This removes the bprm_secureexec hook since the logic has been folded into
the bprm_set_creds hook for all LSMs now.
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Instead of a separate function, open-code the cap_elevated test, which
lets us entirely remove bprm->cap_effective (to use the local "effective"
variable instead), and more accurately examine euid/egid changes via the
existing local "is_setid".
The following LTP tests were run to validate the changes:
# ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
# ./runltp -f securebits
# ./runltp -f cap_bounds
# ./runltp -f filecaps
All kernel selftests for capabilities and exec continue to pass as well.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
The commoncap implementation of the bprm_secureexec hook is the only LSM
that depends on the final call to its bprm_set_creds hook (since it may
be called for multiple files, it ignores bprm->called_set_creds). As a
result, it cannot safely _clear_ bprm->secureexec since other LSMs may
have set it. Instead, remove the bprm_secureexec hook by introducing a
new flag to bprm specific to commoncap: cap_elevated. This is similar to
cap_effective, but that is used for a specific subset of elevated
privileges, and exists solely to track state from bprm_set_creds to
bprm_secureexec. As such, it will be removed in the next patch.
Here, set the new bprm->cap_elevated flag when setuid/setgid has happened
from bprm_fill_uid() or fscapabilities have been prepared. This temporarily
moves the bprm_secureexec hook to a static inline. The helper will be
removed in the next patch; this makes the step easier to review and bisect,
since this does not introduce any changes to inputs nor outputs to the
"elevated privileges" calculation.
The new flag is merged with the bprm->secureexec flag in setup_new_exec()
since this marks the end of any further prepare_binprm() calls.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
The Smack bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).
Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook,
and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The SELinux bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).
Here, the test can just happen at the end of the bprm_set_creds hook,
and the bprm_secureexec hook can be dropped.
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
The AppArmor bprm_secureexec hook can be merged with the bprm_set_creds
hook since it's dealing with the same information, and all of the details
are finalized during the first call to the bprm_set_creds hook via
prepare_binprm() (subsequent calls due to binfmt_script, etc, are ignored
via bprm->called_set_creds).
Here, all the comments describe how secureexec is actually calculated
during bprm_set_creds, so this actually does it, drops the bprm flag that
was being used internally by AppArmor, and drops the bprm_secureexec hook.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
The cred_prepared bprm flag has a misleading name. It has nothing to do
with the bprm_prepare_cred hook, and actually tracks if bprm_set_creds has
been called. Rename this flag and improve its comment.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
We no longer place these on a list so they can be const.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
For PF_UNIX, SOCK_RAW is synonymous with SOCK_DGRAM (cf.
net/unix/af_unix.c). This is a tad obscure, but libpcap uses it.
Signed-off-by: Luis Ressel <aranea@aixah.de>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When ns->level is not larger then cred->user_ns->level,
then ns can't be cred->user_ns's descendant, and
there is no a sense to search in parents.
So, break the cycle earlier and skip needless iterations.
v2: Change comment on suggested by Andy Lutomirski.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.
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Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
"Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.
This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
comes in three patches, largest first:
- mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout
- mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
__randomize_layout section
- mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
later)
And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
s390 for me"
* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
task_struct: Allow randomized layout
randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
After rcu conversions performance degradation in forward tests isn't that
noticeable anymore.
See next patch for some numbers.
A followup patcg could then also remove genid from the policies
as we do not cache bundles anymore.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since commit a79be23860 ("selinux: Use task_alloc hook rather than
task_create hook") changed to use task_alloc hook, task_create hook is
no longer used.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Syscalls must validate that their reserved arguments are zero and return
EINVAL otherwise. Otherwise, it will be impossible to actually use them
for anything in the future because existing programs may be passing
garbage in. This is standard practice when adding new APIs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc
_FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer
overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the
size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc,
it covers buffer reads in addition to writes.
GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a
much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read
overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based
on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and
allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need
for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper
overhead.
This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and
some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in
regular use at runtime too.
Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity,
as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally:
* Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet
place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of
the source buffer.
* Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat.
* It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for
some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like
glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative
approach to avoid likely compatibility issues.
* The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config
option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough
time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed.
Kees said:
"This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have
blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size
argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for
out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already"
[arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de
[keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast
[keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Reasonably busy this cycle, but perhaps not as busy as in the 4.12
merge window:
1) Several optimizations for UDP processing under high load from
Paolo Abeni.
2) Support pacing internally in TCP when using the sch_fq packet
scheduler for this is not practical. From Eric Dumazet.
3) Support mutliple filter chains per qdisc, from Jiri Pirko.
4) Move to 1ms TCP timestamp clock, from Eric Dumazet.
5) Add batch dequeueing to vhost_net, from Jason Wang.
6) Flesh out more completely SCTP checksum offload support, from
Davide Caratti.
7) More plumbing of extended netlink ACKs, from David Ahern, Pablo
Neira Ayuso, and Matthias Schiffer.
8) Add devlink support to nfp driver, from Simon Horman.
9) Add RTM_F_FIB_MATCH flag to RTM_GETROUTE queries, from Roopa
Prabhu.
10) Add stack depth tracking to BPF verifier and use this information
in the various eBPF JITs. From Alexei Starovoitov.
11) Support XDP on qed device VFs, from Yuval Mintz.
12) Introduce BPF PROG ID for better introspection of installed BPF
programs. From Martin KaFai Lau.
13) Add bpf_set_hash helper for TC bpf programs, from Daniel Borkmann.
14) For loads, allow narrower accesses in bpf verifier checking, from
Yonghong Song.
15) Support MIPS in the BPF selftests and samples infrastructure, the
MIPS eBPF JIT will be merged in via the MIPS GIT tree. From David
Daney.
16) Support kernel based TLS, from Dave Watson and others.
17) Remove completely DST garbage collection, from Wei Wang.
18) Allow installing TCP MD5 rules using prefixes, from Ivan
Delalande.
19) Add XDP support to Intel i40e driver, from Björn Töpel
20) Add support for TC flower offload in nfp driver, from Simon
Horman, Pieter Jansen van Vuuren, Benjamin LaHaise, Jakub
Kicinski, and Bert van Leeuwen.
21) IPSEC offloading support in mlx5, from Ilan Tayari.
22) Add HW PTP support to macb driver, from Rafal Ozieblo.
23) Networking refcount_t conversions, From Elena Reshetova.
24) Add sock_ops support to BPF, from Lawrence Brako. This is useful
for tuning the TCP sockopt settings of a group of applications,
currently via CGROUPs"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1899 commits)
net: phy: dp83867: add workaround for incorrect RX_CTRL pin strap
dt-bindings: phy: dp83867: provide a workaround for incorrect RX_CTRL pin strap
cxgb4: Support for get_ts_info ethtool method
cxgb4: Add PTP Hardware Clock (PHC) support
cxgb4: time stamping interface for PTP
nfp: default to chained metadata prepend format
nfp: remove legacy MAC address lookup
nfp: improve order of interfaces in breakout mode
net: macb: remove extraneous return when MACB_EXT_DESC is defined
bpf: add missing break in for the TCP_BPF_SNDCWND_CLAMP case
bpf: fix return in load_bpf_file
mpls: fix rtm policy in mpls_getroute
net, ax25: convert ax25_cb.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, ax25: convert ax25_route.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, ax25: convert ax25_uid_assoc.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_ep_common.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_transport.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_chunk.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_datamsg.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
net, sctp: convert sctp_auth_bytes.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
...
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
- a major update for AppArmor. From JJ:
* several bug fixes and cleanups
* the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated
on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of
securityfs symlinks
* it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been
carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it
converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling
base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally
will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide
a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries.
* This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation
features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that
Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top
of this.
- Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map
permission. From Paul:
"While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12),
the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes.
Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by
Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2
labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy
capabilities on policy load"
There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was
lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs.
- Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a
cap_capable call in privilege check.
- TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements.
- Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same
LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files.
- IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from
the boot command line.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits)
apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers
seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t
seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join
seccomp: Clean up core dump logic
IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option
ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature
ima: Simplify policy_func_show.
integrity: Small code improvements
ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size()
ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data
ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers
ima: introduce ima_parse_buf()
ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list
ima: use memdup_user_nul
ima: fix up #endif comments
IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection
ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled()
ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option
ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures
ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies
...
around. Highlights include:
- Conversion of a bunch of security documentation into RST
- The conversion of the remaining DocBook templates by The Amazing
Mauro Machine. We can now drop the entire DocBook build chain.
- The usual collection of fixes and minor updates.
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Merge tag 'docs-4.13' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"There has been a fair amount of activity in the docs tree this time
around. Highlights include:
- Conversion of a bunch of security documentation into RST
- The conversion of the remaining DocBook templates by The Amazing
Mauro Machine. We can now drop the entire DocBook build chain.
- The usual collection of fixes and minor updates"
* tag 'docs-4.13' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (90 commits)
scripts/kernel-doc: handle DECLARE_HASHTABLE
Documentation: atomic_ops.txt is core-api/atomic_ops.rst
Docs: clean up some DocBook loose ends
Make the main documentation title less Geocities
Docs: Use kernel-figure in vidioc-g-selection.rst
Docs: fix table problems in ras.rst
Docs: Fix breakage with Sphinx 1.5 and upper
Docs: Include the Latex "ifthen" package
doc/kokr/howto: Only send regression fixes after -rc1
docs-rst: fix broken links to dynamic-debug-howto in kernel-parameters
doc: Document suitability of IBM Verse for kernel development
Doc: fix a markup error in coding-style.rst
docs: driver-api: i2c: remove some outdated information
Documentation: DMA API: fix a typo in a function name
Docs: Insert missing space to separate link from text
doc/ko_KR/memory-barriers: Update control-dependencies example
Documentation, kbuild: fix typo "minimun" -> "minimum"
docs: Fix some formatting issues in request-key.rst
doc: ReSTify keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txt
...
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Add the SYSTEM_SCHEDULING bootup state to move various scheduler
debug checks earlier into the bootup. This turns silent and
sporadically deadly bugs into nice, deterministic splats. Fix some
of the splats that triggered. (Thomas Gleixner)
- A round of restructuring and refactoring of the load-balancing and
topology code (Peter Zijlstra)
- Another round of consolidating ~20 of incremental scheduler code
history: this time in terms of wait-queue nomenclature. (I didn't
get much feedback on these renaming patches, and we can still
easily change any names I might have misplaced, so if anyone hates
a new name, please holler and I'll fix it.) (Ingo Molnar)
- sched/numa improvements, fixes and updates (Rik van Riel)
- Another round of x86/tsc scheduler clock code improvements, in hope
of making it more robust (Peter Zijlstra)
- Improve NOHZ behavior (Frederic Weisbecker)
- Deadline scheduler improvements and fixes (Luca Abeni, Daniel
Bristot de Oliveira)
- Simplify and optimize the topology setup code (Lauro Ramos
Venancio)
- Debloat and decouple scheduler code some more (Nicolas Pitre)
- Simplify code by making better use of llist primitives (Byungchul
Park)
- ... plus other fixes and improvements"
* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (103 commits)
sched/cputime: Refactor the cputime_adjust() code
sched/debug: Expose the number of RT/DL tasks that can migrate
sched/numa: Hide numa_wake_affine() from UP build
sched/fair: Remove effective_load()
sched/numa: Implement NUMA node level wake_affine()
sched/fair: Simplify wake_affine() for the single socket case
sched/numa: Override part of migrate_degrades_locality() when idle balancing
sched/rt: Move RT related code from sched/core.c to sched/rt.c
sched/deadline: Move DL related code from sched/core.c to sched/deadline.c
sched/cpuset: Only offer CONFIG_CPUSETS if SMP is enabled
sched/fair: Spare idle load balancing on nohz_full CPUs
nohz: Move idle balancer registration to the idle path
sched/loadavg: Generalize "_idle" naming to "_nohz"
sched/core: Drop the unused try_get_task_struct() helper function
sched/fair: WARN() and refuse to set buddy when !se->on_rq
sched/debug: Fix SCHED_WARN_ON() to return a value on !CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG as well
sched/wait: Disambiguate wq_entry->task_list and wq_head->task_list naming
sched/wait: Move bit_wait_table[] and related functionality from sched/core.c to sched/wait_bit.c
sched/wait: Split out the wait_bit*() APIs from <linux/wait.h> into <linux/wait_bit.h>
sched/wait: Re-adjust macro line continuation backslashes in <linux/wait.h>
...
- introduce the new uuid_t/guid_t types that are going to replace
the somewhat confusing uuid_be/uuid_le types and make the terminology
fit the various specs, as well as the userspace libuuid library.
(me, based on a previous version from Amir)
- consolidated generic uuid/guid helper functions lifted from XFS
and libnvdimm (Amir and me)
- conversions to the new types and helpers (Amir, Andy and me)
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Merge tag 'uuid-for-4.13' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/uuid
Pull uuid subsystem from Christoph Hellwig:
"This is the new uuid subsystem, in which Amir, Andy and I have started
consolidating our uuid/guid helpers and improving the types used for
them. Note that various other subsystems have pulled in this tree, so
I'd like it to go in early.
UUID/GUID summary:
- introduce the new uuid_t/guid_t types that are going to replace the
somewhat confusing uuid_be/uuid_le types and make the terminology
fit the various specs, as well as the userspace libuuid library.
(me, based on a previous version from Amir)
- consolidated generic uuid/guid helper functions lifted from XFS and
libnvdimm (Amir and me)
- conversions to the new types and helpers (Amir, Andy and me)"
* tag 'uuid-for-4.13' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/uuid: (34 commits)
ACPI: hns_dsaf_acpi_dsm_guid can be static
mmc: sdhci-pci: make guid intel_dsm_guid static
uuid: Take const on input of uuid_is_null() and guid_is_null()
thermal: int340x_thermal: fix compile after the UUID API switch
thermal: int340x_thermal: Switch to use new generic UUID API
acpi: always include uuid.h
ACPI: Switch to use generic guid_t in acpi_evaluate_dsm()
ACPI / extlog: Switch to use new generic UUID API
ACPI / bus: Switch to use new generic UUID API
ACPI / APEI: Switch to use new generic UUID API
acpi, nfit: Switch to use new generic UUID API
MAINTAINERS: add uuid entry
tmpfs: generate random sb->s_uuid
scsi_debug: switch to uuid_t
nvme: switch to uuid_t
sysctl: switch to use uuid_t
partitions/ldm: switch to use uuid_t
overlayfs: use uuid_t instead of uuid_be
fs: switch ->s_uuid to uuid_t
ima/policy: switch to use uuid_t
...
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fixes: 8014370f12 ("apparmor: move path_link mediation to using labels")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Two entries being added at the same time to the IFLA
policy table, whilst parallel bug fixes to decnet
routing dst handling overlapping with the dst gc removal
in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If the file doesn't have an xattr, ima_appraise_measurement sets cause to
"missing-hash" while if there's an xattr but it's a digest instead of a
signature it sets cause to "IMA-signature-required".
Fix it by setting cause to "IMA-signature-required" in both cases.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
If the func_tokens array uses the same indices as enum ima_hooks,
policy_func_show can be a lot simpler, and the func_* enum becomes
unnecessary.
Also, if we use the same macro trick used by kernel_read_file_id_str we can
use one hooks list for both the enum and the string array, making sure they
are always in sync (suggested by Mimi Zohar).
Finally, by using the printf pattern for the function token directly
instead of using the pt macro we can simplify policy_func_show even further
and avoid needing a temporary buffer.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
These changes are too small to warrant their own patches:
The keyid and sig_size members of struct signature_v2_hdr are in BE format,
so use a type that makes this assumption explicit. Also, use beXX_to_cpu
instead of __beXX_to_cpu to read them.
Change integrity_kernel_read to take a void * buffer instead of char *
buffer, so that callers don't have to use a cast if they provide a buffer
that isn't a char *.
Add missing #endif comment in ima.h pointing out which macro it refers to.
Add missing fall through comment in ima_appraise.c.
Constify mask_tokens and func_tokens arrays.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Remove '+ 1' from 'size += strlen(entry->template_desc->name) + 1;',
as the template name is sent to userspace without the '\0' character.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The binary_field_data structure definition has been removed from
ima_restore_template_data(). The lengths and data pointers are directly
stored into the template_data array of the ima_template_entry structure.
For template data, both the number of fields and buffer end checks can
be done, as these information are known (respectively from the template
descriptor, and from the measurement header field).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The binary_hdr_v1 and binary_data_v1 structures defined in
ima_restore_measurement_list() have been replaced with an array of four
ima_field_data structures where pcr, digest, template name and
template data lengths and pointers are stored.
The length of pcr and digest in the ima_field_data array and the bits
in the bitmap are set before ima_parse_buf() is called. The ENFORCE_FIELDS
bit is set for all entries except the last one (there is still data to
parse), and ENFORCE_BUFEND is set only for the last entry.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
ima_parse_buf() takes as input the buffer start and end pointers, and
stores the result in a static array of ima_field_data structures,
where the len field contains the length parsed from the buffer, and
the data field contains the address of the buffer just after the length.
Optionally, the function returns the current value of the buffer pointer
and the number of array elements written.
A bitmap has been added as parameter of ima_parse_buf() to handle
the cases where the length is not prepended to data. Each bit corresponds
to an element of the ima_field_data array. If a bit is set, the length
is not parsed from the buffer, but is read from the corresponding element
of the array (the length must be set before calling the function).
ima_parse_buf() can perform three checks upon request by callers,
depending on the enforce mask passed to it:
- ENFORCE_FIELDS: matching of number of fields (length-data combination)
- there must be enough data in the buffer to parse the number of fields
requested (output: current value of buffer pointer)
- ENFORCE_BUFEND: matching of buffer end
- the ima_field_data array must be large enough to contain lengths and
data pointers for the amount of data requested (output: number
of fields written)
- ENFORCE_FIELDS | ENFORCE_BUFEND: matching of both
Use cases
- measurement entry header: ENFORCE_FIELDS | ENFORCE_BUFEND
- four fields must be parsed: pcr, digest, template name, template data
- ENFORCE_BUFEND is enforced only for the last measurement entry
- template digest (Crypto Agile): ENFORCE_BUFEND
- since only the total template digest length is known, the function
parses length-data combinations until the buffer end is reached
- template data: ENFORCE_FIELDS | ENFORCE_BUFEND
- since the number of fields and the total template data length
are known, the function can perform both checks
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cgroups2 is beginning to show up in wider usage. Add it to the default
nomeasure/noappraise list like other filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Use memdup_user_nul() helper instead of open-coding to simplify the
code.
Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
While reading the code, I noticed that these #endif comments don't match
how they're actually nested. This patch fixes that.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
IMA uses the hash algorithm too early to be able to use a module.
Require the selected hash algorithm to be built-in.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Only return enabled if in enforcing mode, not fix or log modes.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Changes:
- Define is_ima_appraise_enabled() as a bool (Thiago Bauermann)
The builtin "ima_appraise_tcb" policy should require file signatures for
at least a few of the hooks (eg. kernel modules, firmware, and the kexec
kernel image), but changing it would break the existing userspace/kernel
ABI.
This patch defines a new builtin policy named "secure_boot", which
can be specified on the "ima_policy=" boot command line, independently
or in conjunction with the "ima_appraise_tcb" policy, by specifing
ima_policy="appraise_tcb | secure_boot". The new appraisal rules
requiring file signatures will be added prior to the "ima_appraise_tcb"
rules.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Changelog:
- Reference secure boot in the new builtin policy name. (Thiago Bauermann)
Add support for providing multiple builtin policies on the "ima_policy="
boot command line. Use "|" as the delimitor separating the policy names.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
New NEWCACHEREPORT message type to be used for cache reports sent
via Netlink, effectively allowing splitting cache report reception from
mroute programming.
Suggested-by: Ryan Halbrook <halbrook@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Gomes <julien@arista.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In kernel version 4.1, tracefs was separated from debugfs into its
own filesystem. Prior to this split, files in
/sys/kernel/debug/tracing could be labeled during filesystem
creation using genfscon or later from userspace using setxattr. This
change re-enables support for genfscon labeling.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The wait_bit*() types and APIs are mixed into wait.h, but they
are a pretty orthogonal extension of wait-queues.
Furthermore, only about 50 kernel files use these APIs, while
over 1000 use the regular wait-queue functionality.
So clean up the main wait.h by moving the wait-bit functionality
out of it, into a separate .h and .c file:
include/linux/wait_bit.h for types and APIs
kernel/sched/wait_bit.c for the implementation
Update all header dependencies.
This reduces the size of wait.h rather significantly, by about 30%.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This patch is based on a discussion generated by an earlier patch
from Tetsuo Handa:
* https://marc.info/?t=149035659300001&r=1&w=2
The double free problem involves the mnt_opts field of the
security_mnt_opts struct, selinux_parse_opts_str() frees the memory
on error, but doesn't set the field to NULL so if the caller later
attempts to call security_free_mnt_opts() we trigger the problem.
In order to play it safe we change selinux_parse_opts_str() to call
security_free_mnt_opts() on error instead of free'ing the memory
directly. This should ensure that everything is handled correctly,
regardless of what the caller may do.
Fixes: e000752989 ("LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount options")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This is a temporary step, towards using the file->ctx for delegation,
and also helps speed up file queries, until the permission lookup
cache is introduced.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The cross check permission helper macros will help simplify code
that does cross task permission checks like ptrace.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Begin the actual switch to using domain labels by storing them on
the context and converting the label to a singular profile where
possible.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Begin moving apparmor to using broader domain labels, that will allow
run time computation of domain type splitting via "stacking" of
profiles into a domain label vec.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Instead of running file revalidation lazily when read/write are called
copy selinux and revalidate the file table on exec. This avoids
extra mediation overhead in read/write and also prevents file handles
being passed through to a grand child unchecked.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
There are still a few places where profile replacement fails to update
and a stale profile is used for mediation. Fix this by moving to
accessing the current label through a critical section that will
always ensure mediation is using the current label regardless of
whether the tasks cred has been updated or not.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
There is no reason to have the small stubs that don't use domain
private functions in domain.c, instead move them to lsm.c and make
them static.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The data being queried isn't always the current profile and a lookup
relative to the current profile should be done.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The namespace being passed into the replace/remove profiles fns() is
not the view, but the namespace specified by the inode from the
file hook (if present) or the loading tasks ns, if accessing the
top level virtualized load/replace file interface.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Currently lookups are restricted to a single ns component in the
path. However when namespaces are allowed to have separate views, and
scopes this will not be sufficient, as it will be possible to have
a multiple component ns path in scope.
Add some ns lookup fns() to allow this and use them.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Allow userspace to query a profile about permissions, through the
transaction interface that is already used to allow userspace to
query about key,value data.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The simple_transaction interface is slow. It requires 4 syscalls
(open, write, read, close) per query and shares a single lock for each
queries.
So replace its use with a compatible in multi_transaction interface.
It allows for a faster 2 syscall pattern per query. After an initial
open, an arbitrary number of writes and reads can be issued. Each
write will reset the query with new data that can be read. Reads do
not clear the data, and can be issued multiple times, and used with
seek, until a new write is performed which will reset the data
available and the seek position.
Note: this keeps the single lock design, if needed moving to a per
file lock will have to come later.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
gsettings mediation needs to be able to determine if apparmor supports
label data queries. A label data query can be done to test for support
but its failure is indistinguishable from other failures, making it an
unreliable indicator.
Fix by making support of label data queries available as a flag in the
apparmorfs features dir tree.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When setting up namespaces for containers its easier for them to use
an fs interface to create the namespace for the containers
policy. Allow mkdir/rmdir under the policy/namespaces/ dir to be used
to create and remove namespaces.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1611078
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add a policy revision file to find the current revision of a ns's policy.
There is a revision file per ns, as well as a virtualized global revision
file in the base apparmor fs directory. The global revision file when
opened will provide the revision of the opening task namespace.
The revision file can be waited on via select/poll to detect apparmor
policy changes from the last read revision of the opened file. This
means that the revision file must be read after the select/poll other
wise update data will remain ready for reading.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When an NFSv4 client performs a mount operation, it first mounts the
NFSv4 root and then does path walk to the exported path and performs a
submount on that, cloning the security mount options from the root's
superblock to the submount's superblock in the process.
Unless the NFS server has an explicit fsid=0 export with the
"security_label" option, the NFSv4 root superblock will not have
SBLABEL_MNT set, and neither will the submount superblock after cloning
the security mount options. As a result, setxattr's of security labels
over NFSv4.2 will fail. In a similar fashion, NFSv4.2 mounts mounted
with the context= mount option will not show the correct labels because
the nfs_server->caps flags of the cloned superblock will still have
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL set.
Allowing the NFSv4 client to enable or disable SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
behavior will ensure that the SBLABEL_MNT flag has the correct value
when the client traverses from an exported path without the
"security_label" option to one with the "security_label" option and
vice versa. Similarly, checking to see if SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS is
set upon return from security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() and clearing
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL if necessary will allow the correct labels to
be displayed for NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount option.
Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/35
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The allocated size for each ebitmap_node is 192byte by kzalloc().
Then, ebitmap_node size is fixed, so it's possible to use only 144byte
for each object by kmem_cache_zalloc().
It can reduce some dynamic allocation size.
Signed-off-by: Junil Lee <junil0814.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
If a key's refcount is dropped to zero between key_lookup() peeking at
the refcount and subsequently attempting to increment it, refcount_inc()
will see a zero refcount. Here, refcount_inc() will WARN_ONCE(), and
will *not* increment the refcount, which will remain zero.
Once key_lookup() drops key_serial_lock, it is possible for the key to
be freed behind our back.
This patch uses refcount_inc_not_zero() to perform the peek and increment
atomically.
Fixes: fff292914d ("security, keys: convert key.usage from atomic_t to refcount_t")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The initial Diffie-Hellman computation made direct use of the MPI
library because the crypto module did not support DH at the time. Now
that KPP is implemented, KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE should use it to get rid of
duplicate code and leverage possible hardware acceleration.
This fixes an issue whereby the input to the KDF computation would
include additional uninitialized memory when the result of the
Diffie-Hellman computation was shorter than the input prime number.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Accessing a 'u8[4]' through a '__be32 *' violates alignment rules. Just
make the counter a __be32 instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
If userspace called KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE with kdf_params containing NULL
otherinfo but nonzero otherinfolen, the kernel would allocate a buffer
for the otherinfo, then feed it into the KDF without initializing it.
Fix this by always doing the copy from userspace (which will fail with
EFAULT in this scenario).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Requesting "digest_null" in the keyctl_kdf_params caused an infinite
loop in kdf_ctr() because the "null" hash has a digest size of 0. Fix
it by rejecting hash algorithms with a digest size of 0.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
While a 'struct key' itself normally does not contain sensitive
information, Documentation/security/keys.txt actually encourages this:
"Having a payload is not required; and the payload can, in fact,
just be a value stored in the struct key itself."
In case someone has taken this advice, or will take this advice in the
future, zero the key structure before freeing it. We might as well, and
as a bonus this could make it a bit more difficult for an adversary to
determine which keys have recently been in use.
This is safe because the key_jar cache does not use a constructor.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any
potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it
is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which
the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing
the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
For keys of type "encrypted", consistently zero sensitive key material
before freeing it. This was already being done for the decrypted
payloads of encrypted keys, but not for the master key and the keys
derived from the master key.
Out of an abundance of caution and because it is trivial to do so, also
zero buffers containing the key payload in encrypted form, although
depending on how the encrypted-keys feature is used such information
does not necessarily need to be kept secret.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Zero the payloads of user and logon keys before freeing them. This
prevents sensitive key material from being kept around in the slab
caches after a key is released.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Before returning from add_key() or one of the keyctl() commands that
takes in a key payload, zero the temporary buffer that was allocated to
hold the key payload copied from userspace. This may contain sensitive
key material that should not be kept around in the slab caches.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
MACs should, in general, be compared using crypto_memneq() to prevent
timing attacks.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The encrypted-keys module was using a single global HMAC transform,
which could be rekeyed by multiple threads concurrently operating on
different keys, causing incorrect HMAC values to be calculated. Fix
this by allocating a new HMAC transform whenever we need to calculate a
HMAC. Also simplify things a bit by allocating the shash_desc's using
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() for both the HMAC and unkeyed hashes.
The following script reproduces the bug:
keyctl new_session
keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s
for i in $(seq 2); do
(
set -e
for j in $(seq 1000); do
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "new user:master 25" @s)
datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc$i "load $datablob" @s)
keyctl unlink $keyid > /dev/null
done
) &
done
Output with bug:
[ 439.691094] encrypted_key: bad hmac (-22)
add_key: Invalid argument
add_key: Invalid argument
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a
data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected,
e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a
master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end
of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also
clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.]
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Since v4.9, the crypto API cannot (normally) be used to encrypt/decrypt
stack buffers because the stack may be virtually mapped. Fix this for
the padding buffers in encrypted-keys by using ZERO_PAGE for the
encryption padding and by allocating a temporary heap buffer for the
decryption padding.
Tested with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y:
keyctl new_session
keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "new user:master 25" @s)
datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
keyctl unlink $keyid
keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "load $datablob" @s)
datablob2="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
[ "$datablob" = "$datablob2" ] && echo "Success!"
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
In join_session_keyring(), if install_session_keyring_to_cred() were to
fail, we would leak the keyring reference, just like in the bug fixed by
commit 23567fd052 ("KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in
join_session_keyring()"). Fortunately this cannot happen currently, but
we really should be more careful. Do this by adding and using a new
error label at which the keyring reference is dropped.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Omit an extra message for a memory allocation failure in this function.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Link: http://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/LCJ16-Refactor_Strings-WSang_0.pdf
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
With the new standardized functions, we can replace all ACCESS_ONCE()
calls across relevant security/keyrings/.
ACCESS_ONCE() does not work reliably on non-scalar types. For example
gcc 4.6 and 4.7 might remove the volatile tag for such accesses during
the SRA (scalar replacement of aggregates) step:
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58145
Update the new calls regardless of if it is a scalar type, this is
cleaner than having three alternatives.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT is defined in arch-specific Kconfigs and is missing for
several 64-bit architectures : mips, parisc, tile.
At the moment and for those architectures, calling in 32-bit userspace the
keyctl syscall would return an ENOSYS error.
This patch moves the CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT option to security/keys/Kconfig, to
make sure the compatibility wrapper is registered by default for any 64-bit
architecture as long as it is configured with CONFIG_COMPAT.
[DH: Modified to remove arm64 compat enablement also as requested by Eric
Biggers]
Signed-off-by: Bilal Amarni <bilal.amarni@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Virtualize the apparmor policy/ directory so that the current
namespace affects what part of policy is seen. To do this convert to
using apparmorfs for policy namespace files and setup a magic symlink
in the securityfs apparmor dir to access those files.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
prefixes are used for fns/data that are not static to apparmorfs.c
with the prefixes being
aafs - special magic apparmorfs for policy namespace data
aa_sfs - for fns/data that go into securityfs
aa_fs - for fns/data that may be used in the either of aafs or
securityfs
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
AppArmor policy needs to be able to be resolved based on the policy
namespace a task is confined by. Add a base apparmorfs filesystem that
(like nsfs) will exist as a kern mount and be accessed via jump_link
through a securityfs file.
Setup the base apparmorfs fns and data, but don't use it yet.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The loaddata sets cover more than just a single profile and should
be tracked at the ns level. Move the load data files under the namespace
and reference the files from the profiles via a symlink.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Dynamically allocating buffers is problematic and is an extra layer
that is a potntial point of failure and can slow down mediation.
Change path lookup to use the preallocated per cpu buffers.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When using a strictly POSIX-compliant shell, "-n #define ..." gets
written into the file. Use "printf '%s'" to avoid this.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Schneider <qsx@qsx.re>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
We can either return PTR_ERR(NULL) or a PTR_ERR(a valid pointer) here.
Returning NULL is probably not good, but since this happens at boot
then we are probably already toasted if we were to hit this bug in real
life. In other words, it seems like a very low severity bug to me.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Two single characters (line breaks) should be put into a sequence.
Thus use the corresponding function "seq_putc".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
A bit of data was put into a sequence by two separate function calls.
Print the same data by a single function call instead.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
For some file systems we still memcpy into it, but in various places this
already allows us to use the proper uuid helpers. More to come..
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (Changes to IMA/EVM)
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
This helper was only used by IMA of all things, which would get spurious
errors if CONFIG_BLOCK is disabled. Just opencode the call there.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
It will allow us to remove the old netfilter hook api in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Use cap_capable() rather than capable() in the Smack privilege
check as the former does not invoke other security module
privilege check, while the later does. This becomes important
when stacking. It may be a problem even with minor modules.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The check of S_ISSOCK() in smack_file_receive() is not
appropriate if the passed descriptor is a socket.
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tyco.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
It will allow us to remove the old netfilter hook api in the near future.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
It is likely that the SID for the same PKey will be requested many
times. To reduce the time to modify QPs and process MADs use a cache to
store PKey SIDs.
This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept
originally developed by James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> and Paul Moore
<paul@paul-moore.com> (see security/selinux/netif.c and
security/selinux/netport.c for more information)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a type for Infiniband ports and an access vector for subnet
management packets. Implement the ib_port_smp hook to check that the
caller has permission to send and receive SMPs on the end port specified
by the device name and port. Add interface to query the SID for a IB
port, which walks the IB_PORT ocontexts to find an entry for the
given name and port.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a type and access vector for PKeys. Implement the ib_pkey_access
hook to check that the caller has permission to access the PKey on the
given subnet prefix. Add an interface to get the PKey SID. Walk the PKey
ocontexts to find an entry for the given subnet prefix and pkey.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Implement and attach hooks to allocate and free Infiniband object
security structures.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Support for Infiniband requires the addition of two new object contexts,
one for infiniband PKeys and another IB Ports. Added handlers to read
and write the new ocontext types when reading or writing a binary policy
representation.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a MAD
agent. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys and sending
and receiving SMPs.
When sending or receiving a MAD check that the agent has permission to
access the PKey for the Subnet Prefix of the port.
During MAD and snoop agent registration for SMI QPs check that the
calling process has permission to access the manage the subnet and
register a callback with the LSM to be notified of policy changes. When
notificaiton of a policy change occurs recheck permission and set a flag
indicating sending and receiving SMPs is allowed.
When sending and receiving MADs check that the agent has access to the
SMI if it's on an SMI QP. Because security policy can change it's
possible permission was allowed when creating the agent, but no longer
is.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
[PM: remove the LSM hook init code]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers
can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce
events.
Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a
connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes.
Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all
QPs on that device when the notification is received.
Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC
cache changes or setenforce is cleared.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for
permission to access a PKey.
Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP.
This context is used for controlling access to PKeys.
When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index,
or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the
PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared
make sure all handles to the QP also have access.
Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init
transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path
independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the
previous settings and the new ones.
In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet
prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on
each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must
have access enforced for the new cache settings.
These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association
with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails,
and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and
PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the
modify fails.
1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate
path insert that QP into the appropriate lists.
2. Check permission to access the new settings.
3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP.
4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations.
4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations.
If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and
check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state
and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the
QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that
owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is
marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving
the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared.
Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction.
The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while
the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security
struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security
structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being
taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it
could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that
flow before cleaning up the structure.
If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into
the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control
is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy
flow.
To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security
related functionality.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The check is already performed in ocontext_read() when the policy is
loaded. Removing the array also fixes the following warning when
building with clang:
security/selinux/hooks.c:338:20: error: variable 'labeling_behaviors'
is not needed and will not be emitted
[-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration]
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Log the state of SELinux policy capabilities when a policy is loaded.
For each policy capability known to the kernel, log the policy capability
name and the value set in the policy. For policy capabilities that are
set in the loaded policy but unknown to the kernel, log the policy
capability index, since this is the only information presently available
in the policy.
Sample output with a policy created with a new capability defined
that is not known to the kernel:
SELinux: policy capability network_peer_controls=1
SELinux: policy capability open_perms=1
SELinux: policy capability extended_socket_class=1
SELinux: policy capability always_check_network=0
SELinux: policy capability cgroup_seclabel=0
SELinux: unknown policy capability 5
Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/32
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
open permission is currently only defined for files in the kernel
(COMMON_FILE_PERMS rather than COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS). Construction of
an artificial test case that tries to open a socket via /proc/pid/fd will
generate a recvfrom avc denial because recvfrom and open happen to map to
the same permission bit in socket vs file classes.
open of a socket via /proc/pid/fd is not supported by the kernel regardless
and will ultimately return ENXIO. But we hit the permission check first and
can thus produce these odd/misleading denials. Omit the open check when
operating on a socket.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a map permission check on mmap so that we can distinguish memory mapped
access (since it has different implications for revocation). When a file
is opened and then read or written via syscalls like read(2)/write(2),
we revalidate access on each read/write operation via
selinux_file_permission() and therefore can revoke access if the
process context, the file context, or the policy changes in such a
manner that access is no longer allowed. When a file is opened and then
memory mapped via mmap(2) and then subsequently read or written directly
in memory, we presently have no way to revalidate or revoke access.
The purpose of a separate map permission check on mmap(2) is to permit
policy to prohibit memory mapping of specific files for which we need
to ensure that every access is revalidated, particularly useful for
scenarios where we expect the file to be relabeled at runtime in order
to reflect state changes (e.g. cross-domain solution, assured pipeline
without data copying).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux uses CAP_MAC_ADMIN to control the ability to get or set a raw,
uninterpreted security context unknown to the currently loaded security
policy. When performing these checks, we only want to perform a base
capabilities check and a SELinux permission check. If any other
modules that implement a capable hook are stacked with SELinux, we do
not want to require them to also have to authorize CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
since it may have different implications for their security model.
Rework the CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks within SELinux to only invoke the
capabilities module and the SELinux permission checking.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Return an error code without storing it in an intermediate variable.
* Delete the local variable "rc" and the jump label "out" which became
unnecessary with this refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace five goto statements (and previous variable assignments) by
direct returns after a memory allocation failure in this function.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch is a preparation for getting rid of task_create hook because
task_alloc hook which can do what task_create hook can do was revived.
Creating a new thread is unlikely prohibited by security policy, for
fork()/execve()/exit() is fundamental of how processes are managed in
Unix. If a program is known to create a new thread, it is likely that
permission to create a new thread is given to that program. Therefore,
a situation where security_task_create() returns an error is likely that
the program was exploited and lost control. Even if SELinux failed to
check permission to create a thread at security_task_create(), SELinux
can later check it at security_task_alloc(). Since the new thread is not
yet visible from the rest of the system, nobody can do bad things using
the new thread. What we waste will be limited to some initialization
steps such as dup_task_struct(), copy_creds() and audit_alloc() in
copy_process(). We can tolerate these overhead for unlikely situation.
Therefore, this patch changes SELinux to use task_alloc hook rather than
task_create hook so that we can remove task_create hook.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide.
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
The commit d69dece5f5 ("LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm") extend
security_add_hooks() with a new parameter to register the LSM name,
which may be useful to make the list of currently loaded LSM available
to userspace. However, there is no clean way for an LSM to split its
hook declarations into multiple files, which may reduce the mess with
all the included files (needed for LSM hook argument types) and make the
source code easier to review and maintain.
This change allows an LSM to register multiple times its hook while
keeping a consistent list of LSM names as described in
Documentation/security/LSM.txt . The list reflects the order in which
checks are made. This patch only check for the last registered LSM. If
an LSM register multiple times its hooks, interleaved with other LSM
registrations (which should not happen), its name will still appear in
the same order that the hooks are called, hence multiple times.
To sum up, "capability,selinux,foo,foo" will be replaced with
"capability,selinux,foo", however "capability,foo,selinux,foo" will
remain as is.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted bits and pieces from various people. No common topic in this
pile, sorry"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs/affs: add rename exchange
fs/affs: add rename2 to prepare multiple methods
Make stat/lstat/fstatat pass AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT to vfs_statx()
fs: don't set *REFERENCED on single use objects
fs: compat: Remove warning from COMPATIBLE_IOCTL
remove pointless extern of atime_need_update_rcu()
fs: completely ignore unknown open flags
fs: add a VALID_OPEN_FLAGS
fs: remove _submit_bh()
fs: constify tree_descr arrays passed to simple_fill_super()
fs: drop duplicate header percpu-rwsem.h
fs/affs: bugfix: Write files greater than page size on OFS
fs/affs: bugfix: enable writes on OFS disks
fs/affs: remove node generation check
fs/affs: import amigaffs.h
fs/affs: bugfix: make symbolic links work again
CURRENT_TIME macro is not y2038 safe on 32 bit systems.
The patch replaces all the uses of CURRENT_TIME by current_time().
This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions vfs
timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them y2038 safe.
current_time() is also planned to be transitioned to y2038 safe behavior
along with this change.
CURRENT_TIME macro will be deleted before merging the aforementioned
change.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1491613030-11599-11-git-send-email-deepa.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There are many code paths opencoding kvmalloc. Let's use the helper
instead. The main difference to kvmalloc is that those users are
usually not considering all the aspects of the memory allocator. E.g.
allocation requests <= 32kB (with 4kB pages) are basically never failing
and invoke OOM killer to satisfy the allocation. This sounds too
disruptive for something that has a reasonable fallback - the vmalloc.
On the other hand those requests might fallback to vmalloc even when the
memory allocator would succeed after several more reclaim/compaction
attempts previously. There is no guarantee something like that happens
though.
This patch converts many of those places to kv[mz]alloc* helpers because
they are more conservative.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103327.2766-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> # Xen bits
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Andreas Dilger <andreas.dilger@intel.com> # Lustre
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> # KVM/s390
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> # nvdim
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> # btrfs
Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> # Ceph
Acked-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> # mlx4
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # mlx5
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
Cc: Santosh Raspatur <santosh@chelsio.com>
Cc: Hariprasad S <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Cc: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>
Cc: Oleg Drokin <oleg.drokin@intel.com>
Cc: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Patch series "kvmalloc", v5.
There are many open coded kmalloc with vmalloc fallback instances in the
tree. Most of them are not careful enough or simply do not care about
the underlying semantic of the kmalloc/page allocator which means that
a) some vmalloc fallbacks are basically unreachable because the kmalloc
part will keep retrying until it succeeds b) the page allocator can
invoke a really disruptive steps like the OOM killer to move forward
which doesn't sound appropriate when we consider that the vmalloc
fallback is available.
As it can be seen implementing kvmalloc requires quite an intimate
knowledge if the page allocator and the memory reclaim internals which
strongly suggests that a helper should be implemented in the memory
subsystem proper.
Most callers, I could find, have been converted to use the helper
instead. This is patch 6. There are some more relying on __GFP_REPEAT
in the networking stack which I have converted as well and Eric Dumazet
was not opposed [2] to convert them as well.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170130094940.13546-1-mhocko@kernel.org
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485273626.16328.301.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com
This patch (of 9):
Using kmalloc with the vmalloc fallback for larger allocations is a
common pattern in the kernel code. Yet we do not have any common helper
for that and so users have invented their own helpers. Some of them are
really creative when doing so. Let's just add kv[mz]alloc and make sure
it is implemented properly. This implementation makes sure to not make
a large memory pressure for > PAGE_SZE requests (__GFP_NORETRY) and also
to not warn about allocation failures. This also rules out the OOM
killer as the vmalloc is a more approapriate fallback than a disruptive
user visible action.
This patch also changes some existing users and removes helpers which
are specific for them. In some cases this is not possible (e.g.
ext4_kvmalloc, libcfs_kvzalloc) because those seems to be broken and
require GFP_NO{FS,IO} context which is not vmalloc compatible in general
(note that the page table allocation is GFP_KERNEL). Those need to be
fixed separately.
While we are at it, document that __vmalloc{_node} about unsupported gfp
mask because there seems to be a lot of confusion out there.
kvmalloc_node will warn about GFP_KERNEL incompatible (which are not
superset) flags to catch new abusers. Existing ones would have to die
slowly.
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: f2fs fixup]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320163735.332e64b7@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103032.2540-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> [ext4 part]
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
IMA:
- provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules
KEYS:
- add a system blacklist keyring
- add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
functionality to userland via keyctl()
LSM:
- harden LSM API with __ro_after_init
- add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux
- revive security_task_alloc hook
TPM:
- implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
tpm: Fix reference count to main device
tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
...
Pull networking updates from David Millar:
"Here are some highlights from the 2065 networking commits that
happened this development cycle:
1) XDP support for IXGBE (John Fastabend) and thunderx (Sunil Kowuri)
2) Add a generic XDP driver, so that anyone can test XDP even if they
lack a networking device whose driver has explicit XDP support
(me).
3) Sparc64 now has an eBPF JIT too (me)
4) Add a BPF program testing framework via BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN (Alexei
Starovoitov)
5) Make netfitler network namespace teardown less expensive (Florian
Westphal)
6) Add symmetric hashing support to nft_hash (Laura Garcia Liebana)
7) Implement NAPI and GRO in netvsc driver (Stephen Hemminger)
8) Support TC flower offload statistics in mlxsw (Arkadi Sharshevsky)
9) Multiqueue support in stmmac driver (Joao Pinto)
10) Remove TCP timewait recycling, it never really could possibly work
well in the real world and timestamp randomization really zaps any
hint of usability this feature had (Soheil Hassas Yeganeh)
11) Support level3 vs level4 ECMP route hashing in ipv4 (Nikolay
Aleksandrov)
12) Add socket busy poll support to epoll (Sridhar Samudrala)
13) Netlink extended ACK support (Johannes Berg, Pablo Neira Ayuso,
and several others)
14) IPSEC hw offload infrastructure (Steffen Klassert)"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (2065 commits)
tipc: refactor function tipc_sk_recv_stream()
tipc: refactor function tipc_sk_recvmsg()
net: thunderx: Optimize page recycling for XDP
net: thunderx: Support for XDP header adjustment
net: thunderx: Add support for XDP_TX
net: thunderx: Add support for XDP_DROP
net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support
net: thunderx: Cleanup receive buffer allocation
net: thunderx: Optimize CQE_TX handling
net: thunderx: Optimize RBDR descriptor handling
net: thunderx: Support for page recycling
ipx: call ipxitf_put() in ioctl error path
net: sched: add helpers to handle extended actions
qed*: Fix issues in the ptp filter config implementation.
qede: Fix concurrency issue in PTP Tx path processing.
stmmac: Add support for SIMATIC IOT2000 platform
net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
tcp: fix wraparound issue in tcp_lp
bpf, arm64: fix jit branch offset related to ldimm64
bpf, arm64: implement jiting of BPF_XADD
...
guide for user-space API documents, rather sparsely populated at the
moment, but it's a start. Markus improved the infrastructure for
converting diagrams. Mauro has converted much of the USB documentation
over to RST. Plus the usual set of fixes, improvements, and tweaks.
There's a bit more than the usual amount of reaching out of Documentation/
to fix comments elsewhere in the tree; I have acks for those where I could
get them.
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Merge tag 'docs-4.12' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation update from Jonathan Corbet:
"A reasonably busy cycle for documentation this time around. There is a
new guide for user-space API documents, rather sparsely populated at
the moment, but it's a start. Markus improved the infrastructure for
converting diagrams. Mauro has converted much of the USB documentation
over to RST. Plus the usual set of fixes, improvements, and tweaks.
There's a bit more than the usual amount of reaching out of
Documentation/ to fix comments elsewhere in the tree; I have acks for
those where I could get them"
* tag 'docs-4.12' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (74 commits)
docs: Fix a couple typos
docs: Fix a spelling error in vfio-mediated-device.txt
docs: Fix a spelling error in ioctl-number.txt
MAINTAINERS: update file entry for HSI subsystem
Documentation: allow installing man pages to a user defined directory
Doc/PM: Sync with intel_powerclamp code behavior
zr364xx.rst: usb/devices is now at /sys/kernel/debug/
usb.rst: move documentation from proc_usb_info.txt to USB ReST book
convert philips.txt to ReST and add to media docs
docs-rst: usb: update old usbfs-related documentation
arm: Documentation: update a path name
docs: process/4.Coding.rst: Fix a couple of document refs
docs-rst: fix usb cross-references
usb: gadget.h: be consistent at kernel doc macros
usb: composite.h: fix two warnings when building docs
usb: get rid of some ReST doc build errors
usb.rst: get rid of some Sphinx errors
usb/URB.txt: convert to ReST and update it
usb/persist.txt: convert to ReST and add to driver-api book
usb/hotplug.txt: convert to ReST and add to driver-api book
...
Pull uaccess unification updates from Al Viro:
"This is the uaccess unification pile. It's _not_ the end of uaccess
work, but the next batch of that will go into the next cycle. This one
mostly takes copy_from_user() and friends out of arch/* and gets the
zero-padding behaviour in sync for all architectures.
Dealing with the nocache/writethrough mess is for the next cycle;
fortunately, that's x86-only. Same for cleanups in iov_iter.c (I am
sold on access_ok() in there, BTW; just not in this pile), same for
reducing __copy_... callsites, strn*... stuff, etc. - there will be a
pile about as large as this one in the next merge window.
This one sat in -next for weeks. -3KLoC"
* 'work.uaccess' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (96 commits)
HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY is unconditional now
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RAW_COPY_USER is unconditional now
m32r: switch to RAW_COPY_USER
hexagon: switch to RAW_COPY_USER
microblaze: switch to RAW_COPY_USER
get rid of padding, switch to RAW_COPY_USER
ia64: get rid of copy_in_user()
ia64: sanitize __access_ok()
ia64: get rid of 'segment' argument of __do_{get,put}_user()
ia64: get rid of 'segment' argument of __{get,put}_user_check()
ia64: add extable.h
powerpc: get rid of zeroing, switch to RAW_COPY_USER
esas2r: don't open-code memdup_user()
alpha: fix stack smashing in old_adjtimex(2)
don't open-code kernel_setsockopt()
mips: switch to RAW_COPY_USER
mips: get rid of tail-zeroing in primitives
mips: make copy_from_user() zero tail explicitly
mips: clean and reorder the forest of macros...
mips: consolidate __invoke_... wrappers
...
simple_fill_super() is passed an array of tree_descr structures which
describe the files to create in the filesystem's root directory. Since
these arrays are never modified intentionally, they should be 'const' so
that they are placed in .rodata and benefit from memory protection.
This patch updates the function signature and all users, and also
constifies tree_descr.name.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Both conflict were simple overlapping changes.
In the kaweth case, Eric Dumazet's skb_cow() bug fix overlapped the
conversion of the driver in net-next to use in-netdev stats.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992c ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
This fixes CVE-2017-6951.
Userspace should not be able to do things with the "dead" key type as it
doesn't have some of the helper functions set upon it that the kernel
needs. Attempting to use it may cause the kernel to crash.
Fix this by changing the name of the type to ".dead" so that it's rejected
up front on userspace syscalls by key_get_type_from_user().
Though this doesn't seem to affect recent kernels, it does affect older
ones, certainly those prior to:
commit c06cfb08b8
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Tue Sep 16 17:36:06 2014 +0100
KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
which went in before 3.18-rc1.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
This fixes CVE-2016-9604.
Keyrings whose name begin with a '.' are special internal keyrings and so
userspace isn't allowed to create keyrings by this name to prevent
shadowing. However, the patch that added the guard didn't fix
KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING. Not only can that create dot-named keyrings,
it can also subscribe to them as a session keyring if they grant SEARCH
permission to the user.
This, for example, allows a root process to set .builtin_trusted_keys as
its session keyring, at which point it has full access because now the
possessor permissions are added. This permits root to add extra public
keys, thereby bypassing module verification.
This also affects kexec and IMA.
This can be tested by (as root):
keyctl session .builtin_trusted_keys
keyctl add user a a @s
keyctl list @s
which on my test box gives me:
2 keys in keyring:
180010936: ---lswrv 0 0 asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: ae3d4a31b82daa8e1a75b49dc2bba949fd992a05
801382539: --alswrv 0 0 user: a
Fix this by rejecting names beginning with a '.' in the keyctl.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Select CONFIG_CRYPTO in addition to CONFIG_HASH to ensure that
also CONFIG_HASH2 is selected. Both are needed for the shash
cipher support required for the KDF operation.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Boot parameters are written before apparmor is ready to answer whether
the user is policy_view_capable(). Setting the parameters at boot results
in an oops and failure to boot. Setting the parameters at boot is
obviously allowed so skip the permission check when apparmor is not
initialized.
While we are at it move the more complicated check to last.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Once the loop on lines 836-853 is complete and exits normally, ent is a
pointer to the dummy list head value. The derefernces accessible from eg
the goto fail on line 860 or the various goto fail_lock's afterwards thus
seem incorrect.
Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When building the kernel with clang, the compiler fails to build
security/apparmor/crypto.c with the following error:
security/apparmor/crypto.c:36:8: error: fields must have a constant
size: 'variable length array in structure' extension will never be
supported
char ctx[crypto_shash_descsize(apparmor_tfm)];
^
Since commit a0a77af141 ("crypto: LLVMLinux: Add macro to remove use
of VLAIS in crypto code"), include/crypto/hash.h defines
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK to work around this issue. Use it in aa_calc_hash()
and aa_calc_profile_hash().
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Add the _APPARMOR substring to reference the intended Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: Valentin Rothberg <valentinrothberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
security/apparmor/lib.c:132:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'aa_policy_init' with return type bool
Return statements in functions returning bool should use
true/false instead of 1/0.
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/misc/boolreturn.cocci
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Since all callers of smk_netlbl_mls() are GFP_KERNEL context
(smk_set_cipso() calls memdup_user_nul(), init_smk_fs() calls
__kernfs_new_node(), smk_import_entry() calls kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL)),
it is safe to use GFP_KERNEL from netlbl_catmap_setbit().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
smack_parse_opts_str() calls kfree(opts->mnt_opts) when kcalloc() for
opts->mnt_opts_flags failed. But it should not have called it because
security_free_mnt_opts() will call kfree(opts->mnt_opts).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
fixes: 3bf2789cad ("smack: allow mount opts setting over filesystems with binary mount data")
Cc: Vivek Trivedi <t.vivek@samsung.com>
Cc: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a
counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other
information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by
the caller.
The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API.
The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the
hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify
the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing
the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API.
As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to
the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size.
The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space
code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with
SP800-56A.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow
individual keys to be validated prior to linking. This functionality
was only available using internal kernel APIs.
With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be
configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and
then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring.
To restrict a keyring, call:
keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type,
const char *restriction)
where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a
string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction
option syntax is specific to each key type.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The keyring restrict callback was sometimes called before
__key_link_begin and sometimes after, which meant that the keyring
semaphores were not always held during the restrict callback.
If the semaphores are consistently acquired before checking link
restrictions, keyring contents cannot be changed after the restrict
check is complete but before the evaluated key is linked to the keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.
The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.
Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
This pointer type needs to be returned from a lookup function, and
without a typedef the syntax gets cumbersome.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
We removed this initialization as a cleanup but it is probably required.
The concern is that "nel" can be zero. I'm not an expert on SELinux
code but I think it looks possible to write an SELinux policy which
triggers this bug. GCC doesn't catch this, but my static checker does.
Fixes: 9c312e79d6 ("selinux: Delete an unnecessary variable initialisation in range_read()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Prepare to mark sensitive kernel structures for randomization by making
sure they're using designated initializers. These were identified during
allyesconfig builds of x86, arm, and arm64, with most initializer fixes
extracted from grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
'perms' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an array
of u32 values.
This fixes the following warning when building with clang:
security/selinux/ss/services.c:158:16: error: address of array
'p_in->perms' will always evaluate to 'true'
[-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A string which did not contain data format specifications should be put
into a sequence. Thus use the corresponding function "seq_puts".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
Comparison to NULL could be written !…
Thus fix affected source code places.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the specification of a data type by a pointer dereference
as the parameter for the operator "sizeof" to make the corresponding size
determination a bit safer according to the Linux coding style convention.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "kzalloc" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security
in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change.
TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct"
security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct
task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another
example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred
a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although
security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module
wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob,
security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were
not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules
which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob.
We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully
armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks
like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of
lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive
hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not
implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will
become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"->
security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length
"struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
"struct security_hook_heads" is an array of "struct list_head"
where elements can be initialized just before registration.
There is no need to waste 350+ lines for initialization. Let's
initialize "struct security_hook_heads" just before registration.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
The local variable "rt" will be set to an appropriate pointer a bit later.
Thus omit the explicit initialisation at the beginning which became
unnecessary with a previous update step.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "next_entry" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The local variable "ft" was set to a null pointer despite of an
immediate reassignment.
Thus remove this statement from the beginning of a loop.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Call the function "kfree" at the end only after it was determined
that the local variable "newgenfs" contained a non-null pointer.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Return directly after a call of the function "next_entry" failed
at the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
WARNING: void function return statements are not generally useful
Thus remove such a statement in the affected function.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Multiplications for the size determination of memory allocations
indicated that array data structures should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kcalloc".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
Comparison to NULL could be written !…
Thus fix affected source code places.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the specification of data structures by pointer dereferences
as the parameter for the operator "sizeof" to make the corresponding size
determination a bit safer.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The script "checkpatch.pl" pointed information out like the following.
WARNING: void function return statements are not generally useful
Thus remove such a statement in the affected function.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kmalloc_array".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
* Replace the specification of a data type by a pointer dereference
to make the corresponding size determination a bit safer according to
the Linux coding style convention.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
For now we have only "=" operator for fowner/uid/euid rules. This
patch provide two more operators - ">" and "<" in order to make
fowner/uid/euid rules more flexible.
Examples of usage.
Appraise all files owned by special and system users (SYS_UID_MAX 999):
appraise fowner<1000
Don't appraise files owned by normal users (UID_MIN 1000):
dont_appraise fowner>999
Appraise all files owned by users with UID 1000-1010:
dont_appraise fowner>1010
appraise fowner>999
Changelog v3:
- Removed code duplication in ima_parse_rule().
- Fix ima_policy_show() - (Mimi)
Changelog v2:
- Fixed default policy rules.
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer, a new error detection tool) reports use of
uninitialized memory in selinux_socket_bind():
==================================================================
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory
inter: 0
CPU: 3 PID: 1074 Comm: packet2 Tainted: G B 4.8.0-rc6+ #1916
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
0000000000000000 ffff8800882ffb08 ffffffff825759c8 ffff8800882ffa48
ffffffff818bf551 ffffffff85bab870 0000000000000092 ffffffff85bab550
0000000000000000 0000000000000092 00000000bb0009bb 0000000000000002
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff825759c8>] dump_stack+0x238/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[<ffffffff818bdee6>] kmsan_report+0x276/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1008
[<ffffffff818bf0fb>] __msan_warning+0x5b/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:424
[<ffffffff822dae71>] selinux_socket_bind+0xf41/0x1080 security/selinux/hooks.c:4288
[<ffffffff8229357c>] security_socket_bind+0x1ec/0x240 security/security.c:1240
[<ffffffff84265d98>] SYSC_bind+0x358/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1366
[<ffffffff84265a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff81005678>] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292
[<ffffffff8518217c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
chained origin: 00000000ba6009bb
[<ffffffff810bb7a7>] save_stack_trace+0x27/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:67
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
[< inline >] kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:337
[<ffffffff818bd2b8>] kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x118/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:530
[<ffffffff818bf033>] __msan_set_alloca_origin4+0xc3/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:380
[<ffffffff84265b69>] SYSC_bind+0x129/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff84265a22>] SyS_bind+0x82/0xa0 net/socket.c:1356
[<ffffffff81005678>] do_syscall_64+0x58/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:292
[<ffffffff8518217c>] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o:?
origin description: ----address@SYSC_bind (origin=00000000b8c00900)
==================================================================
(the line numbers are relative to 4.8-rc6, but the bug persists upstream)
, when I run the following program as root:
=======================================================
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct sockaddr addr;
int size = 0;
if (argc > 1) {
size = atoi(argv[1]);
}
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
int fd = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_IP);
bind(fd, &addr, size);
return 0;
}
=======================================================
(for different values of |size| other error reports are printed).
This happens because bind() unconditionally copies |size| bytes of
|addr| to the kernel, leaving the rest uninitialized. Then
security_socket_bind() reads the IP address bytes, including the
uninitialized ones, to determine the port, or e.g. pass them further to
sel_netnode_find(), which uses them to calculate a hash.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[PM: fixed some whitespace damage]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Modifying the attributes of a file makes ima_inode_post_setattr reset
the IMA cache flags. So if the file, which has just been created,
is opened a second time before the first file descriptor is closed,
verification fails since the security.ima xattr has not been written
yet. We therefore have to look at the IMA_NEW_FILE even if the file
already existed.
With this patch there should no longer be an error when cat tries to
open testfile:
$ rm -f testfile
$ ( echo test >&3 ; touch testfile ; cat testfile ) 3>testfile
A file being new is no reason to accept that it is missing a digital
signature demanded by the policy.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Glöckner <dg@emlix.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The default IMA rules are loaded during init and then do not
change, so mark them as __ro_after_init.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Constify nlmsg permission tables, which are initialized once
and then do not change.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the
__lsm_ro_after_init macro).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subsequent patches will add RO hardening to LSM hooks, however, SELinux
still needs to be able to perform runtime disablement after init to handle
architectures where init-time disablement via boot parameters is not feasible.
Introduce a new kernel configuration parameter CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS,
and a helper macro __lsm_ro_after_init, to handle this case.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
commit 79bcf325e6b32b3c ("prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook
for prlimit") introduced a security hook for prlimit() and implemented it
for SELinux. However, if prlimit() is called with NULL arguments for both
the new limit and the old limit, then the hook is called with 0 for the
read/write flags, since the prlimit() will neither read nor write the
process' limits. This would in turn lead to calling avc_has_perm() with 0
for the requested permissions, which triggers a BUG_ON() in
avc_has_perm_noaudit() since the kernel should never be invoking
avc_has_perm() with no permissions. Fix this in the SELinux hook by
returning immediately if the flags are 0. Arguably prlimit64() itself
ought to return immediately if both old_rlim and new_rlim are NULL since
it is effectively a no-op in that case.
Reported by the lkp-robot based on trinity testing.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull sched.h split-up from Ingo Molnar:
"The point of these changes is to significantly reduce the
<linux/sched.h> header footprint, to speed up the kernel build and to
have a cleaner header structure.
After these changes the new <linux/sched.h>'s typical preprocessed
size goes down from a previous ~0.68 MB (~22K lines) to ~0.45 MB (~15K
lines), which is around 40% faster to build on typical configs.
Not much changed from the last version (-v2) posted three weeks ago: I
eliminated quirks, backmerged fixes plus I rebased it to an upstream
SHA1 from yesterday that includes most changes queued up in -next plus
all sched.h changes that were pending from Andrew.
I've re-tested the series both on x86 and on cross-arch defconfigs,
and did a bisectability test at a number of random points.
I tried to test as many build configurations as possible, but some
build breakage is probably still left - but it should be mostly
limited to architectures that have no cross-compiler binaries
available on kernel.org, and non-default configurations"
* 'WIP.sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (146 commits)
sched/headers: Clean up <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove #ifdefs from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the <linux/topology.h> include from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers, hrtimer: Remove the <linux/wait.h> include from <linux/hrtimer.h>
sched/headers, x86/apic: Remove the <linux/pm.h> header inclusion from <asm/apic.h>
sched/headers, timers: Remove the <linux/sysctl.h> include from <linux/timer.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/magic.h> from <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/init.h>
sched/core: Remove unused prefetch_stack()
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rculist.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the 'init_pid_ns' prototype from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/signal.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rwsem.h> from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove the runqueue_is_locked() prototype
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/hotplug.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/debug.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/nohz.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/sched.h> from <linux/sched/stat.h>
sched/headers: Remove the <linux/gfp.h> include from <linux/sched.h>
sched/headers: Remove <linux/rtmutex.h> from <linux/sched.h>
...
Update files that depend on the magic.h inclusion.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We don't actually need the full rculist.h header in sched.h anymore,
we will be able to include the smaller rcupdate.h header instead.
But first update code that relied on the implicit header inclusion.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h
doing that for them.
Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high,
it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over
2,200 files ...
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/user.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/user.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
commit 1ea0ce4069 ("selinux: allow
changing labels for cgroupfs") broke the Android init program,
which looks up security contexts whenever creating directories
and attempts to assign them via setfscreatecon().
When creating subdirectories in cgroup mounts, this would previously
be ignored since cgroup did not support userspace setting of security
contexts. However, after the commit, SELinux would attempt to honor
the requested context on cgroup directories and fail due to permission
denial. Avoid breaking existing userspace/policy by wrapping this change
with a conditional on a new cgroup_seclabel policy capability. This
preserves existing behavior until/unless a new policy explicitly enables
this capability.
Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in
two different, incompatible ways:
(1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used
to protect the key.
(2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is
used to protect the key and the may be being modified.
Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce:
(1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked:
dereference_key_locked()
user_key_payload_locked()
(2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock:
dereference_key_rcu()
user_key_payload_rcu()
This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper
===============================
[ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable)
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190
nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4]
nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4]
decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4]
nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4]
rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc]
call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc]
__rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc]
rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc]
nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4]
_nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4]
nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4]
nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4]
nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4]
nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4]
nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4]
nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs]
mount_fs+0x74/0x210
vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220
do_mount+0x254/0xf70
SyS_mount+0x94/0x100
system_call+0x38/0xe0
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Kees Cook
Florian Westphal
Luis Ressel
James Morris
David S. Miller
Kirill Tkhai
Linus Torvalds
Tetsuo Handa
Eric Biggers
Daniel Micay
Al Viro
Stephen Rothwell
Thiago Jung Bauermann
Roberto Sassu
Laura Abbott
Geliang Tang
Tycho Andersen
Ben Hutchings
Mimi Zohar
Julien Gomes
Jeff Vander Stoep
Ingo Molnar
Paul Moore
John Johansen
Scott Mayhew
Junil Lee
Mark Rutland
Mat Martineau
Markus Elfring
Davidlohr Bueso
Bilal Amarni
Thomas Schneider
Dan Carpenter
Christoph Hellwig
Casey Schaufler
Daniel Jurgens
Matthias Kaehlcke
Stephen Smalley
Geert Uytterhoeven
Mickaël Salaün
Deepa Dinamani
Michal Hocko
David Howells
Stephan Müller
Nicolas Iooss
Valentin Rothberg
kbuild test robot
Elena Reshetova
mchehab@s-opensource.com
David Ahern
Mikhail Kurinnoi
Alexander Potapenko
Daniel Glöckner
James Morris