongs to the new toplevel page, or the previous, already redirected page.
Can we simplify here?
If a redirect at the http protocol level is seen, can we safely assume, its html content
will not be parsed, anylzed, and no embedded objects will get loaded (css, js, images),
because the redirect is already happening?
If we can assume that, this really simplify things. Because we will never see notification
for sub requests that need to get ignored.
I would like to make this assumption for now, but please let me (kaie) know if I'm wrong.
Excurse:
If my assumption is wrong, then we would require more tracking information.
We need to keep lists of all pointers to request object that had been seen since the
last toplevel start event.
If the start for a redirected page is seen, the list of releveant object must be cleared,
and only progress for requests which start after it must be analyzed.
All other events must be ignored, as they belong to now irrelevant previous top level documents.
Frames are also evil.
First we need a decision.
kaie thinks:
Only if the toplevel frame is secure, we should try to display secure lock icons.
If some of the inner contents are insecure, we display mixed mode.
But if the top level frame is not secure, why indicate a mixed lock icon at all?
I think we should always display an open lock icon, if the top level frameset is insecure.
That's the way Netscape Communicator behaves, and I think we should do the same.
The user will not know which parts are secure and which are not,
and any certificate information, displayed in the tooltip or in the "page info"
will only be relevant for some subframe(s), and the user will not know which ones,
so we shouldn't display it as a general attribute of the displayed page.
Why are frames evil?
Because the progress for the toplevel frame document is not easily distinguishable
from subframes. The same STATE bits are reported.
While at first sight, when a new page load happens,
the toplevel frameset document has also the STATE_IS_NETWORK bit in it.
But this can't really be used. Because in case that document causes a http 302 redirect,
the real top level frameset will no longer have that bit.
But we need some way to distinguish top level frames from inner frames.
I saw that the web progress we get delivered has a reference to the toplevel DOM window.
I suggest, we look at all incoming requests.
If a request is NOT for the toplevel DOM window, we will always treat it as a subdocument request,
regardless of whether the load flags indicate a top level document.
*/
nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> windowForProgress;
aWebProgress->GetDOMWindow(getter_AddRefs(windowForProgress));
const PRBool isToplevelProgress = (windowForProgress.get() == mWindow.get());
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
if (windowForProgress)
{
if (isToplevelProgress)
{
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: progress: for toplevel\n", this));
}
else
{
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: progress: for something else\n", this));
}
}
else
{
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: progress: no window known\n", this));
}
#endif
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange\n", this));
if (mIsViewSource)
return NS_OK;
nsresult res = NS_OK;
if (!aRequest)
{
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange with null request\n", this));
return NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER;
}
#ifdef PR_LOGGING
nsXPIDLCString reqname;
aRequest->GetName(reqname);
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange %x %s\n", this, aProgressStateFlags, reqname.get()));
#endif
// Get the channel from the request...
// If the request is not network based, then ignore it.
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel(do_QueryInterface(aRequest, &res));
if (NS_FAILED(res))
return NS_OK;
// We are only interested in HTTP and file requests.
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpRequest(do_QueryInterface(aRequest));
nsCOMPtr<nsIFileChannel> fileRequest(do_QueryInterface(aRequest));
if (!httpRequest && !fileRequest) {
{
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: no channel\n", this));
return NS_OK;
}
// We are only interested in requests that load in the browser window...
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpRequest(do_QueryInterface(channel));
if (!httpRequest) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIFileChannel> fileRequest(do_QueryInterface(channel));
if (!fileRequest) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIWyciwygChannel> wyciwygRequest(do_QueryInterface(channel));
if (!wyciwygRequest) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIFTPChannel> ftpRequest(do_QueryInterface(channel));
if (!ftpRequest) {
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: not a relevant request\n", this));
return NS_OK;
}
}
}
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> requestor;
nsCOMPtr<nsISecurityEventSink> eventSink;
channel->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(requestor));
if (requestor)
eventSink = do_GetInterface(requestor);
PRUint32 loadFlags = 0;
aRequest->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
#if defined(DEBUG)
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> loadingURI;
res = channel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(loadingURI));
NS_ASSERTION(NS_SUCCEEDED(res), "GetURI failed");
if (loadingURI) {
nsCAutoString temp;
loadingURI->GetSpec(temp);
nsCString info2;
PRUint32 testFlags = loadFlags;
if (testFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI)
{
testFlags -= nsIChannel::LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI;
info2.Append("LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI ");
}
if (testFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_RETARGETED_DOCUMENT_URI)
{
testFlags -= nsIChannel::LOAD_RETARGETED_DOCUMENT_URI;
info2.Append("LOAD_RETARGETED_DOCUMENT_URI ");
}
if (testFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_REPLACE)
{
testFlags -= nsIChannel::LOAD_REPLACE;
info2.Append("LOAD_REPLACE ");
}
const char *_status = NS_SUCCEEDED(aStatus) ? "1" : "0";
nsCString info;
PRInt32 f = aProgressStateFlags;
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_START)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_START;
info.Append("START ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_REDIRECTING)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_REDIRECTING;
info.Append("REDIRECTING ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_TRANSFERRING)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_TRANSFERRING;
info.Append("TRANSFERRING ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_NEGOTIATING)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_NEGOTIATING;
info.Append("NEGOTIATING ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_STOP)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_STOP;
info.Append("STOP ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_REQUEST)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_REQUEST;
info.Append("IS_REQUEST ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_DOCUMENT)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_DOCUMENT;
info.Append("IS_DOCUMENT ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_NETWORK)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_NETWORK;
info.Append("IS_NETWORK ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_WINDOW)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_WINDOW;
info.Append("IS_WINDOW ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_INSECURE)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_INSECURE;
info.Append("IS_INSECURE ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
info.Append("IS_BROKEN ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_SECURE)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_SECURE;
info.Append("IS_SECURE ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_SECURE_HIGH)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_SECURE_HIGH;
info.Append("SECURE_HIGH ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_SECURE_MED)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_SECURE_MED;
info.Append("SECURE_MED ");
}
if (f & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_SECURE_LOW)
{
f -= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_SECURE_LOW;
info.Append("SECURE_LOW ");
}
if (f > 0)
{
info.Append("f contains unknown flag!");
}
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: %s %s -- %s\n", this, _status,
info.get(), info2.get()));
if (aProgressStateFlags & STATE_STOP)
{
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: %x :%s\n", this,
aProgressStateFlags,temp.get()));
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: seeing STOP with security state: %d\n", this,
GetSecurityStateFromChannel(channel)
));
}
#endif
// First event when loading doc
if (aProgressStateFlags & STATE_START) {
if (aProgressStateFlags & STATE_IS_NETWORK) {
// Reset state variables used per doc loading
mMixContentAlertShown = PR_FALSE;
mFirstRequest = PR_TRUE;
mSSLStatus = nsnull;
mRedirecting = PR_FALSE;
}
}
if (aProgressStateFlags & STATE_START
&&
aProgressStateFlags & STATE_IS_REQUEST
&&
isToplevelProgress
&&
loadFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI)
{
if (!mDocumentRequestsInProgress)
{
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: start for toplevel document\n", this
));
// We need to keep track of redirects. This tells us that the current request is going
// to be redirected after it finishes loading.
if ((aProgressStateFlags & STATE_IS_REQUEST) && (aProgressStateFlags & STATE_REDIRECTING)) {
mRedirecting = PR_TRUE;
}
// Request has completed.
if ((aProgressStateFlags & (STATE_STOP)) &&
(aProgressStateFlags & STATE_IS_REQUEST)) {
// work-around for bug 48515.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> aURI;
channel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(aURI));
// Sometimes URI is null, so ignore.
if (aURI == nsnull) {
return NS_OK;
ResetStateTracking();
}
// The document is going to be redirected.
// We must reset our state and start again because the new document may have different security.
if (mRedirecting) {
mMixContentAlertShown = PR_FALSE;
mFirstRequest = PR_TRUE;
mSSLStatus = nsnull;
mRedirecting = PR_FALSE;
return NS_OK;
// By using a counter, this code also works when the toplevel
// document get's redirected, but the STOP request for the
// previous toplevel document has not yet have been received.
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: ++mDocumentRequestsInProgress\n", this
));
++mDocumentRequestsInProgress;
return NS_OK;
}
if (aProgressStateFlags & STATE_START
&&
aProgressStateFlags & STATE_IS_REQUEST)
{
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: ++mSubRequestsInProgress\n", this
));
++mSubRequestsInProgress;
return NS_OK;
}
if (aProgressStateFlags & STATE_STOP
&&
aProgressStateFlags & STATE_IS_REQUEST
&&
isToplevelProgress
&&
loadFlags & nsIChannel::LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI)
{
NS_ASSERTION(mDocumentRequestsInProgress > 0, "Oops? We see more STOPs than STARTs...");
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: --mDocumentRequestsInProgress\n", this
));
if (!mToplevelEventSink)
{
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> requestor;
channel->GetNotificationCallbacks(getter_AddRefs(requestor));
if (requestor)
mToplevelEventSink = do_GetInterface(requestor);
}
if (!--mDocumentRequestsInProgress)
{
// we are arriving at zero, all STOPs for toplevel documents
// have been received
mNewToplevelSecurityState = GetSecurityStateFromChannel(channel);
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: remember mNewToplevelSecurityState => %x\n", this,
mNewToplevelSecurityState));
// Get SSL Status information if possible
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> info;
channel->GetSecurityInfo(getter_AddRefs(info));
nsCOMPtr<nsISSLStatusProvider> sp = do_QueryInterface(info);
if (sp) {
// Ignore result
sp->GetSSLStatus(getter_AddRefs(mSSLStatus));
}
if (info) {
nsCOMPtr<nsITransportSecurityInfo> secInfo(do_QueryInterface(info));
if (secInfo) {
secInfo->GetShortSecurityDescription(getter_Copies(mInfoTooltip));
}
}
if (!mSubRequestsInProgress)
{
return FinishedLoadingStateChange(aRequest);
}
}
// If this is the first request, then do a protocol check
if (mFirstRequest) {
mFirstRequest = PR_FALSE;
return CheckProtocolContextSwitch(eventSink, aRequest, channel);
return NS_OK;
}
if (aProgressStateFlags & STATE_STOP
&&
aProgressStateFlags & STATE_IS_REQUEST)
{
// if we arrive here, LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI is not set
NS_ASSERTION(mSubRequestsInProgress > 0, "Oops? We see more STOPs than STARTs...");
PRInt32 aState = GetSecurityStateFromChannel(channel);
if (aState & STATE_IS_SECURE)
{
if (aState & STATE_SECURE_LOW || aState & STATE_SECURE_MED)
{
++mSubRequestsLowSecurity;
}
else
{
++mSubRequestsHighSecurity;
}
}
// Check that the request does not have mixed content.
return CheckMixedContext(eventSink, aRequest, channel);
else if (aState & STATE_IS_BROKEN)
{
++ mSubRequestsBrokenSecurity;
}
else
{
++mSubRequestsNoSecurity;
}
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnStateChange: --mSubRequestsInProgress\n", this
));
if (!--mSubRequestsInProgress)
{
// we are arriving at zero, all STOPs for currently known sub requests
// have been received
if (!mDocumentRequestsInProgress)
{
return FinishedLoadingStateChange(aRequest);
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
// A document has finished loading
if ((aProgressStateFlags & STATE_STOP) &&
(aProgressStateFlags & STATE_IS_NETWORK)) {
return NS_OK;
}
// Get SSL Status information if possible
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> info;
channel->GetSecurityInfo(getter_AddRefs(info));
nsCOMPtr<nsISSLStatusProvider> sp = do_QueryInterface(info);
if (sp) {
// Ignore result
sp->GetSSLStatus(getter_AddRefs(mSSLStatus));
nsresult nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::FinishedLoadingStateChange(nsIRequest* aRequest)
{
lockIconState newSecurityState;
if (mNewToplevelSecurityState & STATE_IS_SECURE)
{
if (mNewToplevelSecurityState & STATE_SECURE_LOW
||
mNewToplevelSecurityState & STATE_SECURE_MED)
{
if (mSubRequestsBrokenSecurity
||
mSubRequestsNoSecurity)
{
newSecurityState = lis_mixed_security;
}
else
{
newSecurityState = lis_low_security;
}
}
else
{
// high
// update the tooltip text so it can be read
// when we do the security change notification
if (info) {
nsXPIDLString tooltip;
nsCOMPtr<nsITransportSecurityInfo> secInfo(do_QueryInterface(info));
if (secInfo &&
NS_SUCCEEDED(secInfo->GetShortSecurityDescription(getter_Copies(tooltip))) &&
tooltip) {
mTooltipText = tooltip;
if (mSubRequestsLowSecurity
||
mSubRequestsBrokenSecurity
||
mSubRequestsNoSecurity)
{
newSecurityState = lis_mixed_security;
}
else
{
newSecurityState = lis_high_security;
}
}
}
else
if (mNewToplevelSecurityState & STATE_IS_BROKEN)
{
// indicating BROKEN is more important than MIXED.
newSecurityState = lis_broken_security;
}
else
{
newSecurityState = lis_no_security;
}
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: FinishedLoadingStateChange: old-new %d - %d\n", this,
mPreviousSecurityState, newSecurityState
));
if (mPreviousSecurityState != newSecurityState)
{
// must show alert
// we'll treat "broken" exactly like "insecure",
// i.e. we do not show alerts when switching between broken and insecure
/*
from to shows alert
------------------------------ ---------------
no or broken -> no or broken => <NOTHING SHOWN>
no or broken -> mixed => mixed alert
no or broken -> low => low alert
no or broken -> high => high alert
mixed, high, low -> no, broken => leaving secure
mixed -> low => low alert
mixed -> high => high alert
high -> low => low alert
high -> mixed => mixed
low -> high => high
low -> mixed => mixed
security icon
----------------
no open
mixed broken
broken broken
low low
high high
*/
PRBool showWarning = PR_TRUE;
switch (mPreviousSecurityState)
{
case lis_no_security:
case lis_broken_security:
switch (newSecurityState)
{
case lis_no_security:
case lis_broken_security:
showWarning = PR_FALSE;
break;
default:
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (showWarning)
{
switch (newSecurityState)
{
case lis_no_security:
case lis_broken_security:
AlertLeavingSecure();
break;
case lis_mixed_security:
AlertMixedMode();
break;
case lis_low_security:
AlertEnteringWeak();
break;
case lis_high_security:
AlertEnteringSecure();
break;
}
}
if (eventSink)
eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequest, mSecurityState);
mPreviousSecurityState = newSecurityState;
if (lis_no_security == newSecurityState)
{
mSSLStatus = nsnull;
mInfoTooltip.Truncate();
}
if (mToplevelEventSink)
{
PRInt32 newState = STATE_IS_INSECURE;
switch (newSecurityState)
{
case lis_broken_security:
newState = STATE_IS_BROKEN;
break;
case lis_mixed_security:
newState = STATE_IS_BROKEN;
break;
case lis_low_security:
newState = STATE_IS_SECURE | STATE_SECURE_LOW;
break;
case lis_high_security:
newState = STATE_IS_SECURE | STATE_SECURE_HIGH;
break;
default:
case lis_no_security:
newState = STATE_IS_INSECURE;
break;
}
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: FinishedLoadingStateChange: calling OnSecurityChange\n", this
));
mToplevelEventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequest, newState);
}
else
{
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: FinishedLoadingStateChange: NO mToplevelEventSink!\n", this
));
}
}
return res;
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
@ -408,6 +970,20 @@ nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::OnLocationChange(nsIWebProgress* aWebProgress,
nsIURI* aLocation)
{
mCurrentURI = aLocation;
if (mCurrentURI)
{
PRBool vs;
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mCurrentURI->SchemeIs("view-source", &vs)) && vs)
{
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnLocationChange: view-source\n", this));
mIsViewSource = PR_TRUE;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
@ -427,17 +1003,19 @@ nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::OnSecurityChange(nsIWebProgress *aWebProgress,
{
nsresult res = NS_OK;
#if defined(DEBUG_dougt)
#if defined(DEBUG)
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel(do_QueryInterface(aRequest));
if (!channel)
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> aURI;
channel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(aURI));
nsCAutoString temp;
aURI->GetSpec(temp);
printf("OnSecurityChange: (%x) %s\n", state, temp.get());
PR_LOG(gSecureDocLog, PR_LOG_DEBUG,
("SecureUI:%p: OnSecurityChange: (%x) %s\n", this,
state, temp.get()));
#endif
return res;
@ -479,7 +1057,7 @@ nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::IsURLHTTPS(nsIURI* aURL, PRBool* value)
void
nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::GetBundleString(const PRUnichar* name,
nsString &outString)
nsAString &outString)
{
if (mStringBundle && name) {
PRUnichar *ptrv = nsnull;
@ -496,86 +1074,6 @@ nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::GetBundleString(const PRUnichar* name,
}
}
nsresult
nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::CheckProtocolContextSwitch(nsISecurityEventSink* eventSink,
nsIRequest* aRequest,
nsIChannel* aChannel)
{
PRInt32 newSecurityState, oldSecurityState = mSecurityState;
newSecurityState = GetSecurityStateFromChannel(aChannel);
mSecurityState = newSecurityState;
// Check to see if we are going from a secure page to an insecure page
if (newSecurityState == STATE_IS_INSECURE &&
(IS_SECURE(oldSecurityState) ||
oldSecurityState == STATE_IS_BROKEN)) {
SetBrokenLockIcon(eventSink, aRequest, PR_TRUE);
AlertLeavingSecure();
}
// check to see if we are going from an insecure page to a secure one.
else if ((newSecurityState == (STATE_IS_SECURE|STATE_SECURE_HIGH) ||
newSecurityState == STATE_IS_BROKEN) &&
oldSecurityState == STATE_IS_INSECURE) {
AlertEnteringSecure();
}
// check to see if we are going from a strong or insecure page to a
// weak one.
else if ((IS_SECURE(newSecurityState) &&
newSecurityState != (STATE_IS_SECURE|STATE_SECURE_HIGH)) &&
(oldSecurityState == STATE_IS_INSECURE ||
oldSecurityState == (STATE_IS_SECURE|STATE_SECURE_HIGH))) {
AlertEnteringWeak();
}
mSecurityState = newSecurityState;
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::CheckMixedContext(nsISecurityEventSink *eventSink,
nsIRequest* aRequest, nsIChannel* aChannel)
{
PRInt32 newSecurityState;
newSecurityState = GetSecurityStateFromChannel(aChannel);
if ((newSecurityState == STATE_IS_INSECURE ||
newSecurityState == STATE_IS_BROKEN) &&
IS_SECURE(mSecurityState)) {
// work-around for bug 48515
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> aURI;
aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(aURI));
nsCAutoString temp;
aURI->GetSpec(temp);
if (!strncmp(temp.get(), "file:", 5) ||
!strcmp(temp.get(), "about:layout-dummy-request")) {
return NS_OK;
}
mSecurityState = STATE_IS_BROKEN;
SetBrokenLockIcon(eventSink, aRequest);
// Show alert to user (first time only)
// NOTE: doesn't mSecurityState provide the correct
// one-time checking?? Why have mMixContentAlertShown
// as well?
if (!mMixContentAlertShown) {
AlertMixedMode();
mMixContentAlertShown = PR_TRUE;
}
}
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::CheckPost(nsIURI *formURL, nsIURI *actionURL, PRBool *okayToPost)
{
@ -605,27 +1103,6 @@ nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::CheckPost(nsIURI *formURL, nsIURI *actionURL, PRBool *oka
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult
nsSecureBrowserUIImpl::SetBrokenLockIcon(nsISecurityEventSink *eventSink,
nsIRequest* aRequest,
PRBool removeValue)
{
// update the tooltip text so it can be read
// when we do the security change notification
GetBundleString(NS_LITERAL_STRING("SecurityButtonTooltipText").get(),
mTooltipText);
if (removeValue) {
if (eventSink)
(void) eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequest, STATE_IS_INSECURE);
} else {
if (eventSink)
(void) eventSink->OnSecurityChange(aRequest, (STATE_IS_BROKEN));
}
return NS_OK;
}
//
// Implementation of an nsIInterfaceRequestor for use
// as context for NSS calls

36
security/manager/boot/src/nsSecureBrowserUIImpl.h
Просмотреть файл

@ -81,26 +81,38 @@ protected:
nsCOMPtr<nsIDOMWindow> mWindow;
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> mStringBundle;
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mCurrentURI;
nsCOMPtr<nsISecurityEventSink> mToplevelEventSink;
PRBool mMixContentAlertShown;
PRInt32 mSecurityState;
PRBool mFirstRequest;
PRBool mRedirecting;
enum lockIconState {
lis_no_security,
lis_broken_security,
lis_mixed_security,
lis_low_security,
lis_high_security
};
nsString mTooltipText;
PRBool mIsViewSource;
lockIconState mPreviousSecurityState;
void ResetStateTracking();
PRInt32 mNewToplevelSecurityState;
nsXPIDLString mInfoTooltip;
PRInt32 mDocumentRequestsInProgress;
PRInt32 mSubRequestsInProgress;
PRInt32 mSubRequestsHighSecurity;
PRInt32 mSubRequestsLowSecurity;
PRInt32 mSubRequestsBrokenSecurity;
PRInt32 mSubRequestsNoSecurity;
nsresult FinishedLoadingStateChange(nsIRequest* aRequest);
nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> mSSLStatus;
void GetBundleString(const PRUnichar* name, nsString &outString);
void GetBundleString(const PRUnichar* name, nsAString &outString);
nsresult CheckProtocolContextSwitch(nsISecurityEventSink* sink,
nsIRequest* request, nsIChannel* aChannel);
nsresult CheckMixedContext(nsISecurityEventSink* sink, nsIRequest* request,
nsIChannel* aChannel);
nsresult CheckPost(nsIURI *formURI, nsIURI *actionURL, PRBool *okayToPost);
nsresult IsURLHTTPS(nsIURI* aURL, PRBool *value);
nsresult SetBrokenLockIcon(nsISecurityEventSink* sink, nsIRequest* request,
PRBool removeValue = PR_FALSE);
// Alerts for security transitions
void AlertEnteringSecure();