Bug 764987 - "Allow extensions to add exposed protocols in nsMsgContentPolicy". r=rkent
This commit is contained in:
Kent James
Родитель
aa70bcfac0
Коммит
1afa917a01
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@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ XPIDL_SOURCES += [
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'nsIMsgAccountManager.idl',
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'nsIMsgAsyncPrompter.idl',
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'nsIMsgBiffManager.idl',
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'nsIMsgContentPolicy.idl',
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'nsIMsgCopyService.idl',
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'nsIMsgCopyServiceListener.idl',
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'nsIMsgCustomColumnHandler.idl',
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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
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/* -*- mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#include "nsISupports.idl"
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[scriptable, uuid(c29b2fd3-64d0-4083-a096-c20a9b847a99)]
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/**
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* This interface provide functions which help extension developers
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* add their customized schema to the exposed protocls of nsMsgContentPolicy.
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* By default, a list of existing protocols (such as imap and nntp)
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* are allowed to process urls locally, while non-matching urls are required
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* to be processed as external.
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* This interface allows additional protocols to be added to
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* the list of protocols that are processed locally.
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* Typically this would be used in cases where a new messaging protocol
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* is being added by an extension.
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*/
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interface nsIMsgContentPolicy : nsISupports {
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/**
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* Add the specific aScheme to nsMsgContentPolicy's exposed protocols.
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*
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* @param aScheme scheme who will be added to nsMsgContentPolicy's exposed protocols
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*/
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void addExposedProtocol(in ACString aScheme);
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/**
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* Remove the specific aScheme from nsMsgContentPolicy's exposed protocols.
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*
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* @param aScheme scheme who will be removed from nsMsgContentPolicy's exposed protocols
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*/
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void removeExposedProtocol(in ACString aScheme);
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};
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@ -33,18 +33,19 @@ static const char kTrustedDomains[] = "mail.trusteddomains";
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using namespace mozilla::mailnews;
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// Per message headder flags to keep track of whether the user is allowing remote
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// content for a particular message.
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// content for a particular message.
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// if you change or add more values to these constants, be sure to modify
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// the corresponding definitions in mailWindowOverlay.js
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#define kNoRemoteContentPolicy 0
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#define kBlockRemoteContent 1
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#define kAllowRemoteContent 2
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NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsMsgContentPolicy,
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nsIContentPolicy,
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nsIWebProgressListener,
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nsIObserver,
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nsISupportsWeakReference)
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NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsMsgContentPolicy,
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nsIContentPolicy,
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nsIWebProgressListener,
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nsIMsgContentPolicy,
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nsIObserver,
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nsISupportsWeakReference)
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nsMsgContentPolicy::nsMsgContentPolicy()
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{
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@ -87,7 +88,7 @@ nsresult nsMsgContentPolicy::Init()
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return NS_OK;
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}
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/**
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/**
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* @returns true if the sender referenced by aMsgHdr is explicitly allowed to
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* load remote images according to the PermissionManager
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*/
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@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForSender(nsIMsgDBHdr *aMsgHdr)
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nsresult rv = aMsgHdr->GetAuthor(getter_Copies(author));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
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nsCString emailAddress;
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nsCString emailAddress;
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ExtractEmail(EncodedHeader(author), emailAddress);
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if (emailAddress.IsEmpty())
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return false;
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@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ bool nsMsgContentPolicy::IsTrustedDomain(nsIURI * aContentLocation)
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nsAutoCString host;
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nsresult rv = aContentLocation->GetHost(host);
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !mTrustedMailDomains.IsEmpty())
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !mTrustedMailDomains.IsEmpty())
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trustedDomain = MsgHostDomainIsTrusted(host, mTrustedMailDomains);
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return trustedDomain;
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@ -193,14 +194,14 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldLoad(uint32_t aContentType,
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case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT:
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// At this point, we have no intention of supporting a different JS
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// setting on a subdocument, so we don't worry about TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT here.
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// If the timing were right, we'd enable JavaScript on the docshell
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// for non mailnews URIs here. However, at this point, the
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// old document may still be around, so we can't do any enabling just yet.
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// Instead, we apply the policy in nsIWebProgressListener::OnLocationChange.
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// old document may still be around, so we can't do any enabling just yet.
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// Instead, we apply the policy in nsIWebProgressListener::OnLocationChange.
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// For now, we explicitly disable JavaScript in order to be safe rather than
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// sorry, because OnLocationChange isn't guaranteed to necessarily be called
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// soon enough to disable it in time (though bz says it _should_ be called
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// soon enough to disable it in time (though bz says it _should_ be called
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// soon enough "in all sane cases").
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rv = SetDisableItemsOnMailNewsUrlDocshells(aContentLocation,
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aRequestingContext);
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@ -221,7 +222,7 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldLoad(uint32_t aContentType,
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default:
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break;
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}
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// NOTE: Not using NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER because this is a legitimate case
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// that can happen. Also keep in mind that the default policy used for a
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// failure code is ACCEPT.
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@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldLoad(uint32_t aContentType,
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if (IsSafeRequestingLocation(aRequestingLocation))
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return rv;
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// Now default to reject so early returns via NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS
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// Now default to reject so early returns via NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS
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// cause content to be rejected.
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*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST;
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@ -250,7 +251,7 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldLoad(uint32_t aContentType,
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return NS_OK;
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}
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// never load unexposed protocols except for http, https and file.
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// never load unexposed protocols except for http, https and file.
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// Protocols like ftp are always blocked.
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if (ShouldBlockUnexposedProtocol(aContentLocation))
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return NS_OK;
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@ -390,6 +391,10 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::IsExposedProtocol(nsIURI *aContentLocation)
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MsgLowerCaseEqualsLiteral(contentScheme, "about"))
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return true;
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// check if customized exposed scheme
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if (mCustomExposedProtocols.Contains(contentScheme))
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return true;
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bool isData;
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bool isChrome;
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bool isRes;
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@ -468,7 +473,7 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForMsgHdr(nsIMsgDBHdr *aMsgHdr,
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// kNoRemoteContentPolicy means we have never set a value on the message
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if (result == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST && !remoteContentPolicy)
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aMsgHdr->SetUint32Property("remoteContentPolicy", kBlockRemoteContent);
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return result;
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}
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@ -498,7 +503,7 @@ private:
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nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mContentURI;
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};
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/**
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/**
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* This function is used to determine if we allow content for a remote message.
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* If we reject loading remote content, then we'll inform the message window
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* that this message has remote content (and hence we are not loading it).
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@ -548,7 +553,7 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldAcceptContentForPotentialMsg(nsIURI *aOriginatorLocati
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if (*aDecision == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgWindow> msgWindow;
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(void)mailnewsUrl->GetMsgWindow(getter_AddRefs(msgWindow));
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(void)mailnewsUrl->GetMsgWindow(getter_AddRefs(msgWindow));
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if (msgWindow)
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{
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nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> event =
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@ -561,9 +566,9 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldAcceptContentForPotentialMsg(nsIURI *aOriginatorLocati
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}
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}
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/**
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/**
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* Content policy logic for compose windows
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*
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*
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*/
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void nsMsgContentPolicy::ComposeShouldLoad(nsIMsgCompose *aMsgCompose,
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nsISupports *aRequestingContext,
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@ -601,7 +606,7 @@ void nsMsgContentPolicy::ComposeShouldLoad(nsIMsgCompose *aMsgCompose,
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// images that are a part of the quoted content to load. Fortunately, after
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// the quoted message has been inserted into the document, mail compose
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// flags remote content elements that came from the original message with a
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// moz-do-not-send attribute.
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// moz-do-not-send attribute.
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if (*aDecision == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST)
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{
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bool insertingQuotedContent = true;
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@ -613,7 +618,7 @@ void nsMsgContentPolicy::ComposeShouldLoad(nsIMsgCompose *aMsgCompose,
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if (element)
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{
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bool doNotSendAttrib;
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(element->HasAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("moz-do-not-send"), &doNotSendAttrib)) &&
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(element->HasAttribute(NS_LITERAL_STRING("moz-do-not-send"), &doNotSendAttrib)) &&
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!doNotSendAttrib)
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*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
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}
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@ -655,8 +660,8 @@ nsresult nsMsgContentPolicy::SetDisableItemsOnMailNewsUrlDocshells(
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// ShouldProcess, and if it's possible for this to be null when called from
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// ShouldLoad, but not in the corresponding ShouldProcess call,
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// we need to re-think the assumptions underlying this code.
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// If there's no docshell to get to, there's nowhere for the JavaScript to
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// If there's no docshell to get to, there's nowhere for the JavaScript to
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// run, so we're already safe and don't need to disable anything.
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if (!aRequestingContext) {
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return NS_OK;
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@ -681,7 +686,7 @@ nsresult nsMsgContentPolicy::SetDisableItemsOnMailNewsUrlDocshells(
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rv = flOwner->GetFrameLoader(getter_AddRefs(frameLoader));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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NS_ENSURE_TRUE(frameLoader, NS_ERROR_INVALID_POINTER);
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell;
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rv = frameLoader->GetDocShell(getter_AddRefs(docShell));
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NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
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@ -749,7 +754,7 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::GetRootDocShellForContext(nsISupports *aRequestingContext,
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* Navigates up the docshell tree from aRequestingContext and finds the
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* highest parent with the same type docshell as aRequestingContext, then
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* returns the URI associated with that docshell.
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*/
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*/
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nsresult
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nsMsgContentPolicy::GetOriginatingURIForContext(nsISupports *aRequestingContext,
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nsIURI **aURI)
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@ -783,7 +788,7 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldProcess(uint32_t aContentType,
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{
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// XXX Returning ACCEPT is presumably only a reasonable thing to do if we
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// think that ShouldLoad is going to catch all possible cases (i.e. that
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// everything we use to make decisions is going to be available at
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// everything we use to make decisions is going to be available at
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// ShouldLoad time, and not only become available in time for ShouldProcess).
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// Do we think that's actually the case?
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*aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
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@ -792,7 +797,7 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldProcess(uint32_t aContentType,
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NS_IMETHODIMP nsMsgContentPolicy::Observe(nsISupports *aSubject, const char *aTopic, const char16_t *aData)
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{
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if (!strcmp(NS_PREFBRANCH_PREFCHANGE_TOPIC_ID, aTopic))
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if (!strcmp(NS_PREFBRANCH_PREFCHANGE_TOPIC_ID, aTopic))
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{
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NS_LossyConvertUTF16toASCII pref(aData);
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@ -810,11 +815,11 @@ NS_IMETHODIMP nsMsgContentPolicy::Observe(nsISupports *aSubject, const char *aTo
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return NS_OK;
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}
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/**
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/**
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* We implement the nsIWebProgressListener interface in order to enforce
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* settings at onLocationChange time.
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*/
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsMsgContentPolicy::OnStateChange(nsIWebProgress *aWebProgress,
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nsIRequest *aRequest, uint32_t aStateFlags,
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nsresult aStatus)
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@ -833,7 +838,7 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::OnProgressChange(nsIWebProgress *aWebProgress,
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsMsgContentPolicy::OnLocationChange(nsIWebProgress *aWebProgress,
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nsIRequest *aRequest, nsIURI *aLocation,
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uint32_t aFlags)
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@ -841,11 +846,11 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::OnLocationChange(nsIWebProgress *aWebProgress,
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nsresult rv;
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// If anything goes wrong and/or there's no docshell associated with this
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// request, just give up. The behavior ends up being "don't consider
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// request, just give up. The behavior ends up being "don't consider
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// re-enabling JS on the docshell", which is the safe thing to do (and if
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// the problem was that there's no docshell, that means that there was
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// the problem was that there's no docshell, that means that there was
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// nowhere for any JavaScript to run, so we're already safe
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nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell = do_QueryInterface(aWebProgress, &rv);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return NS_OK;
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@ -860,7 +865,7 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::OnLocationChange(nsIWebProgress *aWebProgress,
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" do not point to the same docshell");
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}
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#endif
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nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgMessageUrl> messageUrl = do_QueryInterface(aLocation, &rv);
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if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
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@ -900,3 +905,27 @@ nsMsgContentPolicy::OnSecurityChange(nsIWebProgress *aWebProgress,
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{
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return NS_OK;
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}
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/**
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* Implementation of nsIMsgContentPolicy
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*
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*/
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsMsgContentPolicy::AddExposedProtocol(const nsACString &aScheme)
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{
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if (mCustomExposedProtocols.Contains(nsCString(aScheme)))
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return NS_OK;
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mCustomExposedProtocols.AppendElement(aScheme);
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return NS_OK;
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}
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NS_IMETHODIMP
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nsMsgContentPolicy::RemoveExposedProtocol(const nsACString &aScheme)
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{
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mCustomExposedProtocols.RemoveElement(nsCString(aScheme));
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return NS_OK;
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}
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@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
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#include "nsIMsgCompose.h"
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#include "nsIDocShell.h"
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#include "nsIPermissionManager.h"
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#include "nsIMsgContentPolicy.h"
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#include "nsTArray.h"
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/* DBFCFDF0-4489-4faa-8122-190FD1EFA16C */
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#define NS_MSGCONTENTPOLICY_CID \
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@ -35,6 +37,7 @@ class nsIDocShell;
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class nsMsgContentPolicy : public nsIContentPolicy,
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public nsIObserver,
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public nsIWebProgressListener,
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public nsIMsgContentPolicy,
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public nsSupportsWeakReference
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{
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public:
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@ -46,6 +49,7 @@ public:
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NS_DECL_NSICONTENTPOLICY
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NS_DECL_NSIOBSERVER
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NS_DECL_NSIWEBPROGRESSLISTENER
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NS_DECL_NSIMSGCONTENTPOLICY
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protected:
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virtual ~nsMsgContentPolicy();
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@ -79,6 +83,8 @@ protected:
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nsIURI **aURI);
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nsresult SetDisableItemsOnMailNewsUrlDocshells(nsIURI *aContentLocation,
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nsISupports *aRequestingContext);
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nsTArray<nsCString> mCustomExposedProtocols;
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};
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#endif // _nsMsgContentPolicy_H_
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|
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|
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@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
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/* -*- mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/*
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* Test suite for nsIMsgContentPolicy to check we could add/remove customized protocol to
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* nsMsgContentPolicy.
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*/
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function makeURI(aURL) {
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var ioService = Cc["@mozilla.org/network/io-service;1"]
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.getService(Ci.nsIIOService);
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return ioService.newURI(aURL, null, null);
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}
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function run_test() {
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var content_policy = Cc["@mozilla.org/messenger/content-policy;1"]
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.getService(Ci.nsIContentPolicy);
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Assert.ok(content_policy);
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var msg_content_policy = content_policy.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIMsgContentPolicy);
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Assert.ok(msg_content_policy);
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var req_uri = makeURI("custom-scheme://custom_url/1.emal");
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Assert.ok(req_uri);
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var content_uri = makeURI("custom-scheme://custom_content_url/1.jsp");
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Assert.ok(content_uri);
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var decision = content_policy.shouldLoad(Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
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content_uri,
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req_uri,
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null,
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"img/jpeg",
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null);
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Assert.notEqual(decision,
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Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT,
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"customized protocol should not load");
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msg_content_policy.addExposedProtocol("custom-scheme");
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decision = content_policy.shouldLoad(Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
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content_uri,
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req_uri,
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||||
null,
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"img/jpeg",
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||||
null);
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Assert.equal(decision,
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Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT,
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||||
"customized protocol should load");
|
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msg_content_policy.removeExposedProtocol("custom-scheme");
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decision = content_policy.shouldLoad(Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
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content_uri,
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req_uri,
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null,
|
||||
"img/jpeg",
|
||||
null);
|
||||
Assert.notEqual(decision,
|
||||
Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT,
|
||||
"customized protocol should not load");
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ support-files = nodelist_test.xml data/*
|
|||
# Not yet working for non-Mac OS
|
||||
skip-if = os != 'mac'
|
||||
|
||||
[test_nsIMsgContentPolicy.js]
|
||||
[test_nsIMsgFolder.js]
|
||||
[test_nsIMsgFolderListener.js]
|
||||
[test_nsIMsgFolderListenerLocal.js]
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Загрузка…
Ссылка в новой задаче