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gecko-dev/netwerk/base/nsILoadInfo.idl

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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
* vim: ft=cpp tw=78 sw=2 et ts=2 sts=2 cin
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsISupports.idl"
#include "nsIContentPolicy.idl"
#include "nsIScriptSecurityManager.idl"
#include "nsIInterceptionInfo.idl"
interface nsIChannel;
interface nsIContentSecurityPolicy;
interface nsICookieJarSettings;
interface nsICSPEventListener;
interface nsINode;
interface nsIPrincipal;
interface nsIRedirectHistoryEntry;
interface nsIURI;
webidl Document;
webidl BrowsingContext;
native LoadContextRef(already_AddRefed<nsISupports>);
%{C++
#include "nsTArray.h"
#include "mozilla/LoadTainting.h"
#include "mozilla/OriginAttributes.h"
#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h"
#include "nsRFPService.h"
#include "nsStringFwd.h"
namespace mozilla {
namespace dom {
class ClientInfo;
class ClientSource;
struct FeaturePolicyInfo;
class PerformanceStorage;
class ServiceWorkerDescriptor;
} // namespace dom
} // namespace mozilla
%}
[ref] native nsIRedirectHistoryEntryArray(const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIRedirectHistoryEntry>>);
native OriginAttributes(mozilla::OriginAttributes);
[ref] native const_OriginAttributesRef(const mozilla::OriginAttributes);
[ref] native CStringArrayRef(const nsTArray<nsCString>);
[ref] native StringArrayRef(const nsTArray<nsString>);
[ref] native Uint64ArrayRef(const nsTArray<uint64_t>);
[ref] native PrincipalArrayRef(const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>);
[ref] native const_ClientInfoRef(const mozilla::dom::ClientInfo);
native UniqueClientSource(mozilla::UniquePtr<mozilla::dom::ClientSource>);
native UniqueClientSourceMove(mozilla::UniquePtr<mozilla::dom::ClientSource>&&);
[ref] native const_MaybeClientInfoRef(const mozilla::Maybe<mozilla::dom::ClientInfo>);
[ref] native const_ServiceWorkerDescriptorRef(const mozilla::dom::ServiceWorkerDescriptor);
[ref] native const_MaybeServiceWorkerDescriptorRef(const mozilla::Maybe<mozilla::dom::ServiceWorkerDescriptor>);
[ref] native const_MaybeRFPTarget(const mozilla::Maybe<mozilla::RFPTarget>);
native RFPTarget(mozilla::RFPTarget);
[ptr] native PerformanceStoragePtr(mozilla::dom::PerformanceStorage);
native LoadTainting(mozilla::LoadTainting);
native CSPRef(already_AddRefed<nsIContentSecurityPolicy>);
native MaybeFeaturePolicyInfo(mozilla::Maybe<mozilla::dom::FeaturePolicyInfo>);
[ref] native const_FeaturePolicyInfoRef(const mozilla::dom::FeaturePolicyInfo);
typedef unsigned long nsSecurityFlags;
/**
* The LoadInfo object contains information about a network load, why it
* was started, and how we plan on using the resulting response.
* If a network request is redirected, the new channel will receive a new
* LoadInfo object. The new object will contain mostly the same
* information as the pre-redirect one, but updated as appropriate.
* For detailed information about what parts of LoadInfo are updated on
* redirect, see documentation on individual properties.
*/
[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(ddc65bf9-2f60-41ab-b22a-4f1ae9efcd36)]
interface nsILoadInfo : nsISupports
{
/**
* The following five flags determine the security mode and hence what kind of
* security checks should be performed throughout the lifetime of the channel.
*
* * SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT
* * SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED
* * SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT
* * SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL
* * SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT
*
* Exactly one of these flags are required to be set in order to allow
* the channel to perform the correct security checks (SOP, CORS, ...) and
* return the correct result principal. If none or more than one of these
* flags are set AsyncOpen will fail.
*/
/**
* Warning: Never use this flag when creating a new channel!
* Only use this flag if you have to create a temporary LoadInfo
* for performing an explicit nsIContentPolicy check, like e.g.
* when loading something from the cache that needs an explicit
* nsIContentPolicy check. In all other cases pick one of the
* security flags underneath.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_ONLY_FOR_EXPLICIT_CONTENTSEC_CHECK = 0;
/*
* Enforce the same origin policy where loads inherit the principal.
* See the documentation for principalToInherit, which describes exactly what
* principal is inherited.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT = (1<<0);
/*
* Enforce the same origin policy and data: loads are blocked.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED = (1<<1);
/**
* Allow loads from other origins. Loads which inherit the principal should
* see the documentation for principalToInherit, which describes exactly what
* principal is inherited.
*
* Commonly used by plain <img>, <video>, <link rel=stylesheet> etc.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT = (1 << 2);
/**
* Allow loads from other origins. Loads from data: will be allowed,
* but the resulting resource will get a null principal.
* Used in blink/webkit for <iframe>s. Likely also the mode
* that should be used by most Chrome code.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL = (1<<3);
/**
* Allow loads from any origin, but require CORS for cross-origin loads.
* See the documentation for principalToInherit, which describes exactly what
* principal is inherited.
*
* Commonly used by <img crossorigin>, <video crossorigin>,
* XHR, fetch(), etc.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT = (1<<4);
/**
* Choose cookie policy. The default policy is equivalent to "INCLUDE" for
* SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_* and SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_* modes, and
* equivalent to "SAME_ORIGIN" for SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT mode.
*
* This means that if you want to perform a CORS load with credentials, pass
* SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE.
*
* Note that these flags are still subject to the user's cookie policies.
* For example, if the user is blocking 3rd party cookies, those cookies
* will be blocked no matter which of these flags are set.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT = (0 << 5);
const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE = (1 << 5);
const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN = (2 << 5);
const unsigned long SEC_COOKIES_OMIT = (3 << 5);
/**
* Force inheriting of the principal. See the documentation for
* principalToInherit, which describes exactly what principal is inherited.
*
* Setting this flag will cause GetChannelResultPrincipal to return the
* principal to be inherited as the channel principal.
*
* This will happen independently of the scheme of the URI that the
* channel is loading.
*
* So if the principal that gets inherited is "http://a.com/", and the channel
* is loading the URI "http://b.com/whatever", GetChannelResultPrincipal
* will return a principal from "http://a.com/".
*
* This flag can not be used together with SANDBOXED_ORIGIN sandbox flag. If
* both are passed to the LoadInfo constructor then this flag will be dropped.
* If you need to know whether this flag would have been present but was dropped
* due to sandboxing, check for the forceInheritPrincipalDropped flag.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL = (1<<7);
/**
* Inherit the Principal for about:blank.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_ABOUT_BLANK_INHERITS = (1<<9);
/**
* Allow access to chrome: packages that are content accessible.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_ALLOW_CHROME = (1<<10);
/**
* Disallow access to javascript: uris.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_DISALLOW_SCRIPT = (1<<11);
/**
* Don't follow redirects. Instead the redirect response is returned
* as a successful response for the channel.
*
* Redirects not initiated by a server response, i.e. REDIRECT_INTERNAL and
* REDIRECT_STS_UPGRADE, are still followed.
*
* Note: If this flag is set and the channel response is a redirect, then
* the response body might not be available.
* This can happen if the redirect was cached.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS = (1<<12);
/**
* Load an error page, it should be one of following : about:neterror,
* about:certerror, about:blocked, about:tabcrashed or about:restartrequired.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_LOAD_ERROR_PAGE = (1<<13);
/**
* Force inheriting of the principal, overruling any owner that might be set
* on the channel. (Please note that channel.owner is deprecated and will be
* removed within Bug 1286838). See the documentation for principalToInherit,
* which describes exactly what principal is inherited.
*
* Setting this flag will cause GetChannelResultPrincipal to return the
* principal to be inherited as the channel principal.
*
* This will happen independently of the scheme of the URI that the
* channel is loading.
*/
const unsigned long SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL_OVERRULE_OWNER = (1<<14);
/**
* This is the principal of the network request's caller/requester where
* the resulting resource will be used. I.e. it is the principal which
* will get access to the result of the request. (Where "get access to"
* might simply mean "embed" depending on the type of resource that is
* loaded).
*
* For example for an image, it is the principal of the document where
* the image is rendered. For a stylesheet it is the principal of the
* document where the stylesheet will be applied.
*
* So if document at http://a.com/page.html loads an image from
* http://b.com/pic.jpg, then loadingPrincipal will be
* http://a.com/page.html.
*
* For <iframe> and <frame> loads, the LoadingPrincipal is the
* principal of the parent document. For top-level loads, the
* LoadingPrincipal is null. For all loads except top-level loads
* the LoadingPrincipal is never null.
*
* If the loadingPrincipal is the system principal, no security checks
* will be done at all. There will be no security checks on the initial
* load or any subsequent redirects. This means there will be no
* nsIContentPolicy checks or any CheckLoadURI checks. Because of
* this, never set the loadingPrincipal to the system principal when
* the URI to be loaded is controlled by a webpage.
* If the loadingPrincipal and triggeringPrincipal are both
* content principals, then we will always call into
* nsIContentPolicies and CheckLoadURI. The call to nsIContentPolicies
* and CheckLoadURI happen even if the URI to be loaded is same-origin
* with the loadingPrincipal or triggeringPrincipal.
*/
readonly attribute nsIPrincipal loadingPrincipal;
/**
* A C++-friendly version of triggeringPrincipal.
*
* This is a bit awkward because we can't use
* binaryname(GetLoadingPrincipal).
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall]
nsIPrincipal virtualGetLoadingPrincipal();
%{C++
nsIPrincipal* GetLoadingPrincipal() {
return VirtualGetLoadingPrincipal();
}
%}
/**
* This is the principal which caused the network load to start. I.e.
* this is the principal which provided the URL to be loaded. This is
* often the same as the LoadingPrincipal, but there are a few cases
* where that's not true.
*
* For example for loads into an <iframe>, the LoadingPrincipal is always
* the principal of the parent document. However the triggeringPrincipal
* is the principal of the document which provided the URL that the
* <iframe> is navigating to. This could be the previous document inside
* the <iframe> which set document.location. Or a document elsewhere in
* the frame tree which contained a <a target="..."> which targetted the
* <iframe>.
*
* If a stylesheet links to a sub-resource, like an @imported stylesheet,
* or a background image, then the triggeringPrincipal is the principal
* of the stylesheet, while the LoadingPrincipal is the principal of the
* document being styled.
*
* The triggeringPrincipal is never null.
*
* If the triggeringPrincipal is the system principal, no security checks
* will be done at all. There will be no security checks on the initial
* load or any subsequent redirects. This means there will be no
* nsIContentPolicy checks or any CheckLoadURI checks. Because of
* this, never set the triggeringPrincipal to the system principal when
* the URI to be loaded is controlled by a webpage.
* If the loadingPrincipal and triggeringPrincipal are both
* content principals, then we will always call into
* nsIContentPolicies and CheckLoadURI. The call to nsIContentPolicies
* and CheckLoadURI happen even if the URI to be loaded is same-origin
* with the loadingPrincipal or triggeringPrincipal.
*/
readonly attribute nsIPrincipal triggeringPrincipal;
/**
* A C++-friendly version of triggeringPrincipal.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(TriggeringPrincipal)]
nsIPrincipal binaryTriggeringPrincipal();
/**
* The remote type of the process which caused the network load to start. I.e.
* this is the remote type of the process which provided the URL to be loaded.
*
* For subresource loads, this should be the same as the process which will
* handle the response, however for document loads this may both be different
* than the final process, as well as different from the process which starts
* the navigation.
*
* This field is intentionally not perfectly preserved over IPC, and will be
* reset to the remote type of the sending process when sent from a content
* process to the parent process.
*/
attribute AUTF8String triggeringRemoteType;
/**
* For non-document loads the principalToInherit is always null. For
* loads of type TYPE_DOCUMENT or TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT the principalToInherit
* might be null. If it's non null, then this is the principal that is
* inherited if a principal needs to be inherited. If the principalToInherit
* is null but the inherit flag is set, then the triggeringPrincipal is
* the principal that is inherited.
*/
attribute nsIPrincipal principalToInherit;
/**
* A C++-friendly version of principalToInherit.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(PrincipalToInherit)]
nsIPrincipal binaryPrincipalToInherit();
/**
* Finds the correct principal to inherit for the given channel, based on
* the values of PrincipalToInherit and TriggeringPrincipal.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall]
nsIPrincipal FindPrincipalToInherit(in nsIChannel aChannel);
/**
* This is the ownerDocument of the LoadingNode. Unless the LoadingNode
* is a Document, in which case the LoadingDocument is the same as the
* LoadingNode.
*
* For top-level loads, and for loads originating from workers, the
* LoadingDocument is null. When the LoadingDocument is not null, the
* LoadingPrincipal is set to the principal of the LoadingDocument.
*/
readonly attribute Document loadingDocument;
/**
* A C++-friendly version of loadingDocument (loadingNode).
* This is the Node where the resulting resource will be used. I.e. it is
* the Node which will get access to the result of the request. (Where
* "get access to" might simply mean "embed" depending on the type of
* resource that is loaded).
*
* For example for an <img>/<video> it is the image/video element. For
* document loads inside <iframe> and <frame>s, the LoadingNode is the
* <iframe>/<frame> element. For an XMLHttpRequest, it is the Document
* which contained the JS which initiated the XHR. For a stylesheet, it
* is the Document that contains <link rel=stylesheet>.
*
* For loads triggered by the HTML pre-parser, the LoadingNode is the
* Document which is currently being parsed.
*
* For top-level loads, and for loads originating from workers, the
* LoadingNode is null. If the LoadingNode is non-null, then the
* LoadingPrincipal is the principal of the LoadingNode.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(LoadingNode)]
nsINode binaryLoadingNode();
/**
* A C++ friendly version of the loadingContext for toplevel loads.
* Most likely you want to query the ownerDocument or LoadingNode
* and not this context only available for TYPE_DOCUMENT loads.
* Please note that except for loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT, this
* ContextForTopLevelLoad will always return null.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(ContextForTopLevelLoad)]
LoadContextRef binaryContextForTopLevelLoad();
/**
* For all loads except loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT, the loadingContext
* simply returns the loadingNode. For loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT this
* will return the context available for top-level loads which
* do not have a loadingNode.
*/
[binaryname(LoadingContextXPCOM)]
readonly attribute nsISupports loadingContext;
/**
* A C++ friendly version of the loadingContext.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(GetLoadingContext)]
LoadContextRef binaryGetLoadingContext();
/**
* The securityFlags of that channel.
*/
readonly attribute nsSecurityFlags securityFlags;
%{C++
inline nsSecurityFlags GetSecurityFlags()
{
nsSecurityFlags result;
mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetSecurityFlags(&result);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
return result;
}
%}
/**
* The sandboxFlags of that channel.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long sandboxFlags;
/**
* The TriggingSandboxFlags are the SandboxFlags of the entity
* responsible for causing the load to occur.
*/
[infallible] attribute unsigned long triggeringSandboxFlags;
/**
* The window id and storage access status of the window of the
* context that triggered the load. This is used to allow self-initiated
* same-origin navigations to propogate their "has storage access" bit
* to the next Document.
*/
[infallible] attribute unsigned long long triggeringWindowId;
[infallible] attribute boolean triggeringStorageAccess;
/**
* Allows to query only the security mode bits from above.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long securityMode;
/**
* This flag is used for any browsing context where we should not sniff
* the content type. E.g if an iframe has the XCTO nosniff header, then
* that flag is set to true so we skip content sniffing for that browsing
* context.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean skipContentSniffing;
/**
* (default) If this flag is set, it has not yet been determined if the
* HTTPS-Only mode will upgrade the request.
*/
const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_UNINITIALIZED = (1 << 0);
/**
* Indicates that this is the first time the request gets upgraded, and thus
* the HTTPS-Only StreamListener hasn't been registered yet. Even though there
* might be multiple channels per request that have to be upgraded (e.g.,
* because of redirects), the StreamListener only has to be attached to one
* channel.
*/
const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_NOT_REGISTERED = (1 << 1);
/**
* Indicates that the request will get upgraded, and the HTTPS-Only
* StreamListener got registered.
*/
const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_REGISTERED = (1 << 2);
/**
* This flag can be manually set if the HTTPS-Only mode should exempt the
* request and not upgrade it. (e.g in the case of OCSP.
*/
const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT = (1 << 3);
/**
* This flag can only ever be set on top-level loads. It indicates
* that the top-level https connection succeeded. This flag is mostly
* used to counter time-outs which allows to cancel the channel
* if the https load has not started.
*/
const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS = (1 << 4);
/**
* This flag can only ever be set on downloads. It indicates
* that the download https connection succeeded. This flag is mostly
* used to counter time-outs which allows to cancel the channel
* if the https load has not started.
*/
const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS = (1 << 5);
/**
* This flag indicates that the request should not be logged to the
* console.
*/
const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_DO_NOT_LOG_TO_CONSOLE = (1 << 6);
/**
* This flag indicates that the request was upgraded by https-first mode.
*/
const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_HTTPS_FIRST = (1 << 7);
/**
* This flag indicates that the request should not be blocked by ORB.
*/
const unsigned long HTTPS_ONLY_BYPASS_ORB = (1 << 8);
/**
* This flag indicates that HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT should be
* set the next time HTTPS-Only exemptions are checked
* and HTTPS-First is enabled.
*/
const unsigned long HTTPS_FIRST_EXEMPT_NEXT_LOAD = (1 << 9);
/**
* Upgrade state of HTTPS-Only Mode. The flag HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT can get
* set on requests that should be excempt from an upgrade.
*/
[infallible] attribute unsigned long httpsOnlyStatus;
/**
* Reflects whetehr this is an HTTP Strict Transport Security host
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean hstsStatus;
/**
* Returns true if at the time of the loadinfo construction the document
* that triggered this load has the bit hasValidTransientUserGestureActivation
* set or the load was triggered from External. (Mostly this bool is used
* in the context of Sec-Fetch-User.)
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean hasValidUserGestureActivation;
/**
* Returns true if at the time of the loadinfo construction the document that
* triggered this load was user activated. This flag is being used to indicate
* whether a document load with a text fragment is allowed to scroll to the
* first text directive.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean textDirectiveUserActivation;
/**
* Returns true if the current load is a same-document navigation.
*
* Note: There exists no IPC plumbing for this field. If this object crosses
* a process boundary, it is not same-document, and the value defaults
* to false.
* Also note: This flag is only meant to be used for a specific case when
* scrolling to a text fragment: If a same-doc load is triggered
* during the initial document load, and the target text has not
* been parsed.
* The flag is not being reset. If you want to use this flag for
* another reason, don't. Check Bug 1777171 for a stable solution.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isSameDocumentNavigation;
/**
* We disallow the SystemPrincipal to initiate requests to
* the public web. This flag is to allow exceptions.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean allowDeprecatedSystemRequests;
/**
* Only ever returns true if the loadinfo is of TYPE_SCRIPT and
* the script was created by the HTML parser.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean parserCreatedScript;
/**
* True if this request is known to have been triggered by a user
* manually requesting the URI to be saved.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isUserTriggeredSave;
/**
* True if this request is from DevTools.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isInDevToolsContext;
/**
* True if this request is embedded in a context that can't be third-party
* (i.e. an iframe embedded in a cross-origin parent window). If this is
* false, then this request may be third-party if it's a third-party to
* loadingPrincipal.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isInThirdPartyContext;
/**
* True if this request is a third party in respect to the top-level window.
*
* Note that this doesn't consider the parent window. I.e. It will still
* return false even in the case that the parent is cross-origin but the
* top-level is same-origin.
*
* This value would be set during opening the channel in parent and propagate
* to the channel in the content.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isThirdPartyContextToTopWindow;
/**
* See the SEC_COOKIES_* flags above. This attribute will never return
* SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT, but will instead return what the policy resolves to.
* I.e. SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN for CORS mode, and SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE
* otherwise.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long cookiePolicy;
/**
* The cookie jar settings inherited from the top-level document's loadInfo.
* It cannot be null.
*/
attribute nsICookieJarSettings cookieJarSettings;
cenum StoragePermissionState : 8 {
NoStoragePermission = 0,
HasStoragePermission = 1,
StoragePermissionAllowListed = 2,
};
/**
* The result of the storage permission check of the loading document. This
* value would be set during opening the channel.
*/
[infallible] attribute nsILoadInfo_StoragePermissionState
storagePermission;
/**
* Get the granular overrides of fingerprinting protections associated to the
* channel, the value will override the default fingerprinting protection
* settings. This field will only get populated if these is one that comes
* from the local granular overrides pref or WebCompat. Otherwise, a value of
* Nothing() indicates no granular overrides are present for this channel.
*
* The RFPTarget defined in the RFPTargets.inc.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
const_MaybeRFPTarget GetOverriddenFingerprintingSettings();
/**
* Set the granular overrides of fingerprinting protections for the channel.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void SetOverriddenFingerprintingSettings(in RFPTarget aTargets);
/**
* True if the load was triggered by a meta refresh.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isMetaRefresh;
/**
* If forceInheritPrincipal is true, the data coming from the channel should
* inherit its principal, even when the data is loaded over http:// or another
* protocol that would normally use a URI-based principal.
*
* See the documentation for principalToInherit, which describes exactly what
* principal is inherited.
*
* This attribute will never be true when loadingSandboxed is true.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean forceInheritPrincipal;
/**
* If forceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner is true, the data coming from the
* channel should inherit the principal, even when the data is loaded over
* http:// or another protocol that would normally use a URI-based principal
* and even if the channel's .owner is not null. This last is the difference
* between forceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner and forceInheritPrincipal: the
* latter does _not_ overrule the .owner setting.
*
* See the documentation for principalToInherit, which describes exactly what
* principal is inherited.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean forceInheritPrincipalOverruleOwner;
/**
* If loadingSandboxed is true, the data coming from the channel is
* being loaded sandboxed, so it should have a nonce origin and
* hence should use a NullPrincipal.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean loadingSandboxed;
/**
* If aboutBlankInherits is true, then about:blank should inherit
* the principal.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean aboutBlankInherits;
/**
* If allowChrome is true, then use nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME
* when calling CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal().
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean allowChrome;
/**
* If disallowScript is true, then use nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT
* when calling CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal().
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean disallowScript;
%{C++
uint32_t CheckLoadURIFlags() {
uint32_t flags = nsIScriptSecurityManager::STANDARD;
if (GetAllowChrome()) {
flags |= nsIScriptSecurityManager::ALLOW_CHROME;
}
if (GetDisallowScript()) {
flags |= nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT;
}
return flags;
}
%}
/**
* Returns true if SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS is set.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean dontFollowRedirects;
/**
* Returns true if SEC_LOAD_ERROR_PAGE is set.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean loadErrorPage;
/**
* True if the load was initiated by a form request.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isFormSubmission;
/**
* True if the load will be a get request.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isGETRequest;
/**
* The external contentPolicyType of the channel, used for security checks
* like Mixed Content Blocking and Content Security Policy.
*
* Specifically, content policy types with _INTERNAL_ in their name will
* never get returned from this attribute.
*/
readonly attribute nsContentPolicyType externalContentPolicyType;
/**
* CSP uses this parameter to send or not CSP violation events.
* Default value: true.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean sendCSPViolationEvents;
%{ C++
inline ExtContentPolicyType GetExternalContentPolicyType()
{
nsContentPolicyType result;
mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetExternalContentPolicyType(&result);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
return static_cast<ExtContentPolicyType>(result);
}
%}
/**
* The internal contentPolicyType of the channel, used for constructing
* RequestContext values when creating a fetch event for an intercepted
* channel.
*
* This should not be used for the purposes of security checks, since
* the content policy implementations cannot be expected to deal with
* _INTERNAL_ values. Please use the contentPolicyType attribute above
* for that purpose.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(InternalContentPolicyType)]
nsContentPolicyType binaryInternalContentPolicyType();
readonly attribute nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType;
/**
* Returns true if document or any of the documents ancestors
* up to the toplevel document make use of the CSP directive
* 'block-all-mixed-content'.
*
* Warning: If the loadingDocument is null, then the
* blockAllMixedContent is false.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean blockAllMixedContent;
/**
* Returns true if document or any of the documents ancestors
* up to the toplevel document make use of the CSP directive
* 'upgrade-insecure-requests'.
*
* Warning: If the loadingDocument is null, then the
* upgradeInsecureRequests is false.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean upgradeInsecureRequests;
/**
* Returns true if the the page is https and the content is upgradable from http
* requires 'security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content' pref to be true.
* Currently this only upgrades display content but might be expanded to other loads.
* This is very similar in implementation to upgradeInsecureRequests but browser set.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean browserUpgradeInsecureRequests;
/**
* Returns true if the display content was or will get upgraded from http to https.
* Requires 'security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content' pref to be true.
* Flag is set purely to collect telemetry.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean browserDidUpgradeInsecureRequests;
/**
* Returns true if the the page is https and the content is upgradable from http
* requires 'security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content' pref to be false.
* See browserUpgradeInsecureRequests for more details, this only happens
* when *not* upgrading purely for telemetry.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean browserWouldUpgradeInsecureRequests;
/**
* If true, toplevel data: URI navigation is allowed
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean forceAllowDataURI;
/**
* If true, insecure redirects to a data: URI are allowed.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean allowInsecureRedirectToDataURI;
/**
* If true, the content policy security check is excluded from web requests.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean skipContentPolicyCheckForWebRequest;
/**
* If true, this is the load of a frame's original src attribute
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean originalFrameSrcLoad;
/**
* The SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL flag may be dropped when a load info
* object is created. Specifically, it will be dropped if the SANDBOXED_ORIGIN
* sandbox flag is also present. This flag is set if SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL
* was dropped.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean forceInheritPrincipalDropped;
/**
* This is the inner window ID of the window in which the element being
* loaded lives.
*
* Note that this window ID can be 0 if the window is not
* available.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long innerWindowID;
/**
* The BrowsingContext performing the load for this nsILoadInfo object.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long browsingContextID;
[infallible] readonly attribute BrowsingContext browsingContext;
/**
* The BrowsingContext which the worker is associated.
*
* Note that this could be 0 if the load is not triggered in a WorkerScope.
* This value is only set and used in the parent process for some sitautions
* the channel is created in the parent process for Workers. Such as fetch().
* In content process, it is always 0.
* This value would not be propagated through IPC.
*/
[infallible] attribute unsigned long long workerAssociatedBrowsingContextID;
[infallible] readonly attribute BrowsingContext workerAssociatedBrowsingContext;
/**
* Only when the element being loaded is <frame src="foo.html">
* (or, more generally, if the element QIs to nsFrameLoaderOwner),
* the frameBrowsingContext is the browsing context containing the
* foo.html document.
*
* Note: For other cases, frameBrowsingContextID is 0.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long frameBrowsingContextID;
[infallible] readonly attribute BrowsingContext frameBrowsingContext;
/**
* If the element being loaded is a nsFrameLoaderOwner,
* `targetBrowsingContext` is the Browsing Context which will contain the
* loading document (see `frameBrowsingContext`). Otherwise, it is the
* Browsing Context performing the load (see `browsingContext`).
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute unsigned long long targetBrowsingContextID;
[infallible] readonly attribute BrowsingContext targetBrowsingContext;
/**
* Resets the PrincipalToInherit to a freshly created NullPrincipal
* which inherits the origin attributes from the loadInfo.
*
* WARNING: Please only use that function if you know exactly what
* you are doing!!!
*/
void resetPrincipalToInheritToNullPrincipal();
/**
* Customized OriginAttributes within LoadInfo to allow overwriting of the
* default originAttributes from the loadingPrincipal.
*
* In chrome side, originAttributes.privateBrowsingId will always be 0 even if
* the usePrivateBrowsing is true, because chrome docshell won't set
* privateBrowsingId on origin attributes (See bug 1278664). This is to make
* sure nsILoadInfo and nsILoadContext have the same origin attributes.
*/
[implicit_jscontext, binaryname(ScriptableOriginAttributes)]
attribute jsval originAttributes;
[noscript, nostdcall, binaryname(GetOriginAttributes)]
OriginAttributes binaryGetOriginAttributes();
[noscript, nostdcall, binaryname(SetOriginAttributes)]
void binarySetOriginAttributes(in const_OriginAttributesRef aOriginAttrs);
%{ C++
inline mozilla::OriginAttributes GetOriginAttributes()
{
mozilla::OriginAttributes result;
mozilla::DebugOnly<nsresult> rv = GetOriginAttributes(&result);
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
return result;
}
%}
/**
* Whenever a channel is evaluated by the ContentSecurityManager
* the first time, we set this flag to true to indicate that
* subsequent calls of AsyncOpen() do not have to enforce all
* security checks again. E.g., after a redirect there is no
* need to set up CORS again. We need this separate flag
* because the redirectChain might also contain internal
* redirects which might pollute the redirectChain so we can't
* rely on the size of the redirectChain-array to query whether
* a channel got redirected or not.
*
* Please note, once the flag is set to true it must remain true
* throughout the lifetime of the channel. Trying to set it
* to anything else than true will be discarded.
*
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean initialSecurityCheckDone;
/**
* Returns true if the load was triggered from an external application
* (e.g. Thunderbird). Please note that this flag will only ever be true
* if the load is of TYPE_DOCUMENT.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean loadTriggeredFromExternal;
/**
* True if the tainting has been set by the service worker.
*/
[noscript, infallible] readonly attribute boolean serviceWorkerTaintingSynthesized;
/**
* Whenever a channel gets redirected, append the redirect history entry of
* the channel which contains principal referrer and remote address [before
* the channels got redirected] to the loadinfo, so that at every point this
* array provides us information about all the redirects this channel went
* through.
* @param channelToDeriveFrom the channel being redirected
* @param aIsInternalRedirect should be true if the channel is going
* through an internal redirect, otherwise false.
*/
void appendRedirectHistoryEntry(in nsIChannel channelToDeriveFrom,
in boolean isInternalRedirect);
/**
* An array of nsIRedirectHistoryEntry which stores redirects associated
* with this channel. This array is filled whether or not the channel has
* ever been opened. The last element of the array is associated with the
* most recent redirect. Please note, that this array *includes* internal
* redirects.
*/
[implicit_jscontext]
readonly attribute jsval redirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects;
/**
* A C++-friendly version of redirectChain.
* Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the
* loadInfo object - use with caution!
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(RedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects)]
nsIRedirectHistoryEntryArray binaryRedirectChainIncludingInternalRedirects();
/**
* Same as RedirectChain but does *not* include internal redirects.
*/
[implicit_jscontext]
readonly attribute jsval redirectChain;
/**
* A C++-friendly version of redirectChain.
* Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the
* loadInfo object - use with caution!
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(RedirectChain)]
nsIRedirectHistoryEntryArray binaryRedirectChain();
/**
* This array is only filled out when we are in the parent process and we are
* creating a loadInfo object or deserializing LoadInfoArgs into LoadInfo,
* as we ever only need in the parent process.
*
* The array is meant to be a list of principals of the documents that the
* browsing context, corresponding to this loadInfo object, is "nested through" in
* the sense of
* <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#browsing-context-nested-through>.
* Note that the array does not include the principal corresponding to the frame
* loading this request. The closest ancestor is at index zero and the top level
* ancestor is at the last index.
*
* If this is a toplevel content browsing context (i.e. toplevel document in spec
* terms), the list is empty.
*
* Otherwise the array is a list for the document we're nested through (again in
* the spec sense), with the principal of that document prepended. The
* ancestorPrincipals[0] entry for an iframe load will be the principal of the
* iframe element's owner document. The ancestorPrincipals[0] entry for an image
* loaded in an iframe will be the principal of the iframe element's owner
* document. This matches the ordering specified for Location.ancestorOrigins.
*
* Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the loadInfo object - use
* with caution!
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall]
PrincipalArrayRef AncestorPrincipals();
/**
* An array of BrowsingContext IDs which correspond to nsILoadInfo::AncestorPrincipals
* above. AncestorBrowsingContextIDs[0] is the BrowsingContext ID of the frame
* associated with the principal at ancestorPrincipals[0], and so forth.
*
* Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the
* loadInfo object - use with caution!
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall]
Uint64ArrayRef AncestorBrowsingContextIDs();
/**
* Sets the list of unsafe headers according to CORS spec, as well as
* potentially forces a preflight.
* Note that you do not need to set the Content-Type header. That will be
* automatically detected as needed.
*
* Only call this function when using the SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT mode.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall]
void setCorsPreflightInfo(in CStringArrayRef unsafeHeaders,
in boolean forcePreflight);
/**
* A C++-friendly getter for the list of cors-unsafe headers.
* Please note that this array has the same lifetime as the
* loadInfo object - use with caution!
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(CorsUnsafeHeaders)]
CStringArrayRef corsUnsafeHeaders();
/**
* Returns value set through setCorsPreflightInfo.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean forcePreflight;
/**
* A C++ friendly getter for the forcePreflight flag.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean isPreflight;
/**
* Constants reflecting the channel tainting. These are mainly defined here
* for script. Internal C++ code should use the enum defined in LoadTainting.h.
* See LoadTainting.h for documentation.
*/
const unsigned long TAINTING_BASIC = 0;
const unsigned long TAINTING_CORS = 1;
const unsigned long TAINTING_OPAQUE = 2;
/**
* Determine the associated channel's current tainting. Note, this can
* change due to a service worker intercept, so it should be checked after
* OnStartRequest() fires.
*/
readonly attribute unsigned long tainting;
/**
* Note a new tainting level and possibly increase the current tainting
* to match. If the tainting level is already greater than the given
* value, then there is no effect. It is not possible to reduce the tainting
* level on an existing channel/loadinfo.
*/
void maybeIncreaseTainting(in unsigned long aTainting);
/**
* Various helper code to provide more convenient C++ access to the tainting
* attribute and maybeIncreaseTainting().
*/
%{C++
static_assert(TAINTING_BASIC == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::Basic),
"basic tainting enums should match");
static_assert(TAINTING_CORS == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::CORS),
"cors tainting enums should match");
static_assert(TAINTING_OPAQUE == static_cast<uint32_t>(mozilla::LoadTainting::Opaque),
"opaque tainting enums should match");
mozilla::LoadTainting GetTainting()
{
uint32_t tainting = TAINTING_BASIC;
MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(GetTainting(&tainting));
return static_cast<mozilla::LoadTainting>(tainting);
}
void MaybeIncreaseTainting(mozilla::LoadTainting aTainting)
{
uint32_t tainting = static_cast<uint32_t>(aTainting);
MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(MaybeIncreaseTainting(tainting));
}
%}
/**
* Returns true if this load is for top level document.
* Note that the load for a sub-frame's document will return false here.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean isTopLevelLoad;
/**
* If this is non-null, this property represents two things: (1) the
* URI to be used for the principal if the channel with this loadinfo
* gets a principal based on URI and (2) the URI to use for a document
* created from the channel with this loadinfo.
*/
attribute nsIURI resultPrincipalURI;
/**
* This is the URI used to create the most recent channel in the load's
* redirect chain, if it's different from channel's `originalURI`.
* This is always null for loads not handled by DocumentLoadListener. If
* non-null, channelCreationOriginalURI will be used instead of channel's
* originalURI to re-create the channel in the final content process selected
* to perform the load.
*/
attribute nsIURI channelCreationOriginalURI;
/**
* Returns a unique nsID used to construct the null principal for the
* resulting resource if the SANDBOXED_ORIGIN flag is set. This is used by
* GetChannelResultPrincipal() to ensure that the same null principal is
* returned every time.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
nsIDRef GetSandboxedNullPrincipalID();
/**
* Generates a new nsID to be returned by a future call to
* `GetSandboxedNullPrincipalID()`.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void ResetSandboxedNullPrincipalID();
/**
* Return the top-level principal, which is the principal of the top-level
* window.
*/
[notxpcom, nostdcall] readonly attribute nsIPrincipal topLevelPrincipal;
/**
* Note which client (i.e. global) initiated this network request. All
* nsGlobalWindow and WorkerPrivate can be converted to a ClientInfo to
* be set here. While this is being added to support service worker
* FetchEvent, it can also be used to communicate other information about
* the source global context in the future.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void SetClientInfo(in const_ClientInfoRef aClientInfo);
/**
* Get the ClientInfo for the global that initiated the network request,
* if it has been set.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
const_MaybeClientInfoRef GetClientInfo();
/**
* Give a pre-allocated ClientSource to the channel LoadInfo. This is
* intended to be used by docshell when loading windows without an
* initial about:blank document. The docshell will allocate the ClientSource
* to represent the client that will be created as a result of the navigation
* network request. If the channel succeeds and remains same-origin, then
* the result nsGlobalWindow will take ownership of the reserved ClientSource.
*
* This method is also called when a cross-origin redirect occurs. A new
* ClientSource with a different UUID must be created in this case.
*
* This method automatically calls SetReservedClientInfo() with the
* ClientSource::Info().
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void GiveReservedClientSource(in UniqueClientSourceMove aClientSource);
/**
* This method takes ownership of the reserved ClientSource previously
* provided in GiveReservedClientSource(). It may return nullptr if the
* nsILoadInfo does not own a ClientSource object.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
UniqueClientSource TakeReservedClientSource();
/**
* Note the reserved client that be created if this non-subresource
* network request succeeds. Depending on the type of client this
* may be called directly or indirectly via GiveReservedClientSource().
* For example, web workers do not call give their ClientSource to
* the nsILoadInfo, but must still call this method to indicate the
* reserved client for their main script load.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void SetReservedClientInfo(in const_ClientInfoRef aClientInfo);
/**
* This will clear any existing reserved or initial client and override
* it with the given reserved client. This is similar to calling
* TakeReservedClientSource() and then GiveReservedClientSource() with
* a new client as ClientChannelHelper does. This method is needed,
* though, to perform this operation in the parent process where
* the LoadInfo does not have direct access to a ClientSource.
*
* If in doubt, do not call this method. Its really only needed for
* a specific redirect case where the child has created a new client on
* redirect and we need to override the parent side's reserved client
* to match.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void OverrideReservedClientInfoInParent(in const_ClientInfoRef aClientInfo);
/**
* Return the reserved ClientInfo for this load, if one has been set.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
const_MaybeClientInfoRef GetReservedClientInfo();
/**
* Note that this non-subresource network request will result in
* re-using an existing "initial" active client. This mainly only
* happens when an initial about:blank document is replaced with
* a real load in a window. In these cases we need to track this
* initial client so that we may report its existence in a FetchEvent.
*
* Note, an nsILoadInfo may only have a reserved client or an
* initial client. It should never have both.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void SetInitialClientInfo(in const_ClientInfoRef aClientInfo);
/**
* Return the initial ClientInfo for this load, if one has been set.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
const_MaybeClientInfoRef GetInitialClientInfo();
/**
* Note that this network request should be controlled by a service worker.
* For non-subresource requests this may be set during the load when
* the first service worker interception occurs. For subresource requests
* it may be set by the source client if its already controlled by a
* service worker.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void SetController(in const_ServiceWorkerDescriptorRef aServiceWorker);
/**
* Clear the service worker controller for this channel. This should only
* be used for window navigation redirects. By default we want to keep
* the controller in all other cases.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void ClearController();
/**
* Get the service worker controlling this network request, if one has
* been set.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
const_MaybeServiceWorkerDescriptorRef GetController();
/**
* Set a custom performance storage. This is meant to be executed only for
* workers. If a PerformanceStorage is not set, the loadingDocument->Window
* Performance object will be returned instead.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void SetPerformanceStorage(in PerformanceStoragePtr aPerformanceStorage);
/**
* Get the custom PerformanceStorage if set by SetPerformanceStorage.
* Otherwise the loadingDocument->Window Performance object will be returned
* instead if all the following conditions are met:
* - the triggeringPrincipal is the same as the loadingDocument's principal.
* - if the external content policy type is TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT then loading
* wasn't caused by processing the attributes of the browsing context
* container.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
PerformanceStoragePtr GetPerformanceStorage();
/**
* Returns the CSP (or Preload CSP for preloads) which should be enforced
* when fetching the resource this loadinfo belongs to.
*
* a) Non-navigations:
* For non-navigation loads, GetCsp() returns what the spec refers to as the
* "request's client's global object's CSP list". In practice, if this is the
* loadinfo of a subresource load (e.g an image load), then GetCsp() or
* GetPreloadCSP() returns the CSP of the document which embeds the image.
* The returned CSP includes any policy delivered through the HTTP header or
* also through the meta tag (modulo the difference for preloads, e.g. image
* preloads have to query GetPreloadCsp() because at the time of preloading
* we are not entirely sure if the Meta CSP will be applied to the document
* in the end or not). Please note that GetCSPToInherit() called on a
* loadinfo for any non-navigation always returns null.
*
* b) Navigations:
* * Top-level loads:
* For top-level loads (navigations) GetCsp() will return null, unless
* the navigation is started by a WebExtension, in which case it will
* return the CSP of the webextension, if any.
* If you need to query the CSP that potentially should apply to the
* new top-level load, you have to query GetCspToInherit(), which is
* the CSP of the request's client's global object, just like GetCsp()
* is for non-navigation requests.
*
* * Iframe-loads:
* For iframe-loads (navigations) GetCsp() will return the CSP of the
* parent document, unless the navigation is started by a WebExtension,
* in which case it will return the CSP of the webextension, if any.
*
* If you need to query the CSP that should potentially be inherited
* into the new document, you have to query GetCSPToInherit().
*
* TODO Bug 1557114:
* After evaluating what CSP to use for frame navigations we should
* update the above documentation to match the outcome of Bug 1557114.
*/
[notxpcom,nostdcall] CSPRef GetCsp();
[notxpcom,nostdcall] CSPRef GetPreloadCsp();
[notxpcom,nostdcall] CSPRef GetCspToInherit();
/**
* The possibly cross-origin container feature policy required to
* initialize the feature policy of a document load.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
MaybeFeaturePolicyInfo GetContainerFeaturePolicyInfo();
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void SetContainerFeaturePolicyInfo(in const_FeaturePolicyInfoRef aContainerFeaturePolicy);
/**
* The service worker and fetch specifications require returning the
* exact tainting level of the Response passed to FetchEvent.respondWith().
* This method allows us to override the tainting level in that case.
*
* NOTE: This should not be used outside of service worker code! Use
* nsILoadInfo::MaybeIncreaseTainting() instead.
*/
[noscript, nostdcall, notxpcom]
void SynthesizeServiceWorkerTainting(in LoadTainting aTainting);
/**
* The top-level document has been user-interacted.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean documentHasUserInteracted;
/**
* During a top-level document channel redirect from tracking to
* non-tracking resources, our anti-tracking heuristic, grants the storage
* access permission for a short amount of seconds (See
* privacy.restrict3rdpartystorage.expiration_redirect pref).
* We use this flag to remember this decision even if this channel is part
* of a chain of redirects.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean allowListFutureDocumentsCreatedFromThisRedirectChain;
/**
* Indicates that we need to check if we should apply the anti-tracking
* heuristic after the channel has been classified.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean needForCheckingAntiTrackingHeuristic;
/**
* A snapshot of the nonce at load start time which is used for CSP
* checks and only set for:
* * TYPE_SCRIPT and
* * TYPE_STYLESHEET
*/
attribute AString cspNonce;
// Subresource Integrity (SRI) metadata.
attribute AString integrityMetadata;
/**
* List of possible reasons the request associated with this load info
* may have been blocked, set by various content blocking checkers.
*/
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_NONE = 0;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSDISABLED = 1001;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSDIDNOTSUCCEED = 1002;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSREQUESTNOTHTTP = 1003;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMULTIPLEALLOWORIGINNOTALLOWED = 1004;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMISSINGALLOWORIGIN = 1005;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSNOTSUPPORTINGCREDENTIALS = 1006;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSALLOWORIGINNOTMATCHINGORIGIN = 1007;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMISSINGALLOWCREDENTIALS = 1008;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSORIGINHEADERNOTADDED = 1009;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSEXTERNALREDIRECTNOTALLOWED = 1010;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSPREFLIGHTDIDNOTSUCCEED = 1011;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSINVALIDALLOWMETHOD = 1012;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMETHODNOTFOUND = 1013;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSINVALIDALLOWHEADER = 1014;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CORSMISSINGALLOWHEADERFROMPREFLIGHT = 1015;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_MALWARE_URI = 2001;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_PHISHING_URI = 2002;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_UNWANTED_URI = 2003;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_TRACKING_URI = 2004;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_BLOCKED_URI = 2005;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_HARMFUL_URI = 2006;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_CRYPTOMINING_URI = 2007;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_FINGERPRINTING_URI = 2008;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_SOCIALTRACKING_URI = 2009;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CLASSIFY_EMAILTRACKING_URI = 2010;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_MIXED_BLOCKED = 3001;
// The general reason comes from nsCSPContext::permitsInternal(),
// which is way too generic to distinguish an exact reason.
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_GENERAL = 4000;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_NO_DATA_PROTOCOL = 4001;
// removed 4002
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_CONTENT_BLOCKED = 4003;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_DATA_DOCUMENT = 4004;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_WEB_BROWSER = 4005;
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_PRELOAD = 4006;
// The reason used when SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_* is set and not satisifed.
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_NOT_SAME_ORIGIN = 5000;
// The reason used when an extension cancels the request via the WebRequest api.
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_EXTENSION_WEBREQUEST = 6000;
// The reason used when a request is cancelled via WebDriver BiDi network interception.
const uint32_t BLOCKING_REASON_WEBDRIVER_BIDI = 7000;
/**
* If the request associated with this load info was blocked by some of
* our content or load blockers, the reason can be found here.
* Note that setting this attribute has NO EFFECT on blocking the request.
* This attribute is only informative!
*
* By default the value is '0' - NONE.
* Each write rewrites the last value.
* Can be accessed only on a single thread.
*/
[infallible] attribute unsigned long requestBlockingReason;
/**
* The object in charged to receive CSP violation events. It can be null.
* This attribute will be merged into the CSP object eventually.
* See bug 1500908.
*/
attribute nsICSPEventListener cspEventListener;
/**
* This attribute will be true if this is a load triggered by
* https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/iframe-embed-object.html#process-the-iframe-attributes
* or https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/obsolete.html#process-the-frame-attributes
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean isFromProcessingFrameAttributes;
cenum CrossOriginOpenerPolicy : 8 {
OPENER_POLICY_UNSAFE_NONE = 0,
OPENER_POLICY_SAME_ORIGIN = 1,
OPENER_POLICY_SAME_ORIGIN_ALLOW_POPUPS = 2,
OPENER_POLICY_EMBEDDER_POLICY_REQUIRE_CORP_FLAG = 0x10,
OPENER_POLICY_SAME_ORIGIN_EMBEDDER_POLICY_REQUIRE_CORP =
OPENER_POLICY_SAME_ORIGIN |
OPENER_POLICY_EMBEDDER_POLICY_REQUIRE_CORP_FLAG
};
cenum CrossOriginEmbedderPolicy : 8 {
EMBEDDER_POLICY_NULL = 0,
EMBEDDER_POLICY_REQUIRE_CORP = 1,
EMBEDDER_POLICY_CREDENTIALLESS = 2,
};
/**
* This attribute is the loading context's cross origin embedder policy.
* The value is initialized with corresponding WindowContext which get by
* innerWindowIID in the nsILoadInfo.
* It also could be set by workers when fetch is called under
* the workers' scope.
*/
[infallible] attribute nsILoadInfo_CrossOriginEmbedderPolicy
loadingEmbedderPolicy;
/**
* This attribute will be true if the top level document has COEP:
* credentialless enabled in Origin Trial.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isOriginTrialCoepCredentiallessEnabledForTopLevel;
/**
* This attribute will be true if this is a load triggered by a media
* element.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isMediaRequest;
/**
* This attribute will be true if this is a load triggered by a media
* element and it's an initial request.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isMediaInitialRequest;
/**
* This attribute will be true if the fetch request is from object or embed
* elements
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isFromObjectOrEmbed;
/**
* This attribute will be true if the URL is known to be possibly broken and
* CheckForBrokenChromeURL and RecordZeroLengthEvent should be skipped.
*/
[infallible] readonly attribute boolean shouldSkipCheckForBrokenURLOrZeroSized;
/**
* If this is non-null, this property holds the URI as it was before query
* stripping was performed.
*/
attribute nsIURI unstrippedURI;
/**
* Propagated information from InterceptedHttpChannel
* It should be null when the channel is not created from FetchEvent.request
* or ServiceWorker NavigationPreload.
* nsIFetchEventInfo is C++ only, so it is not an attribute.
*/
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(InterceptionInfo)]
nsIInterceptionInfo binaryInterceptionInfo();
[noscript, notxpcom, nostdcall, binaryname(SetInterceptionInfo)]
void binarySetInterceptionInfo(in nsIInterceptionInfo info);
/**
* Whether nsICookieInjector has injected a cookie for this request to
* handle a cookie banner. This is only done for top-level requests.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean hasInjectedCookieForCookieBannerHandling;
/**
* Whether the load has gone through the URL bar, where the fixup had to add * the protocol scheme.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean wasSchemelessInput;
cenum HTTPSUpgradeTelemetryType : 32 {
NOT_INITIALIZED = 0,
NO_UPGRADE = (1 << 0),
ALREADY_HTTPS = (1 << 1),
HSTS = (1 << 2),
HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADE = (1 << 3),
HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADE_DOWNGRADE = (1 << 4),
HTTPS_FIRST_UPGRADE = (1 << 5),
HTTPS_FIRST_UPGRADE_DOWNGRADE = (1 << 6),
HTTPS_FIRST_SCHEMELESS_UPGRADE = (1 << 7),
HTTPS_FIRST_SCHEMELESS_UPGRADE_DOWNGRADE = (1 << 8),
CSP_UIR = (1 << 9),
HTTPS_RR = (1 << 10),
WEB_EXTENSION_UPGRADE = (1 << 11),
UPGRADE_EXCEPTION = (1 << 12),
SKIP_HTTPS_UPGRADE = (1 << 13),
};
/**
* Solely for the use of collecting Telemetry for HTTPS upgrades.
*/
[infallible] attribute nsILoadInfo_HTTPSUpgradeTelemetryType httpsUpgradeTelemetry;
/**
* Is this the first load in a new pop-up window/tab?
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean isNewWindowTarget;
/**
* When true, this load will never be upgraded to HTTPS.
*/
[infallible] attribute boolean skipHTTPSUpgrade;
};
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