зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/pjs.git
When wrapping secret keys with an unpadded block cipher, null padd the keys
as necessary, per the PKCS 11 spec. Also, implement padding and unpadding for single-part only ciphers.
This commit is contained in:
nelsonb%netscape.com
Родитель
7742033367
Коммит
48e8c13dcd
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@ -472,10 +472,10 @@ pk11_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
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break;
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case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD:
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context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
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context->blockSize = 8;
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/* fall thru */
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case CKM_RC2_ECB:
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case CKM_RC2_CBC:
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context->blockSize = 8;
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if (key_type != CKK_RC2) {
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crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
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break;
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@ -516,9 +516,7 @@ pk11_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
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break;
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}
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rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
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if (context->doPad) {
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context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize*2;
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}
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rc5Key.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
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rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
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context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key,rc5_param->ulRounds,
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@ -556,7 +554,6 @@ pk11_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
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break;
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case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD:
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context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
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context->blockSize = 8;
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/* fall thru */
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case CKM_CDMF_ECB:
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case CKM_CDMF_CBC:
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@ -577,7 +574,6 @@ pk11_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
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goto finish_des;
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case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
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context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
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context->blockSize = 8;
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/* fall thru */
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case CKM_DES_CBC:
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if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
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@ -595,7 +591,6 @@ pk11_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
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goto finish_des;
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case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
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context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
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context->blockSize = 8;
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/* fall thru */
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case CKM_DES3_CBC:
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if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
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@ -604,6 +599,7 @@ pk11_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
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}
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t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC;
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finish_des:
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context->blockSize = 8;
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att = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
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if (att == NULL) {
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crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
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@ -630,10 +626,10 @@ finish_des:
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case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
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context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
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context->blockSize = 16;
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/* fall thru */
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case CKM_AES_ECB:
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case CKM_AES_CBC:
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context->blockSize = 16;
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if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
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crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
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break;
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@ -737,7 +733,6 @@ CK_RV NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
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}
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/* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
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rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pEncryptedPart,
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&outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen);
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@ -765,7 +760,7 @@ CK_RV NSC_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
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*pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0;
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if (!pLastEncryptedPart) {
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/* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
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if (context->blockSize > 0) {
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if (context->blockSize > 0 && context->doPad) {
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*pulLastEncryptedPartLen = context->blockSize;
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contextFinished = PR_FALSE; /* still have padding to go */
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}
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@ -806,6 +801,11 @@ CK_RV NSC_Encrypt (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
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CK_RV crv;
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CK_RV crv2;
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SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
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SECItem pText;
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pText.type = siBuffer;
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pText.data = pData;
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pText.len = ulDataLen;
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/* make sure we're legal */
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crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session);
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@ -817,32 +817,56 @@ CK_RV NSC_Encrypt (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
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}
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if (context->doPad) {
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if (context->multi) {
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CK_ULONG finalLen;
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/* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
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* code deal with it */
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pk11_FreeSession(session);
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crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pData,ulDataLen,pEncryptedData,
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crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData,
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pulEncryptedDataLen);
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if (crv != CKR_OK) *pulEncryptedDataLen = 0;
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if (crv != CKR_OK)
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*pulEncryptedDataLen = 0;
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maxoutlen -= *pulEncryptedDataLen;
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pEncryptedData += *pulEncryptedDataLen;
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finalLen = maxoutlen;
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crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen);
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if (crv2 == CKR_OK) { *pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen; }
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return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 :crv;
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if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
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*pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen;
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return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
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}
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/* doPad without multi means that padding must be done on the first
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** and only update. There will be no final.
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*/
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PORT_Assert(context->blockSize > 1);
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if (context->blockSize > 1) {
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CK_ULONG remainder = ulDataLen % context->blockSize;
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CK_ULONG padding = context->blockSize - remainder;
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pText.len += padding;
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pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
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if (pText.data) {
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memcpy(pText.data, pData, ulDataLen);
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memset(pText.data + ulDataLen, padding, padding);
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} else {
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crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
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goto fail;
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}
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}
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}
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/* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size is big enough. */
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rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedData,
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&outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen);
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&outlen, maxoutlen, pText.data, pText.len);
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crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
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*pulEncryptedDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
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if (pText.data != pData)
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PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
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fail:
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pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_ENCRYPT, NULL);
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pk11_FreeContext(context);
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finish:
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pk11_FreeSession(session);
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return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
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return crv;
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}
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@ -974,30 +998,41 @@ CK_RV NSC_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
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goto finish;
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}
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if (context->doPad) {
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if (context->doPad && context->multi) {
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CK_ULONG finalLen;
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/* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
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* code deal with it */
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pk11_FreeSession(session);
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crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData,ulEncryptedDataLen,
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pData, pulDataLen);
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if (crv != CKR_OK) *pulDataLen = 0;
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if (crv != CKR_OK)
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*pulDataLen = 0;
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maxoutlen -= *pulDataLen;
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pData += *pulDataLen;
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finalLen = maxoutlen;
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crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen);
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if (crv2 == CKR_OK) { *pulDataLen += finalLen; }
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return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 :crv;
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if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
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*pulDataLen += finalLen;
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return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
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}
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rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
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pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen);
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/* XXX need to do MUCH better error mapping than this. */
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crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
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if (rv == SECSuccess && context->doPad) {
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CK_ULONG padding = pData[outlen - 1];
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if (padding > context->blockSize || !padding) {
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crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
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} else
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outlen -= padding;
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}
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*pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
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pk11_SetContextByType(session, PK11_DECRYPT, NULL);
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pk11_FreeContext(context);
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finish:
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pk11_FreeSession(session);
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return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
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return crv;
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}
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@ -3423,7 +3458,13 @@ loser:
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/* it doesn't matter yet, since we colapse error conditions in the
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* level above, but we really should map those few key error differences */
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CK_RV pk11_mapWrap(CK_RV crv) { return crv; }
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CK_RV pk11_mapWrap(CK_RV crv)
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{
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switch (crv) {
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case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID: crv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID; break;
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}
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return crv;
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}
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/* NSC_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
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CK_RV NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
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@ -3449,6 +3490,10 @@ CK_RV NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
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switch(key->objclass) {
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case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
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{
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PK11SessionContext *context = NULL;
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SECItem pText;
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attribute = pk11_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
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if (attribute == NULL) {
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@ -3461,11 +3506,42 @@ CK_RV NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
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pk11_FreeAttribute(attribute);
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break;
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}
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crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)attribute->attrib.pValue,
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attribute->attrib.ulValueLen,pWrappedKey,pulWrappedKeyLen);
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pText.type = siBuffer;
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pText.data = (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
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pText.len = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
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/* Find out if this is a block cipher. */
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crv = pk11_GetContext(hSession,&context,PK11_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
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if (crv != CKR_OK || !context)
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break;
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if (context->blockSize > 1) {
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unsigned int remainder = pText.len % context->blockSize;
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if (!context->doPad && remainder) {
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/* When wrapping secret keys with unpadded block ciphers,
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** the keys are zero padded, if necessary, to fill out
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** a full block.
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*/
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pText.len += context->blockSize - remainder;
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pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
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if (pText.data)
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memcpy(pText.data, attribute->attrib.pValue,
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attribute->attrib.ulValueLen);
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else {
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crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)pText.data,
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pText.len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
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if (pText.data != (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue)
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PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
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pk11_FreeAttribute(attribute);
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break;
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}
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case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
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{
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