зеркало из https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev.git
139 строки
4.3 KiB
C++
139 строки
4.3 KiB
C++
/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
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/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#ifndef TrustOverrides_h
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#define TrustOverrides_h
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#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
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#include "nsNSSCertValidity.h"
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#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
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using namespace mozilla;
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struct DataAndLength {
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const uint8_t* data;
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uint32_t len;
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};
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template<size_t T>
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static bool
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CertDNIsInList(const CERTCertificate* aCert, const DataAndLength (&aDnList)[T])
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(aCert);
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if (!aCert) {
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return false;
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}
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for (auto& dn: aDnList) {
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if (aCert->derSubject.len == dn.len &&
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mozilla::ArrayEqual(aCert->derSubject.data, dn.data, dn.len)) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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template<size_t T>
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static bool
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CertSPKIIsInList(const CERTCertificate* aCert, const DataAndLength (&aSpkiList)[T])
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{
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MOZ_ASSERT(aCert);
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if (!aCert) {
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return false;
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}
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for (auto& spki: aSpkiList) {
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if (aCert->derPublicKey.len == spki.len &&
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mozilla::ArrayEqual(aCert->derPublicKey.data, spki.data, spki.len)) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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template<size_t T, size_t R>
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static bool
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CertMatchesStaticData(const CERTCertificate* cert,
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const unsigned char (&subject)[T],
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const unsigned char (&spki)[R]) {
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MOZ_ASSERT(cert);
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if (!cert) {
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return false;
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}
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return cert->derSubject.len == T &&
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mozilla::ArrayEqual(cert->derSubject.data, subject, T) &&
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cert->derPublicKey.len == R &&
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mozilla::ArrayEqual(cert->derPublicKey.data, spki, R);
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}
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// Implements the graduated Symantec distrust algorithm from Bug 1409257.
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// This accepts a pre-segmented certificate chain (e.g. SegmentCertificateChain)
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// as |intCerts| and |eeCert|, and pre-assumes that the root has been identified
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// as being affected (this is to avoid duplicate Segment operations in the
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// NSSCertDBTrustDomain). If |permitAfterDate| is non-zero, this algorithm
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// returns "not distrusted" if the NotBefore date of |eeCert| is after
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// the |permitAfterDate|. Then each of the |intCerts| is evaluated against a
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// |whitelist| of SPKI entries, and if a match is found, then this returns
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// "not distrusted." Otherwise, due to the precondition holding, the chain is
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// "distrusted."
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template<size_t T>
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static nsresult
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CheckForSymantecDistrust(const nsCOMPtr<nsIX509CertList>& intCerts,
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const nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert>& eeCert,
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const PRTime& permitAfterDate,
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const DataAndLength (&whitelist)[T],
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/* out */ bool& isDistrusted)
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{
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// PRECONDITION: The rootCert is already verified as being one of the
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// affected Symantec roots
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// Check the preference to see if this is enabled before proceeding.
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// TODO in Bug 1437754
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isDistrusted = true;
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// Only check the validity period if we're asked
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if (permitAfterDate > 0) {
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// We need to verify the age of the end entity
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nsCOMPtr<nsIX509CertValidity> validity;
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nsresult rv = eeCert->GetValidity(getter_AddRefs(validity));
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return rv;
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}
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PRTime notBefore;
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rv = validity->GetNotBefore(¬Before);
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if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
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return rv;
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}
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// If the end entity's notBefore date is after the permitAfter date, this
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// algorithm doesn't apply, so exit false before we do any iterating.
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if (notBefore >= permitAfterDate) {
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isDistrusted = false;
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return NS_OK;
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}
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}
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// Look for one of the intermediates to be in the whitelist
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RefPtr<nsNSSCertList> intCertList = intCerts->GetCertList();
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return intCertList->ForEachCertificateInChain(
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[&isDistrusted, &whitelist] (nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> aCert, bool aHasMore,
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/* out */ bool& aContinue) {
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// We need an owning handle when calling nsIX509Cert::GetCert().
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UniqueCERTCertificate nssCert(aCert->GetCert());
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if (CertSPKIIsInList(nssCert.get(), whitelist)) {
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// In the whitelist
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isDistrusted = false;
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aContinue = false;
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}
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return NS_OK;
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});
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}
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#endif // TrustOverrides_h
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