gecko-dev/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl

/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
 * vim: ft=cpp tw=78 sw=2 et ts=2 sts=2 cin
 * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */

#include "nsISupports.idl"
#include "nsIContentPolicy.idl"
#include "nsIScriptSecurityManager.idl"
#include "nsIInterceptionInfo.idl"

interface nsIChannel;
interface nsIContentSecurityPolicy;
interface nsICookieJarSettings;
interface nsICSPEventListener;
interface nsINode;
interface nsIPrincipal;
interface nsIRedirectHistoryEntry;
interface nsIURI;
webidl Document;
webidl BrowsingContext;
native LoadContextRef(already_AddRefed<nsISupports>);
%{C++
#include "nsTArray.h"
#include "mozilla/LoadTainting.h"
#include "mozilla/OriginAttributes.h"
#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
#include "nsRFPService.h"
#include "nsStringFwd.h"

namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {
class ClientInfo;
class ClientSource;
struct FeaturePolicyInfo;
class PerformanceStorage;
class ServiceWorkerDescriptor;
} // namespace dom
} // namespace mozilla
%}

[ref] native nsIRedirectHistoryEntryArray(const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIRedirectHistoryEntry>>);
native OriginAttributes(mozilla::OriginAttributes);
[ref] native const_OriginAttributesRef(const mozilla::OriginAttributes);
[ref] native CStringArrayRef(const nsTArray<nsCString>);
[ref] native StringArrayRef(const nsTArray<nsString>);
[ref] native Uint64ArrayRef(const nsTArray<uint64_t>);
[ref] native PrincipalArrayRef(const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>);
[ref] native const_ClientInfoRef(const mozilla::dom::ClientInfo);
      native UniqueClientSource(mozilla::UniquePtr<mozilla::dom::ClientSource>);
      native UniqueClientSourceMove(mozilla::UniquePtr<mozilla::dom::ClientSource>&&);
[ref] native const_MaybeClientInfoRef(const mozilla::Maybe<mozilla::dom::ClientInfo>);
[ref] native const_ServiceWorkerDescriptorRef(const mozilla::dom::ServiceWorkerDescriptor);
[ref] native const_MaybeServiceWorkerDescriptorRef(const mozilla::Maybe<mozilla::dom::ServiceWorkerDescriptor>);
[ref] native const_MaybeRFPTarget(const mozilla::Maybe<mozilla::RFPTarget>);
      native RFPTarget(mozilla::RFPTarget);
[ptr] native PerformanceStoragePtr(mozilla::dom::PerformanceStorage);
      native LoadTainting(mozilla::LoadTainting);
      native CSPRef(already_AddRefed<nsIContentSecurityPolicy>);
      native MaybeFeaturePolicyInfo(mozilla::Maybe<mozilla::dom::FeaturePolicyInfo>);
[ref] native const_FeaturePolicyInfoRef(const mozilla::dom::FeaturePolicyInfo);

typedef unsigned long nsSecurityFlags;

/**
 * The LoadInfo object contains information about a network load, why it
 * was started, and how we plan on using the resulting response.
 * If a network request is redirected, the new channel will receive a new
 * LoadInfo object. The new object will contain mostly the same
 * information as the pre-redirect one, but updated as appropriate.
 * For detailed information about what parts of LoadInfo are updated on
 * redirect, see documentation on individual properties.
 */
[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(ddc65bf9-2f60-41ab-b22a-4f1ae9efcd36)]
interface nsILoadInfo : nsISupports
{
  /**
   * The following five flags determine the security mode and hence what kind of
   * security checks should be performed throughout the lifetime of the channel.
   *
   *    * SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT
   *    * SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED
   *    * SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT
   *    * SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL
   *    * SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT
   *
   * Exactly one of these flags are required to be set in order to allow
   * the channel to perform the correct security checks (SOP, CORS, ...) and
   * return the correct result principal. If none or more than one of these
   * flags are set AsyncOpen will fail.
   */

   /**
    * Warning: Never use this flag when creating a new channel!
    * Only use this flag if you have to create a temporary LoadInfo
    * for performing an explicit nsIContentPolicy check, like e.g.
    * when loading something from the cache that needs an explicit
    * nsIContentPolicy check. In all other cases pick one of the
    * security flags underneath.
    */
  const unsigned long SEC_ONLY_FOR_EXPLICIT_CONTENTSEC_CHECK = 0;

  /*
   * Enforce the same origin policy where loads inherit the principal.
   * See the documentation for principalToInherit, which describes exactly what
   * principal is inherited.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT = (1<<0);

  /*
   * Enforce the same origin policy and data: loads are blocked.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED = (1<<1);

  /**
   * Allow loads from other origins. Loads which inherit the principal should
   * see the documentation for principalToInherit, which describes exactly what
   * principal is inherited.
   *
   * Commonly used by plain <img>, <video>, <link rel=stylesheet> etc.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT = (1 << 2);

  /**
   * Allow loads from other origins. Loads from data: will be allowed,
   * but the resulting resource will get a null principal.
   * Used in blink/webkit for <iframe>s. Likely also the mode
   * that should be used by most Chrome code.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL = (1<<3);

  /**
   * Allow loads from any origin, but require CORS for cross-origin loads.
   * See the documentation for principalToInherit, which describes exactly what
   * principal is inherited.
   *
   * Commonly used by <img crossorigin>, <video crossorigin>,
   * XHR, fetch(), etc.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT = (1<<4);

  /**
   * Choose cookie policy. The default policy is equivalent to "INCLUDE" for
   * SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_* and SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_* modes, and
   * equivalent to "SAME_ORIGIN" for SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT mode.
   *
   * This means that if you want to perform a CORS load with credentials, pass
   * SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE.
   *
   * Note that these flags are still subject to the user's cookie policies.
   * For example, if the user is blocking 3rd party cookies, those cookies
   * will be blocked no matter which of these flags are set.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT = (0 << 5);
  const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE = (1 << 5);
  const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN = (2 << 5);
  const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_OMIT = (3 << 5);

  /**
   * Force inheriting of the principal.  See the documentation for
   * principalToInherit, which describes exactly what principal is inherited.
   *
   * Setting this flag will cause GetChannelResultPrincipal to return the
   * principal to be inherited as the channel principal.
   *
   * This will happen independently of the scheme of the URI that the
   * channel is loading.
   *
   * So if the principal that gets inherited is "http://a.com/", and the channel
   * is loading the URI "http://b.com/whatever", GetChannelResultPrincipal
   * will return a principal from "http://a.com/".
   *
   * This flag can not be used together with SANDBOXED_ORIGIN sandbox flag.  If
   * both are passed to the LoadInfo constructor then this flag will be dropped.
   * If you need to know whether this flag would have been present but was dropped
   * due to sandboxing, check for the forceInheritPrincipalDropped flag.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL = (1<<7);

  /**
   * Inherit the Principal for about:blank.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_ABOUT_BLANK_INHERITS = (1<<9);

  /**
   * Allow access to chrome: packages that are content accessible.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CHROME = (1<<10);

  /**
   * Disallow access to javascript: uris.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_DISALLOW_SCRIPT = (1<<11);

  /**
   * Don't follow redirects. Instead the redirect response is returned
   * as a successful response for the channel.
   *
   * Redirects not initiated by a server response, i.e. REDIRECT_INTERNAL and
   * REDIRECT_STS_UPGRADE, are still followed.
   *
   * Note: If this flag is set and the channel response is a redirect, then
   * the response body might not be available.
   * This can happen if the redirect was cached.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS = (1<<12);

  /**
   * Load an error page, it should be one of following : about:neterror,
   * about:certerror, about:blocked, about:tabcrashed or about:restartrequired.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_LOAD_ERROR_PAGE = (1<<13);

  /**
   * Force inheriting of the principal, overruling any owner that might be set
   * on the channel. (Please note that channel.owner is deprecated and will be
   * removed within Bug 1286838).  See the documentation for principalToInherit,
   * which describes exactly what principal is inherited.
   *
   * Setting this flag will cause GetChannelResultPrincipal to return the
   * principal to be inherited as the channel principal.
   *
   * This will happen independently of the scheme of the URI that the
   * channel is loading.
   */
  const unsigned long SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL_OVERRULE_OWNER = (1<<14);

  /**
   * This is the principal of the network request's caller/requester where
   * the resulting resource will be used. I.e. it is the principal which
   * will get access to the result of the request. (Where "get access to"
   * might simply mean "embed" depending on the type of resource that is
   * loaded).
   *
   * For example for an image, it is the principal of the document where
   * the image is rendered. For a stylesheet it is the principal of the
   * document where the stylesheet will be applied.
   *
   * So if document at http://a.com/page.html loads an image from
   * http://b.com/pic.jpg, then loadingPrincipal will be
   * http://a.com/page.html.
   *
   * For <iframe> and <frame> loads, the LoadingPrincipal is the
   * principal of the parent document. For top-level loads, the
   * LoadingPrincipal is null. For all loads except top-level loads
   * the LoadingPrincipal is never null.
   *
   * If the loadingPrincipal is the system principal, no security checks
   * will be done at all. There will be no security checks on the initial
   * load or any subsequent redirects. This means there will be no
   * nsIContentPolicy checks or any CheckLoadURI checks. Because of
   * this, never set the loadingPrincipal to the system principal when
   * the URI to be loaded is controlled by a webpage.
   * If the loadingPrincipal and triggeringPrincipal are both
   * content principals, then we will always call into
   * nsIContentPolicies and CheckLoadURI. The call to nsIContentPolicies
   * and CheckLoadURI happen even if the URI to be loaded is same-origin
   * with the loadingPrincipal or triggeringPrincipal.
   */
  readonly attribute nsIPrincipal loadingPrincipal;

  /**
   * A C++-friendly version of triggeringPrincipal.
   *
   * This is a bit awkward because we can't use
   * binaryname(GetLoadingPrincipal).
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall]
  nsIPrincipal virtualGetLoadingPrincipal();

%{C++
  nsIPrincipal* GetLoadingPrincipal() {
    return VirtualGetLoadingPrincipal();
  }
%}

  /**
   * This is the principal which caused the network load to start. I.e.
   * this is the principal which provided the URL to be loaded. This is
   * often the same as the LoadingPrincipal, but there are a few cases
   * where that's not true.
   *
   * For example for loads into an <iframe>, the LoadingPrincipal is always
   * the principal of the parent document. However the triggeringPrincipal
   * is the principal of the document which provided the URL that the
   * <iframe> is navigating to. This could be the previous document inside
   * the <iframe> which set document.location. Or a document elsewhere in
   * the frame tree which contained a <a target="..."> which targetted the
   * <iframe>.
   *
   * If a stylesheet links to a sub-resource, like an @imported stylesheet,
   * or a background image, then the triggeringPrincipal is the principal
   * of the stylesheet, while the LoadingPrincipal is the principal of the
   * document being styled.
   *
   * The triggeringPrincipal is never null.
   *
   * If the triggeringPrincipal is the system principal, no security checks
   * will be done at all. There will be no security checks on the initial
   * load or any subsequent redirects. This means there will be no
   * nsIContentPolicy checks or any CheckLoadURI checks. Because of
   * this, never set the triggeringPrincipal to the system principal when
   * the URI to be loaded is controlled by a webpage.
   * If the loadingPrincipal and triggeringPrincipal are both
   * content principals, then we will always call into
   * nsIContentPolicies and CheckLoadURI. The call to nsIContentPolicies
   * and CheckLoadURI happen even if the URI to be loaded is same-origin
   * with the loadingPrincipal or triggeringPrincipal.
   */
  readonly attribute nsIPrincipal triggeringPrincipal;

  /**
   * A C++-friendly version of triggeringPrincipal.
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(TriggeringPrincipal)]
  nsIPrincipal binaryTriggeringPrincipal();

  /**
   * The remote type of the process which caused the network load to start. I.e.
   * this is the remote type of the process which provided the URL to be loaded.
   *
   * For subresource loads, this should be the same as the process which will
   * handle the response, however for document loads this may both be different
   * than the final process, as well as different from the process which starts
   * the navigation.
   *
   * This field is intentionally not perfectly preserved over IPC, and will be
   * reset to the remote type of the sending process when sent from a content
   * process to the parent process.
   */
  attribute AUTF8String triggeringRemoteType;

  /**
   * For non-document loads the principalToInherit is always null. For
   * loads of type TYPE_DOCUMENT or TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT the principalToInherit
   * might be null. If it's non null, then this is the principal that is
   * inherited if a principal needs to be inherited. If the principalToInherit
   * is null but the inherit flag is set, then the triggeringPrincipal is
   * the principal that is inherited.
   */
  attribute nsIPrincipal principalToInherit;

  /**
   * A C++-friendly version of principalToInherit.
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(PrincipalToInherit)]
  nsIPrincipal binaryPrincipalToInherit();

  /**
   * Finds the correct principal to inherit for the given channel, based on
   * the values of PrincipalToInherit and TriggeringPrincipal.
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall]
  nsIPrincipal FindPrincipalToInherit(in nsIChannel aChannel);

  /**
   * This is the ownerDocument of the LoadingNode. Unless the LoadingNode
   * is a Document, in which case the LoadingDocument is the same as the
   * LoadingNode.
   *
   * For top-level loads, and for loads originating from workers, the
   * LoadingDocument is null. When the LoadingDocument is not null, the
   * LoadingPrincipal is set to the principal of the LoadingDocument.
   */
  readonly attribute Document loadingDocument;

  /**
   * A C++-friendly version of loadingDocument (loadingNode).
   * This is the Node where the resulting resource will be used. I.e. it is
   * the Node which will get access to the result of the request. (Where
   * "get access to" might simply mean "embed" depending on the type of
   * resource that is loaded).
   *
   * For example for an <img>/<video> it is the image/video element. For
   * document loads inside <iframe> and <frame>s, the LoadingNode is the
   * <iframe>/<frame> element. For an XMLHttpRequest, it is the Document
   * which contained the JS which initiated the XHR. For a stylesheet, it
   * is the Document that contains <link rel=stylesheet>.
   *
   * For loads triggered by the HTML pre-parser, the LoadingNode is the
   * Document which is currently being parsed.
   *
   * For top-level loads, and for loads originating from workers, the
   * LoadingNode is null. If the LoadingNode is non-null, then the
   * LoadingPrincipal is the principal of the LoadingNode.
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(LoadingNode)]
  nsINode binaryLoadingNode();

  /**
   * A C++ friendly version of the loadingContext for toplevel loads.
   * Most likely you want to query the ownerDocument or LoadingNode
   * and not this context only available for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads.
   * Please note that except for loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT, this
   * ContextForTopLevelLoad will always return null.
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(ContextForTopLevelLoad)]
  LoadContextRef binaryContextForTopLevelLoad();

  /**
   * For all loads except loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT, the loadingContext
   * simply returns the loadingNode. For loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT this
   * will return the context available for top-level loads which
   * do not have a loadingNode.
   */
  [binaryname(LoadingContextXPCOM)]
  readonly attribute nsISupports loadingContext;

  /**
   * A C++ friendly version of the loadingContext.
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(GetLoadingContext)]
  LoadContextRef binaryGetLoadingContext();

  /**
   * The securityFlags of that channel.
   */
  readonly attribute nsSecurityFlags securityFlags;

%{C++
  inline nsSecurityFlags GetSecurityFlags()
  {
    nsSecurityFlags result;
    mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetSecurityFlags(&result);
    MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
    return result;
  }
%}

  /**
   * The sandboxFlags of that channel.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long sandboxFlags;

  /**
  *   The TriggingSandboxFlags are the SandboxFlags of the entity
  *   responsible for causing the load to occur.
  */
  [infallible] attribute unsigned long triggeringSandboxFlags;


  /**
  * The window id and storage access status of the window of the
  * context that triggered the load. This is used to allow self-initiated
  * same-origin navigations to propogate their "has storage access" bit
  * to the next Document.
  */
  [infallible] attribute unsigned long long triggeringWindowId;
  [infallible] attribute boolean triggeringStorageAccess;

  /**
   * Allows to query only the security mode bits from above.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long securityMode;

  /**
   * This flag is used for any browsing context where we should not sniff
   * the content type. E.g if an iframe has the XCTO nosniff header, then
   * that flag is set to true so we skip content sniffing for that browsing
   * context.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean skipContentSniffing;

  /**
   * (default) If this flag is set, it has not yet been determined if the
   * HTTPS-Only mode will upgrade the request.
   */
  const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_UNINITIALIZED = (1 << 0);

  /**
   * Indicates that this is the first time the request gets upgraded, and thus
   * the HTTPS-Only StreamListener hasn't been registered yet. Even though there
   * might be multiple channels per request that have to be upgraded (e.g.,
   * because of redirects), the StreamListener only has to be attached to one
   * channel.
   */
  const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_NOT_REGISTERED = (1 << 1);

  /**
   * Indicates that the request will get upgraded, and the HTTPS-Only
   * StreamListener got registered.
   */
  const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_REGISTERED = (1 << 2);

  /**
   * This flag can be manually set if the HTTPS-Only mode should exempt the
   * request and not upgrade it. (e.g in the case of OCSP.
   */
  const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT = (1 << 3);

  /**
   * This flag can only ever be set on top-level loads. It indicates
   * that the top-level https connection succeeded. This flag is mostly
   * used to counter time-outs which allows to cancel the channel
   * if the https load has not started.
   */
  const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS = (1 << 4);

   /**
   * This flag can only ever be set on downloads. It indicates
   * that the download https connection succeeded. This flag is mostly
   * used to counter time-outs which allows to cancel the channel
   * if the https load has not started.
   */
  const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS = (1 << 5);

  /**
   * This flag indicates that the request should not be logged to the
   * console.
   */
  const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_DO_NOT_LOG_TO_CONSOLE = (1 << 6);

  /**
   * This flag indicates that the request was upgraded by https-first mode.
   */
  const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_HTTPS_FIRST = (1 << 7);

  /**
   * This flag indicates that the request should not be blocked by ORB.
   */
  const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_BYPASS_ORB = (1 << 8);

  /**
   * This flag indicates that HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT should be
   * set the next time HTTPS-Only exemptions are checked
   * and HTTPS-First is enabled.
   */
  const unsigned long HTTPS_FIRST_EXEMPT_NEXT_LOAD = (1 << 9);

  /**
   * Upgrade state of HTTPS-Only Mode. The flag HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT can get
   * set on requests that should be excempt from an upgrade.
   */
  [infallible] attribute unsigned long httpsOnlyStatus;

  /**
   * Reflects whetehr this is an HTTP Strict Transport Security host
   */
[infallible] attribute boolean hstsStatus;

  /**
   * Returns true if at the time of the loadinfo construction the document
   * that triggered this load has the bit hasValidTransientUserGestureActivation
   * set or the load was triggered from External. (Mostly this bool is used
   * in the context of Sec-Fetch-User.)
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean hasValidUserGestureActivation;

  /**
   * Returns true if at the time of the loadinfo construction the document that
   * triggered this load was user activated. This flag is being used to indicate
   * whether a document load with a text fragment is allowed to scroll to the
   * first text directive.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean textDirectiveUserActivation;

  /**
   * Returns true if the current load is a same-document navigation.
   *
   * Note: There exists no IPC plumbing for this field. If this object crosses
   *       a process boundary, it is not same-document, and the value defaults
   *       to false.
   * Also note: This flag is only meant to be used for a specific case when
   *            scrolling to a text fragment: If a same-doc load is triggered
   *            during the initial document load, and the target text has not
   *            been parsed.
   *            The flag is not being reset. If you want to use this flag for
   *            another reason, don't. Check Bug 1777171 for a stable solution.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isSameDocumentNavigation;

  /**
   * We disallow the SystemPrincipal to initiate requests to
   * the public web. This flag is to allow exceptions.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean allowDeprecatedSystemRequests;

  /**
   * Only ever returns true if the loadinfo is of TYPE_SCRIPT and
   * the script was created by the HTML parser.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean parserCreatedScript;

  /**
   * True if this request is known to have been triggered by a user
   * manually requesting the URI to be saved.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isUserTriggeredSave;

  /**
   * True if this request is from DevTools.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isInDevToolsContext;

  /**
   * True if this request is embedded in a context that can't be third-party
   * (i.e. an iframe embedded in a cross-origin parent window). If this is
   * false, then this request may be third-party if it's a third-party to
   * loadingPrincipal.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isInThirdPartyContext;

  /**
   * True if this request is a third party in respect to the top-level window.
   *
   * Note that this doesn't consider the parent window. I.e. It will still
   * return false even in the case that the parent is cross-origin but the
   * top-level is same-origin.
   *
   * This value would be set during opening the channel in parent and propagate
   * to the channel in the content.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isThirdPartyContextToTopWindow;

  /**
   * See the SEC_COOKIES_* flags above. This attribute will never return
   * SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT, but will instead return what the policy resolves to.
   * I.e. SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN for CORS mode, and SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE
   * otherwise.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long cookiePolicy;

  /**
   * The cookie jar settings inherited from the top-level document's loadInfo.
   * It cannot be null.
   */
  attribute nsICookieJarSettings cookieJarSettings;

  cenum StoragePermissionState : 8 {
    NoStoragePermission = 0,
    HasStoragePermission = 1,
    StoragePermissionAllowListed = 2,
  };

  /**
   * The result of the storage permission check of the loading document. This
   * value would be set during opening the channel.
   */
  [infallible] attribute nsILoadInfo_StoragePermissionState
        storagePermission;

  /**
   * Get the granular overrides of fingerprinting protections associated to the
   * channel, the value will override the default fingerprinting protection
   * settings. This field will only get populated if these is one that comes
   * from the local granular overrides pref or WebCompat. Otherwise, a value of
   * Nothing() indicates no granular overrides are present for this channel.
   *
   * The RFPTarget defined in the RFPTargets.inc.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  const_MaybeRFPTarget GetOverriddenFingerprintingSettings();

  /**
   * Set the granular overrides of fingerprinting protections for the channel.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void SetOverriddenFingerprintingSettings(in RFPTarget aTargets);

  /**
   * True if the load was triggered by a meta refresh.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isMetaRefresh;

  /**
   * If forceInheritPrincipal is true, the data coming from the channel should
   * inherit its principal, even when the data is loaded over http:// or another
   * protocol that would normally use a URI-based principal.
   *
   * See the documentation for principalToInherit, which describes exactly what
   * principal is inherited.
   *
   * This attribute will never be true when loadingSandboxed is true.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean forceInheritPrincipal;

  /**
   * If forceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner is true, the data coming from the
   * channel should inherit the principal, even when the data is loaded over
   * http:// or another protocol that would normally use a URI-based principal
   * and even if the channel's .owner is not null.  This last is the difference
   * between forceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner and forceInheritPrincipal: the
   * latter does _not_ overrule the .owner setting.
   *
   * See the documentation for principalToInherit, which describes exactly what
   * principal is inherited.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean forceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner;

  /**
   * If loadingSandboxed is true, the data coming from the channel is
   * being loaded sandboxed, so it should have a nonce origin and
   * hence should use a NullPrincipal.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean loadingSandboxed;

  /**
   * If aboutBlankInherits is true, then about:blank should inherit
   * the principal.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean aboutBlankInherits;

  /**
   * If allowChrome is true, then use nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME
   * when calling CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal().
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean allowChrome;

  /**
   * If disallowScript is true, then use nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT
   * when calling CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal().
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean disallowScript;

%{C++
  uint32_t CheckLoadURIFlags() {
    uint32_t flags = nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD;
    if (GetAllowChrome()) {
      flags |= nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME;
    }
    if (GetDisallowScript()) {
      flags |= nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT;
    }
    return flags;
  }
%}

  /**
   * Returns true if SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS is set.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean dontFollowRedirects;

  /**
   * Returns true if SEC_LOAD_ERROR_PAGE is set.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean loadErrorPage;

  /**
   * True if the load was initiated by a form request.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isFormSubmission;

  /**
   * True if the load will be a get request.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isGETRequest;

  /**
   * The external contentPolicyType of the channel, used for security checks
   * like Mixed Content Blocking and Content Security Policy.
   *
   * Specifically, content policy types with _INTERNAL_ in their name will
   * never get returned from this attribute.
   */
  readonly attribute nsContentPolicyType externalContentPolicyType;

  /**
   * CSP uses this parameter to send or not CSP violation events.
   * Default value: true.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean sendCSPViolationEvents;

%{ C++
  inline ExtContentPolicyType GetExternalContentPolicyType()
  {
    nsContentPolicyType result;
    mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetExternalContentPolicyType(&result);
    MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
    return static_cast<ExtContentPolicyType>(result);
  }

%}


  /**
   * The internal contentPolicyType of the channel, used for constructing
   * RequestContext values when creating a fetch event for an intercepted
   * channel.
   *
   * This should not be used for the purposes of security checks, since
   * the content policy implementations cannot be expected to deal with
   * _INTERNAL_ values.  Please use the contentPolicyType attribute above
   * for that purpose.
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(InternalContentPolicyType)]
  nsContentPolicyType binaryInternalContentPolicyType();

  readonly attribute nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType;

  /**
   * Returns true if document or any of the documents ancestors
   * up to the toplevel document make use of the CSP directive
   * 'block-all-mixed-content'.
   *
   * Warning: If the loadingDocument is null, then the
   * blockAllMixedContent is false.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean blockAllMixedContent;

  /**
   * Returns true if document or any of the documents ancestors
   * up to the toplevel document make use of the CSP directive
   * 'upgrade-insecure-requests'.
   *
   * Warning: If the loadingDocument is null, then the
   * upgradeInsecureRequests is false.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean upgradeInsecureRequests;

  /**
   * Returns true if the the page is https and the content is upgradable from http
   * requires 'security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content' pref to be true.
   * Currently this only upgrades display content but might be expanded to other loads.
   * This is very similar in implementation to upgradeInsecureRequests but browser set.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean browserUpgradeInsecureRequests;

  /**
   * Returns true if the display content was or will get upgraded from http to https.
   * Requires 'security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content' pref to be true.
   * Flag is set purely to collect telemetry.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean browserDidUpgradeInsecureRequests;

  /**
   * Returns true if the the page is https and the content is upgradable from http
   * requires 'security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content' pref to be false.
   * See browserUpgradeInsecureRequests for more details, this only happens
   * when *not* upgrading purely for telemetry.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean browserWouldUpgradeInsecureRequests;

  /**
   * If true, toplevel data: URI navigation is allowed
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean forceAllowDataURI;

  /**
   * If true, insecure redirects to a data: URI are allowed.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean allowInsecureRedirectToDataURI;

  /**
   * If true, the content policy security check is excluded from web requests.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean skipContentPolicyCheckForWebRequest;

  /**
   * If true, this is the load of a frame's original src attribute
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean originalFrameSrcLoad;

  /**
   * The SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL flag may be dropped when a load info
   * object is created.  Specifically, it will be dropped if the SANDBOXED_ORIGIN
   * sandbox flag is also present.  This flag is set if SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL
   * was dropped.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean forceInheritPrincipalDropped;

  /**
   * This is the inner window ID of the window in which the element being
   * loaded lives.
   *
   * Note that this window ID can be 0 if the window is not
   * available.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long innerWindowID;

  /**
   * The BrowsingContext performing the load for this nsILoadInfo object.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long browsingContextID;
  [infallible] readonly attribute BrowsingContext browsingContext;

  /**
   * The BrowsingContext which the worker is associated.
   *
   * Note that this could be 0 if the load is not triggered in a WorkerScope.
   * This value is only set and used in the parent process for some sitautions
   * the channel is created in the parent process for Workers. Such as fetch().
   * In content process, it is always 0.
   * This value would not be propagated through IPC.
   */
  [infallible] attribute unsigned long long workerAssociatedBrowsingContextID;
  [infallible] readonly attribute BrowsingContext workerAssociatedBrowsingContext;

  /**
   * Only when the element being loaded is <frame src="foo.html">
   * (or, more generally, if the element QIs to nsFrameLoaderOwner),
   * the frameBrowsingContext is the browsing context containing the
   * foo.html document.
   *
   * Note: For other cases, frameBrowsingContextID is 0.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long frameBrowsingContextID;
  [infallible] readonly attribute BrowsingContext frameBrowsingContext;

  /**
   * If the element being loaded is a nsFrameLoaderOwner,
   * `targetBrowsingContext` is the Browsing Context which will contain the
   * loading document (see `frameBrowsingContext`). Otherwise, it is the
   * Browsing Context performing the load (see `browsingContext`).
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long targetBrowsingContextID;
  [infallible] readonly attribute BrowsingContext targetBrowsingContext;

  /**
   * Resets the PrincipalToInherit to a freshly created NullPrincipal
   * which inherits the origin attributes from the loadInfo.
   *
   * WARNING: Please only use that function if you know exactly what
   * you are doing!!!
   */
  void resetPrincipalToInheritToNullPrincipal();

  /**
   * Customized OriginAttributes within LoadInfo to allow overwriting of the
   * default originAttributes from the loadingPrincipal.
   *
   * In chrome side, originAttributes.privateBrowsingId will always be 0 even if
   * the usePrivateBrowsing is true, because chrome docshell won't set
   * privateBrowsingId on origin attributes (See bug 1278664). This is to make
   * sure nsILoadInfo and nsILoadContext have the same origin attributes.
   */
  [implicit_jscontext, binaryname(ScriptableOriginAttributes)]
  attribute jsval originAttributes;

  [noscript, nostdcall, binaryname(GetOriginAttributes)]
  OriginAttributes binaryGetOriginAttributes();

  [noscript, nostdcall, binaryname(SetOriginAttributes)]
  void binarySetOriginAttributes(in const_OriginAttributesRef aOriginAttrs);

%{ C++
  inline mozilla::OriginAttributes GetOriginAttributes()
  {
    mozilla::OriginAttributes result;
    mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetOriginAttributes(&result);
    MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
    return result;
  }
%}

  /**
   * Whenever a channel is evaluated by the ContentSecurityManager
   * the first time, we set this flag to true to indicate that
   * subsequent calls of AsyncOpen() do not have to enforce all
   * security checks again. E.g., after a redirect there is no
   * need to set up CORS again. We need this separate flag
   * because the redirectChain might also contain internal
   * redirects which might pollute the redirectChain so we can't
   * rely on the size of the redirectChain-array to query whether
   * a channel got redirected or not.
   *
   * Please note, once the flag is set to true it must remain true
   * throughout the lifetime of the channel. Trying to set it
   * to anything else than true will be discarded.
   *
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean initialSecurityCheckDone;

  /**
   * Returns true if the load was triggered from an external application
   * (e.g. Thunderbird). Please note that this flag will only ever be true
   * if the load is of TYPE_DOCUMENT.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean loadTriggeredFromExternal;

  /**
   * True if the tainting has been set by the service worker.
   */
  [noscript, infallible] readonly attribute boolean serviceWorkerTaintingSynthesized;

  /**
   * Whenever a channel gets redirected, append the redirect history entry of
   * the channel which contains principal referrer and remote address [before
   * the channels got redirected] to the loadinfo, so that at every point this
   * array provides us information about all the redirects this channel went
   * through.
   * @param channelToDeriveFrom the channel being redirected
   * @param aIsInternalRedirect should be true if the channel is going
   *        through an internal redirect, otherwise false.
   */
  void appendRedirectHistoryEntry(in nsIChannel channelToDeriveFrom,
                                  in boolean isInternalRedirect);

  /**
   * An array of nsIRedirectHistoryEntry which stores redirects associated
   * with this channel. This array is filled whether or not the channel has
   * ever been opened. The last element of the array is associated with the
   * most recent redirect. Please note, that this array *includes* internal
   * redirects.
   */
  [implicit_jscontext]
  readonly attribute jsval redirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects;

  /**
   * A C++-friendly version of redirectChain.
   * Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the
   * loadInfo object - use with caution!
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(RedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects)]
  nsIRedirectHistoryEntryArray binaryRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects();

  /**
   * Same as RedirectChain but does *not* include internal redirects.
   */
  [implicit_jscontext]
  readonly attribute jsval redirectChain;

  /**
   * A C++-friendly version of redirectChain.
   * Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the
   * loadInfo object - use with caution!
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(RedirectChain)]
  nsIRedirectHistoryEntryArray binaryRedirectChain();

  /**
   * This array is only filled out when we are in the parent process and we are
   * creating a loadInfo object or deserializing LoadInfoArgs into LoadInfo,
   * as we ever only need in the parent process.
   *
   * The array is meant to be a list of principals of the documents that the
   * browsing context, corresponding to this loadInfo object, is "nested through" in
   * the sense of
   * <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#browsing-context-nested-through>.
   * Note that the array does not include the principal corresponding to the frame
   * loading this request. The closest ancestor is at index zero and the top level
   * ancestor is at the last index.
   *
   * If this is a toplevel content browsing context (i.e. toplevel document in spec
   * terms), the list is empty.
   *
   * Otherwise the array is a list for the document we're nested through (again in
   * the spec sense), with the principal of that document prepended. The
   * ancestorPrincipals[0] entry for an iframe load will be the principal of the
   * iframe element's owner document. The ancestorPrincipals[0] entry for an image
   * loaded in an iframe will be the principal of the iframe element's owner
   * document. This matches the ordering specified for Location.ancestorOrigins.
   *
   * Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the loadInfo object - use
   * with caution!
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall]
  PrincipalArrayRef AncestorPrincipals();

  /**
   * An array of BrowsingContext IDs which correspond to nsILoadInfo::AncestorPrincipals
   * above.  AncestorBrowsingContextIDs[0] is the BrowsingContext ID of the frame
   * associated with the principal at ancestorPrincipals[0], and so forth.
   *
   * Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the
   * loadInfo object - use with caution!
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall]
  Uint64ArrayRef AncestorBrowsingContextIDs();

  /**
   * Sets the list of unsafe headers according to CORS spec, as well as
   * potentially forces a preflight.
   * Note that you do not need to set the Content-Type header. That will be
   * automatically detected as needed.
   *
   * Only call this function when using the SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT mode.
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall]
  void setCorsPreflightInfo(in CStringArrayRef unsafeHeaders,
                            in boolean forcePreflight);

  /**
   * A C++-friendly getter for the list of cors-unsafe headers.
   * Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the
   * loadInfo object - use with caution!
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(CorsUnsafeHeaders)]
  CStringArrayRef corsUnsafeHeaders();

  /**
   * Returns value set through setCorsPreflightInfo.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean forcePreflight;

  /**
   * A C++ friendly getter for the forcePreflight flag.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean isPreflight;

  /**
  * Constants reflecting the channel tainting.  These are mainly defined here
  * for script.  Internal C++ code should use the enum defined in LoadTainting.h.
  * See LoadTainting.h for documentation.
  */
  const unsigned long TAINTING_BASIC = 0;
  const unsigned long TAINTING_CORS = 1;
  const unsigned long TAINTING_OPAQUE = 2;

  /**
   * Determine the associated channel's current tainting.  Note, this can
   * change due to a service worker intercept, so it should be checked after
   * OnStartRequest() fires.
   */
  readonly attribute unsigned long tainting;

  /**
   * Note a new tainting level and possibly increase the current tainting
   * to match.  If the tainting level is already greater than the given
   * value, then there is no effect.  It is not possible to reduce the tainting
   * level on an existing channel/loadinfo.
   */
  void maybeIncreaseTainting(in unsigned long aTainting);

  /**
   * Various helper code to provide more convenient C++ access to the tainting
   * attribute and maybeIncreaseTainting().
   */
%{C++
  static_assert(TAINTING_BASIC == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::Basic),
                "basic tainting enums should match");
  static_assert(TAINTING_CORS == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::CORS),
                "cors tainting enums should match");
  static_assert(TAINTING_OPAQUE == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::Opaque),
                "opaque tainting enums should match");

  mozilla::LoadTainting GetTainting()
  {
    uint32_t tainting = TAINTING_BASIC;
    MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(GetTainting(&tainting));
    return static_cast<mozilla::LoadTainting>(tainting);
  }

  void MaybeIncreaseTainting(mozilla::LoadTainting aTainting)
  {
    uint32_t tainting = static_cast<uint32_t>(aTainting);
    MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(MaybeIncreaseTainting(tainting));
  }
%}

  /**
   * Returns true if this load is for top level document.
   * Note that the load for a sub-frame's document will return false here.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean isTopLevelLoad;

  /**
   * If this is non-null, this property represents two things: (1) the
   * URI to be used for the principal if the channel with this loadinfo
   * gets a principal based on URI and (2) the URI to use for a document
   * created from the channel with this loadinfo.
   */
  attribute nsIURI resultPrincipalURI;

  /**
   * This is the URI used to create the most recent channel in the load's
   * redirect chain, if it's different from channel's `originalURI`.
   * This is always null for loads not handled by DocumentLoadListener. If
   * non-null, channelCreationOriginalURI will be used instead of channel's
   * originalURI to re-create the channel in the final content process selected
   * to perform the load.
   */
  attribute nsIURI channelCreationOriginalURI;

  /**
   * Returns a unique nsID used to construct the null principal for the
   * resulting resource if the SANDBOXED_ORIGIN flag is set.  This is used by
   * GetChannelResultPrincipal() to ensure that the same null principal is
   * returned every time.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  nsIDRef GetSandboxedNullPrincipalID();

  /**
   * Generates a new nsID to be returned by a future call to
   * `GetSandboxedNullPrincipalID()`.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void ResetSandboxedNullPrincipalID();

  /**
   * Return the top-level principal, which is the principal of the top-level
   * window.
   */
  [notxpcom, nostdcall] readonly attribute nsIPrincipal topLevelPrincipal;

  /**
   * Note which client (i.e. global) initiated this network request.  All
   * nsGlobalWindow and WorkerPrivate can be converted to a ClientInfo to
   * be set here.  While this is being added to support service worker
   * FetchEvent, it can also be used to communicate other information about
   * the source global context in the future.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void SetClientInfo(in const_ClientInfoRef aClientInfo);

  /**
   * Get the ClientInfo for the global that initiated the network request,
   * if it has been set.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  const_MaybeClientInfoRef GetClientInfo();

  /**
   * Give a pre-allocated ClientSource to the channel LoadInfo.  This is
   * intended to be used by docshell when loading windows without an
   * initial about:blank document.  The docshell will allocate the ClientSource
   * to represent the client that will be created as a result of the navigation
   * network request.  If the channel succeeds and remains same-origin, then
   * the result nsGlobalWindow will take ownership of the reserved ClientSource.
   *
   * This method is also called when a cross-origin redirect occurs.  A new
   * ClientSource with a different UUID must be created in this case.
   *
   * This method automatically calls SetReservedClientInfo() with the
   * ClientSource::Info().
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void GiveReservedClientSource(in UniqueClientSourceMove aClientSource);

  /**
   * This method takes ownership of the reserved ClientSource previously
   * provided in GiveReservedClientSource().  It may return nullptr if the
   * nsILoadInfo does not own a ClientSource object.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  UniqueClientSource TakeReservedClientSource();

  /**
   * Note the reserved client that be created if this non-subresource
   * network request succeeds.  Depending on the type of client this
   * may be called directly or indirectly via GiveReservedClientSource().
   * For example, web workers do not call give their ClientSource to
   * the nsILoadInfo, but must still call this method to indicate the
   * reserved client for their main script load.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void SetReservedClientInfo(in const_ClientInfoRef aClientInfo);

  /**
   * This will clear any existing reserved or initial client and override
   * it with the given reserved client.  This is similar to calling
   * TakeReservedClientSource() and then GiveReservedClientSource() with
   * a new client as ClientChannelHelper does.  This method is needed,
   * though, to perform this operation in the parent process where
   * the LoadInfo does not have direct access to a ClientSource.
   *
   * If in doubt, do not call this method.  Its really only needed for
   * a specific redirect case where the child has created a new client on
   * redirect and we need to override the parent side's reserved client
   * to match.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void OverrideReservedClientInfoInParent(in const_ClientInfoRef aClientInfo);

  /**
   * Return the reserved ClientInfo for this load, if one has been set.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  const_MaybeClientInfoRef GetReservedClientInfo();

  /**
   * Note that this non-subresource network request will result in
   * re-using an existing "initial" active client.  This mainly only
   * happens when an initial about:blank document is replaced with
   * a real load in a window.  In these cases we need to track this
   * initial client so that we may report its existence in a FetchEvent.
   *
   * Note, an nsILoadInfo may only have a reserved client or an
   * initial client.  It should never have both.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void SetInitialClientInfo(in const_ClientInfoRef aClientInfo);

  /**
   * Return the initial ClientInfo for this load, if one has been set.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  const_MaybeClientInfoRef GetInitialClientInfo();

  /**
   * Note that this network request should be controlled by a service worker.
   * For non-subresource requests this may be set during the load when
   * the first service worker interception occurs.  For subresource requests
   * it may be set by the source client if its already controlled by a
   * service worker.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void SetController(in const_ServiceWorkerDescriptorRef aServiceWorker);

  /**
   * Clear the service worker controller for this channel.  This should only
   * be used for window navigation redirects.  By default we want to keep
   * the controller in all other cases.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void ClearController();

  /**
   * Get the service worker controlling this network request, if one has
   * been set.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  const_MaybeServiceWorkerDescriptorRef GetController();

  /**
   * Set a custom performance storage. This is meant to be executed only for
   * workers. If a PerformanceStorage is not set, the loadingDocument->Window
   * Performance object will be returned instead.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void SetPerformanceStorage(in PerformanceStoragePtr aPerformanceStorage);

  /**
   * Get the custom PerformanceStorage if set by SetPerformanceStorage.
   * Otherwise the loadingDocument->Window Performance object will be returned
   * instead if all the following conditions are met:
   * - the triggeringPrincipal is the same as the loadingDocument's principal.
   * - if the external content policy type is TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT then loading
   *   wasn't caused by processing the attributes of the browsing context
   *   container.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  PerformanceStoragePtr GetPerformanceStorage();

  /**
   * Returns the CSP (or Preload CSP for preloads) which should be enforced
   * when fetching the resource this loadinfo belongs to.
   *
   * a) Non-navigations:
   * For non-navigation loads, GetCsp() returns what the spec refers to as the
   * "request's client's global object's CSP list". In practice, if this is the
   * loadinfo of a subresource load (e.g an image load), then GetCsp() or
   * GetPreloadCSP() returns the CSP of the document which embeds the image.
   * The returned CSP includes any policy delivered through the HTTP header or
   * also through the meta tag (modulo the difference for preloads, e.g. image
   * preloads have to query GetPreloadCsp() because at the time of preloading
   * we are not entirely sure if the Meta CSP will be applied to the document
   * in the end or not). Please note that GetCSPToInherit() called on a
   * loadinfo for any non-navigation always returns null.
   *
   * b) Navigations:
   *   * Top-level loads:
   *     For top-level loads (navigations) GetCsp() will return null, unless
   *     the navigation is started by a WebExtension, in which case it will
   *     return the CSP of the webextension, if any.
   *     If you need to query the CSP that potentially should apply to the
   *     new top-level load, you have to query GetCspToInherit(), which is
   *     the CSP of the request's client's global object, just like GetCsp()
   *     is for non-navigation requests.
   *
   *   * Iframe-loads:
   *     For iframe-loads (navigations) GetCsp() will return the CSP of the
   *     parent document, unless the navigation is started by a WebExtension,
   *     in which case it will return the CSP of the webextension, if any.
   *
   * If you need to query the CSP that should potentially be inherited
   * into the new document, you have to query GetCSPToInherit().
   *
   * TODO Bug 1557114:
   * After evaluating what CSP to use for frame navigations we should
   * update the above documentation to match the outcome of Bug 1557114.
   */
  [notxpcom,nostdcall] CSPRef GetCsp();
  [notxpcom,nostdcall] CSPRef GetPreloadCsp();
  [notxpcom,nostdcall] CSPRef GetCspToInherit();

  /**
    * The possibly cross-origin container feature policy required to
    * initialize the feature policy of a document load.
    */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  MaybeFeaturePolicyInfo GetContainerFeaturePolicyInfo();
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void SetContainerFeaturePolicyInfo(in const_FeaturePolicyInfoRef aContainerFeaturePolicy);

  /**
    * The service worker and fetch specifications require returning the
    * exact tainting level of the Response passed to FetchEvent.respondWith().
    * This method allows us to override the tainting level in that case.
    *
    * NOTE: This should not be used outside of service worker code! Use
    *       nsILoadInfo::MaybeIncreaseTainting() instead.
   */
  [noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
  void SynthesizeServiceWorkerTainting(in LoadTainting aTainting);

  /**
    * The top-level document has been user-interacted.
    */
  [infallible] attribute boolean documentHasUserInteracted;

  /**
    * During a top-level document channel redirect from tracking to
    * non-tracking resources, our anti-tracking heuristic, grants the storage
    * access permission for a short amount of seconds (See
    * privacy.restrict3rdpartystorage.expiration_redirect pref).
    * We use this flag to remember this decision even if this channel is part
    * of a chain of redirects.
    */
  [infallible] attribute boolean allowListFutureDocumentsCreatedFromThisRedirectChain;

  /**
   * Indicates that we need to check if we should apply the anti-tracking
   * heuristic after the channel has been classified.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean needForCheckingAntiTrackingHeuristic;

  /**
   * A snapshot of the nonce at load start time which is used for CSP
   * checks and only set for:
   *  * TYPE_SCRIPT and
   *  * TYPE_STYLESHEET
   */
  attribute AString cspNonce;

  // Subresource Integrity (SRI) metadata.
  attribute AString integrityMetadata;

  /**
   * List of possible reasons the request associated with this load info
   * may have been blocked, set by various content blocking checkers.
   */
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_NONE = 0;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSDISABLED = 1001;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSDIDNOTSUCCEED = 1002;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSREQUESTNOTHTTP = 1003;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMULTIPLEALLOWORIGINNOTALLOWED = 1004;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMISSINGALLOWORIGIN = 1005;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSNOTSUPPORTINGCREDENTIALS = 1006;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSALLOWORIGINNOTMATCHINGORIGIN = 1007;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMISSINGALLOWCREDENTIALS = 1008;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSORIGINHEADERNOTADDED = 1009;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSEXTERNALREDIRECTNOTALLOWED = 1010;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSPREFLIGHTDIDNOTSUCCEED = 1011;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSINVALIDALLOWMETHOD = 1012;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMETHODNOTFOUND = 1013;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSINVALIDALLOWHEADER = 1014;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMISSINGALLOWHEADERFROMPREFLIGHT = 1015;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_MALWARE_URI = 2001;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_PHISHING_URI = 2002;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_UNWANTED_URI = 2003;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_TRACKING_URI = 2004;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_BLOCKED_URI = 2005;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_HARMFUL_URI = 2006;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_CRYPTOMINING_URI = 2007;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_FINGERPRINTING_URI = 2008;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_SOCIALTRACKING_URI = 2009;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_EMAILTRACKING_URI = 2010;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_MIXED_BLOCKED = 3001;
  // The general reason comes from nsCSPContext::permitsInternal(),
  // which is way too generic to distinguish an exact reason.
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_GENERAL = 4000;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_NO_DATA_PROTOCOL = 4001;
  // removed 4002
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_CONTENT_BLOCKED = 4003;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_DATA_DOCUMENT = 4004;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_WEB_BROWSER = 4005;
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_PRELOAD = 4006;
  // The reason used when SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_* is set and not satisifed.
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_NOT_SAME_ORIGIN = 5000;
  // The reason used when an extension cancels the request via the WebRequest api.
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_EXTENSION_WEBREQUEST = 6000;
  // The reason used when a request is cancelled via WebDriver BiDi network interception.
  const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_WEBDRIVER_BIDI = 7000;

  /**
   * If the request associated with this load info was blocked by some of
   * our content or load blockers, the reason can be found here.
   * Note that setting this attribute has NO EFFECT on blocking the request.
   * This attribute is only informative!
   *
   * By default the value is '0' - NONE.
   * Each write rewrites the last value.
   * Can be accessed only on a single thread.
   */
  [infallible] attribute unsigned long requestBlockingReason;

  /**
    * The object in charged to receive CSP violation events. It can be null.
    * This attribute will be merged into the CSP object eventually.
    * See bug 1500908.
    */
  attribute nsICSPEventListener cspEventListener;

  /**
   * This attribute will be true if this is a load triggered by
   * https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#process-the-iframe-attributes
   * or https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/obsolete.html#process-the-frame-attributes
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean isFromProcessingFrameAttributes;

  cenum CrossOriginOpenerPolicy : 8 {
    OPENER_POLICY_UNSAFE_NONE = 0,
    OPENER_POLICY_SAME_ORIGIN = 1,
    OPENER_POLICY_SAME_ORIGIN_ALLOW_POPUPS = 2,
    OPENER_POLICY_EMBEDDER_POLICY_REQUIRE_CORP_FLAG = 0x10,
    OPENER_POLICY_SAME_ORIGIN_EMBEDDER_POLICY_REQUIRE_CORP =
        OPENER_POLICY_SAME_ORIGIN |
        OPENER_POLICY_EMBEDDER_POLICY_REQUIRE_CORP_FLAG
  };

  cenum CrossOriginEmbedderPolicy : 8 {
    EMBEDDER_POLICY_NULL = 0,
    EMBEDDER_POLICY_REQUIRE_CORP = 1,
    EMBEDDER_POLICY_CREDENTIALLESS = 2,
  };

  /**
   * This attribute is the loading context's cross origin embedder policy.
   * The value is initialized with corresponding WindowContext which get by
   * innerWindowIID in the nsILoadInfo.
   * It also could be set by workers when fetch is called under
   * the workers' scope.
   */
  [infallible] attribute nsILoadInfo_CrossOriginEmbedderPolicy
        loadingEmbedderPolicy;

  /**
   * This attribute will be true if the top level document has COEP:
   * credentialless enabled in Origin Trial.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isOriginTrialCoepCredentiallessEnabledForTopLevel;
  /**
   * This attribute will be true if this is a load triggered by a media
   * element.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isMediaRequest;

  /**
   * This attribute will be true if this is a load triggered by a media
   * element and it's an initial request.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isMediaInitialRequest;

  /**
   * This attribute will be true if the fetch request is from object or embed
   * elements
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isFromObjectOrEmbed;

  /**
   * This attribute will be true if the URL is known to be possibly broken and
   * CheckForBrokenChromeURL and RecordZeroLengthEvent should be skipped.
   */
  [infallible] readonly attribute boolean shouldSkipCheckForBrokenURLOrZeroSized;

  /**
   * If this is non-null, this property holds the URI as it was before query
   * stripping was performed.
   */
  attribute nsIURI unstrippedURI;

  /**
   * Propagated information from InterceptedHttpChannel
   * It should be null when the channel is not created from FetchEvent.request
   * or ServiceWorker NavigationPreload.
   * nsIFetchEventInfo is C++ only, so it is not an attribute.
   */
  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(InterceptionInfo)]
  nsIInterceptionInfo binaryInterceptionInfo();

  [noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(SetInterceptionInfo)]
  void binarySetInterceptionInfo(in nsIInterceptionInfo info);

  /**
   * Whether nsICookieInjector has injected a cookie for this request to
   * handle a cookie banner. This is only done for top-level requests.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean hasInjectedCookieForCookieBannerHandling;

  /**
   * Whether the load has gone through the URL bar, where the fixup had to add * the protocol scheme.
   */
   [infallible] attribute boolean wasSchemelessInput;

  cenum HTTPSUpgradeTelemetryType : 32 {
    NOT_INITIALIZED = 0,
    NO_UPGRADE = (1 << 0),
    ALREADY_HTTPS = (1 << 1),
    HSTS = (1 << 2),
    HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADE = (1 << 3),
    HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADE_DOWNGRADE = (1 << 4),
    HTTPS_FIRST_UPGRADE = (1 << 5),
    HTTPS_FIRST_UPGRADE_DOWNGRADE = (1 << 6),
    HTTPS_FIRST_SCHEMELESS_UPGRADE = (1 << 7),
    HTTPS_FIRST_SCHEMELESS_UPGRADE_DOWNGRADE = (1 << 8),
    CSP_UIR = (1 << 9),
    HTTPS_RR = (1 << 10),
    WEB_EXTENSION_UPGRADE = (1 << 11),
    UPGRADE_EXCEPTION = (1 << 12),
    SKIP_HTTPS_UPGRADE = (1 << 13),
  };

  /**
   * Solely for the use of collecting Telemetry for HTTPS upgrades.
   */
  [infallible] attribute nsILoadInfo_HTTPSUpgradeTelemetryType httpsUpgradeTelemetry;

  /**
   * Is this the first load in a new pop-up window/tab?
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean isNewWindowTarget;

  /**
   * When true, this load will never be upgraded to HTTPS.
   */
  [infallible] attribute boolean skipHTTPSUpgrade;
};