679db70801
Some CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack. This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return. Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> |
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| .. | ||
| hyp | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||
| debug.c | ||
| fpsimd.c | ||
| guest.c | ||
| handle_exit.c | ||
| hyp-init.S | ||
| hyp.S | ||
| inject_fault.c | ||
| irq.h | ||
| regmap.c | ||
| reset.c | ||
| sys_regs.c | ||
| sys_regs.h | ||
| sys_regs_generic_v8.c | ||
| trace.h | ||
| va_layout.c | ||
| vgic-sys-reg-v3.c | ||