it's inline and unlikely() inside of it (including the implicit one
in WARN_ON_ONCE()) suffice to convince the compiler that getting
false from check_copy_size() is unlikely.
Spotted-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
On hardware with features like arm64 MTE or SPARC ADI, an access fault
can be triggered at sub-page granularity. Depending on how the
fault_in_writeable() function is used, the caller can get into a
live-lock by continuously retrying the fault-in on an address different
from the one where the uaccess failed.
In the majority of cases progress is ensured by the following
conditions:
1. copy_to_user_nofault() guarantees at least one byte access if the
user address is not faulting.
2. The fault_in_writeable() loop is resumed from the first address that
could not be accessed by copy_to_user_nofault().
If the loop iteration is restarted from an earlier (initial) point, the
loop is repeated with the same conditions and it would live-lock.
Introduce an arch-specific probe_subpage_writeable() and call it from
the newly added fault_in_subpage_writeable() function. The arch code
with sub-page faults will have to implement the specific probing
functionality.
Note that no other fault_in_subpage_*() functions are added since they
have no callers currently susceptible to a live-lock.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220423100751.1870771-2-catalin.marinas@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
There are three sets of updates for 5.18 in the asm-generic tree:
- The set_fs()/get_fs() infrastructure gets removed for good. This
was already gone from all major architectures, but now we can
finally remove it everywhere, which loses some particularly
tricky and error-prone code.
There is a small merge conflict against a parisc cleanup, the
solution is to use their new version.
- The nds32 architecture ends its tenure in the Linux kernel. The
hardware is still used and the code is in reasonable shape, but
the mainline port is not actively maintained any more, as all
remaining users are thought to run vendor kernels that would never
be updated to a future release.
There are some obvious conflicts against changes to the removed
files.
- A series from Masahiro Yamada cleans up some of the uapi header
files to pass the compile-time checks.
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Merge tag 'asm-generic-5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann:
"There are three sets of updates for 5.18 in the asm-generic tree:
- The set_fs()/get_fs() infrastructure gets removed for good.
This was already gone from all major architectures, but now we can
finally remove it everywhere, which loses some particularly tricky
and error-prone code. There is a small merge conflict against a
parisc cleanup, the solution is to use their new version.
- The nds32 architecture ends its tenure in the Linux kernel.
The hardware is still used and the code is in reasonable shape, but
the mainline port is not actively maintained any more, as all
remaining users are thought to run vendor kernels that would never
be updated to a future release.
- A series from Masahiro Yamada cleans up some of the uapi header
files to pass the compile-time checks"
* tag 'asm-generic-5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic: (27 commits)
nds32: Remove the architecture
uaccess: remove CONFIG_SET_FS
ia64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support
sh: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support
sparc64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support
lib/test_lockup: fix kernel pointer check for separate address spaces
uaccess: generalize access_ok()
uaccess: fix type mismatch warnings from access_ok()
arm64: simplify access_ok()
m68k: fix access_ok for coldfire
MIPS: use simpler access_ok()
MIPS: Handle address errors for accesses above CPU max virtual user address
uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault
nios2: drop access_ok() check from __put_user()
x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition
x86: remove __range_not_ok()
sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nofault()
nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user
uaccess: fix nios2 and microblaze get_user_8()
sparc64: fix building assembly files
...
There are no remaining callers of set_fs(), so CONFIG_SET_FS
can be removed globally, along with the thread_info field and
any references to it.
This turns access_ok() into a cheaper check against TASK_SIZE_MAX.
As CONFIG_SET_FS is now gone, drop all remaining references to
set_fs()/get_fs(), mm_segment_t, user_addr_max() and uaccess_kernel().
Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> # for sparc32 changes
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Sergey Matyukevich <sergey.matyukevich@synopsys.com> # for arc changes
Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> # [openrisc, asm-generic]
Acked-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
There are many different ways that access_ok() is defined across
architectures, but in the end, they all just compare against the
user_addr_max() value or they accept anything.
Provide one definition that works for most architectures, checking
against TASK_SIZE_MAX for user processes or skipping the check inside
of uaccess_kernel() sections.
For architectures without CONFIG_SET_FS(), this should be the fastest
check, as it comes down to a single comparison of a pointer against a
compile-time constant, while the architecture specific versions tend to
do something more complex for historic reasons or get something wrong.
Type checking for __user annotations is handled inconsistently across
architectures, but this is easily simplified as well by using an inline
function that takes a 'const void __user *' argument. A handful of
callers need an extra __user annotation for this.
Some architectures had trick to use 33-bit or 65-bit arithmetic on the
addresses to calculate the overflow, however this simpler version uses
fewer registers, which means it can produce better object code in the
end despite needing a second (statically predicted) branch.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [arm64, asm-generic]
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Nine architectures are still missing __{get,put}_kernel_nofault:
alpha, ia64, microblaze, nds32, nios2, openrisc, sh, sparc32, xtensa.
Add a generic version that lets everything use the normal
copy_{from,to}_kernel_nofault() code based on these, removing the last
use of get_fs()/set_fs() from architecture-independent code.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
All users of compat_alloc_user_space() and copy_in_user() have been
removed from the kernel, only a few functions in sparc remain that can be
changed to calling arch_copy_in_user() instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210727144859.4150043-7-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In the same way as commit 14026b94cc ("signal: Add
unsafe_put_compat_sigset()"), this time add
unsafe_get_compat_sigset() macro which is the 'unsafe'
version of get_compat_sigset()
For the bigendian, use unsafe_get_user() directly
to avoid intermediate copy through the stack.
For the littleendian, use a straight unsafe_copy_from_user().
This commit adds the generic fallback for unsafe_copy_from_user().
Architectures wanting to use unsafe_get_compat_sigset() have to
make sure they have their own unsafe_copy_from_user().
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b05bf434ee13c76bc9df5f02653a10db5e7b54e5.1616151715.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
This actually just contains a single patch set:
* The remainder of Christoph's work to remove set_fs, including the RISC-V
portion.
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Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.10-mw1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux
Pull more RISC-V updates from Palmer Dabbelt:
"Just a single patch set: the remainder of Christoph's work to remove
set_fs, including the RISC-V portion"
* tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.10-mw1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux:
riscv: remove address space overrides using set_fs()
riscv: implement __get_kernel_nofault and __put_user_nofault
riscv: refactor __get_user and __put_user
riscv: use memcpy based uaccess for nommu again
asm-generic: make the set_fs implementation optional
asm-generic: add nommu implementations of __{get,put}_kernel_nofault
asm-generic: improve the nommu {get,put}_user handling
uaccess: provide a generic TASK_SIZE_MAX definition
Pull initial set_fs() removal from Al Viro:
"Christoph's set_fs base series + fixups"
* 'work.set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: Allow a NULL pos pointer to __kernel_read
fs: Allow a NULL pos pointer to __kernel_write
powerpc: remove address space overrides using set_fs()
powerpc: use non-set_fs based maccess routines
x86: remove address space overrides using set_fs()
x86: make TASK_SIZE_MAX usable from assembly code
x86: move PAGE_OFFSET, TASK_SIZE & friends to page_{32,64}_types.h
lkdtm: remove set_fs-based tests
test_bitmap: remove user bitmap tests
uaccess: add infrastructure for kernel builds with set_fs()
fs: don't allow splice read/write without explicit ops
fs: don't allow kernel reads and writes without iter ops
sysctl: Convert to iter interfaces
proc: add a read_iter method to proc proc_ops
proc: cleanup the compat vs no compat file ops
proc: remove a level of indentation in proc_get_inode
To test fault-tolerance of user memory access functions, introduce fault
injection to usercopy functions.
If a failure is expected return either -EFAULT or the total amount of
bytes that were not copied.
Signed-off-by: Albert van der Linde <alinde@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200831171733.955393-3-alinde@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kernel.h is being used as a dump for all kinds of stuff for a long time.
Here is the attempt to start cleaning it up by splitting out min()/max()
et al. helpers.
At the same time convert users in header and lib folder to use new header.
Though for time being include new header back to kernel.h to avoid
twisted indirected includes for other existing users.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200910164152.GA1891694@smile.fi.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In reaction to a proposal to introduce a memcpy_mcsafe_fast()
implementation Linus points out that memcpy_mcsafe() is poorly named
relative to communicating the scope of the interface. Specifically what
addresses are valid to pass as source, destination, and what faults /
exceptions are handled.
Of particular concern is that even though x86 might be able to handle
the semantics of copy_mc_to_user() with its common copy_user_generic()
implementation other archs likely need / want an explicit path for this
case:
On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 11:28 AM Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 6:21 PM Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > However now I see that copy_user_generic() works for the wrong reason.
> > It works because the exception on the source address due to poison
> > looks no different than a write fault on the user address to the
> > caller, it's still just a short copy. So it makes copy_to_user() work
> > for the wrong reason relative to the name.
>
> Right.
>
> And it won't work that way on other architectures. On x86, we have a
> generic function that can take faults on either side, and we use it
> for both cases (and for the "in_user" case too), but that's an
> artifact of the architecture oddity.
>
> In fact, it's probably wrong even on x86 - because it can hide bugs -
> but writing those things is painful enough that everybody prefers
> having just one function.
Replace a single top-level memcpy_mcsafe() with either
copy_mc_to_user(), or copy_mc_to_kernel().
Introduce an x86 copy_mc_fragile() name as the rename for the
low-level x86 implementation formerly named memcpy_mcsafe(). It is used
as the slow / careful backend that is supplanted by a fast
copy_mc_generic() in a follow-on patch.
One side-effect of this reorganization is that separating copy_mc_64.S
to its own file means that perf no longer needs to track dependencies
for its memcpy_64.S benchmarks.
[ bp: Massage a bit. ]
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjSqtXAqfUJxFtWNwmguFASTgB0dz1dT3V-78Quiezqbg@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/160195561680.2163339.11574962055305783722.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Define TASK_SIZE_MAX as TASK_SIZE if not otherwise defined.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Add a CONFIG_SET_FS option that is selected by architecturess that
implement set_fs, which is all of them initially. If the option is not
set stubs for routines related to overriding the address space are
provided so that architectures can start to opt out of providing set_fs.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add helpers to wrap the get_fs/set_fs magic for undoing any damange done
by set_fs(KERNEL_DS). There is no real functional benefit, but this
documents the intent of these calls better, and will allow stubbing the
functions out easily for kernels builds that do not allow address space
overrides in the future.
[hch@lst.de: drop two incorrect hunks, fix a commit log typo]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200714105505.935079-6-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710135706.537715-6-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
segment_eq is only used to implement uaccess_kernel. Just open code
uaccess_kernel in the arch uaccess headers and remove one layer of
indirection.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710135706.537715-5-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now that we've renamed probe_kernel_address() to get_kernel_nofault()
and made it look and behave more in line with get_user(), some of the
subtle type behavior differences end up being more obvious and possibly
dangerous.
When you do
get_user(val, user_ptr);
the type of the access comes from the "user_ptr" part, and the above
basically acts as
val = *user_ptr;
by design (except, of course, for the fact that the actual dereference
is done with a user access).
Note how in the above case, the type of the end result comes from the
pointer argument, and then the value is cast to the type of 'val' as
part of the assignment.
So the type of the pointer is ultimately the more important type both
for the access itself.
But 'get_kernel_nofault()' may now _look_ similar, but it behaves very
differently. When you do
get_kernel_nofault(val, kernel_ptr);
it behaves like
val = *(typeof(val) *)kernel_ptr;
except, of course, for the fact that the actual dereference is done with
exception handling so that a faulting access is suppressed and returned
as the error code.
But note how different the casting behavior of the two superficially
similar accesses are: one does the actual access in the size of the type
the pointer points to, while the other does the access in the size of
the target, and ignores the pointer type entirely.
Actually changing get_kernel_nofault() to act like get_user() is almost
certainly the right thing to do eventually, but in the meantime this
patch adds logit to at least verify that the pointer type is compatible
with the type of the result.
In many cases, this involves just casting the pointer to 'void *' to
make it obvious that the type of the pointer is not the important part.
It's not how 'get_user()' acts, but at least the behavioral difference
is now obvious and explicit.
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Better describe what this helper does, and match the naming of
copy_from_kernel_nofault.
Also switch the argument order around, so that it acts and looks
like get_user().
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Merge the state of the locking kcsan branch before the read/write_once()
and the atomics modifications got merged.
Squash the fallout of the rebase on top of the read/write once and atomic
fallback work into the merge. The history of the original branch is
preserved in tag locking-kcsan-2020-06-02.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Except for historical confusion in the kprobes/uprobes and bpf tracers,
which has been fixed now, there is no good reason to ever allow user
memory accesses from probe_kernel_read. Switch probe_kernel_read to only
read from kernel memory.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: update it for "mm, dump_page(): do not crash with invalid mapping pointer"]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-17-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently architectures have to override every routine that probes
kernel memory, which includes a pure read and strcpy, both in strict
and not strict variants. Just provide a single arch hooks instead to
make sure all architectures cover all the cases.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix !CONFIG_X86_64 build]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-11-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This matches the naming of strnlen_user, and also makes it more clear
what the function is supposed to do.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-9-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This matches the naming of strncpy_from_user_nofault, and also makes it
more clear what the function is supposed to do.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-8-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This matches the naming of strncpy_from_user, and also makes it more
clear what the function is supposed to do.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-7-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many of the maccess routines have a copy of the kerneldoc comment
in the header. Remove it as it is not useful and will get out of
sync sooner or later.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-4-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
maccess tends to define lots of underscore prefixed symbols that then
have other weak aliases. But except for two cases they are never
actually used, so remove them.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200521152301.2587579-3-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Some architectures like powerpc64 have the capability to separate
read access and write access protection.
For get_user() and copy_from_user(), powerpc64 only open read access.
For put_user() and copy_to_user(), powerpc64 only open write access.
But when using unsafe_get_user() or unsafe_put_user(),
user_access_begin open both read and write.
Other architectures like powerpc book3s 32 bits only allow write
access protection. And on this architecture protection is an heavy
operation as it requires locking/unlocking per segment of 256Mbytes.
On those architecture it is therefore desirable to do the unlocking
only for write access. (Note that book3s/32 ranges from very old
powermac from the 90's with powerpc 601 processor, till modern
ADSL boxes with PowerQuicc II processors for instance so it
is still worth considering.)
In order to avoid any risk based of hacking some variable parameters
passed to user_access_begin/end that would allow hacking and
leaving user access open or opening too much, it is preferable to
use dedicated static functions that can't be overridden.
Add a user_read_access_begin and user_read_access_end to only open
read access.
Add a user_write_access_begin and user_write_access_end to only open
write access.
By default, when undefined, those new access helpers default on the
existing user_access_begin and user_access_end.
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/36e43241c7f043a24b5069e78c6a7edd11043be5.1585898438.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr
This replaces the KASAN instrumentation with generic instrumentation,
implicitly adding KCSAN instrumentation support.
For KASAN no functional change is intended.
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add two new probe_kernel_read_strict() and strncpy_from_unsafe_strict()
helpers which by default alias to the __probe_kernel_read() and the
__strncpy_from_unsafe(), respectively, but can be overridden by archs
which have non-overlapping address ranges for kernel space and user
space in order to bail out with -EFAULT when attempting to probe user
memory including non-canonical user access addresses [0]:
4-level page tables:
user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00007fffffffffff
non-canonical: 0x0000800000000000 - 0xffff7fffffffffff
5-level page tables:
user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00ffffffffffffff
non-canonical: 0x0100000000000000 - 0xfeffffffffffffff
The idea is that these helpers are complementary to the probe_user_read()
and strncpy_from_unsafe_user() which probe user-only memory. Both added
helpers here do the same, but for kernel-only addresses.
Both set of helpers are going to be used for BPF tracing. They also
explicitly avoid throwing the splat for non-canonical user addresses from
00c42373d3 ("x86-64: add warning for non-canonical user access address
dereferences").
For compat, the current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are
left as-is.
[0] Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/eefeefd769aa5a013531f491a71f0936779e916b.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
Commit 3d7081822f ("uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space read functions")
missed to add probe write function, therefore factor out a probe_write_common()
helper with most logic of probe_kernel_write() except setting KERNEL_DS, and
add a new probe_user_write() helper so it can be used from BPF side.
Again, on some archs, the user address space and kernel address space can
co-exist and be overlapping, so in such case, setting KERNEL_DS would mean
that the given address is treated as being in kernel address space.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9df2542e68141bfa3addde631441ee45503856a8.1572649915.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
In commit 9f79b78ef7 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to
unsafe_put_user()") I made filldir() use unsafe_put_user(), which
improves code generation on x86 enormously.
But because we didn't have a "unsafe_copy_to_user()", the dirent name
copy was also done by hand with unsafe_put_user() in a loop, and it
turns out that a lot of other architectures didn't like that, because
unlike x86, they have various alignment issues.
Most non-x86 architectures trap and fix it up, and some (like xtensa)
will just fail unaligned put_user() accesses unconditionally. Which
makes that "copy using put_user() in a loop" not work for them at all.
I could make that code do explicit alignment etc, but the architectures
that don't like unaligned accesses also don't really use the fancy
"user_access_begin/end()" model, so they might just use the regular old
__copy_to_user() interface.
So this commit takes that looping implementation, turns it into the x86
version of "unsafe_copy_to_user()", and makes other architectures
implement the unsafe copy version as __copy_to_user() (the same way they
do for the other unsafe_xyz() accessor functions).
Note that it only does this for the copying _to_ user space, and we
still don't have a unsafe version of copy_from_user().
That's partly because we have no current users of it, but also partly
because the copy_from_user() case is slightly different and cannot
efficiently be implemented in terms of a unsafe_get_user() loop (because
gcc can't do asm goto with outputs).
It would be trivial to do this using "rep movsb", which would work
really nicely on newer x86 cores, but really badly on some older ones.
Al Viro is looking at cleaning up all our user copy routines to make
this all a non-issue, but for now we have this simple-but-stupid version
for x86 that works fine for the dirent name copy case because those
names are short strings and we simply don't need anything fancier.
Fixes: 9f79b78ef7 ("Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-and-tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A common pattern for syscall extensions is increasing the size of a
struct passed from userspace, such that the zero-value of the new fields
result in the old kernel behaviour (allowing for a mix of userspace and
kernel vintages to operate on one another in most cases).
While this interface exists for communication in both directions, only
one interface is straightforward to have reasonable semantics for
(userspace passing a struct to the kernel). For kernel returns to
userspace, what the correct semantics are (whether there should be an
error if userspace is unaware of a new extension) is very
syscall-dependent and thus probably cannot be unified between syscalls
(a good example of this problem is [1]).
Previously there was no common lib/ function that implemented
the necessary extension-checking semantics (and different syscalls
implemented them slightly differently or incompletely[2]). Future
patches replace common uses of this pattern to make use of
copy_struct_from_user().
Some in-kernel selftests that insure that the handling of alignment and
various byte patterns are all handled identically to memchr_inv() usage.
[1]: commit 1251201c0d ("sched/core: Fix uclamp ABI bug, clean up and
robustify sched_read_attr() ABI logic and code")
[2]: For instance {sched_setattr,perf_event_open,clone3}(2) all do do
similar checks to copy_struct_from_user() while rt_sigprocmask(2)
always rejects differently-sized struct arguments.
Suggested-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191001011055.19283-2-cyphar@cyphar.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The usercopy implementation comments describe that callers of the
copy_*_user() family of functions must always have their return values
checked. This can be enforced at compile time with __must_check, so add
it where needed.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201908251609.ADAD5CAAC1@keescook
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Declare a prototype of non-static __probe_user_read() as
same as __probe_kernel_read() at uaccess.h.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Add probe_user_read(), strncpy_from_unsafe_user() and
strnlen_unsafe_user() which allows caller to access user-space
in IRQ context.
Current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are
not available for user-space memory, because it sets
KERNEL_DS while accessing data. On some arch, user address
space and kernel address space can be co-exist, but others
can not. In that case, setting KERNEL_DS means given
address is treated as a kernel address space.
Also strnlen_user() is only available from user context since
it can sleep if pagefault is enabled.
To access user-space memory without pagefault, we need
these new functions which sets USER_DS while accessing
the data.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155789869802.26965.4940338412595759063.stgit@devnote2
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
WARN_ON_IN_IRQ() assumes that the access_ok() and following
user memory access can sleep. But this assumption is not
always correct; when the pagefault is disabled, following
memory access will just returns -EFAULT and never sleep.
Add pagefault_disabled() check in WARN_ON_ONCE() so that
it can ignore the case we call it with disabling pagefault.
For this purpose, this modified pagefault_disabled() as
an inline function.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/155789868664.26965.7932665824135793317.stgit@devnote2
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Introduce common helpers for when we need to safely suspend a
uaccess section; for instance to generate a {KA,UB}SAN report.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
direct (optimized) user access.
But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
similar. Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
actually been range-checked.
If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin(). But
nothing really forces the range check.
By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
near the actual accesses. We have way too long a history of people
trying to avoid them.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch adds checking of usercopy cache whitelisting, and is modified
from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the
last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the
code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't
reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
The SLAB and SLUB allocators are modified to WARN() on all copy operations
in which the kernel heap memory being modified falls outside of the cache's
defined usercopy region.
Based on an earlier patch from David Windsor.
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
In preparation for refactoring the usercopy checks to pass offset to
the hardened usercopy report, this renames report_usercopy() to the
more accurate usercopy_abort(), marks it as noreturn because it is,
adds a hopefully helpful comment for anyone investigating such reports,
makes the function available to the slab allocators, and adds new "detail"
and "offset" arguments.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
copy_in_user() copies data from user-space address @from to user-
space address @to. Hence declare both @from and @to as user-space
pointers.
Fixes: commit d597580d37 ("generic ...copy_..._user primitives")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull __copy_in_user removal from Al Viro:
"There used to be 6 places in the entire tree calling __copy_in_user(),
all of them bogus.
Four got killed off in work.drm branch, this takes care of the
remaining ones and kills the definition of that sucker"
* 'work.__copy_in_user' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
kill __copy_in_user()
sanitize do_i2c_smbus_ioctl()
Al Viro
Catalin Marinas
Linus Torvalds
Christophe Leroy
Arnd Bergmann
Albert van der Linde
Andy Shevchenko
Dan Williams
Christoph Hellwig
Thomas Gleixner
Christophe Leroy
Marco Elver
Daniel Borkmann
Aleksa Sarai
Kees Cook
Masami Hiramatsu
Peter Zijlstra
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Bart Van Assche