pjs/mail/base/content/phishingDetector.js

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JavaScript

# -*- Mode: Java; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
# ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
# Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
#
# The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
# 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
# the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
# http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
#
# Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
# WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
# for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
# License.
#
# The Original Code is Thunderbird Phishing Dectector
#
# The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
# The Mozilla Foundation.
# Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 2005
# the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Contributor(s):
# Scott MacGregor <mscott@mozilla.org>
#
# Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
# either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
# the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
# in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
# of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
# under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
# use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
# decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
# and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
# the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
# the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
#
# ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ******
// Dependencies:
// gPrefBranch, gBrandBundle, gMessengerBundle should already be defined
// gatherTextUnder from utilityOverlay.js
const kPhishingNotSuspicious = 0;
const kPhishingWithIPAddress = 1;
const kPhishingWithMismatchedHosts = 2;
var gPhishingDetector = {
mCheckForIPAddresses: true,
mCheckForMismatchedHosts: true,
mPhishingWarden: null,
shutdown: function()
{
try {
this.mPhishingWarden.shutdown();
} catch (ex) {}
},
/**
* initialize the phishing warden.
* initialize the black and white list url tables.
* update the local tables if necessary
*/
init: function()
{
try {
// set up the anti phishing service
var appContext = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/phishingprotection/application;1"]
.getService().wrappedJSObject;
this.mPhishingWarden = new appContext.PROT_PhishingWarden();
// Register tables
// XXX: move table names to a pref that we originally will download
// from the provider (need to workout protocol details)
this.mPhishingWarden.registerWhiteTable("goog-white-exp");
this.mPhishingWarden.registerBlackTable("goog-phish-sha128");
// Download/update lists if we're in non-enhanced mode
this.mPhishingWarden.maybeToggleUpdateChecking();
} catch (ex) { dump('unable to create the phishing warden: ' + ex + '\n');}
this.mCheckForIPAddresses = gPrefBranch.getBoolPref("mail.phishing.detection.ipaddresses");
this.mCheckForMismatchedHosts = gPrefBranch.getBoolPref("mail.phishing.detection.mismatched_hosts");
},
/**
* Analyzes the urls contained in the currently loaded message in the message pane, looking for
* phishing URLs.
* Assumes the message has finished loading in the message pane (i.e. OnMsgParsed has fired).
*
* @param aUrl nsIURI for the message being analyzed.
*
* @return asynchronously calls gMessageNotificationBar.setPhishingMsg if the message
* is identified as a scam.
*/
analyzeMsgForPhishingURLs: function (aUrl)
{
if (!aUrl || !gPrefBranch.getBoolPref("mail.phishing.detection.enabled"))
return;
// Ignore nntp and RSS messages
var folder;
try {
folder = aUrl.folder;
if (folder.server.type == 'nntp' || folder.server.type == 'rss')
return;
} catch (ex) {}
// extract the link nodes in the message and analyze them, looking for suspicious URLs...
var linkNodes = document.getElementById('messagepane').contentDocument.links;
for (var index = 0; index < linkNodes.length; index++)
this.analyzeUrl(linkNodes[index].href, gatherTextUnder(linkNodes[index]));
// extract the action urls associated with any form elements in the message and analyze them.
var formNodes = document.getElementById('messagepane').contentDocument.getElementsByTagName("form");
for (index = 0; index < formNodes.length; index++)
{
if (formNodes[index].action)
this.analyzeUrl(formNodes[index].action);
}
},
/**
* Analyze the url contained in aLinkNode for phishing attacks. If a phishing URL is found,
*
* @param aHref the url to be analyzed
* @param aLinkText (optional) user visible link text associated with aHref in case
* we are dealing with a link node.
* @return asynchronously calls gMessageNotificationBar.setPhishingMsg if the link node
* contains a phishing URL.
*/
analyzeUrl: function (aUrl, aLinkText)
{
if (!aUrl)
return;
var ioService = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/network/io-service;1"].getService(Components.interfaces.nsIIOService);
var hrefURL;
// make sure relative link urls don't make us bail out
try {
hrefURL = ioService.newURI(aUrl, null, null);
} catch(ex) { return; }
// only check for phishing urls if the url is an http or https link.
// this prevents us from flagging imap and other internally handled urls
if (hrefURL.schemeIs('http') || hrefURL.schemeIs('https'))
{
var linkTextURL = {};
var unobscuredHostName = {};
unobscuredHostName.value = hrefURL.host;
// The link is not suspicious if the visible text is the same as the URL,
// even if the URL is an IP address.
var failsStaticTests = (aLinkText != aUrl) &&
((this.mCheckForIPAddresses && this.hostNameIsIPAddress(hrefURL.host, unobscuredHostName) &&
!this.isLocalIPAddress(unobscuredHostName)) ||
(this.mCheckForMismatchedHosts && aLinkText &&
this.misMatchedHostWithLinkText(hrefURL, aLinkText, linkTextURL)));
// Lookup the url against our local list. We want to do this even if the url fails our static
// test checks because the url might be in the white list.
if (this.mPhishingWarden)
this.mPhishingWarden.isEvilURL(GetLoadedMessage(), failsStaticTests, aUrl, this.localListCallback);
else
this.localListCallback(GetLoadedMessage(), failsStaticTests, aUrl, 2 /* not found */);
}
},
/**
*
* @param aMsgURI the uri for the loaded message when the look up was initiated.
* @param aFailsStaticTests true if our static tests think the url is a phishing scam
* @param aUrl the url we looked up in the phishing tables
* @param aLocalListStatus the result of the local lookup (PROT_ListWarden.IN_BLACKLIST,
* PROT_ListWarden.IN_WHITELIST or PROT_ListWarden.NOT_FOUND.
*/
localListCallback: function (aMsgURI, aFailsStaticTests, aUrl, aLocalListStatus)
{
// for urls in the blacklist, notify the phishing bar.
// for urls in the whitelist, do nothing
// for all other urls, fall back to the static tests
if (aMsgURI == GetLoadedMessage())
{
if (aLocalListStatus == 0 /* PROT_ListWarden.IN_BLACKLIST */ ||
(aLocalListStatus == 2 /* PROT_ListWarden.PROT_ListWarden.NOT_FOUND */ && aFailsStaticTests))
gMessageNotificationBar.setPhishingMsg();
}
},
/**
* Looks up the report phishing url for the current phishing provider, appends aPhishingURL to the url,
* and loads it in the default browser where the user can submit the url as a phish.
* @param aPhishingURL the url we want to report back as a phishing attack
*/
reportPhishingURL: function(aPhishingURL)
{
var appContext = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/phishingprotection/application;1"]
.getService().wrappedJSObject;
var reportUrl = appContext.getReportPhishingURL();
if (reportUrl)
{
reportUrl += "&url=" + encodeURIComponent(aPhishingURL);
// now send the url to the default browser
var ioService = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/network/io-service;1"]
.getService(Components.interfaces.nsIIOService);
var uri = ioService.newURI(reportUrl, null, null);
var protocolSvc = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/uriloader/external-protocol-service;1"]
.getService(Components.interfaces.nsIExternalProtocolService);
protocolSvc.loadUrl(uri);
}
},
/**
* Private helper method to determine if the link node contains a user visible
* url with a host name that differs from the actual href the user would get taken to.
* i.e. <a href="http://myevilsite.com">http://mozilla.org</a>
*
* @return true if aHrefURL.host matches the host of the link node text.
* @return aLinkTextURL the nsIURI for the link node text
*/
misMatchedHostWithLinkText: function(aHrefURL, aLinkNodeText, aLinkTextURL)
{
// gatherTextUnder puts a space between each piece of text it gathers,
// so strip the spaces out (see bug 326082 for details).
aLinkNodeText = aLinkNodeText.replace(/ /g, "");
// only worry about http and https urls
if (aLinkNodeText)
{
// does the link text look like a http url?
if (aLinkNodeText.search(/(^http:|^https:)/) != -1)
{
var ioService = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/network/io-service;1"].getService(Components.interfaces.nsIIOService);
aLinkTextURL.value = ioService.newURI(aLinkNodeText, null, null);
// compare hosts, but ignore possible www. prefix
return !(aHrefURL.host.replace(/^www\./, "") == aLinkTextURL.value.host.replace(/^www\./, ""));
}
}
return false;
},
/**
* Private helper method to determine if aHostName is an obscured IP address
* @return unobscured host name (if there is one)
* @return true if aHostName is an IP address
*/
hostNameIsIPAddress: function(aHostName, aUnobscuredHostName)
{
// TODO: Add Support for IPv6
var index;
// scammers frequently obscure the IP address by encoding each component as octal, hex
// or in some cases a mix match of each. The IP address could also be represented as a DWORD.
// break the IP address down into individual components.
var ipComponents = aHostName.split(".");
// if we didn't find at least 4 parts to our IP address it either isn't a numerical IP
// or it is encoded as a dword
if (ipComponents.length < 4)
{
// Convert to a binary to test for possible DWORD.
var binaryDword = parseInt(aHostName).toString(2);
if (isNaN(binaryDword))
return false;
// convert the dword into its component IP parts.
ipComponents = new Array;
ipComponents[0] = (aHostName >> 24) & 255;
ipComponents[1] = (aHostName >> 16) & 255;
ipComponents[2] = (aHostName >> 8) & 255;
ipComponents[3] = (aHostName & 255);
}
else
{
for (index = 0; index < ipComponents.length; ++index)
{
// by leaving the radix parameter blank, we can handle IP addresses
// where one component is hex, another is octal, etc.
ipComponents[index] = parseInt(ipComponents[index]);
}
}
// make sure each part of the IP address is in fact a number
for (index = 0; index < ipComponents.length; ++index)
if (isNaN(ipComponents[index])) // if any part of the IP address is not a number, then we can safely return
return false;
var hostName = ipComponents[0] + '.' + ipComponents[1] + '.' + ipComponents[2] + '.' + ipComponents[3];
// only set aUnobscuredHostName if we are looking at an IPv4 host name
if (this.isIPv4HostName(hostName))
{
aUnobscuredHostName.value = hostName;
return true;
}
return false;
},
/**
* Private helper method.
* @return true if aHostName is an IPv4 address
*/
isIPv4HostName: function(aHostName)
{
var ipv4HostRegExp = new RegExp(/\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}/); // IPv4
// treat 0.0.0.0 as an invalid IP address
return ipv4HostRegExp.test(aHostName) && aHostName != '0.0.0.0';
},
/**
* Private helper method.
* @return true if unobscuredHostName is a local IP address.
*/
isLocalIPAddress: function(unobscuredHostName)
{
var ipComponents = unobscuredHostName.value.split(".");
return ipComponents[0] == 10 ||
(ipComponents[0] == 192 && ipComponents[1] == 168) ||
(ipComponents[0] == 169 && ipComponents[1] == 254) ||
(ipComponents[0] == 172 && ipComponents[1] >= 16 && ipComponents[1] < 32);
},
/**
* If the current message has been identified as an email scam, prompts the user with a warning
* before allowing the link click to be processed. The warning prompt includes the unobscured host name
* of the http(s) url the user clicked on.
*
* @param aUrl the url
* @return true if the link should be allowed to load
*/
warnOnSuspiciousLinkClick: function(aUrl)
{
// if the loaded message has been flagged as a phishing scam,
if (!gMessageNotificationBar.isFlagSet(kMsgNotificationPhishingBar))
return true;
var ioService = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/network/io-service;1"]
.getService(Components.interfaces.nsIIOService);
var hrefURL;
// make sure relative link urls don't make us bail out
try {
hrefURL = ioService.newURI(aUrl, null, null);
} catch(ex) { return false; }
// only prompt for http and https urls
if (hrefURL.schemeIs('http') || hrefURL.schemeIs('https'))
{
// unobscure the host name in case it's an encoded ip address..
var unobscuredHostName = {};
unobscuredHostName.value = hrefURL.host;
this.hostNameIsIPAddress(hrefURL.host, unobscuredHostName);
var brandShortName = gBrandBundle.getString("brandShortName");
var titleMsg = gMessengerBundle.getString("confirmPhishingTitle");
var dialogMsg = gMessengerBundle.getFormattedString("confirmPhishingUrl",
[brandShortName, unobscuredHostName.value], 2);
const nsIPS = Components.interfaces.nsIPromptService;
var promptService = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/embedcomp/prompt-service;1"].getService(nsIPS);
return !promptService.confirmEx(window, titleMsg, dialogMsg, nsIPS.STD_YES_NO_BUTTONS + nsIPS.BUTTON_POS_1_DEFAULT,
"", "", "", "", {}); /* the yes button is in position 0 */
}
return true; // allow the link to load
}
};