pjs/security/nss/lib/pkcs7/p7decode.c

2091 строка
60 KiB
C

/*
* The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public
* License Version 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file
* except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of
* the License at http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
*
* Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS
* IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or
* implied. See the License for the specific language governing
* rights and limitations under the License.
*
* The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
*
* The Initial Developer of the Original Code is Netscape
* Communications Corporation. Portions created by Netscape are
* Copyright (C) 1994-2000 Netscape Communications Corporation. All
* Rights Reserved.
*
* Contributor(s):
*
* Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the
* terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the
* "GPL"), in which case the provisions of the GPL are applicable
* instead of those above. If you wish to allow use of your
* version of this file only under the terms of the GPL and not to
* allow others to use your version of this file under the MPL,
* indicate your decision by deleting the provisions above and
* replace them with the notice and other provisions required by
* the GPL. If you do not delete the provisions above, a recipient
* may use your version of this file under either the MPL or the
* GPL.
*/
/*
* PKCS7 decoding, verification.
*
* $Id: p7decode.c,v 1.4 2001-01-30 21:02:13 wtc%netscape.com Exp $
*/
#include "nssrenam.h"
#include "p7local.h"
#include "cert.h"
/* XXX do not want to have to include */
#include "certdb.h" /* certdb.h -- the trust stuff needed by */
/* the add certificate code needs to get */
/* rewritten/abstracted and then this */
/* include should be removed! */
#include "cdbhdl.h"
#include "cryptohi.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "secasn1.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "secoid.h"
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "prtime.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "sechash.h" /* for HASH_GetHashObject() */
#include "secder.h"
struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker {
int depth;
int digcnt;
void **digcxs;
const SECHashObject **digobjs;
sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj;
PRBool saw_contents;
};
struct SEC_PKCS7DecoderContextStr {
SEC_ASN1DecoderContext *dcx;
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb;
void *cb_arg;
SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn;
void *pwfn_arg;
struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker worker;
PRArenaPool *tmp_poolp;
int error;
SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback dkcb;
void *dkcb_arg;
SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb;
};
/*
* Handle one worker, decrypting and digesting the data as necessary.
*
* XXX If/when we support nested contents, this probably needs to be
* revised somewhat to get passed the content-info (which unfortunately
* can be two different types depending on whether it is encrypted or not)
* corresponding to the given worker.
*/
static void
sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx,
struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker,
const unsigned char *data, unsigned long len,
PRBool final)
{
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
int i;
/*
* We should really have data to process, or we should be trying
* to finish/flush the last block. (This is an overly paranoid
* check since all callers are in this file and simple inspection
* proves they do it right. But it could find a bug in future
* modifications/development, that is why it is here.)
*/
PORT_Assert ((data != NULL && len) || final);
/*
* Decrypt this chunk.
*
* XXX If we get an error, we do not want to do the digest or callback,
* but we want to keep decoding. Or maybe we want to stop decoding
* altogether if there is a callback, because obviously we are not
* sending the data back and they want to know that.
*/
if (worker->decryptobj != NULL) {
/* XXX the following lengths should all be longs? */
unsigned int inlen; /* length of data being decrypted */
unsigned int outlen; /* length of decrypted data */
unsigned int buflen; /* length available for decrypted data */
SECItem *plain;
inlen = len;
buflen = sec_PKCS7DecryptLength (worker->decryptobj, inlen, final);
if (buflen == 0) {
if (inlen == 0) /* no input and no output */
return;
/*
* No output is expected, but the input data may be buffered
* so we still have to call Decrypt.
*/
rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt (worker->decryptobj, NULL, NULL, 0,
data, inlen, final);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
return; /* XXX indicate error? */
}
return;
}
if (p7dcx->cb != NULL) {
buf = (unsigned char *) PORT_Alloc (buflen);
plain = NULL;
} else {
unsigned long oldlen;
/*
* XXX This assumes one level of content only.
* See comment above about nested content types.
* XXX Also, it should work for signedAndEnvelopedData, too!
*/
plain = &(p7dcx->cinfo->
content.envelopedData->encContentInfo.plainContent);
oldlen = plain->len;
if (oldlen == 0) {
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc (p7dcx->cinfo->poolp,
buflen);
} else {
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaGrow (p7dcx->cinfo->poolp,
plain->data,
oldlen, oldlen + buflen);
if (buf != NULL)
buf += oldlen;
}
plain->data = buf;
}
if (buf == NULL) {
p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
return; /* XXX indicate error? */
}
rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt (worker->decryptobj, buf, &outlen, buflen,
data, inlen, final);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
return; /* XXX indicate error? */
}
if (plain != NULL) {
PORT_Assert (final || outlen == buflen);
plain->len += outlen;
}
data = buf;
len = outlen;
}
/*
* Update the running digests.
*/
if (len) {
for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++) {
(* worker->digobjs[i]->update) (worker->digcxs[i], data, len);
}
}
/*
* Pass back the contents bytes, and free the temporary buffer.
*/
if (p7dcx->cb != NULL) {
if (len)
(* p7dcx->cb) (p7dcx->cb_arg, (const char *)data, len);
if (worker->decryptobj != NULL) {
PORT_Assert (buf != NULL);
PORT_Free (buf);
}
}
}
static void
sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter (void *arg, const char *data, unsigned long len,
int depth, SEC_ASN1EncodingPart data_kind)
{
SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx;
struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker;
/*
* Since we do not handle any nested contents, the only bytes we
* are really interested in are the actual contents bytes (not
* the identifier, length, or end-of-contents bytes). If we were
* handling nested types we would probably need to do something
* smarter based on depth and data_kind.
*/
if (data_kind != SEC_ASN1_Contents)
return;
/*
* The ASN.1 decoder should not even call us with a length of 0.
* Just being paranoid.
*/
PORT_Assert (len);
if (len == 0)
return;
p7dcx = (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext*)arg;
/*
* Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain
* of workers -- one per each level of content. The following
* would start with the first worker and loop over them.
*/
worker = &(p7dcx->worker);
worker->saw_contents = PR_TRUE;
sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data (p7dcx, worker,
(const unsigned char *) data, len, PR_FALSE);
}
/*
* Create digest contexts for each algorithm in "digestalgs".
* No algorithms is not an error, we just do not do anything.
* An error (like trouble allocating memory), marks the error
* in "p7dcx" and returns SECFailure, which means that our caller
* should just give up altogether.
*/
static SECStatus
sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int depth,
SECAlgorithmID **digestalgs)
{
SECAlgorithmID *algid;
SECOidData *oiddata;
const SECHashObject *digobj;
void *digcx;
int i, digcnt;
if (digestalgs == NULL)
return SECSuccess;
/*
* Count the algorithms.
*/
digcnt = 0;
while (digestalgs[digcnt] != NULL)
digcnt++;
/*
* No algorithms means no work to do.
* This is not expected, so cause an assert.
* But if it does happen, just act as if there were
* no algorithms specified.
*/
PORT_Assert (digcnt != 0);
if (digcnt == 0)
return SECSuccess;
p7dcx->worker.digcxs = (void**)PORT_ArenaAlloc (p7dcx->tmp_poolp,
digcnt * sizeof (void *));
p7dcx->worker.digobjs = (const SECHashObject**)PORT_ArenaAlloc (p7dcx->tmp_poolp,
digcnt * sizeof (SECHashObject *));
if (p7dcx->worker.digcxs == NULL || p7dcx->worker.digobjs == NULL) {
p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
return SECFailure;
}
p7dcx->worker.depth = depth;
p7dcx->worker.digcnt = 0;
/*
* Create a digest context for each algorithm.
*/
for (i = 0; i < digcnt; i++) {
algid = digestalgs[i];
oiddata = SECOID_FindOID(&(algid->algorithm));
if (oiddata == NULL) {
digobj = NULL;
} else {
switch (oiddata->offset) {
case SEC_OID_MD2:
digobj = HASH_GetHashObject(HASH_AlgMD2);
break;
case SEC_OID_MD5:
digobj = HASH_GetHashObject(HASH_AlgMD5);
break;
case SEC_OID_SHA1:
digobj = HASH_GetHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA1);
break;
default:
digobj = NULL;
break;
}
}
/*
* Skip any algorithm we do not even recognize; obviously,
* this could be a problem, but if it is critical then the
* result will just be that the signature does not verify.
* We do not necessarily want to error out here, because
* the particular algorithm may not actually be important,
* but we cannot know that until later.
*/
if (digobj == NULL) {
p7dcx->worker.digcnt--;
continue;
}
digcx = (* digobj->create)();
if (digcx != NULL) {
(* digobj->begin) (digcx);
p7dcx->worker.digobjs[p7dcx->worker.digcnt] = digobj;
p7dcx->worker.digcxs[p7dcx->worker.digcnt] = digcx;
p7dcx->worker.digcnt++;
}
}
if (p7dcx->worker.digcnt != 0)
SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc (p7dcx->dcx,
sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter,
p7dcx,
(PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL));
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Close out all of the digest contexts, storing the results in "digestsp".
*/
static SECStatus
sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx,
PRArenaPool *poolp,
SECItem ***digestsp)
{
struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker;
const SECHashObject *digobj;
void *digcx;
SECItem **digests, *digest;
int i;
void *mark;
/*
* XXX Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain
* of workers -- one per each level of content. The following
* would want to find the last worker in the chain.
*/
worker = &(p7dcx->worker);
/*
* If no digests, then we have nothing to do.
*/
if (worker->digcnt == 0)
return SECSuccess;
/*
* No matter what happens after this, we want to stop filtering.
* XXX If we handle nested contents, we only want to stop filtering
* if we are finishing off the *last* worker.
*/
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc (p7dcx->dcx);
/*
* If we ended up with no contents, just destroy each
* digest context -- they are meaningless and potentially
* confusing, because their presence would imply some content
* was digested.
*/
if (! worker->saw_contents) {
for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++) {
digcx = worker->digcxs[i];
digobj = worker->digobjs[i];
(* digobj->destroy) (digcx, PR_TRUE);
}
return SECSuccess;
}
mark = PORT_ArenaMark (poolp);
/*
* Close out each digest context, saving digest away.
*/
digests =
(SECItem**)PORT_ArenaAlloc (poolp,(worker->digcnt+1)*sizeof(SECItem *));
digest = (SECItem*)PORT_ArenaAlloc (poolp, worker->digcnt*sizeof(SECItem));
if (digests == NULL || digest == NULL) {
p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
PORT_ArenaRelease (poolp, mark);
return SECFailure;
}
for (i = 0; i < worker->digcnt; i++, digest++) {
digcx = worker->digcxs[i];
digobj = worker->digobjs[i];
digest->data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc (poolp, digobj->length);
if (digest->data == NULL) {
p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
PORT_ArenaRelease (poolp, mark);
return SECFailure;
}
digest->len = digobj->length;
(* digobj->end) (digcx, digest->data, &(digest->len), digest->len);
(* digobj->destroy) (digcx, PR_TRUE);
digests[i] = digest;
}
digests[i] = NULL;
*digestsp = digests;
PORT_ArenaUnmark (poolp, mark);
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* XXX Need comment explaining following helper function (which is used
* by sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt).
*/
extern const SEC_ASN1Template SEC_SMIMEKEAParamTemplateAllParams[];
static PK11SymKey *
sec_pkcs7_decoder_get_recipient_key (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx,
SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientinfos,
SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo)
{
SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo *ri;
CERTCertificate *cert = NULL;
SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey = NULL;
PK11SymKey *bulkkey;
SECOidTag keyalgtag, bulkalgtag, encalgtag;
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
int i, bulkLength = 0;
if (recipientinfos == NULL || recipientinfos[0] == NULL) {
p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NOT_A_RECIPIENT;
goto no_key_found;
}
cert = PK11_FindCertAndKeyByRecipientList(&slot,recipientinfos,&ri,
&privkey, p7dcx->pwfn_arg);
if (cert == NULL) {
p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_NOT_A_RECIPIENT;
goto no_key_found;
}
ri->cert = cert; /* so we can find it later */
PORT_Assert(privkey != NULL);
keyalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm));
encalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag (&(ri->keyEncAlg));
if ((encalgtag != SEC_OID_NETSCAPE_SMIME_KEA) && (keyalgtag != encalgtag)) {
p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_KEYALG_MISMATCH;
goto no_key_found;
}
bulkalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag (&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg));
switch (encalgtag) {
case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
bulkkey = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey (privkey, &ri->encKey,
PK11_AlgtagToMechanism (bulkalgtag),
CKA_DECRYPT, 0);
if (bulkkey == NULL) {
p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
PORT_SetError(0);
goto no_key_found;
}
break;
/* ### mwelch -- KEA */
case SEC_OID_NETSCAPE_SMIME_KEA:
{
SECStatus err;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulkType;
PK11SymKey *tek;
SECKEYPublicKey *senderPubKey;
SEC_PKCS7SMIMEKEAParameters keaParams;
(void) memset(&keaParams, 0, sizeof(keaParams));
/* Decode the KEA algorithm parameters. */
err = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(NULL,
&keaParams,
SEC_SMIMEKEAParamTemplateAllParams,
&(ri->keyEncAlg.parameters));
if (err != SECSuccess)
{
p7dcx->error = err;
PORT_SetError(0);
goto no_key_found;
}
/* We just got key data, no key structure. So, we
create one. */
senderPubKey =
PK11_MakeKEAPubKey(keaParams.originatorKEAKey.data,
keaParams.originatorKEAKey.len);
if (senderPubKey == NULL)
{
p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
PORT_SetError(0);
goto no_key_found;
}
/* Generate the TEK (token exchange key) which we use
to unwrap the bulk encryption key. */
tek = PK11_PubDerive(privkey, senderPubKey,
PR_FALSE,
&keaParams.originatorRA,
NULL,
CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
CKA_WRAP, 0, p7dcx->pwfn_arg);
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(senderPubKey);
if (tek == NULL)
{
p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
PORT_SetError(0);
goto no_key_found;
}
/* Now that we have the TEK, unwrap the bulk key
with which to decrypt the message. We have to
do one of two different things depending on
whether Skipjack was used for bulk encryption
of the message. */
bulkType = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism (bulkalgtag);
switch(bulkType)
{
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16:
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8:
/* Skipjack is being used as the bulk encryption algorithm.*/
/* Unwrap the bulk key. */
bulkkey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(tek, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
NULL, &ri->encKey,
CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64,
CKA_DECRYPT, 0);
break;
default:
/* Skipjack was not used for bulk encryption of this
message. Use Skipjack CBC64, with the nonSkipjackIV
part of the KEA key parameters, to decrypt
the bulk key. If we got a parameter indicating that the
bulk key size is different than the encrypted key size,
pass in the real key size. */
/* Check for specified bulk key length (unspecified implies
that the bulk key length is the same as encrypted length) */
if (keaParams.bulkKeySize.len > 0)
{
p7dcx->error = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(NULL, &bulkLength,
SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_IntegerTemplate),
&keaParams.bulkKeySize);
}
if (p7dcx->error != SECSuccess)
goto no_key_found;
bulkkey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(tek, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64,
&keaParams.nonSkipjackIV,
&ri->encKey,
bulkType,
CKA_DECRYPT, bulkLength);
}
if (bulkkey == NULL)
{
p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
PORT_SetError(0);
goto no_key_found;
}
break;
}
default:
p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG;
goto no_key_found;
}
return bulkkey;
no_key_found:
if (privkey != NULL)
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey (privkey);
return NULL;
}
/*
* XXX The following comment is old -- the function used to only handle
* EnvelopedData or SignedAndEnvelopedData but now handles EncryptedData
* as well (and it had all of the code of the helper function above
* built into it), though the comment was left as is. Fix it...
*
* We are just about to decode the content of an EnvelopedData.
* Set up a decryption context so we can decrypt as we go.
* Presumably we are one of the recipients listed in "recipientinfos".
* (XXX And if we are not, or if we have trouble, what should we do?
* It would be nice to let the decoding still work. Maybe it should
* be an error if there is a content callback, but not an error otherwise?)
* The encryption key and related information can be found in "enccinfo".
*/
static SECStatus
sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx, int depth,
SEC_PKCS7RecipientInfo **recipientinfos,
SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo,
PK11SymKey **copy_key_for_signature)
{
PK11SymKey *bulkkey = NULL;
sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj;
/*
* If a callback is supplied to retrieve the encryption key,
* for instance, for Encrypted Content infos, then retrieve
* the bulkkey from the callback. Otherwise, assume that
* we are processing Enveloped or SignedAndEnveloped data
* content infos.
*
* XXX Put an assert here?
*/
if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType(p7dcx->cinfo) == SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA) {
if (p7dcx->dkcb != NULL) {
bulkkey = (*p7dcx->dkcb)(p7dcx->dkcb_arg,
&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg));
}
enccinfo->keysize = 0;
} else {
bulkkey = sec_pkcs7_decoder_get_recipient_key (p7dcx, recipientinfos,
enccinfo);
if (bulkkey == NULL) goto no_decryption;
enccinfo->keysize = PK11_GetKeyStrength(bulkkey,
&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg));
}
/*
* XXX I think following should set error in p7dcx and clear set error
* (as used to be done here, or as is done in get_receipient_key above.
*/
if(bulkkey == NULL) {
goto no_decryption;
}
/*
* We want to make sure decryption is allowed. This is done via
* a callback specified in SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart().
*/
if (p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb) {
if ((*p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb) (&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg),
bulkkey) == PR_FALSE) {
p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_DECRYPTION_DISALLOWED;
goto no_decryption;
}
} else {
p7dcx->error = SEC_ERROR_DECRYPTION_DISALLOWED;
goto no_decryption;
}
/*
* When decrypting a signedAndEnvelopedData, the signature also has
* to be decrypted with the bulk encryption key; to avoid having to
* get it all over again later (and do another potentially expensive
* RSA operation), copy it for later signature verification to use.
*/
if (copy_key_for_signature != NULL)
*copy_key_for_signature = PK11_ReferenceSymKey (bulkkey);
/*
* Now we have the bulk encryption key (in bulkkey) and the
* the algorithm (in enccinfo->contentEncAlg). Using those,
* create a decryption context.
*/
decryptobj = sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject (bulkkey,
&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg));
/*
* For PKCS5 Encryption Algorithms, the bulkkey is actually a different
* structure. Therefore, we need to set the bulkkey to the actual key
* prior to freeing it.
*/
if ( SEC_PKCS5IsAlgorithmPBEAlg(&(enccinfo->contentEncAlg)) && bulkkey ) {
SEC_PKCS5KeyAndPassword *keyPwd = (SEC_PKCS5KeyAndPassword *)bulkkey;
bulkkey = keyPwd->key;
}
/*
* We are done with (this) bulkkey now.
*/
PK11_FreeSymKey (bulkkey);
if (decryptobj == NULL) {
p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
PORT_SetError(0);
goto no_decryption;
}
SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc (p7dcx->dcx,
sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter,
p7dcx,
(PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL));
p7dcx->worker.depth = depth;
p7dcx->worker.decryptobj = decryptobj;
return SECSuccess;
no_decryption:
/*
* For some reason (error set already, if appropriate), we cannot
* decrypt the content. I am not sure what exactly is the right
* thing to do here; in some cases we want to just stop, and in
* others we want to let the decoding finish even though we cannot
* decrypt the content. My current thinking is that if the caller
* set up a content callback, then they are really interested in
* getting (decrypted) content, and if they cannot they will want
* to know about it. However, if no callback was specified, then
* maybe it is not important that the decryption failed.
*/
if (p7dcx->cb != NULL)
return SECFailure;
else
return SECSuccess; /* Let the decoding continue. */
}
static SECStatus
sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx,
PRArenaPool *poolp,
SEC_PKCS7EncryptedContentInfo *enccinfo)
{
struct sec_pkcs7_decoder_worker *worker;
/*
* XXX Handling nested contents would mean that there is a chain
* of workers -- one per each level of content. The following
* would want to find the last worker in the chain.
*/
worker = &(p7dcx->worker);
/*
* If no decryption context, then we have nothing to do.
*/
if (worker->decryptobj == NULL)
return SECSuccess;
/*
* No matter what happens after this, we want to stop filtering.
* XXX If we handle nested contents, we only want to stop filtering
* if we are finishing off the *last* worker.
*/
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc (p7dcx->dcx);
/*
* Handle the last block.
*/
sec_pkcs7_decoder_work_data (p7dcx, worker, NULL, 0, PR_TRUE);
/*
* All done, destroy it.
*/
sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject (worker->decryptobj);
return SECSuccess;
}
static void
sec_pkcs7_decoder_notify (void *arg, PRBool before, void *dest, int depth)
{
SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx;
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sigd;
SEC_PKCS7EnvelopedData *envd;
SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saed;
SEC_PKCS7EncryptedData *encd;
SEC_PKCS7DigestedData *digd;
PRBool after;
SECStatus rv;
/*
* Just to make the code easier to read, create an "after" variable
* that is equivalent to "not before".
* (This used to be just the statement "after = !before", but that
* causes a warning on the mac; to avoid that, we do it the long way.)
*/
if (before)
after = PR_FALSE;
else
after = PR_TRUE;
p7dcx = (SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext*)arg;
cinfo = p7dcx->cinfo;
if (cinfo->contentTypeTag == NULL) {
if (after && dest == &(cinfo->contentType))
cinfo->contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOID(&(cinfo->contentType));
return;
}
switch (cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset) {
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
sigd = cinfo->content.signedData;
if (sigd == NULL)
break;
if (sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) {
if (after && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.contentType))
sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag =
SECOID_FindOID(&(sigd->contentInfo.contentType));
break;
}
/*
* We only set up a filtering digest if the content is
* plain DATA; anything else needs more work because a
* second pass is required to produce a DER encoding from
* an input that can be BER encoded. (This is a requirement
* of PKCS7 that is unfortunate, but there you have it.)
*
* XXX Also, since we stop here if this is not DATA, the
* inner content is not getting processed at all. Someday
* we may want to fix that.
*/
if (sigd->contentInfo.contentTypeTag->offset != SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA) {
/* XXX Set an error in p7dcx->error */
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc (p7dcx->dcx);
break;
}
/*
* Just before the content, we want to set up a digest context
* for each digest algorithm listed, and start a filter which
* will run all of the contents bytes through that digest.
*/
if (before && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.content)) {
rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests (p7dcx, depth,
sigd->digestAlgorithms);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc (p7dcx->dcx);
break;
}
/*
* XXX To handle nested types, here is where we would want
* to check for inner boundaries that need handling.
*/
/*
* Are we done?
*/
if (after && dest == &(sigd->contentInfo.content)) {
/*
* Close out the digest contexts. We ignore any error
* because we are stopping anyway; the error status left
* behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions.
*/
(void) sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests (p7dcx, cinfo->poolp,
&(sigd->digests));
/*
* XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove
* the worker from the chain (and free it).
*/
/*
* Stop notify.
*/
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc (p7dcx->dcx);
}
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
envd = cinfo->content.envelopedData;
if (envd == NULL)
break;
if (envd->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) {
if (after && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.contentType))
envd->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag =
SECOID_FindOID(&(envd->encContentInfo.contentType));
break;
}
/*
* Just before the content, we want to set up a decryption
* context, and start a filter which will run all of the
* contents bytes through it to determine the plain content.
*/
if (before && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt (p7dcx, depth,
envd->recipientInfos,
&(envd->encContentInfo),
NULL);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc (p7dcx->dcx);
break;
}
/*
* Are we done?
*/
if (after && dest == &(envd->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
/*
* Close out the decryption context. We ignore any error
* because we are stopping anyway; the error status left
* behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions.
*/
(void) sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt (p7dcx, cinfo->poolp,
&(envd->encContentInfo));
/*
* XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove
* the worker from the chain (and free it).
*/
/*
* Stop notify.
*/
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc (p7dcx->dcx);
}
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
saed = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
if (saed == NULL)
break;
if (saed->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag == NULL) {
if (after && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.contentType))
saed->encContentInfo.contentTypeTag =
SECOID_FindOID(&(saed->encContentInfo.contentType));
break;
}
/*
* Just before the content, we want to set up a decryption
* context *and* digest contexts, and start a filter which
* will run all of the contents bytes through both.
*/
if (before && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt (p7dcx, depth,
saed->recipientInfos,
&(saed->encContentInfo),
&(saed->sigKey));
if (rv == SECSuccess)
rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests (p7dcx, depth,
saed->digestAlgorithms);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc (p7dcx->dcx);
break;
}
/*
* Are we done?
*/
if (after && dest == &(saed->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
/*
* Close out the decryption and digests contexts.
* We ignore any errors because we are stopping anyway;
* the error status left behind in p7dcx will be seen by
* outer functions.
*
* Note that the decrypt stuff must be called first;
* it may have a last buffer to do which in turn has
* to be added to the digest.
*/
(void) sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt (p7dcx, cinfo->poolp,
&(saed->encContentInfo));
(void) sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_digests (p7dcx, cinfo->poolp,
&(saed->digests));
/*
* XXX To handle nested contents, we would need to remove
* the worker from the chain (and free it).
*/
/*
* Stop notify.
*/
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc (p7dcx->dcx);
}
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
digd = cinfo->content.digestedData;
/*
* XXX Want to do the digest or not? Maybe future enhancement...
*/
if (before && dest == &(digd->contentInfo.content.data)) {
SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc (p7dcx->dcx, sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter,
p7dcx,
(PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL));
break;
}
/*
* Are we done?
*/
if (after && dest == &(digd->contentInfo.content.data)) {
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc (p7dcx->dcx);
}
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
encd = cinfo->content.encryptedData;
/*
* XXX If the decryption key callback is set, we want to start
* the decryption. If the callback is not set, we will treat the
* content as plain data, since we do not have the key.
*
* Is this the proper thing to do?
*/
if (before && dest == &(encd->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
/*
* Start the encryption process if the decryption key callback
* is present. Otherwise, treat the content like plain data.
*/
rv = SECSuccess;
if (p7dcx->dkcb != NULL) {
rv = sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt (p7dcx, depth, NULL,
&(encd->encContentInfo),
NULL);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess)
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc (p7dcx->dcx);
break;
}
/*
* Are we done?
*/
if (after && dest == &(encd->encContentInfo.encContent)) {
/*
* Close out the decryption context. We ignore any error
* because we are stopping anyway; the error status left
* behind in p7dcx will be seen by outer functions.
*/
(void) sec_pkcs7_decoder_finish_decrypt (p7dcx, cinfo->poolp,
&(encd->encContentInfo));
/*
* Stop notify.
*/
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc (p7dcx->dcx);
}
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
/*
* If a output callback has been specified, we want to set the filter
* to call the callback. This is taken care of in
* sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_decrypt() or
* sec_pkcs7_decoder_start_digests() for the other content types.
*/
if (before && dest == &(cinfo->content.data)) {
/*
* Set the filter proc up.
*/
SEC_ASN1DecoderSetFilterProc (p7dcx->dcx,
sec_pkcs7_decoder_filter,
p7dcx,
(PRBool)(p7dcx->cb != NULL));
break;
}
if (after && dest == &(cinfo->content.data)) {
/*
* Time to clean up after ourself, stop the Notify and Filter
* procedures.
*/
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc (p7dcx->dcx);
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearFilterProc (p7dcx->dcx);
}
break;
default:
SEC_ASN1DecoderClearNotifyProc (p7dcx->dcx);
break;
}
}
SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *
SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb, void *cb_arg,
SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg,
SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback decrypt_key_cb,
void *decrypt_key_cb_arg,
SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb)
{
SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx;
SEC_ASN1DecoderContext *dcx;
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
PRArenaPool *poolp;
poolp = PORT_NewArena (1024); /* XXX what is right value? */
if (poolp == NULL)
return NULL;
cinfo = (SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc (poolp, sizeof(*cinfo));
if (cinfo == NULL) {
PORT_FreeArena (poolp, PR_FALSE);
return NULL;
}
cinfo->poolp = poolp;
cinfo->pwfn = pwfn;
cinfo->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg;
cinfo->created = PR_FALSE;
cinfo->refCount = 1;
p7dcx =
(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext*)PORT_ZAlloc (sizeof(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext));
if (p7dcx == NULL) {
PORT_FreeArena (poolp, PR_FALSE);
return NULL;
}
p7dcx->tmp_poolp = PORT_NewArena (1024); /* XXX what is right value? */
if (p7dcx->tmp_poolp == NULL) {
PORT_Free (p7dcx);
PORT_FreeArena (poolp, PR_FALSE);
return NULL;
}
dcx = SEC_ASN1DecoderStart (poolp, cinfo, sec_PKCS7ContentInfoTemplate);
if (dcx == NULL) {
PORT_FreeArena (p7dcx->tmp_poolp, PR_FALSE);
PORT_Free (p7dcx);
PORT_FreeArena (poolp, PR_FALSE);
return NULL;
}
SEC_ASN1DecoderSetNotifyProc (dcx, sec_pkcs7_decoder_notify, p7dcx);
p7dcx->dcx = dcx;
p7dcx->cinfo = cinfo;
p7dcx->cb = cb;
p7dcx->cb_arg = cb_arg;
p7dcx->pwfn = pwfn;
p7dcx->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg;
p7dcx->dkcb = decrypt_key_cb;
p7dcx->dkcb_arg = decrypt_key_cb_arg;
p7dcx->decrypt_allowed_cb = decrypt_allowed_cb;
return p7dcx;
}
/*
* Do the next chunk of PKCS7 decoding. If there is a problem, set
* an error and return a failure status. Note that in the case of
* an error, this routine is still prepared to be called again and
* again in case that is the easiest route for our caller to take.
* We simply detect it and do not do anything except keep setting
* that error in case our caller has not noticed it yet...
*/
SECStatus
SEC_PKCS7DecoderUpdate(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx,
const char *buf, unsigned long len)
{
if (p7dcx->cinfo != NULL && p7dcx->dcx != NULL) {
PORT_Assert (p7dcx->error == 0);
if (p7dcx->error == 0) {
if (SEC_ASN1DecoderUpdate (p7dcx->dcx, buf, len) != SECSuccess) {
p7dcx->error = PORT_GetError();
PORT_Assert (p7dcx->error);
if (p7dcx->error == 0)
p7dcx->error = -1;
}
}
}
if (p7dcx->error) {
if (p7dcx->dcx != NULL) {
(void) SEC_ASN1DecoderFinish (p7dcx->dcx);
p7dcx->dcx = NULL;
}
if (p7dcx->cinfo != NULL) {
SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo (p7dcx->cinfo);
p7dcx->cinfo = NULL;
}
PORT_SetError (p7dcx->error);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
SEC_PKCS7DecoderFinish(SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx)
{
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo;
cinfo = p7dcx->cinfo;
if (p7dcx->dcx != NULL) {
if (SEC_ASN1DecoderFinish (p7dcx->dcx) != SECSuccess) {
SEC_PKCS7DestroyContentInfo (cinfo);
cinfo = NULL;
}
}
PORT_FreeArena (p7dcx->tmp_poolp, PR_FALSE);
PORT_Free (p7dcx);
return cinfo;
}
SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *
SEC_PKCS7DecodeItem(SECItem *p7item,
SEC_PKCS7DecoderContentCallback cb, void *cb_arg,
SECKEYGetPasswordKey pwfn, void *pwfn_arg,
SEC_PKCS7GetDecryptKeyCallback decrypt_key_cb,
void *decrypt_key_cb_arg,
SEC_PKCS7DecryptionAllowedCallback decrypt_allowed_cb)
{
SEC_PKCS7DecoderContext *p7dcx;
p7dcx = SEC_PKCS7DecoderStart(cb, cb_arg, pwfn, pwfn_arg, decrypt_key_cb,
decrypt_key_cb_arg, decrypt_allowed_cb);
(void) SEC_PKCS7DecoderUpdate(p7dcx, (char *) p7item->data, p7item->len);
return SEC_PKCS7DecoderFinish(p7dcx);
}
/*
* If the thing contains any certs or crls return true; false otherwise.
*/
PRBool
SEC_PKCS7ContainsCertsOrCrls(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
{
SECOidTag kind;
SECItem **certs;
CERTSignedCrl **crls;
kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType (cinfo);
switch (kind) {
default:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
return PR_FALSE;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
certs = cinfo->content.signedData->rawCerts;
crls = cinfo->content.signedData->crls;
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
certs = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->rawCerts;
crls = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->crls;
break;
}
/*
* I know this could be collapsed, but I was in a mood to be explicit.
*/
if (certs != NULL && certs[0] != NULL)
return PR_TRUE;
else if (crls != NULL && crls[0] != NULL)
return PR_TRUE;
else
return PR_FALSE;
}
/* return the content length...could use GetContent, however we
* need the encrypted content length
*/
PRBool
SEC_PKCS7IsContentEmpty(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, unsigned int minLen)
{
SECItem *item = NULL;
if(cinfo == NULL) {
return PR_TRUE;
}
switch(SEC_PKCS7ContentType(cinfo))
{
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
item = cinfo->content.data;
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
item = &cinfo->content.encryptedData->encContentInfo.encContent;
break;
default:
/* add other types */
return PR_FALSE;
}
if(!item) {
return PR_TRUE;
} else if(item->len <= minLen) {
return PR_TRUE;
}
return PR_FALSE;
}
PRBool
SEC_PKCS7ContentIsEncrypted(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
{
SECOidTag kind;
kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType (cinfo);
switch (kind) {
default:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
return PR_FALSE;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
return PR_TRUE;
}
}
/*
* If the PKCS7 content has a signature (not just *could* have a signature)
* return true; false otherwise. This can/should be called before calling
* VerifySignature, which will always indicate failure if no signature is
* present, but that does not mean there even was a signature!
* Note that the content itself can be empty (detached content was sent
* another way); it is the presence of the signature that matters.
*/
PRBool
SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
{
SECOidTag kind;
SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos;
kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType (cinfo);
switch (kind) {
default:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
return PR_FALSE;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos;
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData->signerInfos;
break;
}
/*
* I know this could be collapsed; but I kind of think it will get
* more complicated before I am finished, so...
*/
if (signerinfos != NULL && signerinfos[0] != NULL)
return PR_TRUE;
else
return PR_FALSE;
}
/*
* SEC_PKCS7ContentVerifySignature
* Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature is good.
* The digest was either calculated earlier (and is stored in the
* contentInfo itself) or is passed in via "detached_digest".
*
* The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted
* for the purpose specified by "certusage".
*
* In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found
* into our local database.
*
* XXX Each place which returns PR_FALSE should be sure to have a good
* error set for inspection by the caller. Alternatively, we could create
* an enumeration of success and each type of failure and return that
* instead of a boolean. For now, the default in a bad situation is to
* set the error to SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE. But this should be
* reviewed; better (more specific) errors should be possible (to distinguish
* a signature failure from a badly-formed pkcs7 signedData, for example).
* Some of the errors should probably just be SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
* but that has a less helpful error string associated with it right now;
* if/when that changes, review and change these as needed.
*
* XXX This is broken wrt signedAndEnvelopedData. In that case, the
* message digest is doubly encrypted -- first encrypted with the signer
* private key but then again encrypted with the bulk encryption key used
* to encrypt the content. So before we can pass the digest to VerifyDigest,
* we need to decrypt it with the bulk encryption key. Also, in this case,
* there should be NO authenticatedAttributes (signerinfo->authAttr should
* be NULL).
*/
static PRBool
sec_pkcs7_verify_signature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
SECCertUsage certusage,
SECItem *detached_digest,
HASH_HashType digest_type,
PRBool keepcerts)
{
SECAlgorithmID **digestalgs, *bulkid;
SECItem *digest;
SECItem **digests;
SECItem **rawcerts;
CERTSignedCrl **crls;
SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos, *signerinfo;
CERTCertificate *cert, **certs;
PRBool goodsig;
CERTCertDBHandle local_certdb, *certdb, *defaultdb;
SECOidData *algiddata;
int i, certcount;
SECKEYPublicKey *publickey;
SECItem *content_type;
PK11SymKey *sigkey;
SECItem *utc_stime;
int64 stime;
SECStatus rv;
/*
* Everything needed in order to "goto done" safely.
*/
goodsig = PR_FALSE;
certcount = 0;
cert = NULL;
certs = NULL;
certdb = NULL;
defaultdb = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
publickey = NULL;
if (! SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned(cinfo)) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
PORT_Assert (cinfo->contentTypeTag != NULL);
switch (cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset) {
default:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
/* Could only get here if SEC_PKCS7ContentIsSigned is broken. */
PORT_Assert (0);
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
{
SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp;
sdp = cinfo->content.signedData;
digestalgs = sdp->digestAlgorithms;
digests = sdp->digests;
rawcerts = sdp->rawCerts;
crls = sdp->crls;
signerinfos = sdp->signerInfos;
content_type = &(sdp->contentInfo.contentType);
sigkey = NULL;
bulkid = NULL;
}
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
{
SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
digestalgs = saedp->digestAlgorithms;
digests = saedp->digests;
rawcerts = saedp->rawCerts;
crls = saedp->crls;
signerinfos = saedp->signerInfos;
content_type = &(saedp->encContentInfo.contentType);
sigkey = saedp->sigKey;
bulkid = &(saedp->encContentInfo.contentEncAlg);
}
break;
}
if ((signerinfos == NULL) || (signerinfos[0] == NULL)) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
/*
* XXX Need to handle multiple signatures; checking them is easy,
* but what should be the semantics here (like, return value)?
*/
if (signerinfos[1] != NULL) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
signerinfo = signerinfos[0];
/*
* XXX I would like to just pass the issuerAndSN, along with the rawcerts
* and crls, to some function that did all of this certificate stuff
* (open/close the database if necessary, verifying the certs, etc.)
* and gave me back a cert pointer if all was good.
*/
certdb = defaultdb;
if (certdb == NULL) {
if (CERT_OpenCertDBFilename (&local_certdb, NULL,
(PRBool)!keepcerts) != SECSuccess)
goto done;
certdb = &local_certdb;
}
certcount = 0;
if (rawcerts != NULL) {
for (; rawcerts[certcount] != NULL; certcount++) {
/* just counting */
}
}
/*
* Note that the result of this is that each cert in "certs"
* needs to be destroyed.
*/
rv = CERT_ImportCerts(certdb, certusage, certcount, rawcerts, &certs,
keepcerts, PR_FALSE, NULL);
if ( rv != SECSuccess ) {
goto done;
}
/*
* This cert will also need to be freed, but since we save it
* in signerinfo for later, we do not want to destroy it when
* we leave this function -- we let the clean-up of the entire
* cinfo structure later do the destroy of this cert.
*/
cert = CERT_FindCertByIssuerAndSN(certdb, signerinfo->issuerAndSN);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto done;
}
signerinfo->cert = cert;
/*
* Get and convert the signing time; if available, it will be used
* both on the cert verification and for importing the sender
* email profile.
*/
utc_stime = SEC_PKCS7GetSigningTime (cinfo);
if (utc_stime != NULL) {
if (DER_UTCTimeToTime (&stime, utc_stime) != SECSuccess)
utc_stime = NULL; /* conversion failed, so pretend none */
}
/*
* XXX This uses the signing time, if available. Additionally, we
* might want to, if there is no signing time, get the message time
* from the mail header itself, and use that. That would require
* a change to our interface though, and for S/MIME callers to pass
* in a time (and for non-S/MIME callers to pass in nothing, or
* maybe make them pass in the current time, always?).
*/
if (CERT_VerifyCert (certdb, cert, PR_TRUE, certusage,
utc_stime != NULL ? stime : PR_Now(),
cinfo->pwfn_arg, NULL) != SECSuccess)
{
/*
* XXX Give the user an option to check the signature anyway?
* If we want to do this, need to give a way to leave and display
* some dialog and get the answer and come back through (or do
* the rest of what we do below elsewhere, maybe by putting it
* in a function that we call below and could call from a dialog
* finish handler).
*/
goto savecert;
}
publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey (cert);
if (publickey == NULL)
goto done;
/*
* XXX No! If digests is empty, see if we can create it now by
* digesting the contents. This is necessary if we want to allow
* somebody to do a simple decode (without filtering, etc.) and
* then later call us here to do the verification.
* OR, we can just specify that the interface to this routine
* *requires* that the digest(s) be done before calling and either
* stashed in the struct itself or passed in explicitly (as would
* be done for detached contents).
*/
if ((digests == NULL || digests[0] == NULL)
&& (detached_digest == NULL || detached_digest->data == NULL))
goto done;
/*
* Find and confirm digest algorithm.
*/
algiddata = SECOID_FindOID (&(signerinfo->digestAlg.algorithm));
if (detached_digest != NULL) {
switch (digest_type) {
default:
case HASH_AlgNULL:
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
case HASH_AlgMD2:
PORT_Assert (detached_digest->len == MD2_LENGTH);
if (algiddata->offset != SEC_OID_MD2) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
break;
case HASH_AlgMD5:
PORT_Assert (detached_digest->len == MD5_LENGTH);
if (algiddata->offset != SEC_OID_MD5) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
break;
case HASH_AlgSHA1:
PORT_Assert (detached_digest->len == SHA1_LENGTH);
if (algiddata->offset != SEC_OID_SHA1) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
break;
}
digest = detached_digest;
} else {
PORT_Assert (digestalgs != NULL && digestalgs[0] != NULL);
if (digestalgs == NULL || digestalgs[0] == NULL) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
/*
* pick digest matching signerinfo->digestAlg from digests
*/
if (algiddata == NULL) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
for (i = 0; digestalgs[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (SECOID_FindOID (&(digestalgs[i]->algorithm)) == algiddata)
break;
}
if (digestalgs[i] == NULL) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
digest = digests[i];
}
/*
* XXX This may not be the right set of algorithms to check.
* I'd prefer to trust that just calling VFY_Verify{Data,Digest}
* would do the right thing (and set an error if it could not);
* then additional algorithms could be handled by that code
* and we would Just Work. So this check should just be removed,
* but not until the VFY code is better at setting errors.
*/
algiddata = SECOID_FindOID (&(signerinfo->digestEncAlg.algorithm));
if (algiddata == NULL ||
((algiddata->offset != SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION) &&
(algiddata->offset != SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE))) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
if (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL) {
SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr;
SECItem *value;
SECItem encoded_attrs;
/*
* We have a sigkey only for signedAndEnvelopedData, which is
* not supposed to have any authenticated attributes.
*/
if (sigkey != NULL) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
/*
* PKCS #7 says that if there are any authenticated attributes,
* then there must be one for content type which matches the
* content type of the content being signed, and there must
* be one for message digest which matches our message digest.
* So check these things first.
* XXX Might be nice to have a compare-attribute-value function
* which could collapse the following nicely.
*/
attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute (signerinfo->authAttr,
SEC_OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE, PR_TRUE);
value = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue (attr);
if (value == NULL || value->len != content_type->len) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp (value->data, content_type->data, value->len) != 0) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute (signerinfo->authAttr,
SEC_OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST, PR_TRUE);
value = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue (attr);
if (value == NULL || value->len != digest->len) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
if (PORT_Memcmp (value->data, digest->data, value->len) != 0) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
/*
* Okay, we met the constraints of the basic attributes.
* Now check the signature, which is based on a digest of
* the DER-encoded authenticated attributes. So, first we
* encode and then we digest/verify.
*/
encoded_attrs.data = NULL;
encoded_attrs.len = 0;
if (sec_PKCS7EncodeAttributes (NULL, &encoded_attrs,
&(signerinfo->authAttr)) == NULL)
goto done;
if (encoded_attrs.data == NULL || encoded_attrs.len == 0) {
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
goodsig = (PRBool)(VFY_VerifyData (encoded_attrs.data,
encoded_attrs.len,
publickey, &(signerinfo->encDigest),
SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(signerinfo->digestEncAlg)),
cinfo->pwfn_arg) == SECSuccess);
PORT_Free (encoded_attrs.data);
} else {
SECItem *sig;
SECItem holder;
SECStatus rv;
/*
* No authenticated attributes.
* The signature is based on the plain message digest.
*/
sig = &(signerinfo->encDigest);
if (sig->len == 0) { /* bad signature */
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto done;
}
if (sigkey != NULL) {
sec_PKCS7CipherObject *decryptobj;
unsigned int buflen;
/*
* For signedAndEnvelopedData, we first must decrypt the encrypted
* digest with the bulk encryption key. The result is the normal
* encrypted digest (aka the signature).
*/
decryptobj = sec_PKCS7CreateDecryptObject (sigkey, bulkid);
if (decryptobj == NULL)
goto done;
buflen = sec_PKCS7DecryptLength (decryptobj, sig->len, PR_TRUE);
PORT_Assert (buflen);
if (buflen == 0) { /* something is wrong */
sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject (decryptobj);
goto done;
}
holder.data = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc (buflen);
if (holder.data == NULL) {
sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject (decryptobj);
goto done;
}
rv = sec_PKCS7Decrypt (decryptobj, holder.data, &holder.len, buflen,
sig->data, sig->len, PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
sec_PKCS7DestroyDecryptObject (decryptobj);
goto done;
}
sig = &holder;
}
goodsig = (PRBool)(VFY_VerifyDigest (digest, publickey, sig,
SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(signerinfo->digestEncAlg)),
cinfo->pwfn_arg)
== SECSuccess);
if (sigkey != NULL) {
PORT_Assert (sig == &holder);
PORT_ZFree (holder.data, holder.len);
}
}
if (! goodsig) {
/*
* XXX Change the generic error into our specific one, because
* in that case we get a better explanation out of the Security
* Advisor. This is really a bug in our error strings (the
* "generic" error has a lousy/wrong message associated with it
* which assumes the signature verification was done for the
* purposes of checking the issuer signature on a certificate)
* but this is at least an easy workaround and/or in the
* Security Advisor, which specifically checks for the error
* SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE and gives more explanation
* in that case but does not similarly check for
* SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE. It probably should, but then would
* probably say the wrong thing in the case that it *was* the
* certificate signature check that failed during the cert
* verification done above. Our error handling is really a mess.
*/
if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
PORT_SetError (SEC_ERROR_PKCS7_BAD_SIGNATURE);
}
savecert:
/*
* Only save the smime profile if we are checking an email message and
* the cert has an email address in it.
*/
if ( ( cert->emailAddr != NULL ) &&
( ( certusage == certUsageEmailSigner ) ||
( certusage == certUsageEmailRecipient ) ) ) {
SECItem *profile = NULL;
int save_error;
/*
* Remember the current error set because we do not care about
* anything set by the functions we are about to call.
*/
save_error = PORT_GetError();
if (goodsig && (signerinfo->authAttr != NULL)) {
/*
* If the signature is good, then we can save the S/MIME profile,
* if we have one.
*/
SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr;
attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute (signerinfo->authAttr,
SEC_OID_PKCS9_SMIME_CAPABILITIES,
PR_TRUE);
profile = sec_PKCS7AttributeValue (attr);
}
rv = CERT_SaveSMimeProfile (cert, profile, utc_stime);
/*
* Restore the saved error in case the calls above set a new
* one that we do not actually care about.
*/
PORT_SetError (save_error);
/*
* XXX Failure is not indicated anywhere -- the signature
* verification itself is unaffected by whether or not the
* profile was successfully saved.
*/
}
done:
/*
* See comment above about why we do not want to destroy cert
* itself here.
*/
if (certs != NULL)
CERT_DestroyCertArray (certs, certcount);
if (defaultdb == NULL && certdb != NULL)
CERT_ClosePermCertDB (certdb);
if (publickey != NULL)
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey (publickey);
return goodsig;
}
/*
* SEC_PKCS7VerifySignature
* Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature is good.
* The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted
* for the purpose specified by "certusage".
*
* In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found
* into our local database.
*/
PRBool
SEC_PKCS7VerifySignature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
SECCertUsage certusage,
PRBool keepcerts)
{
return sec_pkcs7_verify_signature (cinfo, certusage,
NULL, HASH_AlgNULL, keepcerts);
}
/*
* SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignature
* Look at a PKCS7 contentInfo and check if the signature matches
* a passed-in digest (calculated, supposedly, from detached contents).
* The verification checks that the signing cert is valid and trusted
* for the purpose specified by "certusage".
*
* In addition, if "keepcerts" is true, add any new certificates found
* into our local database.
*/
PRBool
SEC_PKCS7VerifyDetachedSignature(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo,
SECCertUsage certusage,
SECItem *detached_digest,
HASH_HashType digest_type,
PRBool keepcerts)
{
return sec_pkcs7_verify_signature (cinfo, certusage,
detached_digest, digest_type,
keepcerts);
}
/*
* Return the asked-for portion of the name of the signer of a PKCS7
* signed object.
*
* Returns a pointer to allocated memory, which must be freed.
* A NULL return value is an error.
*/
#define sec_common_name 1
#define sec_email_address 2
static char *
sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo, int selector)
{
SECOidTag kind;
SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos;
CERTCertificate *signercert;
char *container;
kind = SEC_PKCS7ContentType (cinfo);
switch (kind) {
default:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
PORT_Assert (0);
return NULL;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
{
SEC_PKCS7SignedData *sdp;
sdp = cinfo->content.signedData;
signerinfos = sdp->signerInfos;
}
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
{
SEC_PKCS7SignedAndEnvelopedData *saedp;
saedp = cinfo->content.signedAndEnvelopedData;
signerinfos = saedp->signerInfos;
}
break;
}
if (signerinfos == NULL || signerinfos[0] == NULL)
return NULL;
signercert = signerinfos[0]->cert;
/*
* No cert there; see if we can find one by calling verify ourselves.
*/
if (signercert == NULL) {
/*
* The cert usage does not matter in this case, because we do not
* actually care about the verification itself, but we have to pick
* some valid usage to pass in.
*/
(void) sec_pkcs7_verify_signature (cinfo, certUsageEmailSigner,
NULL, HASH_AlgNULL, PR_FALSE);
signercert = signerinfos[0]->cert;
if (signercert == NULL)
return NULL;
}
switch (selector) {
case sec_common_name:
container = CERT_GetCommonName (&signercert->subject);
break;
case sec_email_address:
if(signercert->emailAddr) {
container = PORT_Strdup(signercert->emailAddr);
} else {
container = NULL;
}
break;
default:
PORT_Assert (0);
container = NULL;
break;
}
return container;
}
char *
SEC_PKCS7GetSignerCommonName(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
{
return sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(cinfo, sec_common_name);
}
char *
SEC_PKCS7GetSignerEmailAddress(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
{
return sec_pkcs7_get_signer_cert_info(cinfo, sec_email_address);
}
/*
* Return the signing time, in UTCTime format, of a PKCS7 contentInfo.
*/
SECItem *
SEC_PKCS7GetSigningTime(SEC_PKCS7ContentInfo *cinfo)
{
SEC_PKCS7SignerInfo **signerinfos;
SEC_PKCS7Attribute *attr;
if (SEC_PKCS7ContentType (cinfo) != SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA)
return NULL;
signerinfos = cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos;
/*
* No signature, or more than one, means no deal.
*/
if (signerinfos == NULL || signerinfos[0] == NULL || signerinfos[1] != NULL)
return NULL;
attr = sec_PKCS7FindAttribute (signerinfos[0]->authAttr,
SEC_OID_PKCS9_SIGNING_TIME, PR_TRUE);
return sec_PKCS7AttributeValue (attr);
}